Participation

Young people, extremism, and radicalisation: a European survey

Deliverable D2.2

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Summary of the Project

The overarching objective of **PARTICIPATION** is to identify future perspectives and trends of polarisation, extremism and radicalisation as well as the social composition of the group at risk in Europe by a participatory and provisional methodological strategy, that permits to co-create with social actors, stakeholders and policy-makers effective strategies for prevention. So, the specific objectives of **PARTICIPATION** are:

1. **Multidimensional modeling to understand current and future trends of extremism, polarisation and radicalisation**: to develop a holistic multidimensional model based on participatory fieldwork and mixed-method approaches, in order to better understand the different drivers of violent radical ideologies, how these are organized in different pathways and, complementary to that, which mechanisms, factors and strategies contribute to support non-radical attitudes and behaviours, nowadays and in the future.

Sub-objective (a): targets: analysing and discussing, using a strategy based on the principles of action research involving young people in different parts of Europe, the socio-psychological mechanisms, such as social marginalization, alienation and polarization, that lead to radicalisation, with a special focus on gender, sexuality and regional differences.

These objectives will be achieved by milestones M2 ("requirement of analysis and methodologies") [month 6], and by M6 ("Models on radicalisation and extremism") [month 35].

2. **Communication dynamics**: to develop an analysis of extremism, polarisation and radicalisation on-line dynamics by ICT tools (as semantic analysis) and to co-create with the involvement of civil society strategies to contrast and preventing these phenomena. This goal will be achieved by milestone M3 ("Communication analysis") [month 9] and D.4.5. ("Analysing different communication strategies against extremism and radicalisation") [month 25], D.4.6. ("Projecting counter-narrative campaigns involving young people") [month 33], D.4.7 ("Methodological tools for evaluating counter-narrative campaigns and validation") [month 35].

3. **Co-creation:** field-work to analyse and to generate with the involvement of the social actors in different social spheres, strategies of contrasting polarisation, extremism and radicalisation. Thus, the research processes supporting the achievement of the following sub-objectives:

Sub-objective (b): Resilience: developing communicative tools, education approaches and community-based strategies, with the involvement and cooperation of practitioners, stakeholders and young people (with particular attention to gender balance), in order to improve the resilience of the communities and people at risk.

Sub-objective (c): Empowerment: to improve the awareness of young people and communities as well as the society at a whole, toward the risks of extremism, hate discourses and radical ideologies, contrasting the processes of marginalization, self-marginalization and alienation of ethnic, religious, gender and sexualities minorities.

4. **Tools:** to develop methodologies and policies recommendations for improving the action of policy-makers also on the basis of the previous field-work.

Sub-objective (d): Methodologies for supporting decision-makers: to realize databases and a systematic set of indexes and early-warnings, based on previous holistic multidimensional model and fieldworks as

well as a testing phase on its practical usability involving decision-makers, in order to support them in decisions, improving effectiveness and social acceptability.

Sub-objective (e): Policies recommendations: developing a set of policies recommendations with the participation of stakeholders, policy-makers and targets, in order to optimize strategies and interventions against extremism, hate cultures and radicalisation, at micro, meso and macro-level of the governance process.

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Acronym	Description
MS	Mean Score
PCA	Principal Component Analysis
VE	Violent Extremism

Executive summary

This deliverable is a report of a survey undertaken with young people in schools in six European countries: Belgium, Greece, Italy, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom. The survey explores attitudes towards, and encounters with, extremism and radicalisation in the lives of young people. It also aims at identifying factors and experiences associated with resilience towards extremism. It addresses forms of social polarisation associated with pathways to extremism, examining a wide range of socio-demographic factors, as well as other themes that have emerged as important in earlier research actions undertaken within the PARTICIPATION project. These themes include encounters with hate speech, conspiracy theories, social and cultural diversity, and the impact of online experiences and cultures.

Completion of this survey was delayed as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, with schools naturally prioritising student safety. Data collection took place over five months from November 2021 to March 2022, with a total of 1,243 students participating. Involving 68 questions, the survey has generated a significant data set about the lives of young people in Europe and their experiences with different expressions of extremism and radicalisation. Consistent with European Union research policy, the data generated through this survey is 'Open Data', and will be made available to researchers who wish to explore the data and construct new questions and analyses.

This Deliverable constructs a Violent Extremism Index as an indicator of the support for violence as a means to achieve social change. This Index is of a limited nature, and cannot be interpreted as an indicator of support for terrorism. Based on existing and widely used survey questions, it offers an insight into openness to violence, including violence against people, as a means to achieve change. The data below highlights important factors associated with a higher than average 'score' on this index, and then undertakes regression analyses to understand the importance of these factors within different models of extremism. This analysis highlights the relative importance of the experience of very young people (15-16 years of age) in terms of openness to violence and the significance of opposition to gender equality. Particular forms of online experience are associated with openness to violence, notably justification of hate speech, circulating disinformation, and a passive engagement with online videos. However other forms of online experience are not. The survey also points to forms of subjective experience, or relationship to the self, as significant as well: a controlling or instrumental relationship to the self appears as a significant factor of openness to violence, even when located within complex models, while experiences of 'responsibility' for the self are associated with dimensions of resilience. These are important insights that have not been identified by previous research, and they offer significant implications not only for our understanding of pathways towards extremism, but also resilience towards this. Over coming months more detailed data analysis, addressing both conceptual issues and national comparisons, is scheduled to follow the overview of data that this report details.

1 Introduction

The Horizon 2020 Participation Student-Youth Survey plays a key role in Work Package Two. This Work Package aims at providing an updated understanding of pathways and trends constituting radicalisation and violent extremism in Europe. Within this wider aim, WP2 has a particular focus on young people and gender, and this survey sets out to generate quantitative data to capture and explore these transformations. The particular focus of this survey is young people who are at high school or college, so the survey was administered with the cooperation of educational institutions in the countries concerned. This was during a period strongly impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic, where schools' principal focus was to maintain the health and safety of their students. Ensuring that the survey could be discussed with teachers and students, and then administered in a way that was consistent with COVID protocols, meant considerable delay beyond the dates initially projected for the survey. It is important to underline that this survey would not have been possible without the support and assistance of school leaders and teachers, as well as the generosity of the students who gave of their time to respond to the questions posed. While research such as this always depends upon the generosity and cooperation of many partners, this has been the case particularly during the period of COVID-19, and we wish to highlight this at the very beginning of this report.

The survey aims to capture attitudes towards extremism and radicalisation as well as attitudes towards cultural diversity, gender equality and conspiracy theories[1]. It also addresses young people's use of social media and their online engagement, themes that emerged as central to the focus group research that was carried out prior to this survey. In order to consider the possible impact of forms of social polarisation on pathways to radicalisation and extremism, basic socio-demographic variables have also been collected such as age, gender, ethnicity, religion as well as father's and mother's highest education level and subjective household income. In addition to that the survey collected information on neighbourhood attachment, engagement in individual or group sports activities, activities in free time, online and off-line experience of hate crimes, psychological wellbeing, and political orientation and activism. All these variables are discussed in the literature widely as co-founding factors to vulnerability to extremism.

The questions were largely adapted from existing established surveys which have already been tested, such as the psychological well-being questions or the socio-demographic questions such as the European Social Survey (ESS), the World Values Survey (WVS), the NatCen Youth in Europe Survey 2014, Ipsos Mori Youth Social Action in the UK 2016, the Delaware School Climate Survey 2014-2015, the YouGov 2016 Survey on Masculinity, Young People's Social Attitudes Survey 2003, SELMA Hacking Hate (Social and Emotional Learning for Mutual Awareness) (https://hackinghate.eu) and their Survey on online hate speech for young people. The attitudinal questions on cultural diversity and gender equality to measure misogyny and anti-immigration or anti-Islam sentiments are partly based on existing survey questions such as the ESS but have been modified and new questions developed based on ethnographic case

[1] Jolley D, Douglas KM, Skipper Y, Thomas E, Cookson D. Measuring adolescents' beliefs in conspiracy theories: Development and validation of the Adolescent Conspiracy Beliefs Questionnaire (ACBQ). Br J Dev Psychol. 2021 Sep;39(3):499-520. doi: 10.1111/bjdp.12368. Epub 2021 Feb 8. PMID: 33556990.

studies from the Horizon 2020 DARE project, underlining the importance of building on previous H2020 research.

The questions were translated by the research partners into their national languages and checked again by a second person. In Romania the survey was translated into Hungarian in addition to Romanian, and in Belgium the survey was translated into Flemish and French. The other languages in which the survey was translated were Greek, Italian and Polish.

The survey was piloted among the target group in each country in September 2021 and adjustments made to the survey based on the feedback. The survey was ready to be rolled out at schools in November after receiving ethical clearance from the Ethics committee at Middlesex University London.

The Middlesex partner, who led this task, prepared a debriefing for students (see Appendix 1) which the partners adapted in their own national languages and this document was given to the schools and students prior to carrying out the survey. The survey was designed using the software Qualtrics and students were given an anonymous link to complete the survey.[2] The survey was administered online and was a self-completion questionnaire. In some cases, researchers went to the schools to introduce the survey to the students and be available for them until they have completed the survey on their own (i.e. UK, Romania, Greece) and in other cases the schools were not able to allow researchers to come into school premises due to COVID restrictions. In these cases, the students were given the link to the survey by their teachers with instructions from the researchers to complete it in class.

Data collection lasted for five months from November 2021 to March 2022. The surveys were carried out in large cities: Wroclaw (Poland), Manchester (UK), Athens (Greece), Rome (Italy), Antwerp and Brussels (Belgium), Bucharest (Romania). In each country access to at least two high schools/colleges were secured for the survey. The target sample size for each country was set as 200 and the finale sample size varied between 158 in Romania to 249 in Italy with a total sample size of 1,243. Due to the pandemic access to the schools has been delayed which had a knock-on effect on finishing Task 2.2 on time and a staff member being off-sick for 3 months caused a delay of 7 months.

[2] To view the online survey see: https://mdxl.eu.qualtrics.com/jfe/form/SV_3VnISqmw04H8l3o

2 Data and Descriptive Statistics

In this section the results of the survey will be presented and discussed. The survey asked a total of 68 questions which means the data has many variables that needed to be explored and presented in such a way that the reader can easily makes sense of it. Most of these descriptive results are presented in tables and graphs with percentages within country and gender rather than overall percentages, as the sample sizes varies between countries and no weights have been used to correct for that. Overall around 20 per cent of the data had missing values for at least one variable or several. No missing data was imputed and cases with missing values were not deleted. In the regression analysis, missing values were automatically dropped and in the cross-tabulations the total percentages calculated were based on those who have responded to both questions. This explains the changing number of total sample size which are reported for each cross-tabulation. Given the length of this report, we have focused on describing the key trends across countries and sometimes across gender, however, undoubtedly, the tables and graphs reveal much more than we were able to summarise. Given the volume of variables, after presenting how a variable is distributed and varies by country, we will also discuss briefly how they behave in a bivariate analysis, i.e. whether they have an effect on the dependent variable violent extremism in order to understand the relevance of this variable for our study. A bivariate regression analysis looks at the relationship between the dependent variable and one independent variable such as between violent extremism and gender. The statistics we will discuss in the bivariate analysis will be the p=values showing the significance level and the direction of the relationship, which in itself can be an interesting insight irrespective of whether this relationship is significant or not. In the second half of this section we will carry out multiple regression analysis and run several models where we will control for socio-demographic variables (country, age, ethnicity, religion, gender, and social-class indicators) and include only those variables which showed a significant relationship in the bivariate analysis by group of variables such as social isolation and conflict indicators, spare time activities, online experiences, political engagement and attitudes.

We will start with introducing how violent extremism was measured and how this was transformed into the Violent Extremism Index which constitutes the dependent variables. As we are combing the descriptive analysis with the bivariate analysis in this section, it's important to discuss the violent extremism variable first. Most of the analysis was carried out in Stata 17 with some data clearing initially carried out in SPSS. Graphs and tables were created using Excel.

2.1 Dependent variable: Violent extremism

The questions we use to measure attitudes towards using violence for political purposes were asked in Q13 of the survey. It is a measure taken from Nivette et al. (2017)[3] who use a modified version of the 2009/2010 UK Citizenship Survey[4] on attitudes toward violent extremism and ask respondents to indicate

[3] Nivette et al 2017. Developmental Predictors of Violent Extremist Attitudes: A Test of General Strain Theory. *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 2017, Vol. 54(6) 755-790.

[4] Department for Communities and Local Government and Ipsos MORI (2011) *Citizenship Survey 2009-2010.* (Available at >http://doc.ukdataservice.ac.uk/doc/7111/mrdoc/pdf/7111_technical_report.pdf< last accessed 21/05/2024.

how much they disagree or agree on a 6-point Likert scale with the following statements concerning "using violence for collective goals".

Operationalising violent extremism through the four broad items listed below highlights several issues. These four items encompass attitudes that endorse or justify violent acts for political, ideological, religious, social, or economic goals, risks being overly expansive. This broad scope may inadvertently capture a general propensity towards violence rather than specific extremist tendencies. The underlying models from which these items are driven assumes a gradual and stepwise progress from believes and attitudes to behaviour (Borum 2011[5]). Yet, as discussed in Nivette et. al. (2017) while many individuals may hold pro-extremist attitudes early on, only a few progress to actual extremist behaviours. Additionally, some violent extremists exhibit limited radical beliefs, and many supporters of violent strategies do not act on them (Simi et al., 2016)[6]. This discrepancy highlights the complexity of the relationship between beliefs and actions. The broadness of the definition of violent extremism measure adapted for this study may capture a general propensity for violence-condoning attitudes rather than specific extremist attitudes. Therefore, the Violent Extremism measure used in this study is to be interpreted with caution as its most likely capturing vulnerability to extremist violent pathways rather than violent extremism per se.

The Horizon 2020 PARTICIPATION Youth Survey data is now accessible to researchers via the Middlesex University research repository. This availability aims to ensure transparency and support further studies into the vulnerabilities of young people to violent extremism.[7] **Q 13: How much do you disagree or agree with the following statements?**

Q 13_1: It's sometimes necessary to use violence to fight against things that are very unjust.
Q 13_2: Sometimes people have to resort to violence to defend their values, convictions, or religious beliefs.
Q 13_3: It's OK to support groups that use violence to fight injustices.
Q 13_4: It's sometimes necessary to use violence, commit attacks, or kidnap people to fight for a better world.

Each item was treated as an individual continuous variable where a score of 1 means strongly disagree and a score of 6 means strongly agree.

Figure 1 shows the mean score of each violent extremist statement by country. The higher the scores, the more likely respondents agreed with these statements. Overall, the scores are very low indicating that most disagreed with these statements. However, the rate of disagreement was different for the different items and some variations were also observable between countries. The first statement VE1:" It's sometimes necessary to use violence to fight against things that are very unjust" yields higher rates of agreement compare to the last statement VE4: "It's sometimes necessary to use violence, commit attacks, or kidnap people to fight for a better world." Thus, the more extreme the statements justify violent

[5] Borum, Randy. 2011b. "Radicalization into Violent Extremism II: A Review of Conceptual Models and Empirical Research." *Journal of Strategic Security* 4: 37-62.

[6] Simi, Pete, Karyn Sporer, and Bryan F. Bubolz. 2016. "Narratives of Childhood Adversity and Adolescent Misconduct as Precursors to Violent Extremism: A Life-Course Criminological Approach." *Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency* 53:536-63.

[7] Acik, Necla (2024). Horizon 2020 PARTICIPATION Youth Survey.sav. Middlesex University. Dataset. https://doi.org/10.22023/mdx.25872154.v1

extremism, the lower the agreement on average on these items. In Greece and Poland however, this last statement has relatively high levels of approval.

Figure 1 Violent extremism items by country, mean scores



Measured on a 6-point Likert scale where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somehow disagree, 4= somehow agree, 5=agree, 6= strongly agree.

Figure 2 below shows the differences by gender. The graphs show that women have lower rates of agreement on all four violent extremism statements. Survey respondents who identified themselves as 'Other Gender' form a small sample (26 cases for non-binary, 17 trans people, 16 other). In some of the countries where this survey was undertaken there is considerable public controversy around the legitimacy of introducing 'other gender' as a category in public life, and it is not clear if some respondents who chose to identify themselves in this way may have done so with the intention of disrupting the survey. This is because the small number of respondents who identified themselves in this way demonstrate the highest rates of violent extremism approval. The interpretation of this has therefore to be undertaken with some caution. While we will not exclude this category other gender from the analysis, we will not focus on it as the results for this group do not possess the reliability necessary to draw confident conclusions.

Figure 2 Violent extremism items by gender, mean scores



Principal Component Analysis of Violent Extremism Items

To assess whether these items measure similar attitudes i.e. support of violent extremism, and whether they can be combined to create one variable, a Principal Component Analysis (PCA) was carried out. The variables have 6 responses options, which can be treated as a scale and they are therefore suitable for a PCA analysis. Principal Component Analysis is a statistical method that uses an orthogonal transformation transforming a set of variables into a set of principal components (PC). The purpose of the PCA is to reduce the dimensionality of the data by transforming them into a new data set where the first components contain most of the variation of the chosen data. A cut of point to determine how many components are essentially a good summary of all the items is to keep components with Eigenvalues over 1.

Running a PCA with all four items of violent extremism statement leads, as anticipated, to one dimension being extracted (total n= 1,085). All the items loaded very high on the first component, explaining 67.39% of the variation with Eigenvalues of 2.69. This component can be saved as a new variable which takes the form of a scale with higher values indicating greater agreement with violent extremism. In other words, the four items were reduced to one dimension only and this new scale will be the dependent variable Violent Extremism Index that will be used in bivariate and multivariate regression analysis throughout this study.[8]

[8] Due to time pressure the results of the PCA analysis were copied as picture from Stata outputs plane into this report..

Figure 3 Output: PCA of violent extremism

```
. pca Q13_1r Q13_2r Q13_3r Q13_4r

Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =      1,085
                                                  Number of comp.  =          4
                                                  Trace            =          4
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =     1.0000
```

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	2.6957	2.11376	0.6739	0.6739
Comp2	.581942	.214081	0.1455	0.8194
Comp3	.367861	.0133611	0.0920	0.9114
Comp4	.3545	.	0.0886	1.0000

```
Principal components (eigenvectors)
```

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Unexplained
Q13_1r	0.4964	-0.5344	0.5261	0.4373	0
Q13_2r	0.5160	-0.2425	-0.8156	0.0992	0
Q13_3r	0.5247	0.0340	0.2220	-0.8211	0
Q13_4r	0.4605	0.8090	0.0938	0.3531	0

Bivariate analysis of violent extremism and countries

To explore the effect of the country variable on Violent Extremism Index a bivariate analysis was run with dummy variables created for each country. The UK was taken as the base category, which means that the coefficients for the other countries are calculated in comparison to the UK and this explains.

Figure 4 below shows that compared to the UK, all other countries are significanlty less likely to agree on violent extremism.[9]This might be related to the specific composition of the sample in each country which varies in terms of religion, ethnicity, age and gender. We will explore this when we run multiple regression analyis later on to determine whether the differences between countries remain or disappear once other socio-demograhic variables are taking into account.

[9] The significance level, also known as alpha or α, is a measure of the strength of the evidence that must be present in the sample before the null hypothesis (that no relationship exists) is rejected and conclude that the effect is statistically significant. Common representation of significance is the letter *p* (for probability) and a number between 0 and 1. Typical values for significance levels are 0.1 (10%), 0.05 (5%), and 0.01 (1%). These values correspond to the probability of observing such an extreme value by chance, thus the lower the significance level the less likely that the relationship observed occurred by chance and the greater the likelihood that the conclusion is correct.

Figure 4 Output: Bivariate analysis of violent extremism with country

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) Country. Variables are coded 0 1.  UK base category
.
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  Italy Belgium Romania Poland Greece , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	181.537947	5	36.3075894	Number of obs	= 1,085
				F(5, 1079)	= 14.29
Residual	2740.59791	1,079	2.53994245	Prob > F	= 0.0000
				R-squared	= 0.0621
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0578
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	= 1.5937

Extremism~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Italy	-1.137181	.162274	-7.01	0.000	-.277653
Belgium	-.8455198	.1797783	-4.70	0.000	-.1747973
Romania	-1.134923	.1804679	-6.29	0.000	-.233239
Poland	-.3514569	.167692	-2.10	0.036	-.0812254
Greece	-.8049873	.16211	-4.97	0.000	-.1968815
_cons	.7129373	.1211683	5.88	0.000	.

2.2 Sociodemographic variables

In this section we present and discuss socio-demographic variables. The variables presented in this section give an overview of the socio-demographic composition of the countries, which in some cases differ considerably and it is important to keep these differences in mind when interpreting cross-tabulation and the results of bivariate analysis in this report. To control for these differences in a multiple regression analysis most of the variables will be used as control variables. For the bivariate analysis however, no control variables are used as we are primarily interested first what effect each independent variable has on the dependent variable.

Gender

Table 1 shows the crosstabulation of gender by country. Overall, 42% of the sample are men and 53% are women. About 5% of the respondents indicated their gender to be other. The "other gender" category includes 26 non-binary, 14 transgender men, 3 transgender women and 16 other categories (Table 2). Due to the small nature of this third gender category, they were all collapsed into the "Other" category and as will be evident in the analysis in this report further below, this group is very diverse in terms of their attitudes and political orientation. Most of the cross-tabs in the analysis in this report shows the differences within groups in percentages. Figures presented for the Other Gender category are therefore to be viewed with caution as this category is too small and too diverse to draw any reasonable conclusions from it. It was nevertheless important to include them in the analysis and to give young people the opportunities to express their gender identity and not limit it to 'man' and 'woman' only.

Table 1 Crosstab gender by country, percentages

Gender	Country						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Man	56.48%	34.14%	44.05%	34.18%	33.06%	52.36%	42.16%
Woman	40.41%	61.85%	50.60%	61.39%	59.09%	44.21%	53.10%
Other	3.11%	4.02%	5.36%	4.43%	7.85%	3.43%	4.75%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	193	249	168	158	242	233	1,243

Table 2 Crosstab detailed gender by country, frequency

Gender detailed	Country						
	UK	**Italy**	**Belgium**	**Romania**	**Poland**	**Greece**	**Total**
Male	109	85	74	54	80	122	524
Female	78	154	85	97	143	103	660
Non-binary	4	5	3	4	6	4	26
Transgender male	1	1	3	1	5	3	14
Transgender female	1	0	1	0	0	1	3
Other	0	4	2	2	8	0	16
Total	193	249	168	158	242	233	1,243

In the bivariate regression analysis with extremism as the dependent variable, gender appears as highly significant. Taking man as the base category, women were significantly less likely than men to agree with the Violent Extremism Index. There was no statistical difference between men and Other Gender in a bivariate analysis.

Figure 5 Output: Bivariate analysis with gender

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) gender. Variables are coded 0 1. Male base category.
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  female OtherGender , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
				Number of obs	= 1,085
				F(2, 1082)	= 22.17
Model	115.018284	2	57.5091422	Prob > F	= 0.0000
Residual	2807.11757	1,082	2.59437853	R-squared	= 0.0394
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0376
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	= 1.6107

Extremism~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
female	-.6025356	.100783	-5.98	0.000	-.182901
OtherGender	.3775802	.2518042	1.50	0.134	.045874
_cons	.3114308	.0758453	4.11	0.000	.

Age

As the survey was conducted in schools, the age groups ranged from 15-23 with age 18 being the most common age group (43.4% of the sample) and with age group 19-23 representing only 8.5% of the sample. The age distribution within countries varies considerably, with the UK, Belgium, Greece

representing younger cohorts and Italy, Romania and Poland representing older cohorts. This is related to both the age of consent required to participate in research projects (lower in the former countries and higher in the latter group) and variations in the age of children attending school.

Table 3 Crosstab age group by country

Age group	Country						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
15/16	50.26%	1.61%	53.57%	6.96%	3.72%	32.62%	23.09%
17	35.23%	10.44%	32.74%	34.18%	3.31%	42.92%	25.02%
18	10.36%	78.71%	10.71%	53.16%	73.97%	18.03%	43.36%
19-23	4.15%	9.24%	2.98%	5.70%	19.01%	6.44%	8.53%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	*193*	*249*	*168*	*158*	*242*	*233*	*1,243*

Figure 6 is a visualisation of the above table.

Figure 6 Age groups by country in percentages



In a bivariate analysis, taking age 15/16 as the base category, those who were age 17 and 18 were significantly less likely to agree with violent extremism statements, whereas there was no difference between the youngest age groups in the sample and the oldest. Given the unequal age distribution across countries, these differences might be due to differences between countries, which will be taking into account later on with more complex regression modelling with several explanatory variables. At this stage we report only the results of cross-tabulations and the bivariate analysis.

Figure 7 Output: Bivariate analysis with age groups

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) age group (base age 15/16).
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13   i.age , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	41.3608924	3	13.7869641	Number of obs	= 1,085
Residual	2880.77496	1,081	2.66491671	F(3, 1081)	= 5.17
				Prob > F	= 0.0015
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	R-squared	= 0.0142
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0114
				Root MSE	= 1.6325

Extremism~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
age					
17	-.2789174	.1405505	-1.98	0.047	-.0751304
18	-.4396928	.1281253	-3.43	0.001	-.1321271
19-23	.0664437	.2003583	0.33	0.740	.0111666
_cons	.2523576	.1026317	2.46	0.014	.

Ethnicity

Table 4 shows the ethnic composition of the sample across countries. Two thirds of the sample in Belgium are ethnic minorities (73.5%). In the UK just over half of the sample are ethnic minorities (52.6%). Countries with the least diverse composition are Romania, Italy and Poland where the autochthonous population is almost 90%. In Greece the proportion of ethnic minorities is 24.5% of which the majority are Albanians (detailed breakdown of ethnicities not shown in the tables here). Overall, about one third of the sample are of ethnic minority background (28.4%) and two third (71.6%) of the sample belong to the dominant ethnicity/nationality in each country.

Table 4 Crosstab ethnicity by country

Ethnicity	**Country**						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Autochthonous	47.37%	89.58%	26.52%	91.80%	89.16%	75.47%	71.62%
Ethnic minority	52.63%	10.42%	73.48%	8.20%	10.84%	24.53%	28.38%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	152	192	132	122	166	212	976

Note: This question was rephrased for each country, with follow up questions to determine whether they belonged to an ethnic group. The final ethnicity variable used in the analysis is composed of two categories, 0 for Autochthonous and 1 for Ethnic Minority.

In a bivariate regression anallysis of ethnicity (dummy variable where the autochthonous ethnic group takes the value of 0 and ethnic minority takes the value of 1) those who belong to ethnic minority are more likely the "native" or autochthonous groups to agree with the extremism items with a p value of 0.018.

Figure 8 Output: Bivariate analysis with ethnicity

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) Ethncity. Variable is coded 0 1
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13   EthnicMinority , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	15.0904966	1	15.0904966	Number of obs	= 1,085
Residual	2907.04536	1,083	2.68425241	F(1, 1083)	= 5.62
				Prob > F	= 0.0179
				R-squared	= 0.0052
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0042
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	= 1.6384

ExtremismIn~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
EthnicMinority	.2724393	.1149026	2.37	0.018	.0718624
_cons	-.068047	.0574248	-1.18	0.236	.

Religion

In each country respondents were asked the same question about religion and shown the same categories. Table 5 shows the recoded region variable by country, with No Religion, Christianity and Islam being the most common categories. The Other category included Hindu, Buddhism, Judaism and other, and were all collapsed into the Other Religion category due to their small numbers.

Table 5 Crosstab religion by country

Religion	**Country**						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
No religion	37.50%	39.06%	27.82%	13.11%	46.71%	17.37%	30.64%
Christianity	28.95%	54.17%	41.35%	81.97%	43.71%	72.77%	54.24%
Islam	29.61%	0.52%	24.81%		1.80%	3.29%	9.09%
Other	3.95%	6.25%	6.02%	4.92%	7.78%	6.57%	6.03%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	152	192	132	122	166	212	976

Overall one third of the sample indicated that they have no religion, with Poland representing the highest proportion among them and Romania the lowest. Those who identified as Christians were the highest in Romania (just over 80%) followed by Greece (just over 70%) and Italy (just over half of the sample). The countries with the highest Muslim proportion in the sample are UK (almost 30%) and Belgium (almost 25%). Romania, Italy and Poland have no or very small numbers of Muslims in the sample.

In the bivariate analysis, selecting Christians as the base category, Muslims, no religion and other appear to be more likely to hold extremist attitudes. However, given the uneven distribution of the religion variable across countries, this has to be viewed with caution and examined further in regression analysis with other co-variants.

Figure 9 Output: Bivariate analysis with religion

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) Religion. Variables are coded 0 1. Christian base category
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  NoReligion Muslim  ReligionOther , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,085
				F(3, 1081)	=	7.00
Model	55.6588905	3	18.5529635	Prob > F	=	0.0001
Residual	2866.47696	1,081	2.65169007	R-squared	=	0.0190
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0163
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	=	1.6284

ExtremismI~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
NoReligion	.3796821	.1147226	3.31	0.001	.1027192
Muslim	.5884232	.1850513	3.18	0.002	.0978844
ReligionOther	.557306	.2214837	2.52	0.012	.0770067
_cons	-.1805614	.0641182	-2.82	0.005	.

2.3 Indicators of social class

We attempted to capture social class through various questions. Students were asked about their living arrangements, their mother's and father's level of education, the employment status of the main earner in the household, the occupational group of the main earner and subjective household income. None of these variables on their own seemed to be reliable or strong indicators of socio-economic class. There were for example a large proportion of the sample who were not able to indicate the occupational group of the main earner in the household, which rendered this variable as not suitable for analysis. Other variables didn't have much variation between the categories and needed to be collapsed into two or three categories to have enough cases in each category.

Employment

Table 6 shows the distribution of the employment variable for example, where 75% of those who have responded to this question (956 cases) reported the main earner being in employment and 24.5% not being economically active. The lowest rate of employment was recorded for Belgium, Greece and the UK and the highest for Romania, Poland and Italy.

Table 6 Crosstab Employment activity of household main earner by country

Employment	**Country**						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
In employment	70.86%	80.32%	67.19%	84.03%	83.44%	68.60%	75.52%
Not economically employed	29.14%	19.68%	32.81%	15.97%	16.56%	31.40%	24.48%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	151	188	128	119	163	207	956

Bivariate analysis of violent extremism and employment shows that compared to those who are in employment, not being in employment is significant at the 1% level and is negatively related. That means that respondents who are from households where the main earner is not in paid employment are less

likely to support violent extremism compared to respondents who are from households where the main earner is in employment.

Figure 10 Output: Bivariate analysis of employment

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) Social class indicators, coded 0 1. In employmen
> t dummy (EmployedD),
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13   employedD , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,085
				F(1, 1083)	=	4.22
Model	11.3523355	1	11.3523355	Prob > F	=	0.0401
Residual	2910.78352	1,083	2.68770408	R-squared	=	0.0039
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0030
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	=	1.6394

Extremism~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
employedD	-.2157762	.1049909	-2.06	0.040	-.0623293
_cons	.1421936	.0852295	1.67	0.096	.

Education

The education variable was collapsed into three categories, those who had no education at all to those who completed secondary education were grouped as one category, those who did further education i.e. college or high school (depending on the country) remained the same group and those who went to university and above. Table 7 and 8 shows father's and mother's levels of education. Mother's level of education in general seems to be higher than father's level of education, however there are great variations between countries. In the UK and Greece, both mother's and father's level of education is around 20-30% while in Poland, Italy, Romania, and Belgium it varies around 50% with Poland at 70% for mother's higher education level.

Table 7 Crosstab of father's education by country

Father's education	**Country**						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
No Edu/Primary/ Secondary Edu.	45.53%	16.30%	35.14%	21.93%	38.67%	64.16%	37.31%
Further Edu. (College)	34.96%	33.15%	12.61%	29.82%	6.67%	12.14%	21.40%
Higher Edu. (Uni)	19.51%	50.54%	52.25%	48.25%	54.67%	23.70%	41.29%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	123	184	111	114	150	173	855

Table 8 Crosstab of mother's education by country

Mother's education	**Country**						
	UK	**Italy**	**Belgium**	**Romania**	**Poland**	**Greece**	**Total**
No Edu/Primary/ Secondary Edu.	32.26%	5.32%	35.34%	17.09%	26.00%	60.85%	29.98%
Further Edu. (College)	38.71%	41.49%	10.34%	32.48%	3.33%	9.52%	22.51%
Higher Edu. (Uni)	29.03%	53.19%	54.31%	50.43%	70.67%	29.63%	47.51%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	124	188	116	117	150	189	884

For analysis a new variable has been created (Parents' Higher Education) collapsing all those who indicated that either their father or mother had university level education, which resulted in 498 cases. Figure 11 shows the proportion of the total sample who fall within this category within country and within gender. Women are more likely to indicate that either or both of their parents have higher education levels (44.4%) compared to men (35.9%). Respondents from Italy and Poland, followed by Belgium and Romania have the highest level of parents with university or above education level, whereas the UK and Greece have the lowest level. Parents' education level can be used as a proxy for social class, along with the employment variable (Table 6).

Figure 11 Parent's level of university education by gender and country, percentages



A bivariate analysis with three education variables was carried out. The results show that having higher levels of education i.e. having a university degree as opposed to not having higher education levels, relates negatively to violent extremism and the relationship is more pronounced for father's level of higher education which is significant at 10%. The combined variable parents' higher levels of education show a stronger relationship with violent extremism and is significant at the 5% level. This variable will be used in further regression analysis as a control variable and indicator of social class.

Figure 12 Output: Bivariate analysis of education variables

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) Social class indicators, coded 0 1.  father's ed
> ucation Higher Eudcation (HE) dummy, Mother's education HE dummy, ParentsEducationHE: combined father
>  or/and mother's  education Higher Education dummy.
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13   FatherHigherEdu , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	8.66595252	1	8.66595252	Number of obs	= 844
Residual	2259.67264	842	2.68369672	F(1, 842)	= 3.23
				Prob > F	= 0.0727
Total	2268.33859	843	2.69079311	R-squared	= 0.0038
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0026
				Root MSE	= 1.6382

ExtremismInd~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
FatherHigherEdu	-.1144391	.0636844	-1.80	0.073	-.0618094
_cons	.1744988	.1415735	1.23	0.218	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  MotherHigherEud  , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	.865556815	1	.865556815	Number of obs	= 872
Residual	2353.64949	870	2.70534424	F(1, 870)	= 0.32
				Prob > F	= 0.5718
Total	2354.51505	871	2.70323197	R-squared	= 0.0004
				Adj R-squared	= -0.0008
				Root MSE	= 1.6448

ExtremismInd~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
MotherHigherEud	-.0630847	.1115289	-0.57	0.572	-.0191733
_cons	.0462581	.1737759	0.27	0.790	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  ParentsEducationHE , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	11.2615999	1	11.2615999	Number of obs	= 1,085
Residual	2910.87425	1,083	2.68778786	F(1, 1083)	= 4.19
				Prob > F	= 0.0409
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	R-squared	= 0.0039
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0029
				Root MSE	= 1.6394

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
ParentsEducationHE	-.2046826	.099995	-2.05	0.041	-.0620797
_cons	.092626	.0672673	1.38	0.169	.

Living arrangements/Single parents

Question on living arrangement can help to understand poverty and deprivation and be used as social class indicators. Most single parent households are female-led and they are often at-risk-of poverty.[10] Table 9 confirms this trend with around one fifth of respondents indicating that the live with their mothers only. On average only 3.3% live with their fathers only. Overall, two thirds of the respondents indicated that they live with both parents and this rate is the highest for Greece and Italy. This variable has been collapsed into two categories to look at the proportion of single parent household including those who live with a guardian, care home or in other living arrangements. Figure 13 shows the distribution of single parent household by gender and country. The graph shows that Italy has the

[10] Nieuwenhouis, R., I.Sokolska, F. Van Der Elst (2020) The situation of single parents in the EU. Study requested by the FEMM committee, European Parliament. 98pp.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2020/659870/IPOL_STU(2020)659870_EN.pdf

lowest proportion of single parent households and the UK has the highest proportion. Within gender, the most vulnerable group is Other Gender (43.9%) while the rates between female and male respondents are very similar.

Table 9 Crosstab of living arrangements by country

Living with?	Country						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Both parents	60.26%	74.48%	72.31%	71.07%	67.68%	75.24%	70.56%
Mother only	21.19%	19.79%	20.00%	18.18%	20.12%	17.14%	19.32%
Father only	3.97%	2.08%	2.31%	1.65%	3.66%	5.24%	3.31%
Guardian	4.64%	0.52%	0.77%	1.65%	0.61%	0.95%	1.45%
Care home	0.66%	0	0	0	1.22%	0.48%	0.41%
Other	9.27%	3.13%	4.62%	7.44%	6.71%	0.95%	4.96%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	151	192	130	121	164	210	968

Figure 13 Single parent households by country and gender, percentages



Note: Single parent category includes those in care, living with a guardian or other arrangements.

In a bivariate analysis being from a single parent household did not show a significant effect on violent extremism although the relationship is positive.

Figure 14 Output: Bivariate analysis with single parent HH

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) Social class indicators, coded 0 1. Single Paren
> t's HH
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  SingleParentHH , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	955
				F(1, 953)	=	0.14
Model	.362558613	1	.362558613	Prob > F	=	0.7116
Residual	2526.16916	953	2.65075463	R-squared	=	0.0001
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.0009
Total	2526.53172	954	2.6483561	Root MSE	=	1.6281

ExtremismIn~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
SingleParentHH	.0428016	.1157326	0.37	0.712	.0119792
_cons	-.0337489	.0626661	-0.54	0.590	.

Current HH subjective income

Another measure of current levels of poverty is subjective household financial difficulties. The question provided 4 answer categories from very difficult, difficult, coping to living comfortably. For an easier reading of the distribution the variable has been recoded into those who stated that they find it very difficult or difficult and into those who stated that they live comfortably with their current household (HH) income. The highest rate of current HH income satisfaction was in Italy, Romania and Poland with around 88-90% of the sample within these countries falling within that category, whereas this rate for Greece is relatively low with 39% (see table 10).

Table 10 Crosstab of household subjective income by country

HH subjective income	UK	Italy	Belgium	Romania	Poland	Greece	Total
Very difficult/ difficult	19.33%	9.63%	16.00%	10.92%	11.73%	60.95%	23.82%
Coping/living comfortably	80.67%	90.37%	84.00%	89.08%	88.27%	39.05%	76.18%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	*150*	*187*	*125*	*119*	*162*	*210*	*953*

Q68 And finally, which of the descriptions below comes closest to how you feel about your household's income nowadays? By household we mean your family or other relatives or carers who live with you and provide for you.

Exploring this variable further, Figure 15 shows the percentages of those who stated that they find their current household income very difficult or difficult to cope with by ethnic groups and within religious groups. Within ethnic groups, ethnic minorities have a higher proportion (33%) than autochthonous groups (20%). Within religious groups, Muslims have the highest proportion of perceived household income difficulties (29.3%) followed by other religion (28.8%) while those with no religion have the lowest rates (17.1%).

Figure 15 HH subjective income" difficult" responses by ethnicity and religion in percentage



For regression analysis the original variable with the four categories was used as a continuous variable with four ordered categories, which allows us to use it as scale. In a bivariate analysis the direction of this variable was negative and significant on the 10% level, meaning that the higher levels of satisfaction with current HH income, the less likely they are to agree on violent extremism. In other words, HH subjective income showed to have an effect on extremism.

Figure 16 Output: Bivariate analysis with HH subjective income

```
. **HH subjective income var continious: 1=finding it very difficult on current income, 4= Living comfo
> rtably on present income
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  HHsubjectiveIncome  , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	944
				F(1, 942)	=	3.14
Model	8.32952425	1	8.32952425	Prob > F	=	0.0766
Residual	2496.65757	942	2.65037959	R-squared	=	0.0033
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0023
Total	2504.98709	943	2.65640201	Root MSE	=	1.628

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
HHsubjectiveIncome	-.0984441	.0555307	-1.77	0.077	-.0576643
_cons	.2940313	.1816116	1.62	0.106	.

Financial difficulties while growing up

While the above current HH subjective income measures current levels of perceived relative deprivation, the table and graph below show perceived financial difficulties when the respondents grew up with four options to choose from (always, often, sometimes, never). Table 11 shows the percentages of those who experienced financial difficulties when growing up by country. The UK and Greece shows the highest proportion who stated that they always or often experienced it, followed by Belgium.

Table 11 Crosstab experiencing financial difficulties when growing up by country

Financial difficulties when growing up							
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Always/often	29.25%	9.90%	17.56%	10.40%	12.96%	25.98%	17.90%
Sometimes/never	70.75%	90.10%	82.44%	89.60%	87.04%	74.02%	82.10%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	147	192	131	125	162	204	961

Q31 Please tell me how often you and your family experienced severe financial difficulties when you were growing up?

Figure 17 below shows the proportion of those who stated that they always or often experienced financial difficulties by ethnicity and religion. Again, ethnic minorities are more likely to state that they experienced financial difficulties always/often (24.6%) compared to autochthonous groups (15.2%). Within religious groups, those with other religion and Muslims were more likely to indicate that their families struggled financially in the past (31.5% and 30.8% respectively), compared to Christians and those with no religion (around 15% for both groups).

Figure 17 Experiencing financial difficulties in the past, "always/often" responses by ethnicity and religion in percentages



A bivariate analysis showed a significant relationship at the 1% level with a negative relationship. Thus, experiencing financial difficulties, or having the perception that they experienced financial difficulties in their childhood, increased their likelihood of supporting violent extremism.

Figure 18 Output: Bivariate analysis with financial difficulties when growing up

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and Financial difficulties when growing up, how
> often? Variable 1= Almost ever day, 5=Never
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  FinanceGrowingUp_Q31  , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	949
				F(1, 947)	=	6.60
Model	17.0870966	1	17.0870966	Prob > F	=	0.0103
Residual	2451.26952	947	2.58845779	R-squared	=	0.0069
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0059
Total	2468.35662	948	2.60375171	Root MSE	=	1.6089

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
FinanceGrowingUp_Q31	-.1130656	.0440065	-2.57	0.010	-.0832013
_cons	.3778072	.1701429	2.22	0.027	.

Conflict in household when growing up

Respondents were also asked about how often they experienced conflict within their families or with people they lived together during their childhood. Respondents from Romania showed the highest rate for experiencing always or often conflict (38.4%) followed by Poland (33.5%), while the rates were the lowest for the Greece (24.6%) (see Table 12).

Table 12 Conflict in household when growing up by country

Conflict in HH when growing up

	UK	*Italy*	*Belgium*	*Romania*	*Poland*	*Greece*	*Total*
Sometimes/never	71.34%	69.27%	73.91%	61.54%	66.47%	75.36%	70.01%
Always/often	28.66%	30.73%	26.09%	38.46%	33.53%	24.64%	29.99%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	157	205	138	130	170	207	1,007

Q30 Please tell me how often there was serious conflict between the people living in your household when you were growing up?

Figure 19 shows the proportion of those who stated that they always or often experienced conflict at home by ethnicity and religion. Ethnic minority groups and those with other religion have the highest proportion of those who stated that they always or often experienced conflict within families. The Christian group is the least likely to have experienced conflict, and the difference between Muslim and no religion is minor. Figures for the Other Religion category have to be interpreted with caution, as they represent often small sample sizes.

Figure 19 Conflict in HH in the past, "always/often" responses by ethnicity and religion in percentages



The results of the bivariate analysis below that this variable is also significant at the 5% level, and indicates that the less respondents stated that they experienced conflict in their families, the less likely they are to agree with violent extremism items.

Figure 20 Output: Bivariate analysis of conflict in HH when growing up

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and Conflict between people in HH when growing u
> p, how often? Variable 1= Almost ever day, 5=Never
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  HHconflictGrowingUp_Q30  , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	10.0367256	1	10.0367256	Number of obs	= 994
Residual	2576.55227	992	2.59733092	F(1, 992)	= 3.86
				Prob > F	= 0.0496
Total	2586.58899	993	2.60482275	R-squared	= 0.0039
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0029
				Root MSE	= 1.6116

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
HHconflictGrowingUp_Q30	-.0838051	.0426322	-1.97	0.050	-.062292
_cons	.2387128	.145292	1.64	0.101	.

To sum up, several variables have been used in the survey to capture social class. All of these variables measure different aspects of economic well-being and poverty. Although, there are some differences between the groups in terms of ethnicity, religion and gender, most of these indicators confirm the direction that one would expect based on the literature explains extremism by socio-economic inequalities (highlighted by Horizon 2020 DARE project)[11]. Having parents with Higher Education degree, the main earner of the household being employed, current subject household income, experiencing financial difficulties when growing up, experiencing conflict within the household/family when growing up all showed to have a significant effect on extremism. The only variable within this section that didn't show a significant effect in a bivariate analysis was the Single Parent household variable.

In terms of the differences between countries, each variable showed a different picture. However, the sample in Italy, Romania and Poland seems to report less economic hardship than Greece, the UK and Belgium. In terms of religion, the Christian group seems to fare better than Muslims, while generally ethnic minorities seem to suffer more economic hardship than the natives. However, given that the proportion of ethnic minorities were low in Italy, Romania and Poland, the difference might be due to the sample selection in those countries.

2.4 Psychological Indicators

Several questions were asked to measure psychological wellbeing as they are often used as important co-factors in explaining vulnerabilities to radicalisation and extremism. This includes a general question on how worthwhile respondents perceived their life on a scale from 0-10, a 4 items depression scale and a 6 items psychological well-being scale. All three variables are standard questions that are commonly found in social surveys to measure personality characters and mental well-being.

Life being worthwhile

Figure 21 below shows the mean scores of life-being-worthwhile by gender and country. The higher the scores the more content respondents are with their life. Greece, Italy and Romania seem to show higher levels of satisfaction for both men and women, while the UK has the lowest levels. There doesn't seem to be a great difference between men and women, although in the UK women see their life less worthwhile than men. For all countries, Other Gender seems to have the lowest rates, however given small case numbers for this group, the results need to be interpreted with caution.

[11] Storm, I., T. Pavlovic and R. Franc (2020) Report on the relationship between inequality and youth radicalisation from existing European survey datasets. DARE (Dialogue About Radicalisation and Equality) publication. 202 pp.

Figure 21 Life worthwhile by country and gender, mean scores



Note: On a scale of 0-10, where 0 is not at all worthwhile and 10 is completely worthwhile, overall, to what extent do you feel the things you do in your life are worthwhile? Thus, the higher the scores the more life is worthwhile. Question taken from the Ipsos Mori Youth Social Action in the UK 2016 survey.

In a bivariate analysis this variable was highly significant. The more respondents stated that they feel their life is worthwhile, the less likely they were to support violent extremism.

Figure 22 Output: Bivariate analysis with life being worthwhile

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and  Life Worthwhile nowadays? (0=Not at all, 10
> = Completely worthwhile)
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  LifeWorthwhileQ24 ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	56.1276372	1	56.1276372	Number of obs	= 1,021
Residual	2627.5019	1,019	2.57851021	F(1, 1019)	= 21.77
				Prob > F	= 0.0000
				R-squared	= 0.0209
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0200
Total	2683.62954	1,020	2.63100935	Root MSE	= 1.6058

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
LifeWorthwhileQ24	-.1006857	.0215806	-4.67	0.000	-.1446196
_cons	.6950329	.1570395	4.43	0.000	.

Depression

Figure 23 shows the mean score for the depression items which measures, feeling worries, anxious, depressed and worthless and the answers can be treated as a scale as they range from 1 (never) to 4 (often). Thus, higher scores mean higher levels of occurrence. Feeling worried and anxious seems to be more common among young people than feeling depressed or worthless. Italy and Poland report higher levels of feeling anxious and worried compared to the other countries, although Greece is not far behind them. Feeling worthless is the lowest in all countries, however, the scores for Italy, Romania and Poland are the highest. Feelings of depression are highest in Poland and Greece and lowest in Belgium, UK and Italy.

Figure 23 Depression items by country, mean scores



Answer scale: 1 Never true, 2 Rarely true, 3 Sometimes true, 4 Often true. Questions taken from the 2014 NatCen Youth in Europe Survey 2014.[12]

Figure 24 shows the depression mean scores by gender, with women and other gender category scoring on average higher than men.

Figure 24 Depression items by gender, mean scores



Note: The scores range from 1 (never) to 4 (often), thus the higher the scores the more common the occurrence.

In a bivariate analysis for each depression item, feeling worried and feeling anxious showed a significantly negative relationship with extremism. In other words, the more a person stated that they are worried and anxious the less they agree on violent extremism. Feeling worthless is also significant on the 10% level but the relationship is positive meaning that the more often they felt worthless the more likely they are to support violent extremism. Feeling depressed on the other hand didn't show a significant effect on violent extremism, although the relationship is negative.

[12] https://www.cils4.eu/images/wave3_material/national/england/w3_ym_en_web_phone_english.pdf

Figure 25 Output: Bivariate analysis of depression items

```
. ***Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and Depression Items 1=Never, 4=Often
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13   Depression_Worried_Q25_1  ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	11.2851356	1	11.2851356	Number of obs	= 1,027
				F(1, 1025)	= 4.32
Residual	2677.44282	1,025	2.61213933	Prob > F	= 0.0379
				R-squared	= 0.0042
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0032
Total	2688.72795	1,026	2.62059255	Root MSE	= 1.6162

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Depression_Worried_Q25_1	-.1178177	.0566833	-2.08	0.038	-.0647858
_cons	.3418496	.1775297	1.93	0.054	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Depression_Anxious_Q25_2   ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	19.5076782	1	19.5076782	Number of obs	= 1,024
				F(1, 1022)	= 7.47
Residual	2668.29359	1,022	2.61085478	Prob > F	= 0.0064
				R-squared	= 0.0073
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0063
Total	2687.80127	1,023	2.62737172	Root MSE	= 1.6158

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Depression_Anxious_Q25_2	-.1485727	.0543535	-2.73	0.006	-.0851931
_cons	.4427442	.1740493	2.54	0.011	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Depression_Depressed_Q25_3   ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	.046637663	1	.046637663	Number of obs	= 1,021
				F(1, 1019)	= 0.02
Residual	2663.24761	1,019	2.61358941	Prob > F	= 0.8938
				R-squared	= 0.0000
				Adj R-squared	= -0.0010
Total	2663.29425	1,020	2.61107279	Root MSE	= 1.6167

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Depression_Depressed_Q25_3	-.0067394	.0504511	-0.13	0.894	-.0041846
_cons	.0030233	.1418562	0.02	0.983	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Depression_Worthless_Q25_4   ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	8.06522132	1	8.06522132	Number of obs	= 1,025
				F(1, 1023)	= 3.08
Residual	2676.3603	1,023	2.61618797	Prob > F	= 0.0794
				R-squared	= 0.0030
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0020
Total	2684.42552	1,024	2.62150929	Root MSE	= 1.6175

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Depression_Worthless_Q25_4	.0824542	.0469612	1.76	0.079	.0548129
_cons	-.1997622	.1178124	-1.70	0.090	.

Psychological wellbeing

The next set of items are measuring psychological wellbeing. The questions were taken from the Delaware School Climate Survey 2014-2015[13] and are common items asked in surveys. Unlike the depression scales, which measures current moods, the psychological wellbeing items measure character traits which are important factors in building resilience in young people.[14] The following 6 questions were asked in the survey capturing self-awareness, self-management, responsible decision making and relationships with others:

Q26_1r: I think about how I feel *(self-awareness)*
Q26_2r: I can control how I behave *(self-management)*
Q26_3r: I feel responsible for how I act *(responsible decision making)*
Q26_4r: I care about how others feel *(social awareness)*
Q26_5r: I get along well with others *(relationships)*
Q26_6r: I am good at deciding right from wrongs *(responsible decision making)*

Figure 26 below shows the mean score for each item for all countries. The higher the scores the more the overall responses tend to agree with these statements. The statements have been sorted so that the items on which the respondents agree most are listed in decreasing order. Respondents seems to agree most strongly on the item "I feel responsible for how I act" (responsible decision making) while the self-awareness item "I think about how I feel" has the lowest average scores of agreements. In other words, the respondents in the sample have relatively high levels of perceptions of themselves of being able to take responsibility for their actions, while they acknowledge that they do not pay much attention to how they feel. The other items have similar levels of agreement (around 3.6) with the exception of caring about how others feel (3.8) where there is more agreement. Overall, with the scores being over 3 on average, the tendency is tilted towards agreement with these statements.

Figure 26 Psychological wellbeing, mean total core for each item, sorted



Answers in 6 points Likert scale: 1= Strongly disagree to 6=Strongly agree.

[13] For details about the survey see: https://wh1.oet.udel.edu/pbs/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/Delaware-School-Survey-Technical-Manual-Fall-2016.pdf

[14] Campbell-Sills, L. S.L. Cohan, S.B. Stein (2006) Relationships of resilience to personality, coping and psychiatric symptoms in young adults. *Behaviour Research and Therapy*, 44(4); 585-599.

Figure 27 shows the distribution of the mean scores by gender. The graph shows a great gender difference with the Other Gender showing the greatest variation and tending to disagree stronger on all items. In terms of difference between men and women, the greatest difference is evident in the item caring about others and thinking about one's feeling, on which women tend to agree more strongly than men. There is only one statement with which men tend to agree more strongly than women and it relates to perceptions of self-management: "I can control how I behave".

Figure 27 Psychological wellbeing items by gender, mean score



Figure 28 gives a detailed breakdown of mean scores for each country. There are great variations between countries. On average the score for Italy on the responsible decision-making item "I feel responsible for how I act" for example has the highest score, i.e. tend to strongly agree, followed by Romania, Poland and Greece, whereas the UK and Belgium tend to agree less on this item.

Figure 28 Psychological wellbeing by country, mean scores



In a bivariate regression analysis with all the psychological wellbeing items individually, the following items showed to have significant effect on the dependent extremism variable

Q26_1r: I think about how I feel (self-awareness): **Significant at 5%, negative** (p=0.023, beta -0.071), i.e. the less they think about their feelings, or the lower their level of self-awareness, the more likely they are to agree with violent extremism items.

Q26_2r: I can control how I behave (self-management), **Highly Significant** at 1% level (p=0.002, beta 0.0989), **positive**, the more they feel that they can control how they behave, the more likely they are to agree with violent extremism.

Q26_3r: I feel responsible for how I act: (responsible decision making), **Highly significant at 1%** (p=0.000, beta -0.124), **negative relationship**. In other words, the less they feel that they are responsible for how they act, the more likely to agree on violent extremism statement.

Q26_4r: I care about how others feel (social awareness), **negative and significant at 10%** (p=0.094, beta -0.052). The more they care about others the less likely they are to support violent extremism.

Q26_5r: I get along well with others (relationships) positive relationship but **not significant**.

Q26_6r: I am good at deciding right from wrong. (responsible decision making), **significant** p=0.037 at 5% level (beta - 0.065**), negative relationship**. The less they agree that they are good at deciding right from wrong, the more likely they are to agree on violent extremism.

Figure 29 below shows the above results as carried out in Stata.

Figure 29 Output: Bivariate analysis with psychological wellbeing items

```
. ****Psychologial Wellbeing items, 1= Strongly Disagree, 10=Stronlgy agree
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Wellbeing_ThinkFeel_Q26_1   ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	13.6226138	1	13.6226138	Number of obs	1,023
				F(1, 1021)	5.21
Residual	2671.57073	1,021	2.61662168	Prob > F	0.0227
				R-squared	0.0051
				Adj R-squared	0.0041
Total	2685.19335	1,022	2.62739075	Root MSE	1.6176

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Wellbeing_ThinkFeel_Q26_1	-.0922179	.0404162	-2.28	0.023	-.0712266
_cons	.4199961	.1917255	2.19	0.029	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Wellbeing_ControlBehaviour_Q26_2   ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	26.3878801	1	26.3878801	Number of obs	1,026
				F(1, 1024)	10.12
Residual	2669.69421	1,024	2.60712326	Prob > F	0.0015
				R-squared	0.0098
				Adj R-squared	0.0088
Total	2696.08209	1,025	2.63032399	Root MSE	1.6147

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Wellbeing_ControlBehaviour_Q26_2	.1378096	.043317	3.18	0.002	.0989318
_cons	-.3421242	.1162064	-2.94	0.003	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  Wellbeing_ResponsibleAct_Q26_3  ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	41.3619087	1	41.3619087	Number of obs	1,027
				F(1, 1025)	15.95
Residual	2658.13985	1,025	2.59330717	Prob > F	0.0001
				R-squared	0.0153
				Adj R-squared	0.0144
Total	2699.50176	1,026	2.63109333	Root MSE	1.6104

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Wellbeing_ResponsibleAct_Q26_3	-.1902312	.0476331	-3.99	0.000	-.1237823
_cons	.9445509	.2436357	3.88	0.000	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Wellbeing_CareOthers_Q26_4   ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	7.38726369	1	7.38726369	Number of obs	1,025
				F(1, 1023)	2.82
Residual	2682.01744	1,023	2.62171793	Prob > F	0.0935
				R-squared	0.0027
				Adj R-squared	0.0018
Total	2689.4047	1,024	2.62637178	Root MSE	1.6192

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Wellbeing_CareOthers_Q26_4	-.0709685	.0422782	-1.68	0.094	-.0524099
_cons	.329547	.207822	1.59	0.113	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Wellbeing_GetAlongOthers_Q26_5   ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	3.00721689	1	3.00721689	Number of obs	1,025
				F(1, 1023)	1.14
Residual	2693.40976	1,023	2.63285411	Prob > F	0.2854
				R-squared	0.0011
				Adj R-squared	0.0001
Total	2696.41698	1,024	2.6332197	Root MSE	1.6226

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Wellbeing_GetAlongOthers_Q26_5	-.0497581	.0465581	-1.07	0.285	-.0333956
_cons	.2204659	.2194636	1.00	0.315	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Wellbeing_DecideRightWrong_Q26_6   ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	11.405852	1	11.405852	Number of obs	1,026
				F(1, 1024)	4.36
Residual	2680.23812	1,024	2.61742004	Prob > F	0.0371
				R-squared	0.0042
				Adj R-squared	0.0033
Total	2691.64397	1,025	2.62599412	Root MSE	1.6178

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Wellbeing_DecideRightWrong_Q26_6	-.0944984	.0452686	-2.09	0.037	-.0650961
_cons	.4269015	.2155773	1.98	0.048	.

Correlation and PCA of the pschological wellbeing items

While it made sense to explore the psychological wellbeing items individually in a bivariate analysis, for a multiple regression analysis, it is important not to not to overload the models and ideally have one measure that summaries the trends within across the six psychological well-being items. Thus, a PCA analysis was run with all the six psychological wellbeing items (Q26_1 to Q26_6). To explore how the variable late to each other, first a correlation analysis was run. The first matrix in Figure 30 shows that the items correlate moderately with each other and that the direction is not the same. Q26_1:" I think about how I feel" relates negatively Q26_2 "I can control how I behave" that means the more one agrees that they think about how they feel the less likely they agree on that they can control how they behave. Q26_2 also relates negatively to all other items, which indicates that this variable, which is an indication of self-management does not behave like the other variables and is in opposite direction of the other items. It also has the highest contrast to Q26_3: "I feel responsible for how I act" which is an indication of responsible decision making (correlation of -0.4771) and with Q26_6: "I am good at deciding right from wrongs" (correlation -0.3780) which is an indication of responsible decision making. All the other variables are positively related to each other.

Next in the output in Figure 30, are the results of the PCA analysis. The results showed that only the first component has Eigenvalues over one (2.63) and this component explains 43.8% of the variance in the data. No other component had Eigenvalues grater than 1. In terms of the loadings of each item on the first component, all variables load moderately on this component (between 0.3655 to 4.663) and item 2 (Q26_2) has a negative relationship to the other items in this component as confirmed in the correlation matrix. That means the controlling for how one behaves has a different direction to the other variables. The third item Q26_3: "I feel responsible for how I act" has the highest loading on this component contributes the highest to explaining this component, followed by Q26_4 caring about how others feel (0.4092) and Q26_6 good at deciding right from wrongs (0.4023). Overall, it is safe to say that the psychological wellbeing index measure responsible decision making and social awareness.

Factor scores for the first component was computed automatically and saves as the Psychological Wellbeing Index. As a last step, a bivariate analysis was run with the Psychological Wellbeing Index and violent extremism. The result shown at the end of the output in Figure 30 shows that this index is highly significant at the 1% level and the relationship is negative. In other words, responsible decision making and social awareness are negatively related to violent extremism, i.e. the less a respondent displays these competencies the more likely they are to support violent extremism.

To sum up, all the Psychological items whether measured as life-being worthwhile, depression scale or as the Psychological Wellbeing Index appeared as significant in the bivariate analysis. They will be included in regression models further below in the analysis.

Figure 30 Output: Correlation, PCA, bivariate analysis with psychological wellbeing items

```
. **Correlation and Principal Component Analysis of Psychological Wellbeing items followed by
> bivariate analysis
. *Q26_1r: I think about how I feel (self-awareness)
. *Q26_2r: I can control how I behave (self-management)
. *Q26_3r: I feel responsible for how I act (responsible decision making)
. *Q26_4r: I care about how others feel (social awareness)
. *Q26_5r: I get along well with others (relationships)
. *Q26_6r: I am good at deciding right from wrongs (responsible decision making)
. corr  Q26_1r Q26_2r Q26_3r Q26_4r Q26_5r Q26_6r
(obs=1,026)
```

	Q26_1r	Q26_2r	Q26_3r	Q26_4r	Q26_5r	Q26_6r
Q26_1r	1.0000					
Q26_2r	-0.2956	1.0000				
Q26_3r	0.3600	-0.4771	1.0000			
Q26_4r	0.3251	-0.2653	0.3637	1.0000		
Q26_5r	0.2280	-0.2584	0.2972	0.4028	1.0000	
Q26_6r	0.2046	-0.3780	0.4139	0.2858	0.2963	1.0000

```
.  pca Q26_1r Q26_2r Q26_3r Q26_4r Q26_5r Q26_6r

Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs     =       1,026
                                                  Number of comp.   =           6
                                                  Trace             =           6
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho               =      1.0000
```

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	2.63008	1.75035	0.4383	0.4383
Comp2	.879734	.0671849	0.1466	0.5850
Comp3	.81255	.210481	0.1354	0.7204
Comp4	.602069	.0239134	0.1003	0.8207
Comp5	.578156	.0807461	0.0964	0.9171
Comp6	.497409	.	0.0829	1.0000

```
Principal components (eigenvectors)
```

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5	Comp6	Unexplained
Q26_1r	0.3644	0.1192	0.7870	0.1686	0.4425	-0.0970	0
Q26_2r	-0.4222	0.4755	-0.0172	0.5719	0.1415	0.4982	0
Q26_3r	0.4663	-0.2830	0.0843	-0.0371	-0.2709	0.7878	0
Q26_4r	0.4092	0.5228	0.0076	0.2600	-0.6488	-0.2661	0
Q26_5r	0.3772	0.5477	-0.3966	-0.4274	0.4426	0.1481	0
Q26_6r	0.4023	-0.3260	-0.4646	0.6268	0.3066	-0.1705	0

```
.  predict PsyWellbeingIndex
(score assumed)
(5 components skipped)

Scoring coefficients
    sum of squares(column-loading) = 1
```

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5	Comp6
Q26_1r	0.3644	0.1192	0.7870	0.1686	0.4425	-0.0970
Q26_2r	-0.4222	0.4755	-0.0172	0.5719	0.1415	0.4982
Q26_3r	0.4663	-0.2830	0.0843	-0.0371	-0.2709	0.7878
Q26_4r	0.4092	0.5228	0.0076	0.2600	-0.6488	-0.2661
Q26_5r	0.3772	0.5477	-0.3966	-0.4274	0.4426	0.1481
Q26_6r	0.4023	-0.3260	-0.4646	0.6268	0.3066	-0.1705

```
.  regress ExtremismIndexQ13 PsyWellbeingIndex ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	33.1104753	1	33.1104753	Number of obs	= 1,012
Residual	2627.62938	1,010	2.60161324	F(1, 1010)	= 12.73
				Prob > F	= 0.0004
				R-squared	= 0.0124
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0115
Total	2660.73985	1,011	2.63179016	Root MSE	= 1.613

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
PsyWellbeingIndex	-.1114944	.031253	-3.57	0.000	-.1115531
_cons	-.0083752	.0507027	-0.17	0.869	.

2.5 Social isolation and conflict

Several questions were asked in the survey to capture social isolation and conflict. This includes the variable getting into trouble at school, getting into fights, talking to friends or taking to family when having a problems and social activities compared to peers. Two more variables on neighbourhood cohesion was asked; having a neighbour to go to when keys were lost and they could not access their home, and how safe they felt walking at night in their local area or neighbourhood.

Getting into trouble at school

Table 13 shows the crosstabulations of how often the respondents gets into trouble at school. The answer option ranged from 1) Almost every day, 2) Once or twice a week, 3) A few times a month, 4) A few times a year, 5) Never. These four categories were collapsed into two categories never/rarely (cat 4/5) and often (categories 1to3).

The table below shows that Greece has the highest proportion of young people who stated that they got themselves into trouble with school officials (40.6%) followed by Italy (31.1%). Romania and Poland on the other hand has the lowest rates with around 10-11.5%.

Table 13 Crosstab getting into trouble at school by country

Getting into trouble at school	**Country**						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Rarely/never	76.05%	68.90%	82.98%	90.15%	88.44%	59.45%	75.94%
Often	23.95%	31.10%	17.02%	9.85%	11.56%	40.55%	24.06%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	167	209	141	132	173	217	1,039

Q32 How often are you in trouble with school officials? For example, because of poor grades, skipping school, or acting out in class.

The graph below (Figure 31) shows the distribution of this variable by ethnicity and religion by those who indicated that they get into trouble often. Ethnic minorities are more likely to get into trouble at school and within religion, those with 'no religion' and Muslims have the highest rates, with Christians being the least likely group.

Figure 31 Getting into trouble at school, often responses, by ethnicity and religion in percentages



In a bivariate regression analysis, we used the more detailed original variable with the 5 categories of how often they got into trouble as this is an ordinal variable (i.e. 1) Almost every day, 2) Once or twice a week, 3) A few times a month, 4) A few times a year, 5) Never) and can therefore be treated as a continuous variable. The results as shown in the output in Figure 32 showed a negative relationship between that this variable and extremism. In other words, the more a respondent stated that he/she got into trouble at school, the more likely they were to agree strongly on the dependent extremism index variable and this relationship is highly significant at the 1% level with p=0.000.

Figure 32 Output: Bivariate analysis with trouble at school

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and Trouble at school with school officials, how
>  often? Variable 1= Almost ever day, 5=Never
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  TroubleSchool_Q32  , beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,026
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1024)      =     14.33
       Model |    36.94649         1    36.94649   Prob > F        =    0.0002
    Residual |  2640.28117     1,024  2.57839958   R-squared       =    0.0138
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0128
       Total |  2677.22766     1,025  2.61192942   Root MSE        =    1.6057

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
TroubleSchool_Q32 |  -.1590007   .0420037    -3.79   0.000            -.1174746
            _cons |   .6418296   .1796147     3.57   0.000                    .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Getting into fights

The next question asks about how often respondents get themselves into fights, verbal or physical and includes at school as well as outside school. The response options are the same as the above variable and have been collapsed into two categories for ease of representation. Again, similar to the trouble at school variable, Italy and Greece have the highest rates of those getting into fights, while Poland and Romania have the lowest levels.

Table 14 Crosstab getting into fights by country

Getting into fights	**Country**						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Rarely/never	88.55%	33.49%	85.11%	92.42%	93.10%	71.03%	74.61%
Often	11.45%	66.51%	14.89%	7.58%	6.90%	28.97%	25.39%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	166	209	141	132	174	214	1,036

Q33 How often to you get into fights? This can involve physical fight and/or verbal threat. It can be at school or outside school.

A breakdown by ethnic groups and religion shows a slightly different picture than the getting into trouble variable. Here, it's the autochthonous ethnic groups more likely than ethnic minorities getting into fights. In terms of religion, Muslims seems to be the least likely group to get into fights, while those with other religion and no religion have higher rates.

Figure 33 Getting often into fights by ethnicity and religion



In a bivariate analysis the relationship between this variable was negative, in other words the more one got into fights, the more likely they are to agree on the extremism index (this is due to the order of this variable). However, the variable was not significant.

Figure 34 Output: Bivariate analysis with getting into fights

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and getting into fights (Physcial and verbal inc
> l threats) at school and outside, how often? Variable 1= Almost ever day, 5=Never
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  FightsPhysVerbal_Q33  , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	3.70054188	1	3.70054188	Number of obs	= 1,023
Residual	2660.14921	1,021	2.60543507	F(1, 1021)	= 1.42
				Prob > F	= 0.2336
Total	2663.84975	1,022	2.6065066	R-squared	= 0.0014
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0004
				Root MSE	= 1.6141

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
FightsPhysVerbal_Q33	-.0529406	.0444218	-1.19	0.234	-.0372716
_cons	.2054102	.1914915	1.07	0.284	.

Although, the two variables on getting into trouble and getting into fights might look similar, they are fundamentally different as the variable about trouble at school relates to getting into conflict with school authority, whereas getting into fights relates to trouble with peers perhaps and also captures outside places. This suggests that support for violence as a means of achieving social change is associated with increased frequency of involvement in conflicts with authorities in school.

Talking to family/friends about problems

Having someone to talk to about personal problems, whether this is a family member or a friend, are important factors of psychological wellbeing and ultimately resilience to extremism. Such questions are also asked to explore masculinity attitudes and the two questions below were taken from the YouGov 2016 survey on masculinity. Table 15 shows that the Belgium sample has the highest rates of young people who find it difficult or very difficult to talk to friends about personal problems (45.9%), while the Greece and Romanian sample have the lowest rates (18.45%, 20.6% respectively).

Table 15 Crosstab Talking to friends when having problems by country

Talking to friends when having problems							
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Very easy/ easy	62.76%	71.36%	54.14%	79.37%	58.90%	81.55%	68.85%
Very difficult/ difficult	37.24%	28.64%	45.86%	20.63%	41.10%	18.45%	31.15%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	145	206	133	126	163	206	979

Q28 And how easy do you find it to talk to friends about personal problems? Question taken from the YouGov 2016 survey on masculinity

Talking to family members seems to be even more difficult for all young people across the countries with almost half of the sample finding it very difficult or difficult to talk to family about problems and for Poland the rate is much higher than for the other countries (68%).

Table 16 Crosstab Talking to family when having problems by country

Talking to family when having problems							
	UK	**Italy**	**Belgium**	**Romania**	**Poland**	**Greece**	**Total**
Very easy/ easy	51.02%	55.33%	47.29%	48.00%	31.90%	55.22%	48.65%
Very difficult/ difficult	48.98%	44.67%	52.71%	52.00%	68.10%	44.78%	51.35%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	147	197	129	125	163	201	962

Q27 When you have personal problems, how easy do you find it to talk to family about personal problems? YouGov 2016 survey on masculinity

Both variables appear as highly significant in a bivariate regression analysis and the relationship is positive. In other words, t*he harder it is to talk to family or friends, the higher the respondents tend to agreement with extremism.*

Figure 35 Output: Bivariate analysis with talking to family and friends

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and Talking to family and talking to friends abo
> ut personal problems , 1- very easy, 4=very hard
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  Problems_TalkFriends_Q28 , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	17.0146764	1	17.0146764	Number of obs	= 966
				F(1, 964)	= 6.56
Residual	2501.56281	964	2.59498217	Prob > F	= 0.0106
				R-squared	= 0.0068
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0057
Total	2518.57749	965	2.60992486	Root MSE	= 1.6109

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Problems_TalkFriends_Q28	.1463103	.0571387	2.56	0.011	.0821929
_cons	-.3400485	.134103	-2.54	0.011	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  Problems_TalkFamily_Q27 , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	22.1972624	1	22.1972624	Number of obs	= 951
				F(1, 949)	= 8.65
Residual	2435.35731	949	2.56623531	Prob > F	= 0.0034
				R-squared	= 0.0090
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0080
Total	2457.55457	950	2.58689955	Root MSE	= 1.6019

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Problems_TalkFamily_Q27	.1488887	.0506244	2.94	0.003	.0950382
_cons	-.4434806	.1412262	-3.14	0.002	.

Social activities compared to peers

Table 17 shows the crosstabulation of social activities compared to peers. Of interest are the 'much less than most' and 'less than most' which has been collapsed into one category for ease of interpretation. Almost half of the Belgian sample felt 'less socially active' than their peers (47.1%). However, overall, the rates for the other countries were not particularly low either, ranging from 30.6% in Italy to 39.1% in Romania for those who are less active than their peers.

Table 17 Crosstab social activities compered to peers by country

Social activities compared to peers

	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Much/less than most	34.30%	30.63%	47.06%	39.07%	38.60%	34.91%	36.89%
Same	43.60%	50.00%	30.07%	39.07%	37.67%	36.32%	39.91%
More than most	22.09%	19.37%	22.88%	21.85%	23.72%	28.77%	23.20%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	172	222	153	151	215	212	1,125

Q7 Compared to other people of your age, how often would you say you take part in social activities?
By social activities we mean events/encounters with other people, by choice and for enjoyment rather than for reasons of school, work or duty.

In a bivariate regression analysis this variable was not significant, although the direction has been negative, i.e. the less one took part in social activities compared to other people of their age, the more likely they were to score high on the extremism variable.

Figure 36 Output: Bivariate analysis with social activities compared to peers

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and  *Q7 Compared to other people of your age, h
> ow often would you say you take part in social activities? 1  Much less than most,   5  Much more tha
> n most
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 SocialActComparePeers_Q7  , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,016
				F(1, 1014)	=	0.92
Model	2.44247215	1	2.44247215	Prob > F	=	0.3386
Residual	2701.5434	1,014	2.66424399	R-squared	=	0.0009
				Adj R-squared	=	-0.0001
Total	2703.98587	1,015	2.66402549	Root MSE	=	1.6323

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
SocialActComparePeers_Q7	-.0479703	.0501008	-0.96	0.339	-.0300547
_cons	.1061446	.1495774	0.71	0.478	.

Number of people to talk to about problems

Another measure of social isolation is the question number of friends one has to discuss intimate and personal matters with. Respondents, were asked to select from 7 options ranging from 1= 'no friends' to 6='7 and over friends'. The variable is an ordinal variable and can therefore threated as a continuous variable; the higher the scale the more friends respondents had that they could talk to about personal matters. Figure 37 below shows the distribution of this variable for the whole sample. It shows that overall, across the countries, only 3.9% stated that they have no friends while the most common number was having 3 friends (29.9%).

Figure 37 Number of friends to talk to, percentage for all countries



Q29 How many people, if any, are there with whom you can discuss intimate and personal matters?

This variable appeared significant at the 5% level in a bivariate regression with having more friends to talk to about intimate or persona problems being negatively related to violent extremism.

Figure 38 Output: Bivariate analysis with number of friends

```
. regress   ExtremismIndexQ13 NumberOfFriends , beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       969
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 967)       =      4.49
       Model |  11.5684488         1  11.5684488   Prob > F        =    0.0344
    Residual |  2493.34704       967  2.57843541   R-squared       =    0.0046
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0036
       Total |  2504.91549       968  2.58772261   Root MSE        =    1.6058

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismInd~13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                 Beta
----------------+-------------------------------------------------------------
NumberOfFriends |  -.0868987   .0410255    -2.12   0.034            -.0679581
          _cons |   .2872134   .1676622     1.71   0.087                    .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Neighbourhood Indicators

A key aim of this study is to explore the potential relationship between social polarisation and support for violence as a means to achieve social change. One of the aims of this survey has been to explore this relationship, framed in terms of the lived experience of locality, and indictors such as sense of safety.

The data presents a number of patterns. The next table shows that Italy has the highest proportion of people feeling unsafe walking in their neighbourhood after dark (52.3 %) while the rate is the lowest for Greece and the UK (around 37%).

Table 18 Crosstab feeling safe walking in neighbourhood by country

Feeling safe walking alone in local area at night

	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Very/ safe	62.50%	47.67%	48.85%	51.67%	53.61%	62.86%	54.94%
Very/unsafe	37.50%	52.33%	51.15%	48.33%	46.39%	37.14%	45.06%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	152	193	131	120	166	210	972

60 How safe do you – or would you – feel walking alone in this your local area or neighbourhood after dark?

Figure 39 shows the gender difference of feeling of safety with great variations between gender. 64.5% of women feel very unsafe or unsafe walking on their own after dark, whereas this proportion is much lower for men (16.3%)

Figure 39 Feeling safety in neighbourhood when walking at night by gender in percentages



The bivariate analysis shows that this variable is significant at the 1% level, and that the relationship is negative. This result might be driven by the relatively high proportion of women who feel unsafe and who are also less likely to support violent extremism. Thus, it remains to be seen whether this relationship will be observed when controlling for gender in a multivariate analysis.

Figure 40 Output: Bivariate analysis with feeling safe walking in neighbourhood after dark

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and   Q60 How safe do you – or would you – feel
> walking alone in this your local area or neighbourhood after dark? 1=very safe, 4=very unsafe
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 NeighbourhoodHowSafe_Q60 , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	17.6944539	1	17.6944539	Number of obs	= 958
Residual	2513.90277	956	2.62960541	F(1, 956)	= 6.73
				Prob > F	= 0.0096
				R-squared	= 0.0070
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0060
Total	2531.59722	957	2.64534715	Root MSE	= 1.6216

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
NeighbourhoodHowSafe_Q60	-.14181	.054668	-2.59	0.010	-.0836029
_cons	.317167	.1412664	2.25	0.025	.

Another question on neighbourhood cohesion is the next question on whether respondents have a neighbour they can go to in case the lost their keys. Poland has the highest rates of people saying that they probably wouldn't have a neighbour to go to (40%) with Greece having the lowest rate (21.5%). The other countries are closer to the average rate of 30%.

Table 19 Crosstab 'having neighbours to go to when lost keys' by country

Neighbours to go to when lost keys

	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Probably/definitely	64.36%	66.10%	64.24%	67.10%	59.83%	78.51%	66.83%
Probably/definitely not	35.64%	33.90%	35.76%	32.90%	40.17%	21.49%	33.17%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	188	236	165	155	234	228	1,206

Q8 Suppose you lost your house keys – Is there a neighbour you could go and wait with for a few hours? Question taken from the Young People's Social Attitudes Survey 2003

In a bivariate analysis this variable is significant at the 10% level with a positive relationship which means the more respondents thought that they don't have a neighbour they can go when they lost the key, the more likely they are to support violent extremism. This confirms the neighbourhood cohesion and extremism thesis.

Figure 41 Output: Bivariate analysis with neighbour to go to when lost keys

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and  Q8 Suppose you lost your house keys – Is th
> ere a neighbour you could go and wait with for a few hours? 1= Definitely 4=Definitely not
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 NeighbourKeys_Q8 , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,083
				F(1, 1081)	=	3.05
Model	8.13868838	1	8.13868838	Prob > F	=	0.0812
Residual	2887.77073	1,081	2.67138828	R-squared	=	0.0028
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0019
Total	2895.90941	1,082	2.67644123	Root MSE	=	1.6344

ExtremismInde~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
NeighbourKeys_Q8	.0822854	.0471426	1.75	0.081	.0530133
_cons	-.174582	.1105918	-1.58	0.115	.

2.6 Activities, experiences and ideologies

Spare time activities

Respondents were asked about what they do in their spare time. A range of activities were listed and they were asked to tick as many as applicable. Figure 42 shows the proportion of responses to the individual activities. The most common form of activities was spending times with friends (67% of the sample), listening to music (58.8%) and spending time on social media (46.3%). Going to galleries and museum was the least popular activity with only 12.7%.

Figure 42 Percentage of spare time activity for all countries



Table 20 shows the proportion of spare time activities by country. There are stark variations by country driven presumable by social class and country specific culture. For example, in Poland a relatively high proportion of young people goes outdoors and spend time in parks (around 40%), while this is much lower for the UK (13%). The UK on the other hand, has highest rates of spending time on social media (56.5%) while in Greece this is 36%. The differences might also be sensitive to changes in age groups across the countries. For example, in Belgium which has a younger age cohort, the rate of spending time with family is the highest (42%), while the lowest is in Greece (26%) which has a much older cohort in the sample.

Table 20 Crosstab spare time activity by country in percentages

Spare time	**Country**						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Spend time with friends	64.77%	74.30%	57.14%	67.72%	71.90%	63.52%	67.18%
Listen to music	52.33%	59.84%	63.10%	60.76%	64.05%	53.22%	58.81%
Spend time on social media	56.48%	45.38%	51.19%	41.14%	49.17%	36.05%	46.34%
Watch TV/streaming	44.04%	44.58%	43.45%	48.10%	47.52%	23.61%	41.43%
Sports/gym/play football	31.09%	33.73%	44.64%	40.51%	35.54%	31.76%	35.64%
Time with family	37.82%	36.55%	42.26%	32.28%	35.54%	26.18%	34.84%
Chat online with friends	34.20%	21.29%	35.71%	32.28%	30.99%	23.18%	28.88%
Spend time play games/ online	31.61%	19.68%	30.95%	27.85%	31.82%	24.89%	27.43%
Cinema/theatre/concert	19.17%	32.53%	20.83%	25.95%	42.56%	18.45%	27.35%
Outdoors/park	12.95%	28.11%	19.64%	29.11%	41.32%	21.89%	26.15%
Read books/magazines	12.95%	23.29%	25.60%	38.61%	44.63%	11.59%	25.91%
Shopping	21.76%	32.53%	13.10%	17.72%	18.60%	16.74%	20.68%
Galleries/museums	2.07%	22.89%	10.71%	10.13%	21.90%	4.29%	12.71%

For regression analysis these variables were coded as dummy variables, with the incident occurring coded as 1 and 0 if they have not selected the particular activity. In a bivariate analysis out of the 13 items asking about spare time activity, eight spare time activities appeared significant of which seven were significantly negatively related to violent extremism. The only variable that was related significantly positive with violent extremism is playing video games. The other significant variables which have a negative relationship with violent extremism are: talking to family, visiting galleries and museum, reading books and news, doing sports and going to the gym, being outdoors and spending time in parks, shopping and listening to music. All other variables (talking to friends, chatting online with friends, being on social media, watching TV or streaming, going to the cinema) were not significant.

Figure 43 Output: Bivariate analysis with spare time activities I

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and Spare time activities. Variables are coded 0
>  1
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  SpareTime_VideoGames_Q5_11, beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =      6.45
       Model |  17.299306         1   17.299306   Prob > F        =    0.0112
    Residual |  2904.83655    1,083  2.68221288   R-squared       =    0.0059
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0050
       Total |  2922.13585    1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =    1.6377

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
SpareTime_VideoGames_Q5_11 |   .2831965   .1115116     2.54   0.011     .0769421
                     _cons |  -.0775201   .0583423    -1.33   0.184           .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  SpareTime_TalkFamily_Q5_20, beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =      4.81
       Model |  12.9266237         1  12.9266237   Prob > F        =    0.0285
    Residual |  2909.20923    1,083  2.68625044   R-squared       =    0.0044
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0035
       Total |  2922.13585    1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =     1.639

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
SpareTime_TalkFamily_Q5_20 |  -.2274745   .1036963    -2.19   0.028    -.0665108
                     _cons |   .081765     .06217     1.32   0.189           .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 SpareTime_GaleriesMuseum_Q5_2 , beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =      4.75
       Model |  12.7522628         1  12.7522628   Prob > F        =    0.0296
    Residual |  2909.38359    1,083  2.68641144   R-squared       =    0.0044
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0034
       Total |  2922.13585    1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =     1.639

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
SpareTime_GaleriesMuseum_Q5_2 |  -.3253823   .1493436    -2.18   0.030    -.0660607
                     _cons |    .041385   .0532612     0.78   0.437           .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  SpareTime_ReadBooksNews_Q5_16, beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =      3.29
       Model |  8.84115005         1  8.84115005   Prob > F        =    0.0701
    Residual |   2913.2947    1,083  2.69002281   R-squared       =    0.0030
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0021
       Total |  2922.13585    1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =    1.6401

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
SpareTime_ReadBooksNews_Q5_16 |  -.2062967   .1137931    -1.81   0.070    -.0550053
                     _cons |   .0532379   .0578069     0.92   0.357           .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

.
```

Figure 44 Output: Bivariate analysis with spare time activities II

```
. ***Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and Spare time activities. Variables are coded 0
> 1
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 SpareTime_SportsGym_Q5_13, beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,085
				F(1, 1083)	=	2.92
Model	7.85856041	1	7.85856041	Prob > F	=	0.0878
Residual	2914.27729	1,083	2.6909301	R-squared	=	0.0027
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0018
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	=	1.6404

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
SpareTime_SportsGym_Q5_13	-.1761334	.1030674	-1.71	0.088	-.0518587
_cons	.065421	.0628144	1.04	0.298	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  SpareTime_OutdoorsPark_Q5_17, beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,085
				F(1, 1083)	=	2.66
Model	7.16426174	1	7.16426174	Prob > F	=	0.1031
Residual	2914.97159	1,083	2.69157118	R-squared	=	0.0025
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0015
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	=	1.6406

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
SpareTime_OutdoorsPark_Q5_17	-.183821	.1126711	-1.63	0.103	-.0495149
_cons	.0489625	.0581496	0.84	0.400	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  SpareTime_Shopping_Q5_6, beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,085
				F(1, 1083)	=	2.85
Model	7.6805849	1	7.6805849	Prob > F	=	0.0914
Residual	2914.45527	1,083	2.69109443	R-squared	=	0.0026
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0017
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	=	1.6405

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
SpareTime_Shopping_Q5_6	-.2048869	.1212779	-1.69	0.091	-.0512681
_cons	.0439988	.0562011	0.78	0.434	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  SpareTime_ListenMusic_Q5_16, beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	1,085
				F(1, 1083)	=	3.29
Model	8.84115005	1	8.84115005	Prob > F	=	0.0701
Residual	2913.2947	1,083	2.69002281	R-squared	=	0.0030
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0021
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	=	1.6401

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
SpareTime_ListenMusic_Q5_16	-.2062967	.1137931	-1.81	0.070	-.0550053
_cons	.0532379	.0578069	0.92	0.357	.

Online Experiences

Questions on online behaviour of young people were taken from the European Commission funded project SELMA Hacking Hate (Social and Emotional Learning for Mutual Awareness) (https://hackinghate.eu) and their Survey on online hate speech for young people.

Online activity

The literature on social media and radicalisation point to the importance of social media behaviour of young people and their risk of radicalisation. Increasingly violent extremist groups use social media platforms and chatrooms to recruit and groom young people.[15] The survey therefore also attempted to capture online activism. Respondents were asked to indicate what activities they do when they are online and how often. The response variables are continuous variables with 1= never and 5= all the time. Figure 45 shows the mean score for type of activities for each country for a range of online activities. The most common types of activities are chatting with people when online, searching for information, watching videos and doing schoolwork. Reading news is also relatively popular but there are great variations between countries with Poland and Italy having the highest rates, and the UK having the lowest rates, reflecting perhaps the social-class composition of the sample. Creating videos and uploading them as well as using blogs and forums have the lowest rates across countries compared to the other activities. Playing games online is highest in Greece and the UK and Belgium, and lowest in Italy, Poland and Romania. See appendix for a breakdown of the online activities by country.

Figure 45 Online activities how often by country, mean scores



Q9: When you go online, what activities do you do? Being online means using websites or apps to chat, share pictures, study, play games, work… using a mobile phone, tablet or computer.

[15] Fernandez, M.; A. Gonzalez-Pardo, and H. Alani (2019). Radicalisation Influence in Social Media. Journal of Web Science, 6, http://oro.open.ac.uk/66155/

Figure 46 breaks down online activity by gender. The biggest diffence between men and women is palying games online, with men more likely than women to do it. Men are also more likely than women to use blogs and chat forums, read news, watch vidoeos. Women on the other hand are more likely than men to upload their own videos, do schoolwork, chat with people, search for infomatiton online. Apart from playing games however, overall the gender difference is not very large.

Figure 46 Online activities how often by gender, mean scores



In a bivariate regression analysis, out of the 9 variables, five were significant: playing games online is highly significant p=0.000 and the relationship is positive, suggesting the more someone plays games online, the more likely they are to endorse violent extremism views. The same is for watching videos (P=0.001). Uploading own videos or content on the other hand is also significant (p=0.030), and searching for information online (p=0.038), doing schoolwork when online (p=0.030) were all significant, however the relationship is negative, i.e. less likely to related to violent extremism. All other online activities did not show a significant effect on violent extremisms. The table below shows only the significant variables.

Figure 47 Output: Bivariate analysis of online activities

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and What to do when online. Variables are contin
> ious 1= Never to 5= Almost all the time
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13   WhenOnline_Gaming_Q9_2 ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,063
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1061)      =     17.11
       Model |    45.21243         1    45.21243   Prob > F        =    0.0000
    Residual |  2803.04012     1,061  2.64188513   R-squared       =    0.0159
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0149
       Total |  2848.25255     1,062  2.68197039   Root MSE        =    1.6254

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
WhenOnline_Gaming_Q9_2 |   .1738654   .0420282     4.14   0.000            .125991
                 _cons |   -.403017   .1086261    -3.71   0.000                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  WhenOnline_Watching_videos_Q9_3  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,060
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1058)      =     10.34
       Model |  27.2454773         1  27.2454773   Prob > F        =    0.0013
    Residual |  2787.55478     1,058  2.63473987   R-squared       =    0.0097
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0087
       Total |  2814.80026     1,059  2.65797947   Root MSE        =    1.6232

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
WhenOnline_Watching_videos_Q9_3 |   .1628641   .0506462     3.22   0.001           .0983838
                 _cons |  -.5376238   .1723965    -3.12   0.002                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 WhenOnline_UploadVideos_Q9_6   ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,059
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1057)      =      4.71
       Model |  12.5589995         1  12.5589995   Prob > F        =    0.0301
    Residual |  2816.35607     1,057  2.66448067   R-squared       =    0.0044
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0035
       Total |  2828.91507     1,058  2.67383277   Root MSE        =    1.6323

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
WhenOnline_UploadVideos_Q9_6 |  -.1102582   .0507855    -2.17   0.030          -.0666297
                 _cons |   .1859771   .1025019     1.81   0.070                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  WhenOnline_SearchInfo_Q9_8  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,066
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1064)      =      4.33
       Model |  11.5615942         1  11.5615942   Prob > F        =    0.0376
    Residual |  2837.81383     1,064  2.66711826   R-squared       =    0.0041
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0031
       Total |  2849.37543     1,065  2.67546988   Root MSE        =    1.6331

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
WhenOnline_SearchInfo_Q9_8 |  -.1014921   .0487466    -2.08   0.038          -.0636992
                 _cons |   .3398638   .1749003     1.94   0.052                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  WhenOnline_Schoolwork_Q9_4  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,065
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1063)      =      4.72
       Model |  12.5808441         1  12.5808441   Prob > F        =    0.0301
    Residual |  2835.13732     1,063  2.66710942   R-squared       =    0.0044
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0035
       Total |  2847.71816     1,064  2.67642684   Root MSE        =    1.6331

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
WhenOnline_Schoolwork_Q9_4 |  -.1027663   .0473169    -2.17   0.030          -.066467
                 _cons |   .3024278   .1493409     2.03   0.043                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Social media behaviour

This data suggests that in relation to online activities, it's what one does online what matters, not the time spent online. E-safety and digital skills has become integrated in many school curriculums across Europe. To capture critical social media skills, respondents have been asked three standard survey questions that aims to measure these critical skills related to reliance on social media to get information, trust in these sources and the habits of fact-checking news or messages before checking them. Respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed or disagreed with these statements where 1=strongly disagree and 6=strongly agree.

- *Q10_1: I get all the information I need from the social media websites/apps.*
- *Q10_2: Most on the information that is available on social media/apps is trustful.*
- *Q10_3 I often fact-check news or messages before sharing them.*

Figure 48 shows that fact-checking information and messages before sharing has relatively high levels of agreement, although for the UK this rate is very low. The highest rate of fact-checking is in Romania, Poland and Italy. Many disagree with the statement that information on social media is trustworthy (the lower the scores the more disagreement), however, the respondents from Greece, Italy and the UK seems to be more trusting towards information that they receive on social media. In terms of overreliance on social media as the main source of information, Poland has lowest score, meaning that they rely less on social media for information, whereas Italy, followed by Greece and Belgium seem to be slightly more reliant on social media for information.

Figure 48 Social media behaviour by country, mean scores



Figure 49 shows the gender difference between the three variables and as the graphs indicates, the differences between gender is minimal, with women more likely to fact-check before sharing content.

Figure 49 Social media activities by gender, mean score



In a bivariate regression analysis, fact-checking variable was negative highly significant (p=0.000). In other word, *the more a respondent agreed that they fact-check information before sharing, the less likely they were to agree with the violent extremism statements*.

Figure 50 Output: Bivariate analysis by fact-checking

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and  10_3 I often fact-check news or messages be
> fore sharing them.
. ***1=Strongly disagree Agree, 6=Strongly Agree
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  SocialMedia_FactCheckInfo_Q10_3  ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	63.0420059	1	63.0420059	Number of obs	= 1,085
Residual	2859.09385	1,083	2.63997585	F(1, 1083)	= 23.88
				Prob > F	= 0.0000
				R-squared	= 0.0216
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0207
Total	2922.13585	1,084	2.69569728	Root MSE	= 1.6248

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
SocialMedia_FactCheckInfo_Q10_3	-.1967126	.0402548	-4.89	0.000	-.1468807
_cons	.9059659	.1918444	4.72	0.000	.

The strong association of sharing without fact-checking has been highlighted by recent research. Research on UK social media demonstrates that *43% of news sharers share inaccurate or false news*. But this is not simply a result of manipulation by disinformation. The same research demonstrates that *17% of UK sharers knowingly share news they suspect or believe to be false*[16] . A recent study by political psychologists exploring the online political communications of a representative sample of the United States population highlights the importance of communications aiming at creating 'chaos' and 'disruption'. This research focuses on the motivations of those who share hostile rumours online with the knowledge that these rumours are false. The authors argue '*the sharing of hostile political rumours is not motivated by a desire to aid actors within the system. Instead it is motivated by a desire to tear down the system*'.[17]

[16] Russell, A (2020) 'Coming to terms with dysfunctional hybridity: a conversation with Andrew Chadwick on the challenges of liberal democracy in the second-wave networked era', *Studies in Communication Sciences*, 20, 2, 211-225

[17] Petersen, M, M Osmundsen, and K Arceneaux (2020) "The "need for Chaos" and Motivations to Share Hostile Political Rumors" *PsyArXiv*. doi:10.31234/osf.io/6m4ts

The other two variables did not yield any significant effect on the dependent variable, although the relation for trust of social media and VE was positive and for getting all information from social media and VE was negative as one would expect.

Figure 51 Output: Bivariate analysis by social media attitudes

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and Q10_1: I get all the information I need from
>  the social media websites/apps./ Q10_2: Most on the information that is available on social media/ap
> ps is trustful.
. ***1=Strongly disagree Agree, 6=Strongly Agree
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 SocialMedia_InformationAll_Q10_1   ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =      0.25
       Model |  .671965814         1  .671965814   Prob > F        =    0.6178
    Residual |  2921.46389     1,083  2.69756592   R-squared       =    0.0002
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =   -0.0007
       Total |  2922.13585     1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =    1.6424

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
SocialMedia_Infor~1 |  -.0197896   .0396506    -0.50   0.618          -.0151643
              _cons |   .0667557   .1427441     0.47   0.640                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  SocialMedia_InfoTrust_Q10_2  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =      1.15
       Model |  3.11111692         1  3.11111692   Prob > F        =    0.2829
    Residual |  2919.02474     1,083   2.6953137   R-squared       =    0.0011
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0001
       Total |  2922.13585     1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =    1.6417

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
SocialMedia_InfoT~2 |    .047745   .0444401     1.07   0.283          .0326293
              _cons |  -.1310018    .131727    -0.99   0.320                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Online personal, political and spiritual identification

The next set of questions have specifically been designed for our survey in order to capture feelings of being understood more by people online then face-to-face, of finding like-minded leaders and thinkers online and of finding spiritual and political content online that helps respondents to guide their life and are particularly relevant in relation to what are sometimes described as 'lone-wolf-actors'[18] or 'homegrown terrorism'[19]. These statements were driven from research insight of the PARTICIPATION teams about young people's attraction to social media and radicalisation.

- *Q11_1: I find it easier to be myself online than when I am with people face-to-face.*
- *Q11_2: The internet presents me with thinkers/leaders who understand people like me.*
- *Q11_3: I find spiritual/political content online that helps me to guide my life.*

Respondents from Romania and the UK had the highest levels of agreement with this statement, with Greece scoring the lowest on this item (see Figure 52). In terms of differences between the gender, there

[18] See for example Nordtorp Mølmen, G. and J. Aasland Ravndal (2021) Mechanism of online radicalisation; how the internet affects the radicalisaiton of extreme-right lone actor terrorists. *Behavioural Sciences of Terrorism and Political Aggression*, https://doi.org/10.1080/19434472.2021.1993302

[19] Wilner, A.S. and Dubouloz, C.J. (2010) Homegrown terrorism and transformative learning; an interdisciplinary approach to understanding radicalisation. *Global Change, Peace and Security,* 22(1): 33-51.

doesn't seem to be a great difference between the mean scores between men and women on all three statements (See Figure 53).

Figure 52 Online identification scale by country, mean scores



Figure 53 Online identification scale by gender, mean scores



In a bivariate regression analysis (see Figure 54), all variables were related positive on the extremism variable, however, only the statement *"The internet presents me with thinkers/leaders who understand people like me" was significant (p=0.008) at the 1% level.*

Figure 54 Output: Bivariate analysis of online identification items

```
. ****Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and  Q11_2: The internet presents me with thinke
> rs/leaders who understand people like me. 1=Strongly disagree, 6=Strongly agree
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 OnlineThinkers_Q11_2  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,082
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1080)      =      7.15
       Model |  19.0864863         1  19.0864863   Prob > F        =    0.0076
    Residual |  2881.75491     1,080  2.66829158   R-squared       =    0.0066
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0057
       Total |  2900.84139     1,081  2.68347955   Root MSE        =    1.6335

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
OnlineThinkers_Q11_2 |   .1028465   .0384541     2.67   0.008            .081115
               _cons |  -.3594057   .1418928    -2.53   0.011                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

.
. **Q11_3: I find spiritual/political content online that help me to guide my life.  Q11_1: I find it e
> asier to be myself online than when I am with people face-to-face
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 OnlineMyself_Q11_1   ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,082
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1080)      =      2.44
       Model |  6.51435726         1  6.51435726   Prob > F        =    0.1189
    Residual |  2888.98291     1,080  2.67498418   R-squared       =    0.0022
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0013
       Total |  2895.49727     1,081  2.67853586   Root MSE        =    1.6355

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
OnlineMyself_Q11_1 |   .0517728   .0331762     1.56   0.119           .0474323
               _cons |  -.1624331   .1144778    -1.42   0.156                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

.
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  OnlineGuidance_Q11_3  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,081
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1079)      =      0.59
       Model |  1.57517453         1  1.57517453   Prob > F        =    0.4436
    Residual |  2893.84425     1,079  2.68196872   R-squared       =    0.0005
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =   -0.0004
       Total |  2895.41942     1,080  2.68094391   Root MSE        =    1.6377

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|                Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
OnlineGuidance_Q11_3 |   .0280989    .036665     0.77   0.444           .0233243
               _cons |  -.0954625    .131684    -0.72   0.469                  .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Memes

Recent research has highlighted the increasing significance of memes and meme-sharing communities in pathways to extremism[20]. The importance of memes highlights the increasingly complex relationship between intentions, extremism, humour and satire, and the increasing significance of online hate speech to experiences of radicalisation[21] and the growing extremist activism on the internet, with various social media platforms carrying materials, groups and manifestos - such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Telegram, 8chan, Discord, MeWe, VKontakte. Moreover, there seems to be a growing number of

[20] Maly, I (2019) 'New right metapolitics and the algorithmic activism of Schild & Vrienden', *Social Media and Society*, April-June, 1-19

[21] Greene, V (2019) 'Deplorable satire: alt-right memes, white genocide tweets, and redpilling normies', *Studies in American Humor*, 5, 1, 31-69

perpetrators that have been self-radicalized through these online platforms, sharing their ideologies on platforms such as 4chan and 8chan. "Having started as a countercultural playing ground for young outsiders interested in Japanese manga and anime, online gaming, anarchism, and anti-fascist trolling, they have later expanded to include a wide range of topics, including politically incorrect threads mixing ideas and memes from the quickly expanding and misogynist Incel subculture with some of the most extreme elements from the far-right universe" (Bjørgo and Ravndal, 2019; p. 13)[22].

Far-right communication strategies have also tried to target youth that have grown up experiencing events such as 9/11 and 7/7. In this sense, the far-right anti-Muslim narrative is pushed to target youth that are more likely to see Muslims as 'the other' and the enemy[23]. Humour, a relatively unexplored field, has been used here to lower the threshold towards violence, particularly against minority communities[24]. In the Christchurch and Halle attacks, the perpetrators emerged from online subcultures where 'memes' and humorous content is shared on online platforms. Youth who access these platforms are susceptible to this content. With online communication via roleplay, youth are able to experience and spread this content, which is later applied in real life scenarios. The online gaming culture has emphasized this with their chat rooms[25]. Extremist structures in this online environment can be seen as a "mixture of infantile mischief, communicative ambivalence and a strong dose of nihilism that promote extremist ideas''. This is a recurrent theme in far-right communication strategies, where extremists carefully use their language to avoid sharing obvious racist remarks[26], while creating an online ecology centred on trolling, hate speech, and harassment.

This emerging field of relationships emerged as critical in focus group research undertaken by PARTICIPATION, and in this survey is explored by a series of questions which aim at capturing attitudes towards engaging in online hate and posing hateful memes: The response scale was 1=strongly disagree to 6= strongly agree.

- *Q21_1: It is OK to send hateful or degrading messages against someone online if they start to attack you, your friends or family first.*
- *Q21_3: It's OK to share or post comments or memes online that contain hate speech just for fun.*
- *Q21_4: Sharing or posting hate speech memes online is the same as making hurtful or degrading comments to someone face-to-face.*

22 Bjørgo, T., Ravndal, J. A. (2010) Extreme-Right Violence and Terrorism: Concepts, Patterns, and Responses, ICCT Policy Brief, September

23 Griffith, H (2015) Far right 'targeting new, younger generation'. BBC News. Available at: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-wales-33167441

24 Fielitz, M., and Ahmed, R (2021) It's not funny anymore. Far-right extremists' use of humour. RAN. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-papers/docs/ran_ad-hoc_pap_fre_humor_20210215_en.pdf

25 Krasenberg, J., Lenos, S., and Sterkenburg, N (2019) RAN EDU Academy: Far-right extremism in the classroom. RAN. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/default/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-edu/docs/ran_edu_academy_far-right_extremism_in_classroom_berlin_13-14_062019_en.pdf

26 Busby, E (2018) Far-right group attempts to recruit students at Scottish universities. Independent. Available at: https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/generation-identity-scotland-university-glasgow-students-far-right-gi-posters-recruitment-drive-a8705701.html

Figures 55 shows that there is a greater tendency among young people to agree that sharing or posting hate speech memes online is the same as making hurtful or degrading comments to someone face-to-face as this item has the highest scores (the higher the score, the more on average respondents agreed) with slight variations between counties. Similarly, respondents tend to disagree with the statement that it's OK to share or post memes and hateful comments just for fun, while the levels of disagreement are lower in Greece, the UK and Poland compared to Italy, Belgium and Romania. Retaliating with hateful and degrading messages is more accepted in the UK, Belgium sample, while it's less accepted in the Italian sample.

Figure 55 Attitudes on online hate speech/memes by country, mean scores



Figure 56 shows the gender difference for the mean scores for all three items. Women tend to disagree more than men that it's OK to retaliate with hateful messages and that it's OK to post hateful comments/memes just for fun. They also agree more that online hate is just the same as face-to-face hate.

Figure 56 Attitudes on online hate speech/memes by gender, mean scores



In a bivariate analysis, all three items were highly significant (p=0.000). See output from Stata below (Figure 57).

Figure 57 Output: Bivariate analysis with online hate and memes

```
. ****POST ONLINE HATE MESSAGES AND MEMES- ATTITUDES
. *Q21_1: It is OK to send hateful or degrading messages against someone online if they start to attack
>  you, your friends or family first.
. *Q21_3: It's OK to share or post comments or memes online that contain hate speech just for fun.
. *Q21_4: Sharing or posting hate speech memes online is the same as making hurtful or degrading commen
> ts to someone face-to-face.
. ***1=Strongly disagree, 6=Strongly agree
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  RetaliateHateMessageOK_Q21_1  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,050
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1048)      =     56.94
       Model |  142.696943         1  142.696943   Prob > F        =    0.0000
    Residual |  2626.47834     1,048  2.50618162   R-squared       =    0.0515
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0506
       Total |  2769.17529     1,049  2.63982391   Root MSE        =    1.5831

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|     Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
RetaliateHateMess |   .2379889   .0315396     7.55   0.000     .2270033
            _cons |  -.7148333   .1051018    -6.80   0.000            .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  PostHateMemesFun_Q21_3  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,050
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1048)      =     59.15
       Model |  147.940204         1  147.940204   Prob > F        =    0.0000
    Residual |  2621.23508     1,048  2.50117851   R-squared       =    0.0534
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0525
       Total |  2769.17529     1,049  2.63982391   Root MSE        =    1.5815

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|     Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
PostHateMemesFun_ |   .2570833   .0334274     7.69   0.000     .2311362
            _cons |  -.6357737   .0945864    -6.72   0.000            .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  PostHateSameInPerson_Q21_4  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,050
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1048)      =     14.39
       Model |  37.5201313         1  37.5201313   Prob > F        =    0.0002
    Residual |  2731.65515     1,048  2.60654118   R-squared       =    0.0135
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0126
       Total |  2769.17529     1,049  2.63982391   Root MSE        =    1.6145

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|     Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
PostHateSameInPer |  -.1143872   .0301493    -3.79   0.000    -.1164011
            _cons |   .4091637   .1218328     3.36   0.001            .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Hate Speech

The PARTICIPATION survey also asked about experiences of hate speech. Hate speech was explained to the respondents as follows: "When people talk about hate speech, they often refer to the fact that people sometimes say hurtful or nasty things when talking about groups of people or communities with a certain culture, religion, colour of skin, sexual orientation, or other group characteristics. This may happen in the

offline world; at school, in your neighbourhood or even within your family. It may also happen online; on websites, apps, blogs, social media or services you use, or on your email or instant messaging service.". Following this explanation, respondents were asked four types of questions in relation to the last three months. Whether they have seen or heard hate speech in person (Q15) or online (Q16), and whether they have experienced hate speech themselves in person (Q17) and online (Q19). We created two combinations of experiences of hate speech, combining online and offline experiences either seen/heard or experienced (see for example Table 21 and 22). Overall, around two third of the respondents had seen or heard of hate speech (online/offline) in the last three months (Table 21). Actual experiences of hate speech are much lower varying between 25.9% of respondents in the UK to 38.6% in Greece, however, these figures are still relatively high, given that the reference period is just three months (Table 22).

Table 21 Crosstab Hate speech seen or heard in the last 3 months either online of offline by country

		UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Hate speech seen/heard in last 3 months (on/offline)	Yes	65.28%	78.31%	72.02%	77.22%	68.60%	73.82%	72.57%
	No	34.72%	21.69%	27.98%	22.78%	31.40%	26.18%	27.43%
	Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
	Tot. (N)	193	249	168	158	242	233	1,243

Table 22 Experienced hate speech themselves either online or offline in the last 3 months by country

		UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Hate speech experienced in last 3 months (on/offline)	Yes	25.91%	33.33%	35.12%	34.81%	32.64%	38.63%	33.47%
	No	74.09%	66.67%	64.88%	65.19%	67.36%	61.37%	66.53%
	Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
	Tot. (N)	193	249	168	158	242	233	1,243

Combining online and offline experiences as done for the crosstabulations above masks the difference between online and offline experiences. In Figure 58 the variables are not combined, and show the percentage of those who respond with 'yes' to the four questions of hate speech. As with the above table a large proportion of respondents had witnessed hate speech but on this graph the difference between online and offline is more visible. Apart from experiences of hate speech in person, online experiences have much higher rates than off-line experiences, pointing to the internet as space where young people are witnessing more hate speech than in their everyday lives.

Figure 58 Hate speech by country in percentages



A further exploration of those who have been exposed to hate speech revealed this variable had relatively high proportions of "don't know" (73 cases) and "prefer not to answer" responses (26 cases) ranging from 7-12% of the respondents within countries (See Figure 59). Explorative analysis revealed that these DK/NA categories behave very similarly to the YES categories, and they were therefore all collapsed into the YES category.

Figure 59 Experienced hate speech online by country



Figure 60 shows the gender difference in experiences of online hate speech and the Other Gender category had much higher rates of online hate experiences. Compared to women, the proportion of men is also much higher, although the gap is not as big as between the Other Gender and men.

Figure 60 Experienced hate speech online by gender, percentages



A bivariate regression analysis was run on all four variables, which were coded into dummy variables. Experiences of online hate appeared as the only highly significant variable (p=0.000) with a positive relationship. This variable also included the Don't know/Prefer to not answer category. But even when the DK category was not included, the variable was still significant at the 5% level. In other words, compared to those who stated that they did not experience online hate speech, those who indicated that they did, or were not sure or preferred not to answer (which is different from those who did not respond to the question at all), were more likely to endorse violent extremism views.

Figure 61 Output: Bivariate analysis of hate speech items

```
. ***  HateHeardinPerson_Q15, HateSeenOnline_Q16, HateExperiencedInPerson_Q17 (just Yes respon
> ses), HateExperiencedOnlineQ19 (Incl. DK and prefer not to say responses),
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  HateExperiencedOnlineQ19  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =     13.77
       Model |  36.6779557         1  36.6779557   Prob > F        =    0.0002
    Residual |   2885.4579     1,083  2.66431939   R-squared       =    0.0126
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0116
       Total |  2922.13585     1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =    1.6323

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|     Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
HateExperiencedOn |   .4110759   .1107931     3.71   0.000     .1120346
            _cons |  -.1136615   .0582584    -1.95   0.051            .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  HateSeenOnline_Q16  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =      1.61
       Model |  4.34445081         1  4.34445081   Prob > F        =    0.2044
    Residual |   2917.7914     1,083  2.69417489   R-squared       =    0.0015
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0006
       Total |  2922.13585     1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =    1.6414

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|     Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
HateSeenOnline_Q1 |    .143463   .1129758     1.27   0.204     .0385582
            _cons |  -.1055147   .0968884    -1.09   0.276            .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 HateHeardinPerson_Q15   ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =      0.00
       Model |  .00126958         1   .00126958   Prob > F        =    0.9827
    Residual |  2922.13458     1,083  2.69818521   R-squared       =    0.0000
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =   -0.0009
       Total |  2922.13585     1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =    1.6426

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|     Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
HateHeardinPerson |  -.0021963   .1012509    -0.02   0.983    -.0006591
            _cons |   .0012874   .0775198     0.02   0.987            .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------

. regress ExtremismIndexQ13  HateExperiencedInPerson_Q17  ,beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =     1,085
-------------+----------------------------------   F(1, 1083)      =      0.10
       Model |  .27341787         1   .27341787   Prob > F        =    0.7503
    Residual |  2921.86244     1,083  2.69793392   R-squared       =    0.0001
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =   -0.0008
       Total |  2922.13585     1,084  2.69569728   Root MSE        =    1.6425

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ExtremismIndexQ13 | Coefficient  Std. err.      t    P>|t|     Beta
------------------+-----------------------------------------------------------
HateExperiencedIn |  -.0345955   .1086731    -0.32   0.750    -.009673
            _cons |   .0104265   .0596597     0.17   0.861            .
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

Online recruitment

A similar reluctance to respond to the question on experiences of online recruitment was observed. Table 23 shows those who responded with 'Yes', 'No' and 'DK/Prefer not to answer' by country. The question was designed specifically for this survey, worded as follows:

Q22 When scrolling online, playing games online or being on chat rooms and forums, have you ever been approached by someone who wanted to win you over for their political cause, group or movement?

Table 23 Crosstab of experiences of violent online recruitment by country

Ever experienced extremist online recruitment?	*UK*	*Italy*	*Belgium*	*Romania*	*Poland*	*Greece*	*Total*
Yes	18.13%	17.89%	21.53%	19.71%	28.89%	16.44%	20.21%
No	57.31%	68.81%	62.50%	64.96%	54.44%	70.78%	63.61%
Don't know/ Prefer not to say	24.56%	13.30%	15.97%	15.33%	16.67%	12.79%	16.18%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	171	218	144	137	180	219	1,069

Figure 62 explores this variable further and shows the distribution of experiences of online recruitment by political orientation (Right, Central, Left). The graph shows that there those who identified more with the Left and Right end of the political orientation scale are more likely to have experienced online recruitment.

Figure 62 Experiences of online recruitment within political orientation, percentages



Figure 63 shows the same variable by ethnicity and religion. Ethnic minorities show higher rates of experiences of encounters with online recruitment compared to autochthonous groups, while within 'religion', Muslims, followed by Other Religion and No Religion group have much higher rates compared to Christians. This indicates that ethnic and religious minorities seem to have been exposed to experiences of online recruitment more often than the Christian and autochthonous populations. However, the difference might be due to the countries sample composition which will be explored in a multivariate analysis, where controls will be introduced for country and other socio-demographic variables such as social class.

Figure 63 Experienced encounters with online recruitment by ethnicity and religion, percentages



Those who indicated that they have experienced online recruitment (Yes responses only) were asked this follow-up question: Q23When they try to win your support online, did you feel that they were extremists or groups that promoted the use of violence?

Table 24 below shows the frequency of online interactions experienced as attempts to 'recruit' or 'involve' the person in violent extremism. A total of 215 responded to this question. Overall, the numbers are relatively small, yet this variable appears as highly significant in bivariate regression analysis.

Table 24 Crosstab Experienced violent online recruitment by country, frequency

	UK	Italy	Belgium	Romania	Poland	Greece	*Total (n)*
No	16	25	7	8	24	15	*95*
Yes	4	3	14	11	19	12	*63*
DK/Prefer not to say	11	11	9	8	9	9	*57*
Total (n)	*31*	*39*	*30*	*27*	*52*	*36*	*215*

The graph below (Figure 64) shows the distribution of the variable within countries for the Yes/DK/Prefer-not-to-say categories in percentages. Belgium and Romania followed by Greece have the highest proportion of respondent who experienced attempted online recruitment that was or could have been violent extremism, while the UK and Italy have the lowest rates.

Figure 64 Online recruitment promotes violence by country in percentages



The table below shows the breakdown of the categories by frequency which are relatively low numbers.

Table 25 Crosstab Extremist online recruitment was promoting VE by country

Extremist online recruitment was promoting violence?	**Country**						
	UK	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Yes	20.00%	10.71%	66.67%	57.89%	44.19%	44.44%	39.87%
Frequencies	4	3	14	11	19	12	63
No	80.00%	89.29%	33.33%	42.11%	55.81%	55.56%	60.13%
Frequencies	16	25	7	8	24	15	95
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	20	28	21	19	43	27	158

Both variables capturing experiences of online recruitment appeared significant in a bivariate analysis whether the Yes categories were combined with the DK/Prefer not to answer category or not, see next Figure 65.

Figure 65 Output: Bivariate analysis of online recruitment

```
. **Bivariate Regression Extremism Index (Dependent) and Experiences of online recruitment
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 i.OnlineRecuitment_Q22  ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
				Number of obs	= 1,050
				F(2, 1047)	= 10.81
Model	56.0293508	2	28.0146754	Prob > F	= 0.0000
Residual	2713.14593	1,047	2.59135237	R-squared	= 0.0202
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0184
Total	2769.17529	1,049	2.63982391	Root MSE	= 1.6098

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
OnlineRecuitment_Q22					
Yes	.5309658	.1264452	4.20	0.000	.1317063
DK/NA	.3994598	.1389388	2.88	0.004	.0901763
_cons	-.1847823	.0622838	-2.97	0.003	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 OnlineRecuitment_Q22Dummy  ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
				Number of obs	= 1,050
				F(1, 1048)	= 21.00
Model	54.4017402	1	54.4017402	Prob > F	= 0.0000
Residual	2714.77355	1,048	2.59043277	R-squared	= 0.0196
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0187
Total	2769.17529	1,049	2.63982391	Root MSE	= 1.6095

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
OnlineRecuitment_Q22Dummy	.4731307	.1032431	4.58	0.000	.1401623
_cons	-.1847823	.0622727	-2.97	0.003	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 i.OnlineRecuitmentVE_Q23  ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
				Number of obs	= 213
				F(2, 210)	= 5.21
Model	29.5003099	2	14.750155	Prob > F	= 0.0062
Residual	594.155508	210	2.82931194	R-squared	= 0.0473
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0382
Total	623.655818	212	2.94177272	Root MSE	= 1.6821

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
OnlineRecuitmentVE_Q23					
Yes	.7788454	.2738773	2.84	0.005	.2077327
DK/Prefer not to say	.71299	.283941	2.51	0.013	.1834277
_cons	-.0707228	.1734908	-0.41	0.684	.

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 OnlineRecuitmentVE_Q23Dummy  ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
				Number of obs	= 213
				F(1, 211)	= 10.43
Model	29.3717326	1	29.3717326	Prob > F	= 0.0014
Residual	594.284085	211	2.81651225	R-squared	= 0.0471
				Adj R-squared	= 0.0426
Total	623.655818	212	2.94177272	Root MSE	= 1.6782

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
OnlineRecuitmentVE_Q23Dummy	.7478546	.2315838	3.23	0.001	.2170163
_cons	-.0707228	.1730979	-0.41	0.683	.

```
.
```

Political orientation and activism

In order to identify left-wing and right-wing radicalisation we asked respondents to indicate their political orientation through the following scale question:

- *Q39 In politics people sometimes talk of "left" and "right". Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?*

In total only 661 respondents answered this question. This variable was recoded into Left (0-3, 193 cases) Central (scores 4-6, 325 cases) and Right (scores 7-10, 143 cases). The variable was added to the bivariate regression as a dummy variable and the results did not show an effect on the dependent variable Extremism. The same was the case for the original continuous variable. Thus, this measure of political orientation did not yield the results we had hoped for. We have no other measure to separate different forms of radicalisation. Nevertheless, the question allows us to get an arguably vague idea about the political orientation of parts of the sample. Using the cut off points on the 0-10 scale we have used, about half of the sample placed themselves in the middle of the scale (point 4-6), whereas around 29.2% fell within the left-wing category (0-3 on the scale) and 21.6% towards the end of the scale (7-10) closer to right wing politics. Table 26 shows the distribution of political orientation by country. UK, Italy and Greece distribution of left, central and right politics are close to the overall average just described above. However, Romania and Poland, both post-communist countries, have a pattern that diverged from this mean. In Poland only 7.4% of those who responded to this question indicated a political orientation towards right politics, with 45% placing themselves on the 'left'. For Romania the tendency was the opposite, 25.3% indicted that they are close to politics on the right, while only 14.5% showed affinity with left-wing politics. This might be related to the different meaning of left and right politics in these post-communist countries compared to the Western countries.

Table 26 Crosstab political orientation three groups by country

Political Orientation	UK	Italy	Belgium	Romania	Poland	Greece	Total
Left	30.59%	32.64%	25.00%	14.46%	44.85%	20.16%	29.20%
Central	47.06%	40.28%	50.00%	60.24%	47.79%	54.26%	49.17%
Right	22.35%	27.08%	25.00%	25.30%	7.35%	25.58%	21.63%
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
Total (N)	85	144	84	83	136	129	661

Figure 66 has used the full scale to explore the political orientation variable by gender. Apart from Romania, in all countries women's average score is lower than men's indicating that they lean more towards the left or central and Other Gender tends to navigate more towards the right. This again shows that the Other Gender category is very unreliable as one could expect those who identify outside binary gender norms to be more identifying towards the left.

Figure 66 Political orientation scale by country and gender, mean score



Respondents were asked standard political activities questions to determine their level of activism in legal political activities. This was a multiple-choice question detailed in Figure 67 below. As expected with such political activism questions, involvement such as signing petition and online activism (sharing or posting something about politics online) appeared as the most common form of activism, whereas political group or political party activism has the lowest rates. 20.8% of the sample indicated that they have not done any form of political activism in the last 12 months.

Figure 67 Political activities in the last 12 months, percentages of total sample



Q38 There are different ways of trying to improve things in the country or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Select all that applies.

All these 12 political activism variables were coded as dummy variables and for each of the activities a bivariate regression analysis was run. Apart from signing petition (p=0.088), which had a negative relationship with extremism and significant at the 10% level, and working in a political party or action group (p=0.002) and boycott (p=0.087) which have a positive relationship with extremism, no other forms of engagement appeared significant. However, looking at the directions of the relationships of these

variables with violent extremism reveals whether the variable is likely to increase or decrease support for violent extremism. For example, the variables campaigning for a political cause or conviction, boycotting certain products, taking part at a demonstration, working in a political party group or action or in any other organisation group, or not getting politically involved at all have a positive relationship with extremist views. Whereas giving time for charity or help improve the local area or environment, posting something political online, signing a petition, or being politically engaged in other ways are all decreasing the likelihood of extremism.

Table 27 Results of the bivariate analysis with political activity items

	P value	**Beta value**
Given time to help a charity/cause	0.659	-.0134008
Helped improve your local area/environment	0.383	-.0264844
Campaigned/raised awareness for something you believe in	0.145	.0442594
Signed a petition	0.088*	-.0518028
Posted or shared anything about politics online, for example on blogs, via email or on social media such as Facebook, Twitter, TikTok	0.434	-.0237517
Boycotted certain products	0.087 *	.0520301
Taken part in lawful public demonstration or rally	0.714	.0111394
Contacted a politician, government or local government official	0.485	.0212125
Worked in a political party of action group	0.002 **	.0935336
Worked in another organisation or association	0.792	.0080016
Other	0.434	-.0237517
None of these	0.485	.0212125

2.7 Attitudinal Statements

Conspiracy Theories

There is an increasing literature that links belief in conspiracy theories to extreme political thinking of the left as well as the right.[27] More recent studies have suggested that political extreme groups, especially right-wing groups, have capitalised on the COVID-19 pandemic and have used conspiracies and uncertainties among anti-lockdown and anti-vaccination protests to mobilise for action and recruit for their group (Institute for Strategic Dialogue[28]). Virus related theories are diverse but the main two widely circulated are: the virus is not real and it's a hoax to impose a totalitarian regime; and the virus is real but has been manipulated as a "bioweapon" targeting white people. These theories blame the pandemic and its consequences on the traditional targets of the far-right such as minority groups - although they seem to be strongly antisemitic. Even the conspiracy theory engaging the idea of the 5G spreading the virus which is not necessarily related to minority groups is targeting Jews as controlling the telecommunications

[27] van Prooijen, Jan-Willem, André P. M. Krouwel, Thomas V. Pollet (2015) Political Extremism Predicts Belief in Conspiracy Theories. Social Psychological and Personality Science, 6(5): 570-578.

[28] https://www.isdglobal.org/isd-publications/the-conspiracy-consortium-examining-discussions-of-covid-19-among-right-wing-extremist-telegram-channel/

industry[29]. The far-right has also embraced an anti-China sentiment, perpetuating racist stereotypes as well as anti-Muslim rhetoric propagating misinformation about Muslims breaking the lockdown measures imposed by governments - which led to rising offline hate crimes once the lockdown started to ease[30].

Such far-right anti-establishment and anti-police rhetoric has gained significant traction in online space, with numbers of approximately 2 million mentions on social media of the British far-right activist Tommy Robinson condemning the state and police for overstepping their mandate (Ariza, *ibid*).

Significantly, the "QAnon" conspiracy theory originating in the US has achieved surprising popularity throughout Europe in 2020 during the pandemic. This development relies on multiple alternative media outlets, with an extensive presence of right-wing populists where we encounter far-right channels and believers of alternative medicine and esotericisms[31].

The items measuring conspiracy theories in this survey are based on the Brotherton et al. (2013) Generic Conspiracist Beliefs (GCB) scale.[32] The scale refers to 8 types of generic conspiracy theories that capture a range of specific conspiracies and are therefore more reliable measure of belief in conspiracy theories than very specific conspiracies. In the H2020 Participation Survey the question was phrased as follows:

- *Q40: Now a few statements about how our life and society is governed. How much do you agree or disagree with each statement?*

Respondents were then asked to select on a 6-point Likert Scale whether they strongly agree, agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree, disagree, or strongly disagree for each of the statements. All the Likert scales have been harmonised so that 1=strongly disagree and 6=strongly agree. In other words, the higher the number the higher levels of agreement with that particular statement.

Table 28 gives a detailed breakdown of the full wording of the statements and average score per country. Figure 68 is a simplification of this table and shows the overall average for all items for each country.

[29] Ariza, Cristina, From the Fringes to the Forefront, How far-right movements across the globe have reacted to Covid-19, Tony Blair Institute for Global Change, 2020.

[30] United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, 'Rise in antisemitic hatred during COVID-19 must be countered with tougher measures', 2020 https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25800&LangID=E

[31] State of Hate Report, January 2021, <https://www.amadeu-antonio-stiftung.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ESOH-LOCKED-FINAL.pdf>

32 Brotherton, Robert; Christopher C. French and Alan D. Pickering (2013) Measuring belief in conspiracy theories: the generic conspiracist beliefs scale. *Frontiers in Psychology*, Volume 4, Article 279, 15pp. https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00279/full

Table 28 Conspiracy theories items by country, mean scores

	UK	Italy	Belgium	Romania	Poland	Greece
The government monitors people in secret.	4.21	3.29	4.06	3.69	4.07	4.09
The government often knows about terrorist attacks and lets them happen.	3.47	2.67	2.86	3.13	3.28	4.14
There are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions.	4.17	3.87	4.09	4.28	4.03	4.14
The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some organisations.	3.38	2.78	3.14	3.41	2.96	3.89
Technology with mind-controlling capacities is used on people without their knowledge.	3.25	2.74	3.16	2.87	2.73	3.70
Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public.	3.71	2.66	3.47	3.40	3.06	3.77
We're being lied to and taken for idiots by the mainstream media.	3.83	3.15	3.95	3.85	4.19	4.20
The mainstream media, scientists, and the government often work together to cover up information.	4.07	3.11	3.73	3.88	3.65	4.25

Figure 68 shows that Greece and the UK has the highest mean scores for agreement on average for all conspiracies, while Italy has by far the lowest average belief in conspiracy theories.

Figure 68 Average country scores for all conspiracies



Measured on a 6-point Likert scale where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somehow disagree, 4= somehow agree, 5=agree, 6= strongly agree.

Figure 69 below shows agreement in the conspiracy statements by gender. Overall, there is not a great difference between males and females with the exception of the item: *Technology with mind-controlling capacities is used on people without their knowledge*. The figure also shows that the belief that *"there are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions"* has the highest agreement score on average,

followed by *government monitoring people secretly and being lied to by the media* and "*the mainstream media, scientists, and the government often work together to cover up information*". Interestingly, the two statements most relevant for the pandemic i.e. *"The spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some organisations"* and "*Technology with mind-controlling capacities is used on people without their knowledge"* have the lowest scores of agreements.

Figure 69 Conspiracy by gender, mean score



Measured on a 6-point Likert scale where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somehow disagree, 4= somehow agree, 5=agree, 6= strongly agree.

Correlations analysis and PCA of the conspiracy items

A correlation of the eight conspiracy theory statements was carried out followed by PCA to explore the relationship between these items and whether their dimensionality can be reduced to one index.

The correlation matrix in the Stata output below shows that all the items correlate moderately with each other with the strongest correlation observed between Q40_6 and Q40_8 (0.6021) (scientists manipulate public and media, scientist and government work together to cover up information) and the lowest correlation observed between Q40_3 and Q40_5 (0.3551) (secret organisation influencing political decisions and technology with mind controlling capacities used on people without their knowledge) .

Figure 70 Output Correlation matrix of conspiracy items

```
. do "C:\Users\Necla1\AppData\Local\Temp\STD2d3c_000000.tmp"

. ********** Conspiracy theories Statements with Quesiton nummbers
. *Q40_1r-The government monitors people in secret.
. *Q40_2r-The government often knows about terrorist attacks and lets them happen.
. *Q40_3r-There are secret organizations that greatly influence political decisions.
. *Q40_4rThe spread of certain viruses and/or diseases is the result of the deliberate, concealed efforts of some organisations.
. *Q40_5r- Technology with mind-controlling capacities is used on people without their knowledge.
. *Q40_6r-Groups of scientists manipulate, fabricate, or suppress evidence in order to deceive the public.
. *Q40_7r- We're being lied to and taken for idiots by the mainstream media.
. *Q40_8r-The mainstream media, scientists, and the government often work together to cover up information.
.
. *Correlation of the 8 conspiracy theories statements
. corr Q40_1r Q40_2r Q40_3r Q40_4r Q40_5r Q40_6r Q40_7r Q40_8r
(obs=929)
```

	Q40_1r	Q40_2r	Q40_3r	Q40_4r	Q40_5r	Q40_6r	Q40_7r	Q40_8r
Q40_1r	1.0000							
Q40_2r	0.4950	1.0000						
Q40_3r	0.5165	0.4565	1.0000					
Q40_4r	0.4769	0.5165	0.4514	1.0000				
Q40_5r	0.4203	0.4565	0.3551	0.5299	1.0000			
Q40_6r	0.4521	0.4658	0.4469	0.5451	0.5395	1.0000		
Q40_7r	0.4356	0.3969	0.4619	0.4265	0.3830	0.4924	1.0000	
Q40_8r	0.4708	0.4343	0.4714	0.5212	0.4260	0.6021	0.6187	1.0000

A PCA on all the eight conspiracy items was carried out subsequently to create an index that measure belief in conspiracy theories. The results are in the output below and shows that the first component had an Eigenvalue of 4.32 and the other Eigenvalues were all below 1 and this first component explains 54.04% of the variance in the data. The items can therefore be reduced to this component and the scores for this component were saved as Conspiracy Index and will be used in further regression analysis.

Figure 71 Output: PCA of conspiracy items

```
. *PCA analysis to create the ConspiracyIndex
. pca Q40_1r Q40_2r Q40_3r Q40_4r Q40_5r Q40_6r Q40_7r Q40_8r

Principal components/correlation                Number of obs    =        929
                                                Number of comp.  =          8
                                                Trace            =          8
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)           Rho              =     1.0000
```

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	4.32323	3.56499	0.5404	0.5404
Comp2	.758243	.0458499	0.0948	0.6352
Comp3	.712393	.21034	0.0890	0.7242
Comp4	.502053	.0203233	0.0628	0.7870
Comp5	.48173	.0243951	0.0602	0.8472
Comp6	.457335	.0257978	0.0572	0.9044
Comp7	.431537	.0980566	0.0539	0.9583
Comp8	.33348	.	0.0417	1.0000

Principal components (eigenvectors)

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5	Comp6	Comp7	Comp8	Unexplained
Q40_1r	0.3480	-0.0079	0.4897	0.2992	0.6392	-0.3603	-0.0845	0.0633	0
Q40_2r	0.3439	0.3202	0.3442	-0.7562	0.0108	0.2206	-0.1935	-0.0511	0
Q40_3r	0.3383	-0.2629	0.5109	0.3649	-0.5555	0.3282	0.0118	-0.0759	0
Q40_4r	0.3671	0.3066	-0.0773	-0.0551	-0.3639	-0.5465	0.5483	0.1745	0
Q40_5r	0.3345	0.5352	-0.3115	0.3531	0.2228	0.4926	0.1817	-0.2337	0
Q40_6r	0.3745	0.0548	-0.3664	0.1387	-0.1790	-0.1022	-0.6811	0.4438	0
Q40_7r	0.3446	-0.5524	-0.2258	-0.2098	0.2618	0.3124	0.3783	0.4146	0
Q40_8r	0.3747	-0.3739	-0.3042	-0.1201	-0.0061	-0.2537	-0.1212	-0.7306	0

```
. predict ConspiracyIndex
(score assumed)
(7 components skipped)

Scoring coefficients
    sum of squares(column-loading) = 1
```

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Comp5	Comp6	Comp7	Comp8
Q40_1r	0.3480	-0.0079	0.4897	0.2992	0.6392	-0.3603	-0.0845	0.0633
Q40_2r	0.3439	0.3202	0.3442	-0.7562	0.0108	0.2206	-0.1935	-0.0511
Q40_3r	0.3383	-0.2629	0.5109	0.3649	-0.5555	0.3282	0.0118	-0.0759
Q40_4r	0.3671	0.3066	-0.0773	-0.0551	-0.3639	-0.5465	0.5483	0.1745
Q40_5r	0.3345	0.5352	-0.3115	0.3531	0.2228	0.4926	0.1817	-0.2337
Q40_6r	0.3745	0.0548	-0.3664	0.1387	-0.1790	-0.1022	-0.6811	0.4438
Q40_7r	0.3446	-0.5524	-0.2258	-0.2098	0.2618	0.3124	0.3783	0.4146
Q40_8r	0.3747	-0.3739	-0.3042	-0.1201	-0.0061	-0.2537	-0.1212	-0.7306

Next, we run a bivariate regression analysis with the newly created Conspiracy Index and the result appeared as highly significant. In other words, the higher the agreement on the conspiracy agreement items the more they agreed on violent extremism. Thus, belief in conspiracy theories has a significantly positive effect on violent extremism.

Figure 72 Output: Bivariate analysis of conspiracy items

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 ConspiracyIndex ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	921
				F(1, 919)	=	16.57
Model	43.9790048	1	43.9790048	Prob > F	=	0.0001
Residual	2438.78394	919	2.65373661	R-squared	=	0.0177
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0166
Total	2482.76295	920	2.69865538	Root MSE	=	1.629

ExtremismInd~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
ConspiracyIndex	.1052553	.0258553	4.07	0.000	.133093
_cons	-.0072642	.0536788	-0.14	0.892	.

Cultural diversity attitudes

Attitudes towards cultural diversity and immigration are one of the key markers of right-wing populism. To capture anti-immigration sentiments which we asked four questions taken from the European Social Survey and the NatCen Social Research Youth in Europe Survey 2014 survey which included attitudes towards diversity questions.[33] The question wording was as follow:

Q35 The next statements are concerning cultural life and diversity. Please indicate how much you agree or disagree with each of these statements?

1. *Our country's life is enriched by people coming to live here from other countries (Q35_1)*
2. *Immigrants should drop their former practices to adopt to the cultural and religious norms of our country. (Q35_2)*
3. *Too many privileges are given to foreigners/immigrants in our country. (Q35_3)*
4. *People with my ethnic or religious background are discriminated against in this country. (Q35_4)*

Figure 73 shows the responses to these statements. The first item, diversity being enriching has the highest average score across all countries. It is positively phrased compared to the items 2 and 3 which reflect anti-immigration sentiments and have similar levels of agreement with one exception: Greece has by far the highest score for the statement that foreigners are being privileged (3.8) while the lowest level of agreement of this statement is in the UK (2.3). The last item "People with my ethnic or religious background are discriminated against in this country" have the highest level of agreement in countries with the highest proportion of ethnic minorities i.e. UK, Belgium and Greece, while in Italy, Romania and Poland the average scores a low, indicating less agreement with this statement. Thus, all four items are measuring different aspects of cultural diversity.

[33] https://natcen.ac.uk/our-research/research/youth-in-europe-study

Figure 73 Cultural diversity attitudes items by country, mean score



Measured on a 6-point Likert scale where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somehow disagree, 4= somehow agree, 5=agree, 6= strongly agree.

A correlation analysis between the four cultural diversity items confirms that Q35_2 and Q35_3 correlate highly with each other (i.e. immigrants to assimilate and foreigners privileged). These two items relate negatively to Q35_1 (diversity enriching) as discussed above and Q35_4 correlates very low with any of the three items.

Figure 74 Correlation matrix of cultural diversity items

```
. do "C:\Users\Necla1\AppData\Local\Temp\STD2d3c_000000.tmp"

. corr Q35_1r Q35_2r Q35_3r  Q35_4r
(obs=992)
```

	Q35_1r	Q35_2r	Q35_3r	Q35_4r
Q35_1r	1.0000			
Q35_2r	-0.2577	1.0000		
Q35_3r	-0.2790	0.5225	1.0000	
Q35_4r	0.0436	0.1012	0.1601	1.0000

Similar observations were confirmed by a PCA analysis of all four items. Only Q35_2 and Q35_3 loaded high on one component whereas the other two items each loaded high only on separate components. An index of cultural-diversity was therefore not created, instead, a bivariate analysis was run for each of the items individually.

Figure 75 Output: PCA of cultural diversity items

```
. pca Q35_1r Q35_2r Q35_3r  Q35_4r

Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =        992
                                                  Number of comp.  =          4
                                                  Trace            =          4
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =     1.0000
```

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	1.75015	.712646	0.4375	0.4375
Comp2	1.03751	.297496	0.2594	0.6969
Comp3	.740011	.267683	0.1850	0.8819
Comp4	.472328	.	0.1181	1.0000

```
Principal components (eigenvectors)
```

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Unexplained
Q35_1r	-0.4343	0.4874	0.7547	0.0661	0
Q35_2r	0.6142	-0.0013	0.4131	-0.6724	0
Q35_3r	0.6303	0.0718	0.2524	0.7306	0
Q35_4r	0.1921	0.8702	-0.4429	-0.0983	0

A bivariate analysis with all four diversity items showed that only three items had a significant relationship with violent extremism. The strongest relationship was observed for the item 4: People with my ethnic or religious background are discriminated against in this country is highly significant at the 1% level with a positive relationship indicating that those minority groups who feel discriminated against are more likely to support violent extremism. This confirms the resentment thesis that marginalisation and discrimination are a driver for extremism among ethnic minority groups.

Two other items that have a weak significant relationship with violent extremism is the statement that diversity is enriching, which is negative. In other words, the less respondents agree on this item the more likely they are to support violent extremism. Similarly, item Q35_3 immigrants should assimilate statement is positively related, the more respondents agreed on that they more likely they are to support violent extremism. But this relationship was also only significant at the 10% level.

Figure 76 Output: Bivariate analysis of diversity items

```
. *** Bivaraite analysis: Our country's life is enriched by people coming to live he
> re from other countries (Q35_1).
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Q35_1r ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	991
				F(1, 989)	=	3.02
Model	7.9608491	1	7.9608491	Prob > F	=	0.0824
Residual	2604.69513	989	2.63366545	R-squared	=	0.0030
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0020
Total	2612.65598	990	2.63904644	Root MSE	=	1.6229

Extremism~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Q35_1r	-.06697	.0385195	-1.74	0.082	-.0551999
_cons	.2714444	.1708638	1.59	0.112	.

```
. *** Bivaraite analysis: "Immigrants should drop their former practices to adopt to
>  the cultural and religious norms of our country (Q35_2)"
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Q35_2r ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	992
				F(1, 990)	=	1.84
Model	4.84827028	1	4.84827028	Prob > F	=	0.1750
Residual	2604.8956	990	2.63120767	R-squared	=	0.0019
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0008
Total	2609.74387	991	2.63344487	Root MSE	=	1.6221

Extremism~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Q35_2r	.0525769	.0387328	1.36	0.175	.0431017
_cons	-.1426205	.1118885	-1.27	0.203	.

```
. *** Bivaraite analysis: "Too many privileges are given to foreigners/immigrants in
>  our country (Q35_3)"
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Q35_3r ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	989
				F(1, 987)	=	2.76
Model	7.27862572	1	7.27862572	Prob > F	=	0.0969
Residual	2601.77286	987	2.6360414	R-squared	=	0.0028
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0018
Total	2609.05149	988	2.64074037	Root MSE	=	1.6236

Extremism~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Q35_3r	.0597966	.0359856	1.66	0.097	.0528182
_cons	-.1744533	.1124653	-1.55	0.121	.

```
. *** Bivaraite analysis: People with my ethnic or religious background are discrimi
> nated against in this country (Q35_4).
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 Q35_4r ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	984
				F(1, 982)	=	9.62
Model	25.1365172	1	25.1365172	Prob > F	=	0.0020
Residual	2567.19934	982	2.61425595	R-squared	=	0.0097
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0087
Total	2592.33586	983	2.63716771	Root MSE	=	1.6169

Extremism~13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
Q35_4r	.0982527	.0316859	3.10	0.002	.0984707
_cons	-.284833	.1048083	-2.72	0.007	.

Gender equality attitudes

The H2020 Participation survey asked two sets of attitudinal questions to measure misogyny and anti-gender equality and anti-sexuality rights attitudes. These sentiments are often associated with right-wing groups but also with Incels who have carried out terrorist attacks in recent years. The characteristically nostalgic, mythic past in which women and men are destined to fulfil biological roles still lingers into the ideology of the far-right movements. Women are seen as fulfillers of their domestic destiny, wives and bearers of the future generation that will fix the declining birth rate and save humanity. Elise Thomas writes that the most common feature which unites extremist (online) communities - from national populists in Europe, pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine to white supremacists in the US and Islamic State supporters in the Middle East and Asia, is a fundamental disrespect for women. Thomas argues that "each of these ideologies, in its own way, propagates strict conceptions about the role of women, undermines their agency and autonomy and—with varying degrees of openness—advocates violence against women who dare to transgress the limits imposed on them". The vitriolic hate found online is, as Thomas writes, transgressing the dark reaches of the internet into the physical world[34]

This context highlights the importance of engaging with the question of gender equality in this survey, in particular in the light of the pervasive presence of the kind of themes discussed above. The questions were phrased in the following way:

Q36 Below are some statements concerning issues of equality in the society. How much do you disagree or agree with the following statements?

1. *We need more people who speak up for the rights of men.*
2. *Feminism has destroyed the family structures and values of the Western world.*
3. *Diversity, gay-rights and gender equality have gone too far.*
4. *When women demand equality these days, they actually seeking special favours.*

Q37 And here are a few statements concerning women in contemporary society. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree with each statement.

1. *Women should be cherished & protected by men*
2. *Women seek to gain power by getting control over men*
3. *Women can make men feel insignificant.*

Figure 77 shows the mean scores for questions on equality rights mainly concerning gender but also sexual and cultural groups. What strikes out is the first statement on the need to speak up for men's rights, which has relatively high levels of agreement in Italy. Anti-feminist statements and anti-gay sentiments have the highest support in Greece, Belgium and the UK. Poland, Romania and Italy seem to agree less on anti-feminist statement. However, overall these scores are very low which indicated that the majority of respondents are not endorsing these views.

[34] Elise Thomas, 2020, The national security implications of extreme misogyny, The Strategist, see at < https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-national-security-implications-of-extreme-misogyny/>

Figure 77 Gender equality attitudes items by country, mean scores



Measured on a 6-point Likert scale where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somehow disagree, 4= somehow agree, 5=agree, 6= strongly agree.

Figure 78 below shows the breakdown of these items by gender. Unlike the breakdown by country in the previous graph, in this graph a clearer pattern is observable. On all the four items, women tend to agree less than men on these items.

Figure 78 Gender equality attitudes by gender, mean scores



Measured on a 6-point Likert scale where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somehow disagree, 4= somehow agree, 5=agree, 6= strongly agree.

Overall, these 4 questions tend to tap into different types of sentiments, and a PCA analysis with only these four items did not reduce the dimensions to one meaningful dimension (output not shown here).

The next set of questions aiming to capture misogyny are represented in Figure 79. Here the first statement on women to be cherished and protected by men stand out as it has the highest level of agreement across countries with Italy and Romania with the highest scores. The statement that women seek to gain power by getting control over men have the lowest level of agreement across countries with

the greatest contrast between Italy (2.11) and UK (3.06). The statement that women can make men feel insignificant, a statement commonly found in Incel forums and memes, also varies across countries with the highest level of agreement being in the UK (3.72) followed by Romania (3.50) and Greece (3.41).

Figure 79 Attitudes towards women by country, mean scores



Measured on a 6-point Likert scale where 1= strongly disagree, 2= disagree, 3= somehow disagree, 4= somehow agree, 5=agree, 6= strongly agree.

Figure 80 shows the gender breakdown. There seems to be not a big difference between men and women in relation to the questions on women being cherished and protected. However, for the other two items, not surprisingly men tend to have on average higher levels of agreement.

Figure 80 Attitudes towards women by gender, mean scores



The output below shows the result of a correlation analysis for the two sets of questions on gender equality and feminism. The correlation matrix shows that the two items (Q36_1 speaking up for men's rights and Q37_1 women should be cherished and protected by men and) have a low correlation with the other variables. This reflects the observation we made in the cross-tabulations.

Figure 81 Output: Correlation matrix of anti-gender inequality items

```
. *Correlation of all  anti-gender equality and anti-women items
. *Q36_1 Need to speak up for men's rights
. *Q36_2 Feminism destroyed western family values
. *Q36_3 gender equality gone too far
. *Q36_4 women seek special favours
. *Q37_1 Women to be cherished and protected by men
. *Q37_2 women seek control over women
. *Q37_3 Women can make men feel insignificant
. corr Q36_1r Q36_2r Q36_3r Q36_4r  Q37_1r Q37_2r Q37_3r
(obs=994)
```

	Q36_1r	Q36_2r	Q36_3r	Q36_4r	Q37_1r	Q37_2r	Q37_3r
Q36_1r	1.0000						
Q36_2r	0.1217	1.0000					
Q36_3r	0.0717	0.6071	1.0000				
Q36_4r	0.1087	0.6705	0.5994	1.0000			
Q37_1r	0.1479	0.1220	0.2034	0.0410	1.0000		
Q37_2r	0.0725	0.5673	0.5001	0.6458	0.1540	1.0000	
Q37_3r	0.1336	0.3237	0.2347	0.3337	0.1636	0.4776	1.0000

A PCA analysis with all items (output not shown here) also revealed that Q37_3 (Women make men feel insignificant) was also not loading high on any of the dimensions. In order to create a strong anti-gender equality index, these three variables were excluded from the final PCA analysis that we carried out with the remaining variables in order to have one component that measured clearly anti-gender attitudes.

The output below (Figure 82) shows the PCA analysis of the following items that correlated highly with each other in the correlation analysis above. The final variable included to create the anti-gender index are:

Q36_2 Feminism has destroyed the family structures and values of the Western world.
Q36_3 Diversity, gay-rights and gender equality have gone too far.
Q36_3 When women demand equality these days, they actually seeking special favours.
Q37_2 Women seek to gain power by getting control over men

Figure 82 Output: PCA analysis of anti-gender items

```
. *Principal component analysis of anti-gender equality and anti-women items and creating the
> AntiGenderEqualityIndex
.  *Q36_2 Feminism destroyed western family values
. *Q36_3 gender equality gone too far
. *Q36_4 women seek special favours
. *Q37_2 women seek control over women
. pca Q36_2r Q36_3r Q36_4r Q37_2r

Principal components/correlation                  Number of obs    =        996
                                                  Number of comp.  =          4
                                                  Trace            =          4
    Rotation: (unrotated = principal)             Rho              =     1.0000
```

Component	Eigenvalue	Difference	Proportion	Cumulative
Comp1	2.7943	2.28036	0.6986	0.6986
Comp2	.51394	.130292	0.1285	0.8271
Comp3	.383648	.0755394	0.0959	0.9230
Comp4	.308108	.	0.0770	1.0000

Principal components (eigenvectors)

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4	Unexplained
Q36_2r	0.5108	-0.1915	-0.6860	0.4814	0
Q36_3r	0.4819	-0.6593	0.5753	0.0461	0
Q36_4r	0.5247	0.1373	-0.2171	-0.8116	0
Q37_2r	0.4811	0.7140	0.3890	0.3278	0

```
. predict AntiGenderEqualityIndex
(score assumed)
(3 components skipped)

Scoring coefficients
    sum of squares(column-loading) = 1
```

Variable	Comp1	Comp2	Comp3	Comp4
Q36_2r	0.5108	-0.1915	-0.6860	0.4814
Q36_3r	0.4819	-0.6593	0.5753	0.0461
Q36_4r	0.5247	0.1373	-0.2171	-0.8116
Q37_2r	0.4811	0.7140	0.3890	0.3278

Next, we carried out a bivariate regression analysis of violent extremism with the anti-gender equality Index. The result shown in the output below show a highly significant and positive relationship between these two variables. Thus, *the higher the scores or agreement on the anti-gender equality statements, the more likely they also agree on violent extremism statements*.

Figure 83 Output: Bivariate analysis of Anti-gender equality items

```
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 AntiGenderEqualityIndex ,beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	986
				F(1, 984)	=	48.16
Model	121.459008	1	121.459008	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	2481.43881	984	2.52178741	R-squared	=	0.0467
				Adj R-squared	=	0.0457
Total	2602.89782	985	2.64253586	Root MSE	=	1.588

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
AntiGenderEqualityIndex	.2098713	.0302407	6.94	0.000	.2160162
_cons	-.0043948	.0505727	-0.09	0.931	.

So far, we have described and explored the data through cross-tabulations and principal component analysis. We have also examined each variable or set of variables through bivariate analysis to look how they relate to violent extremism. Given the comparative element of this survey, as well as the differences in sample composition, the results are far more complex than narrated in this report. We have tried to focus on the main trends and patterns and hope that the reader is able to explore more by reading the graphs and tables with more attention. In the next step we run a series of regression models starting with the base model which includes dummy variables for each country and the basic socio-demographic variables. In order to have a meaningful analysis, we run different models exploring different relationships such as social conflict, online activity, conspiracies and anti-gender attitudes. The final model includes all the variables that appeared significant in these regression models. While most of the strong relationship between an explanatory variable and violent extremism that was observed in a bivariate relationship disappeared once the country variable, socio-demographic variables and other relevant variables were taking into account, this does not mean that particular variable is not important, but rather that variations in this variable is explained by the other co-variates. Given that the sample was not randomly selected and the differences in sample selection between countries all results need to be interpreted with caution.

3 Regression Analysis

Several regression models were run to explore the effect of a number of explanatory variables on violent extremism.

Model I: Base model with socio-demographic variables

Model1: Base model with socio-demographic variables, country dummy variables and objective social class indicators (parent's higher education, main household earner being in employment, single parent household, all coded as 0/1)). Building on this base model other variables were added to regression models.

Model 1 shows, that controlling for the country variables and other socio-demographic variables, those who are **age 15/16** are more likely than the age groups 16, 18 and 19-23 to support violent extremism, and this relationship is significant between age 15/16 and age 18. **Women** compared to men are less likely to support violence extremism and this gender difference remains throughout the models. Those with **other religion** and those with **no religion** are significantly more likely than the Christian group to support violent extremism, and the country difference observed in this base model remains throughout the models. **Taking the UK as the base country, support for violent extremism is significantly lower in Italy, Belgium and Greece. There is no difference between the UK and Poland.**

The model also includes three measures of social class or socio-economic position. They include dummies for either parent having Higher Education level i.e. University degree and above, whether main household earner is in employment, and single parent household (incl. a small number of those having other living arrangements). These variables will remain in all the models as control variables for objective socio-economic measures. Other measures of social class are subjective measures and will be discussed in the next model.

Table 29 Model 1: Multiple linear regression of violent extremism: Base model with socio-demographic variables

```
. **Model 1 Base model with basic socio-demographic variables and social class
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 i.age female OtherGender  EthnicMinority NoReligion Muslim   Relig
> ionOther Italy Belgium Romania Poland Greece  ParentsEducationHE employedD  SingleParentHH,
> beta

      Source |       SS           df       MS      Number of obs   =       955
-------------+----------------------------------   F(17, 937)      =      7.13
       Model |  289.43493        17  17.0255841   Prob > F        =    0.0000
    Residual |  2237.09679       937  2.38750991   R-squared       =    0.1146
-------------+----------------------------------   Adj R-squared   =    0.0985
       Total |  2526.53172       954  2.6483561   Root MSE        =    1.5452
```

Model 1 Base Model

	Coef.	SE	t	p-value	95% CI
Age group (Age 15/16 base)					
17	-0.16	0.15	-1.06	0.2912	[-0.45, 0.13]
18	-0.37	0.18	-2.09	0.0365**	[-0.71,-0.02]
19-23	-0.13	0.24	-0.53	0.5928	[-0.60, 0.34]
Gender (Male base)					
Female	-0.49	0.11	-4.60	0.0000***	[-0.70,-0.28]
Other Gender	0.28	0.26	1.06	0.2873	[-0.24, 0.80]
Ethnic Minority	0.20	0.14	1.37	0.1709	[-0.08, 0.48]
Religion (Christian base)					
No Religion	0.29	0.12	2.42	0.0159**	[0.05, 0.53]
Muslim	0.13	0.22	0.61	0.5409	[-0.29, 0.56]
Religion Other	0.41	0.22	1.85	0.0644*	[-0.02, 0.84]
Country (UK base)					
Italy	-0.70	0.22	-3.10	0.0020***	[-1.14,-0.26]
Belgium	-0.82	0.19	-4.23	0.0000***	[-1.20,-0.44]
Romania	-0.67	0.23	-2.95	0.0033***	[-1.11,-0.22]
Poland	0.10	0.23	0.41	0.6788	[-0.36, 0.55]
Greece	-0.64	0.18	-3.52	0.0004***	[-1.00,-0.28]
Parents (Higher Education)	-0.05	0.11	-0.45	0.6561	[-0.27, 0.17]
Main HH earner in employment	-0.14	0.12	-1.13	0.2588	[-0.38, 0.10]
Single Parent HH	-0.11	0.11	-0.94	0.3463	[-0.33, 0.12]
Intercept	0.88	0.22	4.09	0.0000	[0.46, 1.30]

Model II: Social control and psychological wellbeing

Model 2 builds on the base models and adds other indicators of social conflict as well psychology and mental health indicators. Before reporting on the final social control models, a number of models were run to explore these variables in a multivariate analysis after controlling for socio-demographic variables.

The social conflict indicators include the following diverse variables: having conflict and financial difficulties when growing up, trouble at school, getting involved in fights, having family or friends to talk when having problems, social activities compared to others, and the two neighbourhood cohesion items. First, all indicators of social conflict were added separately to the base model. Out of these, the following variables appeared to be significant: **getting into trouble at school with school authorities** (p=0.000, beta=-.1248), **getting into fights at school** (p=0.001, beta=-0.1248), **conflict within household when growing up** (p=0.012, beta=-0.08), and **talking to family members when having problems** (p=0.05, beta=0.0637). Unlike in a bivariate analysis, in a multivariate analysis, the neighbourhood variables did not show any significant relationship with violent extremism. In another model, all of these four social conflict variables were added to the base model and the result showed that only the variable **getting into trouble at school remained significant** (p=0.003, beta= -0.1131) after controlling for the socio-demographic variables.

A similar step was followed for the psychology and mental health items. The following items showed a significant relationship with violent extremism in a regression analysis controlled for socio-demographic variables: **psychological wellbeing index** (p=0.008, beta -0.088), **life-worthwhile** (p=0.004, beta=-0.0919), and **Depression item feeling worthless** (p=0.01, beta=0.0843).

In order to explore the effect on psychological wellbeing on violent extremism further, instead of using the index, the six psychological well-being indicators were included to the base models separately. The result showed that controlling for socio-demographic variables the following variables appeared significant: **Q26_2 I can control how I behave** *(self-management)* (p=0.000, beta 0.112). and **Q26_3 I feel responsible for how I act** *(responsible decision making)* (p=0.001, beta -0.103), **Q26_6 I am good at deciding right from wrongs** *(responsible decision making)* (p=0.078, beta -0.0559). The last two variables have a negative relationship with violent extremism and the particularly the first two variables are highly significant. Thus, it is probably these three variables that drives the significant relationship we have seen of the Psychological well-being index (results not shown here).

Following this analysis, another model was run with all these variables (the three significant indicators of psychological wellbeing dummies (Q26_2, Q26_3, Q26_6), the depression item on life being worthless (dummy), and the life being-worthwhile measure which is a continuous variable. The results showed (output not shown here) that the item **Q26_2 "I can control how I behave"** still remained significant at the 5% level (p=0.046, beta 0.0739) and **Q26_3 feeling responsible for own actions**, still remained significant but at the 10% (p=0.087, beta=-0.065). This means, that out of the various measures of mental wellbeing, these two variables are strong indicators of violent extremism. This is an area that needs further exploration but initial analysis suggests that strengthening self-management and responsible decision-making capabilities of young people can be conducive to lower the risk of support of violent extremism.

Finally, all these social conflict and psychological indicators were added into one model as they are all interrelated. For example psychological well-being might explain the variation on having trouble at school or getting into fights. Thus model 2 builds on the base model and takes into account other social conflict and psychological well-being indicators. The results as shown in Table 30 shows that shows that **getting into trouble at school** and **feeling responsible for one's action** retain their significance in the social control and psychological well-being model.

Table 30 Model 2: Multiple linear regression of violent extremism; social conflict and psychological well-being model

```
. **Model 2 Base model with relevant social conflict and psycholigcal wellbeing items
. *Q26_2r: I can control how I behave (self-management)
. *Q26_3r: I feel responsible for how I act (responsible decision makin
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 i.age female OtherGender  EthnicMinority NoReligion Muslim   Relig
> ionOther Italy Belgium Romania Poland Greece  ParentsEducationHE employedD  SingleParentHH
> HHconflictGrowingUp_Q30  TroubleSchool_Q32 FightsPhysVerbal_Q33  Problems_TalkFamily_Q27 Q26
> _2r Q26_3r  , beta
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
Model	347.254633	23	15.0980275	Prob > F	0.0000
Residual	1917.40793	842	2.27720657	R-squared	0.1533
Total	2264.66256	865	2.61810701	Root MSE	1.509

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	Beta
age					
17	-.0767393	.1536434	-0.50	0.618	-.0210444
18	-.2162511	.1842332	-1.17	0.241	-.0660085
19-23	-.1194323	.249597	-0.48	0.632	-.0202616
female	-.5571628	.1117503	-4.99	0.000	-.1703178
OtherGender	-.1735055	.275449	-0.63	0.529	-.0216985
EthnicMinority	.1359854	.147733	0.92	0.358	.0370868
NoReligion	.2511085	.1247625	2.01	0.044	.0714827
Muslim	.0024093	.2310644	0.01	0.992	.0004034
ReligionOther	.2594407	.2302742	1.13	0.260	.0374203
Italy	-1.022936	.2482569	-4.12	0.000	-.2529166
Belgium	-.8998416	.2009918	-4.48	0.000	-.1881338
Romania	-.7877409	.2355135	-3.34	0.001	-.1646964
Poland	-.063124	.2385382	-0.26	0.791	-.0147719
Greece	-.9743187	.1964559	-4.96	0.000	-.2474294
ParentsEducationHE	.0392683	.1124658	0.35	0.727	.0121257
employedD	-.0352712	.1321956	-0.27	0.790	-.0091269
SingleParentHH	-.1908683	.1215597	-1.57	0.117	-.0536115
HHconflictGrowingUp_Q30	-.0640557	.0481705	-1.33	0.184	-.0473599
TroubleSchool_Q32	-.1432688	.0525508	-2.73	0.007	-.1044209
FightsPhysVerbal_Q33	-.0728856	.0605295	-1.20	0.229	-.0509514
Problems_TalkFamily_Q27	.073196	.0540407	1.35	0.176	.0462396
Q26_2r	.0639102	.0526962	1.21	0.226	.0450631
Q26_3r	-.1036625	.0581739	-1.78	0.075	-.0665184
_cons	2.223385	.5472257	4.06	0.000	.

Model III: Spare time activities model

In the bivariate analysis a number of spare time activities showed to have significant effect on violent extremism. We run several models including each time one of the spare time activities to the socio-demographic model. The results (not shown here) showed that only spending spare time with family (p=0.020, beta=-0.065) and doing sports or going to gym (p=0.042, beta=-0.073) shows to have a significantly negative effect on violent extremism. Model 3 therefore includes these two spare time activities in addition to the socio-demographic variables. The result shows, that even when controlling for the socio-demographic variables**, spending time to talk to family** and **getting physically active by playing sports of going to gym** has a negative effect on supporting the use violence for political purposes.

Table 31 Model 3 Multiple linear regression with violent extremism: spare time activities

```
.
. regress ExtremismIndexQ13 i.age female OtherGender  EthnicMinority NoReligion Muslim   Relig
> ionOther Italy Belgium Romania Poland Greece  ParentsEducationHE employedD  SingleParentHH
>  SpareTime_TalkFamily_Q5_20  SpareTime_SportsGym_Q5_13
```

Source	SS	df	MS		
				Number of obs	= 955
				F(19, 935)	= 6.87
Model	309.440249	19	16.2863289	Prob > F	= 0.0000
Residual	2217.09147	935	2.37122082	R-squared	= 0.1225
				Adj R-squared	= 0.1046
Total	2526.53172	954	2.6483561	Root MSE	= 1.5399

ExtremismIndexQ13	Coefficient	Std. err.	t	P>|t|	[95% conf.	interval]
age						
17	-.1725967	.147138	-1.17	0.241	-.4613557	.1161624
18	-.393105	.1758217	-2.24	0.026	-.7381558	-.0480542
19-23	-.1489169	.240206	-0.62	0.535	-.6203222	.3224884
female	-.5094107	.1087148	-4.69	0.000	-.722764	-.2960574
OtherGender	.2104355	.2644199	0.80	0.426	-.3084898	.7293608
EthnicMinority	.1879003	.1427354	1.32	0.188	-.0922185	.4680191
NoReligion	.2344946	.1215005	1.93	0.054	-.0039506	.4729399
Muslim	.0920484	.2162053	0.43	0.670	-.3322555	.5163524
ReligionOther	.3887646	.2182756	1.78	0.075	-.0396022	.8171315
Italy	-.6852412	.2239007	-3.06	0.002	-1.124647	-.2458351
Belgium	-.7723594	.19413	-3.98	0.000	-1.15334	-.3913784
Romania	-.663011	.2255393	-2.94	0.003	-1.105633	-.2203892
Poland	.1127697	.2298452	0.49	0.624	-.3383025	.563842
Greece	-.6818493	.1825396	-3.74	0.000	-1.040084	-.3236144
ParentsEducationHE	-.0317987	.1099262	-0.29	0.772	-.2475294	.183932
employedD	-.1321317	.1225239	-1.08	0.281	-.3725854	.108322
SingleParentHH	-.1260589	.1143864	-1.10	0.271	-.3505428	.0984249
SpareTime_TalkFamily_Q5_20	-.2240492	.1084949	-2.07	0.039	-.4369709	-.0111276
SpareTime_SportsGym_Q5_13	-.1896562	.108913	-1.74	0.082	-.4033984	.0240861
_cons	1.070729	.2246981	4.77	0.000	.6297578	1.5117

Model IV: Online activities and behaviour

Model 4 includes all the online activity attitudes and behaviours. Among the variables concerning what you do when you go online, **'watching videos'** remained significant in this model. Two further variables that measured attitudes on hate messages and memes, remained significant as well. Those who stated that **"It is OK to send hateful or degrading messages against someone online if they start to attack you, your friends or family first" (Q21_1)** are also significantly more likely to also agree on the violent extremism statement, while those tend to agree that **"Sharing or posting hate speech memes online is the same as making hurtful or degrading comments to someone face-to-face." (Q21_4)** are less likely to support violent extremism. **Having experienced hate speech online and having experienced online recruitment** are also both significant in this model which considers socio-demographic characteristics together with types of online behaviour.

Table 32 Model 4 Multiple linear regression with violent extremism and online activity and behaviour

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	892
				F(40, 851)	=	4.69
Model	415.406238	40	10.3851559	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	1883.29116	851	2.21303309	R-squared	=	0.1807
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1422
Total	2298.6974	891	2.5799073	Root MSE	=	1.4876

Model 4

	Coef.	SE	t	p-value	95% CI
Age group (Age 15/16 base)					
17	-0.18	0.15	-1.20	0.2308	[-0.47, 0.11]
18	-0.27	0.18	-1.54	0.1239	[-0.62, 0.08]
19-23	-0.15	0.25	-0.59	0.5576	[-0.65, 0.35]
Gender (Male base)					
Female	-0.22	0.13	-1.77	0.0778*	[-0.47, 0.03]
Other Gender	0.48	0.28	1.67	0.0943*	[-0.08, 1.04]
Ethnic Minority	0.12	0.15	0.83	0.4078	[-0.17, 0.42]
Religion (Christian base)					
No Religion	0.25	0.12	2.05	0.0405**	[0.01, 0.49]
Muslim	0.12	0.22	0.55	0.5816	[-0.31, 0.55]
Religion Other	0.36	0.22	1.63	0.1040	[-0.07, 0.80]
Country (UK base)					
Italy	-0.68	0.24	-2.86	0.0044**	[-1.14,-0.21]
Belgium	-0.69	0.20	-3.44	0.0006**	[-1.09,-0.30]
Romania	-0.71	0.23	-3.02	0.0026**	[-1.17,-0.25]
Poland	0.09	0.25	0.36	0.7157	[-0.40, 0.58]
Greece	-0.55	0.20	-2.73	0.0064**	[-0.95,-0.16]
Parents (Higher Education)	-0.07	0.11	-0.62	0.5335	[-0.29, 0.15]
Main HH earner in employment	-0.16	0.13	-1.24	0.2159	[-0.40, 0.09]
Single Parent HH	-0.16	0.12	-1.36	0.1747	[-0.39, 0.07]
WhenOnline_Gaming_Q9_2	-0.01	0.05	-0.12	0.9050	[-0.11, 0.09]
WhenOnline_Watching_videos_Q9_3	0.12	0.06	2.04	0.0412*	[0.00, 0.23]

WhenOnline_UploadVideos_Q9_6	-0.09	0.06	-1.51	0.1318	[-0.20, 0.03]
WhenOnline_SearchInfo_Q9_8	0.04	0.06	0.61	0.5432	[-0.08, 0.15]
WhenOnline_Schoolwork_Q9_4	-0.05	0.05	-0.84	0.4026	[-0.15, 0.06]
WhenOnline_ChatPeople_Q9_1	0.03	0.06	0.53	0.5937	[-0.08, 0.14]
WhenOnline_BlogsForums_Q9_5	-0.03	0.06	-0.46	0.6432	[-0.14, 0.09]
WhenOnline_ReadNews_Q9_9	0.02	0.05	0.32	0.7474	[-0.09, 0.12]
WhenOnline_SellBuyThings_Q9_7	-0.10	0.07	-1.41	0.1595	[-0.23, 0.04]
SocialMedia_FactCheckInfo_Q10_3	-0.07	0.04	-1.57	0.1157	[-0.16, 0.02]
SocialMedia_InformationAll_Q10_1	0.03	0.05	0.54	0.5891	[-0.07, 0.12]
SocialMedia_InfoTrust_Q10_2	0.00	0.05	-0.03	0.9767	[-0.11, 0.10]
OnlineMyself_Q11_1	-0.03	0.04	-0.68	0.4996	[-0.10, 0.05]
OnlineThinkers_Q11_2	0.07	0.05	1.53	0.1271	[-0.02, 0.16]
OnlineGuidance_Q11_3	-0.04	0.04	-0.98	0.3277	[-0.12, 0.04]
RetaliateHateMessageOK_Q21_1	0.14	0.04	3.73	0.0002***	[0.07, 0.21]
PostHateMemesFun_Q21_3	0.05	0.04	1.23	0.2172	[-0.03, 0.14]
PostHateSameInPerson_Q21_4	-0.06	0.03	-1.87	0.0623*	[-0.13, 0.00]
HateExperiencedOnlineQ19	0.21	0.12	1.67	0.0946*	[-0.04, 0.45]
HateSeenOnline_Q16	0.09	0.13	0.66	0.5075	[-0.17, 0.34]
HateHeardinPerson_Q15	0.07	0.12	0.60	0.5507	[-0.16, 0.29]
HateExperiencedInPerson_Q17	-0.05	0.12	-0.46	0.6441	[-0.29, 0.18]
Experienced online recruitment	0.24	0.11	2.19	0.0291**	[0.02, 0.46]
Intercept	0.25	0.48	0.53	0.5980	[-0.68, 1.19]

Model V: Political activity and political orientation

Model 5 incudes all the political activity and political orientation variables including the conspiracy index, anti-gender equality index and diversity questions. In this model, there doesn't seem to be significant relationship between political left and political right compared to the base category of political central. However, in a model run separately with the base model including political orientation, **those who indicated that they are more on the right of the political scale, were more likely to support violent extremism** (results not shown here). This relationship disappeared in Model 5 as the difference is accounted for by other factors in the model. Out of the political involvement indicators, controlling for all the other variables in the model, only the activity, **"contacted a politician, government or local government official" remains significant**. Moreover, **the conspiracy index and anti-gender index remained significant** while the questions on tolerance of diversity remained not significant. The effect of the perceived group discrimination variable on violent extremism disappears in this model once controlled for socio-demographic variables as the variance is probably explained by the ethnic and religious composition of the countries.

Table 33 Model 5 Multiple linear regression with violent extremism; political activity and political orientations

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	899
				F(36, 862)	=	4.50
Model	385.960338	36	10.7211205	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	2054.12398	862	2.38297445	R-squared	=	0.1582
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1230
Total	2440.08431	898	2.71724311	Root MSE	=	1.5437

Model 5

	Coef.	SE	t	p-value	95% CI
Age group (Age 15/16 base)					
17	-0.18	0.15	-1.15	0.2514	[-0.47, 0.12]
18	-0.38	0.18	-2.07	0.0388**	[-0.73,-0.02]
19-23	-0.31	0.25	-1.23	0.2207	[-0.80, 0.19]
Gender (Male base)					
Female	-0.21	0.13	-1.65	0.0995*	[-0.46, 0.04]
Other Gender	0.32	0.27	1.15	0.2492	[-0.22, 0.85]
Ethnic Minority	0.13	0.15	0.86	0.3886	[-0.17, 0.43]
Religion (Christian base)					
No Religion	0.40	0.13	3.14	0.0017***	[0.15, 0.65]
Muslim	-0.07	0.23	-0.28	0.7758	[-0.52, 0.39]
Religion Other	0.39	0.23	1.68	0.0927*	[-0.07, 0.85]
Country (UK base)					
Italy	-0.53	0.25	-2.15	0.0317**	[-1.01,-0.05]
Belgium	-0.78	0.20	-3.83	0.0001***	[-1.18,-0.38]
Romania	-0.56	0.24	-2.36	0.0184**	[-1.03,-0.10]
Poland	0.15	0.25	0.62	0.5383	[-0.33, 0.64]
Greece	-0.84	0.20	-4.15	0.0000***	[-1.23,-0.44]
Parents (Higher Education)	-0.02	0.12	-0.17	0.8617	[-0.25, 0.21]
Main HH earner in employment	-0.13	0.13	-0.99	0.3241	[-0.38, 0.13]
Single Parent HH	-0.16	0.12	-1.37	0.1717	[-0.40, 0.07]
Political orientation (Central)					
Left	0.07	0.14	0.50	0.6153	[-0.21, 0.36]
Right	0.08	0.16	0.48	0.6349	[-0.24, 0.39]
Political involvement					
Signed a petition	-0.10	0.13	-0.75	0.4524	[-0.36, 0.16]
Posted or shared anything about politics	0.01	0.13	0.08	0.9400	[-0.25, 0.27]
Worked in a political party of action group	0.39	0.38	1.02	0.3079	[-0.36, 1.14]
Contacted a politician, government or local official	0.53	0.31	1.75	0.0811*	[-0.07, 1.14]
Worked in another organisation/association	-0.02	0.22	-0.10	0.9174	[-0.45, 0.41]
Boycotted certain products	0.17	0.20	0.84	0.4018	[-0.23, 0.57]
Taken part in lawful public demonstration	0.26	0.16	1.59	0.1116	[-0.06, 0.58]
Given time to help a charity/cause)	-0.04	0.13	-0.28	0.7794	[-0.29, 0.22]
Helped improve your local area/environment	-0.16	0.15	-1.06	0.2879	[-0.45, 0.13]
Political involvement. Other	-0.11	0.17	-0.64	0.5242	[-0.43, 0.22]

Political involvement: None of these	-0.04	0.15	-0.26	0.7974	[-0.34, 0.26]
Conspiracy Index	0.08	0.03	2.83	0.0047**	[0.02, 0.14]
Anti-gender Equality Index	0.17	0.04	4.04	0.0001***	[0.09, 0.25]
MyGroupDiscriminatedQ35_4	0.04	0.04	0.99	0.3221	[-0.04, 0.11]
DiversityEnrichingQ35_1	0.00	0.04	-0.02	0.9817	[-0.09, 0.08]
ForeignersPrivilidgedQ35_3	0.04	0.05	0.73	0.4646	[-0.06, 0.13]
ImmigrantAssimilateQ35_2	-0.05	0.05	-0.95	0.3433	[-0.14, 0.05]
Intercept	0.63	0.36	1.77	0.0771	[-0.07, 1.34]

Model 6: The final model

The final model adds the items that appeared to have a significant effect on violent extremism in Model 2-5 controlling for socio-demographic variables i.e. base model. In this final model, the age difference between 15/16- and 18-year-olds remains. Interestingly, the gender difference is not significant anymore and this is probably due to the other variable explaining most of the variation in gender, such as the anti-gender equality index which as explored previously showed great variation between men and women. The country differences remained significant and is something that needs to be explored further. In this final model, respondents from single parent household seems to be less likely to support violent extremism. This variable was used as an indicator of social class. However, it could also reflect social norms. As explored previously, single parent household consists mainly of women, which might explain this negative effect on violent extremism. One of the strongest predictors in this model is the statement that it's ok to retaliate against hate messages and memes online. This probably explains the variations in the variable experiences of online recruitment, and experiences of online hate speech, which don't appear as significant in the final model.

Table 34 Model 6 Multiple linear regression with violent extremism; final model

Source	SS	df	MS	Number of obs	=	852
				F(29, 822)	=	6.29
Model	415.049908	29	14.3120658	Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	1871.01059	822	2.2761686	R-squared	=	0.1816
				Adj R-squared	=	0.1527
Total	2286.0605	851	2.68632256	Root MSE	=	1.5087

Model 6

	Coef.	SE	t	p-value	95% CI
Age group (Age 15/16 base)					
17	-0.23	0.15	-1.51	0.132	[-0.53, 0.07]
18	-0.30	0.18	-1.66	0.098*	[-0.66, 0.06]
19-23	-0.33	0.25	-1.29	0.198	[-0.83, 0.17]
Gender (Male base)					
Female	-0.16	0.13	-1.23	0.221	[-0.42, 0.10]
Other Gender	0.32	0.28	1.15	0.250	[-0.23, 0.87]
Ethnic Minority	0.06	0.15	0.39	0.697	[-0.24, 0.35]
Religion (Christian base)					
No Religion	0.37	0.13	2.86	0.004***	[0.12, 0.62]
Muslim	0.05	0.23	0.22	0.828	[-0.40, 0.50]
Religion Other	0.25	0.23	1.05	0.292	[-0.21, 0.71]
Country (UK base)					
Italy	-0.52	0.24	-2.19	0.029**	[-0.99,-0.05]
Belgium	-0.65	0.20	-3.19	0.001***	[-1.05,-0.25]
Romania	-0.63	0.23	-2.70	0.007***	[-1.09,-0.17]
Poland	0.17	0.25	0.68	0.498	[-0.32, 0.65]
Greece	-0.83	0.21	-3.99	0.000***	[-1.24,-0.42]
Parents (Higher Education)	0.01	0.12	0.09	0.930	[-0.22, 0.24]
Main HH earner in employment	-0.04	0.13	-0.31	0.760	[-0.30, 0.22]
Single Parent HH	-0.24	0.12	-1.90	0.058*	[-0.48, 0.01]
HH subjective income	-0.03	0.07	-0.43	0.669	[-0.17, 0.11]
HHconflictGrowingUp_Q30	-0.04	0.05	-0.85	0.398	[-0.14, 0.06]
TroubleSchool_Q32	-0.06	0.05	-1.12	0.262	[-0.16, 0.04]
SpareTime_TalkFamily_Q5_20	-0.16	0.12	-1.40	0.162	[-0.39, 0.06]
WhenOnline_Watching_videos_Q9_3	0.08	0.06	1.32	0.188	[-0.04, 0.19]
RetaliateHateMessageOK_Q21_1	0.13	0.04	3.69	0.000***	[0.06, 0.20]
Posting hate online the same as in person Q21_4	-0.02	0.03	-0.67	0.501	[-0.09, 0.04]
HateExperiencedOnlineQ19	0.16	0.12	1.33	0.183	[-0.08, 0.41]
Experienced online recruitment	0.16	0.12	1.35	0.178	[-0.07, 0.38]
Pol. Inv: Contacted a pol./gov official	0.35	0.29	1.20	0.232	[-0.22, 0.92]
Conspiracy Index	0.07	0.03	2.33	0.020**	[0.01, 0.13]
Anti-gender Equality Index	0.12	0.04	3.07	0.002***	[0.04, 0.20]
Intercept	0.48	0.51	0.95	0.344	[-0.51, 1.47]

4 Discussion and Conclusion

The aim of this report is to detail the objectives of the Participation survey, the work undertaken in relation to it, to offer an initial presentation of the data generated, and to start the process of analysing this. Consistent with European Union research policy, the data generated through this survey is 'Open Data', and will be made available to researchers who wish to explore the data and construct new questions and analyses.

The analysis presented in this report is thus limited to an overview of themes, issues and findings. At the centre of the data analysis undertaken is the construction of a Violent Extremism Index, based on the responses to four questions that between them open out the question of violence as an instrument for social change. The questions include violence against persons (kidnapping) and also 'commit attacks', without specifying what this means. Overall however the questions involve a reference to violence against persons, and in each case linked to 'causes' of fighting injustice or defending a community. This is deliberately framed in a limited way, in order to distinguish what is being discussed from hate speech or from dimensions of violence that appear to occupy an increasingly important place in contemporary extremism, such as the search to humiliate or obliterate victims, or the place of humour in extremist violence. This deliberately limited model of violence essentially considers openness to violence as a means to achieve a desired change, with references to 'kidnap' and 'commit attacks' signalling that this includes violence against the person. This was considered as far as this question should be taken given the context of this survey, and so we limited ourselves to a citizenship survey undertaken by a (former-) Member State, the United Kingdom, about using violence to achieve collective goals. As a result, the Violent Extremism Index constructed through a Principal Component Analysis should not be considered as an indicator of 'support for terrorism'. This index became the dependent variable that we explore throughout this report, either in relation to other variables (bivariate analyses) or within the context of models in an attempt to identify which factors have most impact in terms of support for violent extremism.

In our discussion of socio-demographic variables, several factors emerge. Gender is well known as a factor, with men more likely to support violent extremism than women. This survey also identifies the greater openness of very young people, aged 15-16, to support violent extremism when compared with the wider cohort who respond to this survey, and this when controlled for other variables such as indicators of social class. This is an important question to attempt to understand more, in particular because this group of young people are not typically involved in political debates. The importance of this very young group may be associated with the importance of what we have called 'subjective factors' – where a focus on 'self-control' (suggesting an instrumental relationship to the self) is positively associated with support for violent extremism, while awareness of being 'responsible for one's actions' is associated negatively. The meanings of 'responsibility' suggest an awareness of the impact of one's actions on others. Understanding this in greater depth may be of real importance for education programmes aiming at countering and preventing support for violent extremism among young people.

There are a number of very strong associations between different variables and support for violence extremism. Having friends and family that one can speak with about personal questions is associated with less support for violent extremism, while watching online videos is positively associated. However,

uploading videos, and other forms of online activity, are not associated with a positive association. These factors may all help articulate what 'resilience' may mean in the lives of young people, and the kind of agency this is associated with. Focusing on this question is an important pathway to examine as we explore this data in more depth. Experiencing the internet as a place where I will find leaders and thinkers who understand 'me' points once again to subjective dimensions linked to support for extremism, highlighted as well by the themes of 'respect' and 'disrespect' associated with stigmatisation, and here too we may have data opening out new insights into resilience, and in particular the kinds of social participation that can counter support for violent extremism.

In the data analysis undertaken above, we construct two further indexes that are both strongly associated with support for violent extremism. These are 'conspiracy theories' an 'rejection of gender equality'. The data generated by this survey opens out important paths to understand how these indexes 'work', and in what we they are associated with violent extremism. Here too we will explore these in relation to a readiness to send hateful memes or to neglect to consider the truthfulness of one's communications (highlighting a post-truth paradigm). The wider importance of digital culture in pathways to extremism emerged as central in the focus group research undertaken within this Work Package, and the survey data will be combined with this earlier research to allow w in-depth comparative analysis among different countries

We conclude this report at this point. We have described the kinds of data generated, offered an overview of the most significant variables associated with support for violent extremism, and have begun a programme of regression analysis to begin to identify the importance of these different factors and in the process construct new models of radicalisation pathways among young people in Europe. But it is of fundamental importance to note that the data presented here also points in new ways to experience resilience, and in particular the association of resilience with certainly kinds of agency and subjectivity. Generating new data to allow us to understand such resilience and the social and moral agency it involves is of fundamental importance to the PARTICIPATION project. The data generated by this survey opens out new and important empirical insights into such agency, and understanding such agency is both a scientific challenge and an ethical imperative.

5 Appendix

Appendix 1: Participant Information Sheet for Students

Information Sheet

European Youth PARTICIPATION Survey-Countering Extremism

You are being invited to take part in a research study which aims to understand social polarisation, extremism and radicalisation in different European countries.

Before you decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and discuss it with others if you wish.

Please ask if there is anything that is not clear or if you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to take part.

Thank you for reading this.

Who will conduct the research?

The project lead is led by Prof. Kevin McDonald and Dr Necla Acik, Department of Criminology and Sociology Department, Middlesex University London.

Title of the Research

European Youth PARTICIPATION Survey-Countering Extremism (2020-2023)

What is the aim of the research?

The aim of the research is to prevent extremism, radicalisation and polarisation that can lead to violence through more effective social and education policies and interventions that target at risk groups such as young people. This survey is part of a larger European research project called Horizon 2020 PARTICIPATION (Analyzing and Preventing Extremism Via Participation) (EU grant agreement No 962547).

Why have I been chosen?

We are asking young people like you, who are age 16-20 and who are still in full-time education, to take part in this online survey. We are looking to include around 1,200 young people with a wide range of views and experiences in five other European countries. In the UK this research is being carried out across several colleges in Greater Manchester and your college is one of them.

What will I have to do?

We will arrange a day with your college to come and visit your class, introduce the survey and ask you to fill in the survey online.

You will use the computers/laptops/tablets provided at school to complete the survey on your own.

You don't need to prepare in any way for the survey.

A researcher will be available for any questions prior and after you have completed the survey.

The survey takes about 20 minutes to complete. You can leave as soon as you have completed the survey. Overall your involvement will be no longer than 45 minutes.

We might come back to your college to present some general results of our research or arrange a workshop with your college to discuss some wider issues related to social polarisation, extremism and radicalisation. However, this might be a different group than yours.

Will my taking part in this study be kept confidential?

The online survey is fully anonymous. We will not keep any records of your personal details. Your college will send you an anonymous link to the survey and we won't be able to trace the submitted results to you.

What happens to the data collected?

The data collected form the online survey will be used only for research purposes. Data will be kept in a secure place on university premises for five years after the research is completed.

What happens if I do not want to take part or if I change my mind?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information sheet to keep and be asked to sign a consent form. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without detriment to yourself.

How do I give consent?

Everybody at your college age 16 and over interested in taking part at the survey will be given the link to the survey and after reading the brief introduction need to indicate whether they agree or disagree to proceed with the survey. If you don't give your consent by clicking the relevant box, the survey automatically terminates for you.

Will I be paid for participating in the research?

Nobody is being paid to take part in this survey and no incentives are offered. However, refreshments will be provided during the session that will be organised at college.

What are the possible benefits of taking part?

There is no intended benefit for you in taking part in this survey. However, the information we get from this study may help us to develop more effective social and education policies and interventions that prevents extremism, radicalisation and social polarisation.

Do I have to take part?

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. Your college will tell you in advance about the day the researcher will come to carry out this survey. You don't have to attend that session or take part in the survey. If you decide to take part you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason. A decision to withdraw at any time, or a decision not to take part, will not affect your status as a student in any way.

What will happen to the results of the research study?

Outcomes of the project will be published in academic journals and books and as blogs. We will also communicate the research findings to governments, policy makers and people working with young people. This information will be publicly available. Your college might also be interested in hearing/reading about the research outcome. All published research will be fully anonymous and no information will be published that could potentially identify any people.

Who has reviewed the research project?

The project has received ethical approval from the European Commission and the survey is currently under review by Middlesex University's Research Ethics Committee.

Contact for further information:

If you require further information, or have any questions you can contact the researcher who leads the survey in Greater Manchester. You will also be able to talk to her in person on the day she comes to the college for the session to do the survey.

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Appendix 2 Crosstab of online activity

Table 35 Crosstab of online activity by country

Online activities; how often?	***UK***	***Italy***	***Belgium***	***Romania***	***Poland***	***Greece***	***Total***
Chat with people							
Never or hardly ever	5.06%	0.87%	1.91%	2.65%	6.19%	4.98%	*3.66%*
At least every month	6.18%	1.75%	8.28%	6.62%	5.71%	4.98%	*5.32%*
Daily or almost daily	33.71%	17.47%	47.13%	26.49%	33.33%	21.27%	*28.88%*
Several times each day	28.65%	53.28%	27.39%	41.72%	31.90%	35.75%	*37.09%*
Almost all the time	26.40%	26.64%	15.29%	22.52%	22.86%	33.03%	*25.04%*
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	*100.00%*
Total (N)	178	229	157	151	210	221	*1,146*
Play games							
Never or hardly ever	22.54%	51.98%	29.49%	33.55%	40.48%	20.47%	*33.80%*
At least every month	28.32%	13.22%	28.21%	29.61%	21.43%	25.12%	*23.57%*
Daily or almost daily	33.53%	21.15%	25.00%	26.97%	27.14%	30.23%	*27.18%*
Several times each day	7.51%	10.57%	9.62%	7.89%	8.10%	15.81%	*10.15%*
Almost all the time	8.09%	3.08%	7.69%	1.97%	2.86%	8.37%	*5.30%*
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	*100.00%*
Total (N)	173	227	156	152	210	215	*1,133*
Watch videos							
Never or hardly ever	3.47%	4.46%	5.81%	2.00%	6.19%	3.69%	*4.34%*
At least every month	5.78%	17.41%	14.84%	12.67%	34.29%	5.99%	*15.59%*
Daily or almost daily	43.35%	38.39%	34.19%	40.00%	47.62%	37.79%	*40.39%*
Several times each day	28.32%	34.38%	28.39%	34.00%	8.57%	40.09%	*28.88%*
Almost all the time	19.08%	5.36%	16.77%	11.33%	3.33%	12.44%	*10.81%*
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	*100.00%*
Total (N)	173	224	155	150	210	217	*1,129*
Use blogs and/or forums							
Never or hardly ever	76.61%	60.89%	76.32%	48.03%	44.29%	35.51%	*55.69%*
At least every month	14.62%	25.78%	11.18%	34.21%	30.00%	28.50%	*24.56%*
Daily or almost daily	5.26%	9.33%	8.55%	14.47%	14.29%	19.63%	*12.19%*
Several times each day	2.34%	2.67%	3.29%	1.97%	10.00%	10.75%	*5.52%*
Almost all the time	1.17%	1.33%	0.66%	1.32%	1.43%	5.61%	*2.05%*
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	*100.00%*
Total (N)	171	225	152	152	210	214	*1,124*
Create & upload my own videos							
Never or hardly ever	59.77%	47.11%	53.29%	57.89%	57.69%	40.37%	*51.99%*
At least every month	24.71%	31.56%	33.55%	28.29%	25.00%	36.70%	*30.12%*
Daily or almost daily	10.92%	14.67%	8.55%	7.89%	10.58%	11.01%	*10.89%*
Several times each day	2.87%	4.00%	3.95%	3.29%	4.33%	7.80%	*4.52%*
Almost all the time	1.72%	2.67%	0.66%	2.63%	2.40%	4.13%	*2.48%*

Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	*100.00%*
Total (N)	174	225	152	152	208	218	*1,129*
Search for information							
Never or hardly ever	6.94%	3.10%	2.58%	0%	2.37%	4.59%	*3.35%*
At least every month	19.08%	8.85%	23.23%	5.92%	7.11%	16.51%	*13.13%*
Daily or almost daily	43.35%	37.17%	37.42%	38.82%	32.70%	36.70%	*37.44%*
Several times each day	18.50%	30.97%	23.23%	25.66%	38.39%	28.90%	*28.28%*
Almost all the time	12.14%	19.91%	13.55%	29.61%	19.43%	13.30%	*17.80%*
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	*100.00%*
Total (N)	173	226	155	152	211	218	*1,135*
Read news							
Never or hardly ever	35.63%	7.96%	25.16%	24.34%	6.73%	29.36%	*20.65%*
At least every month	31.61%	21.24%	27.10%	40.13%	12.98%	22.48%	*24.89%*
Daily or almost daily	26.44%	41.15%	34.84%	25.66%	36.06%	29.82%	*32.83%*
Several times each day	5.17%	15.93%	9.03%	6.58%	28.85%	12.84%	*13.86%*
Almost all the time	1.15%	13.72%	3.87%	3.29%	15.38%	5.50%	*7.77%*
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	*100.00%*
Total (N)	174	226	155	152	208	218	*1,133*
Do schoolwork							
Never or hardly ever	5.75%	6.64%	4.52%	3.33%	4.76%	24.09%	*8.81%*
At least every month	21.84%	9.29%	20.65%	26.67%	15.71%	33.18%	*20.88%*
Daily or almost daily	52.87%	46.46%	48.39%	40.00%	52.38%	27.27%	*44.23%*
Several times each day	14.94%	21.24%	10.32%	13.33%	20.48%	12.73%	*15.95%*
Almost all the time	4.60%	16.37%	16.13%	16.67%	6.67%	2.73%	*10.13%*
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	*100.00%*
Total (N)	174	226	155	150	210	220	*1,135*
Sell or buy things							
Never or hardly ever	30.59%	34.51%	41.94%	39.47%	26.92%	35.78%	*34.46%*
At least every month	51.18%	55.75%	44.52%	55.92%	61.06%	47.71%	*52.97%*
Daily or almost daily	12.35%	5.75%	9.68%	1.97%	9.13%	10.55%	*8.33%*
Several times each day	3.53%	0.44%	2.58%	0.66%	0.48%	4.59%	*2.04%*
Almost all the time	2.35%	3.54%	1.29%	1.97%	2.40%	1.38%	*2.21%*
Total	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%	*100.00%*
Total (N)	170	226	155	152	208	218	*1,129*


Participation