Comparative analysis of P/CVE policies and strategies

Deliverable T3.1

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Summary of the Project

This document presents a comparative analysis of existing policies in the field of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The case studies used include Italy, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Romania, Greece, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. Perspectives were also drawn from the European Union level to assess the pan-European scope of policies. The comparative analysis underpins the core themes of local, regional and national policies, including any strengths and limitations thereof.
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<td>ACT</td>
<td>Action Counters Terrorism</td>
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<td>AD</td>
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<td>AFD</td>
<td>Action des Forces Opérationnelles</td>
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<td>AIVD</td>
<td>Dutch Intelligence Service</td>
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<td>AN</td>
<td>Avanguardia Nazionale</td>
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<td>APAV</td>
<td>Portuguese Association for Victim Support</td>
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<td>AtG</td>
<td>Mixed Anti-terrorism Group</td>
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<td>Free Time Activities</td>
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<td>AUR</td>
<td>Alliance for Romanian Unity</td>
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<td>BSBT</td>
<td>Building a Stronger Britain Together</td>
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<td>CCTV</td>
<td>Closed-Circuit Television</td>
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<td>CEAR</td>
<td>Community Engagement Against Radicalisation</td>
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<td>CICRD</td>
<td>Commission for Equality and Racial Discrimination</td>
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<td>CIL</td>
<td>Islamic Community of Lisbon</td>
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<td>CIPDR</td>
<td>Comité Interministériel de Prévention de la Délinquance et de la Radicalisation</td>
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<td>CLIR</td>
<td>Cellule départementale de Lutte contre l’islamisme et le Repli communautaire</td>
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<td>CML</td>
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<td>Centro nazionale sulla Radicalizzazione</td>
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<td>PPRV</td>
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<td>PSP</td>
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<td>Annual Internal Security Report</td>
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<td>Unidade de Coordenação Anti-Terrorismo</td>
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Executive Summary

NB = Max 1 Page
Objectives
Description
Results and conclusions
Introduction

The purpose of task T3.1 `General framework. Comparative analysis of existing P/CVE policies` is to provide a comparative, in-depth, critical and multi-level analysis of existing policies in the field of prevention and countering of violent extremism (P/CVE) implemented in Europe over the last few years, assessing their aims and breadth, as well as their strengths and weaknesses.

The main output of the comparative analysis performed under T3.1 is a collection of cases highlighting the best practices and lessons learned, which constitute a stepping stone for the task 3.2. and address the social lab participatory strategies.

In order to analyse P/CVE policies in Europe, we have used the comparative method. The following European national case-studies were chosen initially for comparison. The focal countries were: Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Greece. To engage in a more comprehensive analysis relevant to the wider European Union (EU), and to make sure findings may are relevant and sufficient enough at a broader EU-level, more countries/case-studies were added: the European Union, which is not object of the comparative analysis for its particular institutional form, and the United Kingdom.

The aim of these papers is comparing existing P/CVE policies and strategies with the purpose of creating a state-of-art of the fieldwork. The analysis considered the macro level, with the analysis of the National P/CVE Action Plans, the meso level through focused case studies centred on a municipality, and the micro level by zooming in on educational policies.

This study was conducted on the basis of a ‘template’ used across the different case studies. The shared research framework provided all partners with a clear methodology, outlining the research scope, questions, concepts, and focus of each section.

The papers are organized in a logical sequence that bring out some the most important elements of the overall topic at hand. The first part of the papers is focused on the phenomena of violent extremism in each country/case study, characterizing the most common phenomena of violent extremism in each context, including right wing, left wing, secessionist, and religious. Part two provides and overview of types of existing policies in P/CVE in the country, identifying the most relevant documents. It is aimed at answering the questions, such as: are there policies? Are there national, as well as local policies? Is there only one integrated policy or are their also single sector policies addressing different areas of P/CVE, for instance, for sectors, such as, law enforcement, education, de-radicalization, reintegration/disengagement strategies for former extremists, prisons, education, social integration and cohesion. It also aimed to determining whether there are different
levels of policies at the national, and local levels, and in which specific sectors/institutions they are put in place and are relevant.

A multi-level analysis of P/CVE policies was conducted in order to examine a number of dimensions. It focusses on what approaches to P/CVE are addressed: primary, secondary, and tertiary. A second dimension is related to the actual scope of PCVE policies: do they address upstream prevention, deradicalization, disengagement? Another cluster that is explored regards the type of instruments employed, such as law enforcement, judicial, social, economic, and educational. It takes into account who creates and operates these instruments, such as state institutions, local authorities, law-enforcement agencies, NGOs, and civil society organizations. A related topic is how policies are developed, in the sense, of whether they include participation by the different stakeholders. Another potential dimension aims to address questions, such as: are the affected communities involved? Are different key sectors and participants involved, including first-line-practitioners? What are the processes do they go through to develop/tune their P/CVE policies and which actors, institutions, and/or stakeholders are involved? Another vector of the analysis is the implementation of the policies according to their recommendations and measures by different vectors. To what extent is capacity building included and what tools and approaches do they have. The policies assessment adds a further dimension. This includes an analysis of whether and to what extent the policies engage with evaluation and evidence. Drawing on evidence on their implementation, are they reviewed, evaluated and assessed? Are the P/CVE policies changed and improved, and by whom? Do the policies take into account ‘positive goals’, or does the country have ‘positive policies’ that are also relevant to addressing PCVE, such as policies for social cohesion and inclusion?

As regards the municipal level, the aim was to ascertain if there are P-CVE policies and programmes at the municipal level. It inquired into the way P-CVE programmes relate to each other, and to a shared, broader framework. Education was the special focus, with questions honing in on whether extant policies and approaches address P/CVE. The papers pay particular attention to youth.

The case study is based primarily on interviews, based on 6 macro points that were identified: social workers, practitioners, community leaders, NGOs, and institutional representatives. A basic framework was elaborated to conduct semi-structured interviews. Questions were divided in clusters, with interviews touching all clusters in a flexible way in order to deepen the issues deemed more relevant. A standard GDPR form was used for all interviews, with interviewees being gender inclusive.
Several of the countries highlighted in this comparative analysis have encountered numerous forms of extremism simultaneously. In some cases, certain types of extremism such as far-right extremism, date back to the 1960s. This is an important note to highlight that extremism in Europe, relative to terrorism, has existed throughout history. The motives of extremists, subsequently, have shifted throughout time with an underlying consensus on fuelling social unrest. Far-right extremism, which is clearly on the rise, has been known to adapt and establish narratives in response to internal and international political dynamics. Right-wing extremism further consolidated its leverage based on anti-Muslim and anti-immigration sentiments. What will be explored within this comparative analysis is how economic and social crises have fuelled grievances and wider resentment against the state. The refugee crisis of 2015, for example, has encouraged levels of Islamophobia across Europe, particularly in countries such as Italy and France. However, as will be discussed in some case studies, this has also been used to promote tolerance, with local communities and schools being included in discussion. In summary, different types of extremism can impact countries differently, though what can be seen in recent years is the globalized nature of extremism, whereby networks have connected and coordinated online. This online threat has forced countries to adapt their policies to reflect this new dimension of extremism.

Whilst various forms of extremism have existed historically ranging from far-left, far-right and separatist extremism, it is Islamist extremism that has dominated the policy landscape throughout the countries included in this comparative analysis. This focus on Islamist extremism is clearly seen within the policies of countries, such as France, Italy, and the UK, which almost entirely base their P/CVE work on Islamist extremism. Throughout the comparative analysis, most countries have reported a historical struggle against Islamic extremism. Romania and Greece are notable exceptions, having historically respectively witnessed strong ultra-nationalist attitudes and far-left terrorism menace. This trend is interesting to note from the offstart, and is one that the reader should keep in mind when comparing the policy approaches by each country.

In addition to a heavy focus on Islamist extremism, many countries have adopted security-oriented policies involving law enforcement when responding to the threat. This was particularly the case following the attacks of 9/11, which lead to several countries adopting domestic policies to combat terrorism. It is also worth noting here that many historical, and present, policies focus on countering terrorism, and less so on extremism. In fact, in some policies, 'terrorism' and 'extremism' are often used interchangeably, which has reinforced this security-focused approach on responding to the threat. Countries such as France only started to reverse this security dominated approach to P/CVE from 2018 onwards, where a larger emphasis was placed on reintegration and a wider
approach on the socioeconomic, cultural and psychological drivers of extremism. On the other hand, as will be shown within the comparative analysis, countries such as the UK have established dedicated institutions to combat the threat of extremism and to create relevant policy.

Over the years, various countries have amended, revoked and implemented new policies focused on preventing extremism. This shaping of policy has evolved in part due to the diversity of motives and the types of extremism. As such, policies have been framed with different micro, meso and macro levels in mind - the case of Belgium has prioritized this localized approach to extremism. Some of these policies have attempted to collaborate with different local, regional and national actors, and have extended their focus to institutions such as schools. The focus on the socioeconomic causes of radicalization have allowed for a focus on thematic issues such as homegrown terrorism, as seen in France. In the case of France, this is particularly important in relation to the demographics of the country, which hosts the largest Muslim community in Europe. This focus on local initiatives to target radicalization and extremism can prevent breeding grounds for extremism to grow and spread. On the other hand, some countries, such as Greece, offer no critical thinking teaching methods that could be useful in developing resilience and social cohesion. Similarly, Portugal generally lacks a general radicalization prevention program. As we will see, the amount of detail and effort placed on P/CVE differs from country, and provides an interesting analysis of comparative policies and attitudes in Western and Eastern Europe.

Implementing policies on a local level is also a difficult task, not only in terms of training local authorities, but in delivering a positive message to the local population. Early intervention mechanisms have often involved educating children and awareness raising. A second priority here is on building social cohesion and integration - a noted important element of P/CVE.

Under the framework of the PARTICIPATION project, this document, therefore, presents a comparative analysis of existing policies in the field of preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE). The comparative analysis underpins the core themes of local, regional and national policies, including any strengths and limitations thereof.
The European Union

“Phenomena of Violent Extremism” in Europe

According to the European Commission, radicalisation is a phased and complex process in which an individual or a group embraces a radical ideology or belief that accepts, uses or condones violence, including acts of terrorism, to reach a specific political or ideological purpose (European Commission, Prevention of radicalisation). While not a new phenomenon, the trends, means and patterns of radicalisation evolve and the responses adapt to the current trends. Home-grown perpetrators who are born, raised and educated within the country they carry out the attack (Willner & Dubouloz, 2020), lone actors who act without any direct support in planning, perpetrating and executing the attack (Bakker & Roy, 2015) and foreign terrorist fighters, who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality for the purpose of perpetration, planning, and preparation or participation in terrorist acts or for providing or receiving training (United Nations), raise security issues and specific challenges for prevent work.

At the same time the internet has brought changes in our everyday lives for e.g., on the ways people communicate and has simplified the ways in which people create networks amongst like-minded individuals (von Behr et al., 2013). Nonetheless, internet platforms, including social media, can be used by violent extremists, terrorist groups, and their sympathisers by providing new opportunities for mobilisation, recruitment and communication. In addition, the increased online presence during the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns, could further create a fertile ground for, amongst others, radicalisation and the spread of conspiracy theories.

Radicalisation leading to violent extremism is a phenomenon that concerns the EU Member States and beyond. However, acts which amount to terrorism under national legislation in one EU Member State might not be considered to having crossed this line in another Member State. Hence; discrepancies amongst the EU Member States exist and despite the common legal framework, i.e., the EU Directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism which specifies that terrorist offences are certain intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation when committed with the aim of:

- seriously intimidating a population;
- unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act; or
seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

Although in 2019, deaths from terrorism worldwide decreased for the fifth consecutive year since peaking in 2014, the recent attacks on European soil in 2020 have served, for the EU, as a sharp reminder that the fight against terrorism is a constant one. The European Union (EU) Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2020 recorded facts and assembled figures regarding terrorist attacks in Europe 2019 in which it is indicated that 119 completed, failed, and foiled terrorist attacks in 2019 were reported in 13 EU Member States. Since the attacks in the period 2015 early 2017 (Paris, Copenhagen, Brussels, Nice, Berlin and Stockholm), the shift from a jihadist extremist threat to the violent right and left-wing extremism has been widely documented and analysed. Indeed, Member States are concerned about jihadist extremism but it appears to be not the only issue; right and left wing extremist violence pose a threat.

As regards right wing violent extremism in 2019 three EU Member States reported a total of six right-wing terrorist attacks (UK, LT, PL). The vast majority were carried out by individuals acting alone, often with limited preparation and relying on easily available weaponry, targeting densely crowded or highly symbolic spaces. Two attacks committed by right-wing extremists were reported by Germany, but under national law could not be classified as terrorism. In addition, France reported two attacks on mosques in the second half of 2019, which were not classified as terrorism. 26 left-wing and anarchist terrorist attacks were reported in 2019 in Italy (22) Greece (3) and Spain (2), which reached the levels of 2016 and 2017 after a decrease in the year 2018.

Violent extremists and terrorist groups have adapted to today’s challenges and therefore, their narratives, to reinforce disinformation campaigns and the dissemination of conspiracy theories over the internet. The attacks in Paris, Conflans, Dresden, Nice and Vienna in 2020 showed that parts of the Jihadist narratives remain and will continue to impact the threat to the EU internal security and beyond.

The European Union is a unique area of freedom, security and justice, where every person must be able to trust that their freedom and security are guaranteed and well protected. Democracy, rule of law, respect for fundamental rights in particular the right to privacy, freedom of expression, freedom of religion and the respect for diversity are the foundation of our Union (Communication, 2020(795), p:1).

In this light, the EU policies, further analysed below, have tried developing a better understanding of the activities of violent right-wing and left-wing extremists, anarchists and the jihadist threat from or inspired by Daesh, al-Qaeda and their affiliates. Understanding how people
become radicalised, irrespective of the ideology lying behind, is key in countering these phenomena. During the Plenary of the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) on 21 October 2020, Commissioner for Home Affairs Ylva Johansson stated: “in counter terrorism we have two approaches. The strong arm of the law. And the outstretched arms of prevention. And deradicalisation. We need both. We need police intervention to track down terrorists plotting atrocities. To stop attacks as they happen. To arrest perpetrators and put them in jail. We also need strategies to prevent radicalisation. Because it’s always better to prevent than to cure. Because there is a limit to how many anti-terror squads we can deploy.” (European Commission, 2020).

**Overview of EU policies**

Over the last years, the European cooperation on Countering radicalisation and violent extremism has advanced and assisted Member States to develop their capacities in order to ensure the security of their citizens. The EU has not lost momentum, by supporting victims of terrorism through prevent work (e.g. prisons, rehabilitation, education), by restorative justice approaches in exit work and by supporting victims in sharing their narratives. The online dimension remains a priority element. The EU policy response includes amongst others, strengthening the strategic communication responses and the removal of terrorist content online.

The **2005 EU Counter-terrorism Strategy** recognised that the EU can provide an added value in particular by facilitating exchange of experiences and good practices, strengthen cooperation and increase joint capabilities. The **Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)**, established in 2011, connects frontline practitioners from across Europe with one another, and with academics and policymakers, to exchange knowledge, first-hand experiences and approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism in all its forms. Another important milestone in the EU’s policies, was achieved with the adoption of the **European agenda on security 2015-2020**. The European Commission indicated that a strong and determined counter-narrative was crucial to eliminate terrorism’s support base. In 2013, with the Communication on Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism, the Commission set out **ten areas to structure efforts addressing the root causes of extremism**. The Commission also set up an **EU Internet Forum in November 2015** to tackle the problem of online radicalisation.

The **2016 Communication supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism** focuses on how work at EU level can support EU Member States in seven areas, by: i) supporting research, evidence building, monitoring and networking, in order to strengthen the capacity of the EU Member States to fine-tune existing policy approaches and develop new policies and practices (Communication, 2016, p:4) ii) supporting measures on countering the dissemination
of extremist or terrorist material online and hate speech online, and on strengthening the individual’s resilience against such propaganda iii) preventing and countering radicalisation in prisons and promoting rehabilitation and reintegration in the society iv) promoting inclusive education and EU common values and assisting the EU Member States through its policy and financial tools, v) promoting an inclusive, open and resilient society and reaching out to young people in order to increase young’s people resilience to the threats of violent extremism, become media literate and think critically, vi) by improving the exchange of information amongst the EU Member States in the fight against terrorism and for the EU Member States to take measures to prevent people from leaving to conflict zones to join terrorist groups and, vii) strengthening partner countries’ security capacities (e.g. Middle East and North Africa) and by supporting third countries in tackling the underlying factors of radicalisation.

In 2017, the Commission also set up a **High-Level Commission Expert Group on radicalisation** in order to enhance the efforts to prevent and counter radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism as well as to improve coordination and cooperation between relevant stakeholders. The group delivered its Final Report on 18 May 2018 which led to the creation of the **EU Cooperation mechanism**. The mechanisms’ task is to advise the Commission on a) the strategic priorities and orientations in Union cooperation in the area of preventing and countering radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism; (b) possible gaps and scope for improvement in Union cooperation in the area of preventing and countering radicalisation leading to violent extremism and terrorism and the evaluation of measures and mechanisms at Union level.

More recently, on 9 December 2020, the Commission adopted a **new Counter-Terrorism Agenda (CT) for the EU**. The CT Agenda is the declination of the **EU Security Union Strategy** for the period 2020 to 2025 adopted on 24 July 2020. The aim is to step up the fight against terrorism and violent extremism and boost EU’s resilience to terrorist threats to better support Member States countering terrorism. It suggests actions on preventing radicalisation and violent extremism, on anticipating threats and risks, on protecting people and infrastructures, including through border security, and effective follow-up after attacks.

In particular, as regards the part dedicated to the **prevention of radicalisation**, “the European Union is founded on a strong set of values. Our education, health and welfare systems are inclusive by nature but they come part and parcel with acceptance of the values that underpin them” (Communication, 2020(795), p.7). Hence, the Agenda puts forward a number of initiatives in areas such as online radicalisation, prisons and reintegration, as well as empowerment of communities. It fully recognises that promoting inclusion and providing opportunities for young people at risk
through education, culture, youth and sports can further contribute to the prevention of radicalisation, and cohesion inside the EU.

Terrorist organisations and right/left-wing extremists use the Internet indisputably as the most important means for dissemination of their propaganda. Although this number has been reduced during the last years due to combined actions of law enforcement authorities, military forces and anonymous hackers, the threat deriving from the availability of terrorist content online remains high. The EU will step up its efforts as regards the **better detection** of harmful online propaganda for e.g. through the EU Internet Forum which covers the so-called secondary and tertiary prevention level\(^1\) and the identification of the most common **COVID-related narratives and the development of counter and alternative narratives**, as well as other strategic communication responses.

The EU Internet Forum was launched in 2015 to address internet misuse by terrorist groups. It brings together EU Home Affairs Ministers, the internet industry and other stakeholders who work together voluntarily to address this complex issue. As a direct result, in 2015, the **Internet Referral Unit** was created at Europol with the aim of flagging and removing terrorist content online. In 2019, the Forum’s activities was expanded to **Child Sexual Abuse material online** and the Forum endorsed the EU Crisis Protocol. Under the Umbrella of the EU Internet Forum, the **Civil Society Empowerment Programme (CSEP)** was launched in 2015, with the aim to tackle terrorist content online by reducing the availability of it and by supporting the development of alternative and counter narratives.

**Preventive actions** that are more oriented towards the broader public (primary intervention\(^2\)) and that reinforce integration and social inclusion through the measures included in the Action Plan on integration and inclusion are imperative (Communication, 2020(758)). The collaboration amongst schools, communities, youth and social workers and civil society organisations is key in the prevention of radicalisation. It is often at local level that challenges related for instance to right/left wing extremism, polarisation, reintegration of FTFs or women and children returning from conflict zones, are most immediately felt.

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\(^1\) Secondary prevention is targeted at defined risk groups prone to committing criminal acts and Tertiary prevention is targeted at problem groups and individuals who demonstrate problematic behaviour, as defined in: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-pol/docs/ran_pol Lessons from crime prevention 012020_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-pol/docs/ran_pol Lessons from crime prevention 012020_en.pdf)

\(^2\) Primary intervention is targeted at whole population groups or everyone within a broad category, as defined in: [https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-pol/docs/ran_pol Lessons from crime prevention 012020_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/about-ran/ran-pol/docs/ran_pol Lessons from crime prevention 012020_en.pdf)
Radicalisation in prisons remains a challenge. The CT Agenda recognised that it is also important to identify successful approaches to **disengage radicalised inmates and terrorist offenders** and to support **training of professionals** in this field, as well as appropriate measures focused on rehabilitation and reintegration.

At the same time, the **Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN)** is an EU-wide umbrella network, links more than 6000 key first line practitioners and field experts directly engaged in preventing radicalisation, consolidating expertise and fostering the dissemination and exchange of experiences, identifying good and best practices on countering radicalisation leading to violent extremism. First line practitioners meet to address challenges on specific issues related to violent extremism and exchange good practices and ideas on tackling radicalisation. There are currently nine different RAN Working Groups (Prisons, Police, Rehabilitation, Family, Communities & Social care, Youth & Education, Mental Health, Victims of terrorism, Counter & Narratives, Local) with 18 Working Group leaders. RAN also supports local and national governments with developing local action plans to prevent violent extremism and de-radicalisation programmes. Beyond engagement with schools, the RAN also supports practitioners in the field of non-formal education (youth centres, sports clubs, etc.).

For example, young people are among the best allies in preventing violent extremism. This is the reason why in 2020 the RAN set up a new programme: the **RAN YOUNG Empowerment Academy** for young people who wish to develop their knowledge and cultivate their skills and competencies in the area of preventing radicalisation, they received support and guidance from the RAN senior experts and local mentors. Schools and educators play a key role in helping identify and safeguard youngsters at risk of radicalisation. Education can act as a protective factor, both on preventing radicalisation by avoiding extremist ideologies and the spread of anti-democratic narratives.

The **RAN Centre of Excellence (CoE)** supports and coordinates RAN and fosters a dialogue amongst practitioners, policy makers and academics in order to develop and disseminate expertise on countering radicalisation and violent extremism.

Last, as indicated in the CT Action Plan in order to disseminate knowledge and expertise on the prevention of radicalisation, the Commission proposed setting up an **EU Knowledge Hub on prevention of radicalisation** gathering policy makers, practitioners and researchers. The aim for this hub would be, amongst others, to disseminate knowledge and expertise, promote the full use of funding possibilities under various EU programmes, offer expertise and support to national
authorities and victims support organisations (Communication, 2020 (795), p:10). This Hub might as well foster a future EU Centre for the victims of terrorism.
The United Kingdom

Section 1: “Phenomena of Violent Extremism” in the Country

The above infographic provides an overview of the public’s perception of extremism in the United Kingdom (UK) (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019; p. 4).

The UK government defines extremism as "vocal or active opposition to fundamental British values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism calls for the death of members of our armed forces" (Prevent, 2011; p. 108). The UK has struggled historically in responding to this threat of "extremism", partly due to the lack of a universal definition of terrorism. In fact, in the government's own Prevent strategy, it is stated that "In assessing drivers of and pathways to radicalisation, the line between extremism and terrorism is often blurred" (Prevent, 2011; p. 19). This is further reflected by the fact that the British public is confused by this definition and do not find it helpful (Rij and Wilkinson, 2019). Furthermore, even in parliamentary discourse, the terms 'extremism' and 'terrorism' are used interchangeably (Onursal and Kirkpatrick, 2019).
Early on, 'extremism' only referred to political movements and did not focus on the attitudes and mindsets of individuals (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018; pp. 6-8).

Consequently, due to this confusion, various policies and programmes have attempted to control 'suspect communities', often leading to the marginalisation and stigmatisation of majority Muslim populations. It is worth noting here that, although right-wing extremism now constitutes a major threat in UK society, it was not always evaluated in the same light. A strong focus on Islamist terrorism and extremism, instead, has dominated the political landscape in the country.

Historically, the UK has witnessed several cases of violent extremism ranging from Islamist, right-wing, and left-wing extremism. One of the earliest cases of extremism relates to the Dissident Republican groups in Northern Ireland, with reference to groups such as the IRA (Hall, 2020; p. 4). As such, most of the UK's counter-terrorism policy historically, and certainly prior to 2001, focused on groups such as the IRA (Dawson and Godec, 2017; p. 5). In the current climate, the UK faces two principal sources of extremism: violent Islamist and Right-wing. (Hall, 2020; p. 4). Islamist extremism has remained a threat in the UK for many years, and the subsequent counter-terrorism policies have arguably marginalised the Muslim population in the country. This has resulted in the accusation by senior officials that action on counter-terrorism is “exclusively used against Muslims” (Hall, 2020; pp. 22-23). By contrast, Right-Wing terrorism and extremism are seen as growing and evolving (Hall, 2020; p. 22). This is reflected by the fact that in the UK’s major counter-terrorism strategy, CONTEST, right-wing terrorism “does not extend beyond four paragraphs” (ibid; p. 22). Nonetheless, CONTEST describes these forms of terrorism as national security threats. The first far-right group to be placed on the government’s list of terrorist organisations, National Action, subsequently, was in 2016.

The dual-threat of Islamist and far-right extremism in the country are not mutually exclusive. There are other forms of types, and subsequent extremist ideologies, ranging from ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism, left-wing, animal rights extremism and the addition of lone actors not confined to any one type of terrorism (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019; pp. 5-6; Europol, 2020). From these combined types of extremism, a majority of people have witnessed some aspects of extremism (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019; p. 5). It is important to note here that, "extremism is not confined to a single race, religion, or ideology" (ibid). However, specific types of extremism are seen to have an impact on others. For example, the emergence of far-right extremism has in turn coincided with an increase in anti-Muslim and anti-Islam rhetoric (Hall, 2020; p. 23). With notable examples of personalities such as Tommy Robinson and the EDL, this has spread Islamophobia and increased the numbers of individuals radicalised to far-right
values. Right-wing extremist groups have focused on this process of radicalisation in the UK and have focused on anti-Islam rhetoric to create a narrative of ‘us’ vs ‘them’. As a result, this narrative “built on xenophobic, antisemitic, Islamophobic and anti-immigration sentiments, may lower the threshold for some radicalised individuals to use violence against persons and property of minority groups” (Hall, 2020; pp. 23-24).

Whilst CONTEST is focused heavily on Islamist and far-right extremism, the strategy does recognise other forms of extremism relating to environmental issues. Groups such as Extinction Rebellion and Greenpeace have been labelled as ‘extremist’ far-left groups. It has also been identified that most young people from lower-income backgrounds are most susceptible to violent extremism (PREVENT, 2011; p. 16). Furthermore, those who distrust the government, have a negative view of the police, and believe their culture is under threat, are all other factors leading to violent extremism (ibid; p. 18). For these other types of extremism, however, the strategy has not defined them as threats to national security (Hall, 2020; p. 24).

In addition to extremism types, the CONTEST strategy has identified themes that can influence extremism and radicalisation. One of these has looked at the role of technology in providing a “key medium for the distribution of propaganda, radicalisation of sympathisers and preparation of attacks” (Hall, 2020; p. 27). Another theme identified is diversification, which focuses on the unpredictability of both far-right and Islamist attacks but also their radicalisation paths (ibid; p. 28).

Within the CONTEST strategy itself, the PREVENT pillar is solely focused on extremism; "for it is clear that for many who have committed terrorist acts extremism is the foundation, the driver for terrorism" (PREVENT, 2011; p. 3).

Section 2: “Types of Policies”

When analysing P/CVE policies in the UK, it is important to look at the history of counter-terrorism laws. Whilst terrorism and extremism are different, both have often been used interchangeably within the country. There is an assumption, and as seen in counter-terrorism policies, that extremism will always lead to terrorism. This means that counter-terrorism policies and measures have often been used to target extremist and non-extremist individuals (Kirkpatrick and Onursal, 2019). In doing so, these national policies invoke "emergency laws", especially after major terrorist attacks and incidents, which grants authorities additional powers. Often targeted against the Muslim population, and other individuals showing signs of extremist behaviour, this spreads a narrative of Islamophobia across the country. As one example of a counter extremist policy, surveillance cameras were installed in predominantly Muslim areas throughout the country (Lewis, 2020).
Over the years, the UK government has developed various terror legislation ranging from: the Terrorism Acts of 2000 and 2006, Counter-Terrorism Acts of 2008 and 2015, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, and the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. Here, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 is of considerable interest, notably for its emphasis on extremism. The Act emphasised Prevent and Channel, which represent key elements of the UK's counter-extremism policy. Channel acts as a multi-agency programme that connects various local and regional actors together. This panel of actors, ranging from religious, cultural and local groups, monitor all types of extremism and are split into different fields of P/CVE, such as education and employment. Channel is very much a localised policy and reaches into different 'fields' of P/CVE such as education, employment, housing and other socio-economic themes. The policy is mostly targeted towards youth and is an early intervention mechanism to stop people from being drawn into extremism. Importantly, Channel provided a needed shift on the individual in countering extremism, as opposed to a pre-2005 emphasis on groups and movements (Kundnani and Hayes, 2018; pp. 6-8). Under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Channel places a duty on local authorities to identify and provide support for people seen as at risk (Channel Duty Guidance, 2020; p. 4). This can include providing housing, career support and financial assistance, for example. In addition to Channel, the government also released the Act Early campaign in 2020 to support those at risk of being radicalised. As such, public sector workers are at the frontline of P/CVE policy to identify vulnerable individuals before they are radicalised (RightsWatch, 2016; p. 12).

The radicalisation of extremist views has been identified as a major threat not only in societies but particularly in prisons throughout the country. Government policy has identified prisons as a key environment for radicalisation, especially as more people are being convicted of terrorist offences (Acheson, 2016; p. 5-6). Here, government policy has reiterated the threat of radicalisation for prisoners serving sentences for non-terror crimes, and that this number is increasing (ibid; p. 6). Despite research looking at radicalisation in prisons, however, there is no guideline or policy focused on C/PVE in prisons. City councils such as London have stressed the need for further research to understand the prevalence of extremism and also the measures taken to reduce its threat (London Greater Authority, 2019; p. 114). Representatives from prisons, probation providers and other local authorities may be included on Channel panels, which provides an opportunity for rehabilitation and disengagement (Channel Duty Guidance, 2020; p. 11). Most reviews of extremism in prisons have focused on Islamist extremism, and this was the directive of the Prevent strategy in 2011 which stated herein that "Extreme right-wing terrorism in the UK has been much less widespread, systemic or organised than terrorism associated with Al Qa'ida" (Prevent, 2011; p.
15). Whilst the environment of far-right groups has undoubtedly changed since then, this is not reflected in official P/CVE policies for prisons.

On a broader scale, all P/CVE activities fall under CONTEST, which is the UK's major counter-terrorism strategy focused on stopping terrorist attacks and preventing people from becoming radicalised. In its name, the PREVENT pillar deals exclusively on the early-stage analysis of extremism. This Prevent policy is very much localised throughout the country, and many local councils have created their guidance on how to identify violent extremism (Bournemouth, N/A; Greater London Authority, 2019). However, historically, few programmes have attempted to address extremism and radicalisation in the country. For Islamic extremism in 2012, only two programmes in London attempted to address the issue of radicalisation; the Muslim Contact Unit and the 'Steet' Project (Christmann, 2012; p. 4).

The above graphic demonstrates key legislation introduced over the years, and particularly the number of times in which CONTEST, the UK’s central policy on extremism, has been revised (Bellis and Hardcastle, 2019; p. 12-13).

The government has produced various guidance documents and toolkits for local authorities on Prevent. One of the key documents in this regards focuses on the Prevent duty for local authorities to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. The guidance document includes the scope of the duty, risk-based approaches to Prevent, monitoring and enforcement (Prevent Duty Guidance, 2019). Importantly, due to the localised nature of Prevent, the document also provides sector-specific guidance for local authorities, schools, the health sector, prisons and probation and the
police. Throughout the sectors, the guidance provides information on risk assessments, partnerships, action plans, staff training and monitoring and enforcement. *Prevent* is now active in almost every sector across the country, whereby there is a strong duty to manage and spot risks and signs of extremism. The 'risk' factors have been interpreted differently throughout the country and subsequently have constructed certain groups as 'suspect communities'.

In addition to the *Prevent Duty Guidance*, the government published a toolkit to supplement this guidance document. The toolkit, *Prevent Duty Toolkit for Local Authorities and Partner Agencies*, includes a self-assessment tool for local authorities to use and identify "areas of strengths and weaknesses, before using the wider toolkit to identity information and examples of good practice to develop local delivery" (Prevent Duty Toolkit, N/A; p. 2).

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>The organisation has a local risk assessment process reviewed against the Counter Terrorism Local Profile.</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>There is an effective multi-agency partnership board in place to oversee Prevent delivery in the area.</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>The area has an agreed Prevent Partnership Plan.</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>There is an agreed process in place for the referral of those identified as being at risk of radicalisation.</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>There is a Channel Panel in place, meeting monthly, with representation from all relevant sectors.</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>There is a Prevent problem solving process in place to disrupt radicalising influences.</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>There is a training programme in place for relevant personnel.</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>There is a venue hire policy in place, to ensure that premises are not used by radicalising influencers, and an effective IT policy in place to prevent the access of extremist materials by users of networks.</td>
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<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>There is engagement with a range of communities and civil society groups, both faith-based and secular, to encourage an open and transparent dialogue on the Prevent Duty.</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>There is a communications plan in place to proactively communicate and increase transparency of the reality/impact of Prevent work, and support frontline staff and communities to understand what Prevent looks like in practice.</td>
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3. The list above highlights the sections of the self-assessment tool provided within the Prevent Duty Toolkit.

In addition to *Prevent*, the government also produced a comprehensive *Channel Duty Guidance* in 2020. The *Channel* guidance document guides Channel panels and panel partners on the drivers and indicators of terrorism and information on the type of support that can be provided (Channel Duty Guidance, 2020; p. 4). The guidance document provides case studies and examples for local authorities to identify signs of vulnerability and the roles of different providers ranging from social care/police, schools and the Home Office (ibid; p. 19), in addition to an overall pathway diagram explaining the entire process (ibid; p. 21).
Although not carrying the same statutory duty as Prevent and Channel, in 2015, the Counter-Extremism Strategy was announced. This was the first time a policy/strategy attempted to address extremism separately from terrorism, though failed to distinguish the difference between counter-terrorism and counter-extremism (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019; p. 79). The strategy highlighted sectors where extremism exists that ranged from schools, universities, local authorities, charities and prisons (Counter-Extremism Strategy, 2015; pp 13-16). It reiterates a Prevent duty on all local authorities to take action to prevent extremism (ibid; p. 17). The strategy also reiterated Islamist extremism as the greatest threat to the country, though highlighted extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups as subsequent threats in a strategy that would "tackle all forms of extremism" (Counter-Extremism Strategy, 2015; p. 10). Identifying these threats, the strategy set out commitments for local authorities to counter extremism.
In addition to the guidance documents and toolkits, the government has provided numerous sources to support local areas combat extremism. Financial assistance, advice and training have been provided, and specific groups, such as the Special Interest Group on Countering Extremism, have been set up to facilitate good practice among authorities. In 2018, the Commission for Countering Extremism was established to engage with the public sector and other local authorities to analyse the threat of extremism. As an independent body, the Commission reviews government data, literature and other sources of information to provide insight and recommendations (Bellis and Hardcastle, 2019; p. 14). The Commission for Countering Extremism published its flagship report *Challenging Hateful Extremism* in 2019 which collected evidence from public consultations with over 20 towns and 16 roundtables to identify new approaches to extremism.

Various sectors in the country have adapted to the various P/CVE guidelines. The police Counter Terrorism Internet Referral Unit works with the government and internet companies to reduce extremist material online (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019; p. 85). Public health approaches to countering violent extremism have also been highlighted in reports, here suggesting how such an approach helps address the needs of vulnerable individuals and to promote cohesive communities (Bellis and Hardcastle, 2019; p. 2). The document is intended for local authorities particularly in the public health sector, though can be used for multi-agency responses to extremism, such as those encouraged by Channel.

Each school policy for countering extremism is designed by following several government documents and policies. The underlying policy approach here is community cohesion, whereby
schools have a duty to promote cohesion and diversity in the community (Bonnell et al. 2011; pp. 10-11). Whilst there is a statutory duty under the Counter Terrorism & Security Act 2015, other guidance documents that schools refer to include (Harker, 2020; p. 3):

- *Keeping Children Safe in Education*
- *Working Together to Safeguard Children*
- *Prevent Duty Guidance: for England and Wales*
- *The Prevent Duty: Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers*
- *The Use of Social Media for online radicalisation*

An emphasis in these school policies is on teaching British values within the curriculum, in addition to religious education (ibid; p. 5). Schools have an obligation under the Education Act 2002 to promote cultural and British values, as described in the *Promoting fundamental British values as part of SMSC in schools* document (Department for Education, 2014; pp. 5-6). In line with the government's guidance on online threats, digital safety is also considered within these school policies (ibid; p. 6). Other policies in schools, often named *Preventing Extremism and Radicalisation* policies, follow this similar structure.

There are also P/CVE policies for local councils. The Special Interest Group on Countering Extremism connects councils via roundtables and other means to develop shared practices and engage in community resilience (LGA, N/A). City councils ranging from Birmingham to Bristol have built their counter-extremism policies based on the pressing issues in each society. For example, Calderdale Council focuses on taxi drivers to implement Prevent throughout its community (LGA, 2015; pp. 8-9), whilst Cornwall Council has engaged in the online environment (ibid; pp. 10-11).

Furthermore, the UK has produced guidance notes on how to carry out P/CVE policy more broadly. The *UK National Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2018-2022: Guidance Note – Implementing Strategic Outcome 6: Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism* is an example of this gendered lens on P/CVE.

**Section 3: In-depth Analysis of P/CVE Policies / Action Plans**

**1. Primary, Secondary, Tertiary**

Primary prevention: UK P/CVE policy is very much centred on preventing people from being drawn into extremism. This can be directly referring to extremism and radicalisation, such as through *Prevent*, or can be focused on the social issues that increase one's vulnerability. An example of this can be the *Integrated Communities Strategy* (2018), which does not use the terms 'extremism'
nor 'terrorism' and instead focuses on increasing economic opportunity, strengthening leadership, and supporting migrants and residents to build more inclusive communities. This strategy is an example of attempts being made to address the socio-economic structures that can reduce individuals from being drawn into extremism. This emphasis on social inclusion is also represented in the Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015, which focuses on more integrated communities, and the London P/CVE strategy that focuses on rooting out "inequality and poverty which all too often lie at the heart of disenchantment and resentment, feelings extremists seek to exploit" (Greater London Authority, 2019; p. 6).

Awareness-raising measures are implemented throughout the country, mostly in schools and other public institutions, to improve awareness of the Prevent policy and signs of extremism. WRAP, for example, is a free workshop that offers training on radicalisation, vulnerability, signs of extremism, and support mechanisms. Under the Prevent duty, moreover, teachers are required to implement British values, along with lessons on democracy, inclusion and participation. This is an example of efforts made in early prevention that focus on the social issues drawing people towards extremism. Overall, this contributes to the cultural awareness of other groups and religions in the country, social engagement with themes such as democracy, and educational development in terms of critical thinking skills; contributing to a policy on citizenship education. The 'Being British, Being Muslim' programme, for example, engaged with individuals that had been exposed to extremist discourse to develop critical thinking skills, pluralism and integration (Liht and Savage, 2013; pp. 48-51).

Prevent Action Plans are also developed by all schools and local authorities to identify signs of radicalisation and the steps needed to respond. Action plans like this prepare local communities for
early prevention and is a wider effort made towards resilience-building. In the Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015, a focus is placed on countering extremist narratives via building the capacities of communities (Counter-Extremism Strategy, 2015; p. 3).

7. The above table illustrates projects by local authorities within the Prevent strategy that shows a strong focus on resilience and cohesion (Prevent, 2011; p. 29).

Primary approaches to P/CVE are principally addressed via the UK's Channel strategy. The early intervention initiative focuses on de-radicalisation at a local level that combines different societal actors together. One of the key areas of success in the Channel strategy is that it connects these actors together to address extremism, rather than relying on law enforcement. This is said to have removed "the stigma associated with de-radicalization programs and increases community willingness to engage with early intervention locally" (Bilazarian, 2016; p. 2). Channel, in this sense, can be described as both a primary and secondary approach to prevention. On a primary intervention level, it is characterised as an early intervention scheme that supports people at risk of being radicalised. In doing so, the scheme provides tailored support to the individual based on their needs and vulnerabilities, for example, by providing economic support and career opportunities if they come from a low-income background. This emphasis on personal development via language
skill development, as reiterated in the Integrated Communities Strategy 2018, counselling and career guidance prevents individuals from developing extremist ideology.

Building resilience is a key component of many P/CVE policies in the country. In London's P/CVE policy, building resilience to extremism is seen as a core goal. Strengthening community relations between individuals of different backgrounds is targeted as a key response to build resilience to extremism, whereas cuts to youth services are seen as a negative social contributor to extremism (Greater London Authority, 2019; p. 29). Under the current P/CVE narrative, every member of the British public informally has a duty to remain vigilant and to report signs of suspicious activity. This is part of the wider community reporting policy for P/CVE.

8. The infographic above illustrates the difference between primary, secondary and tertiary prevention methods in reference to extremism (Marsden et al. 2017; p. 3).

Secondary prevention: Channel also provides support to those showing signs of radicalisation, thus also acts as a secondary prevention approach. The scheme offers intervention-based support in terms of counselling and mentorship. Here, the Channel scheme benefits from its diverse panel, which includes religious actors, the police, schools and social support services. The UK's Counter-Terrorism Policing ACT scheme - Action Counters Terrorism - is another example of secondary prevention. The scheme focuses on counter-narratives and develops a campaign to counter extremist messages and provides the public with information on how to detect and report signs of extremism.

Community engagement to reduce extremism has also been attempted in the country. In 2005, 'Muslim Contact Units' were deployed to collect information from the country's Muslim communities. This effort is said to have reduced the amount of young Muslims in the country from being involved in extremism (Dodd, 2005). This also confirms research from previous studies that community engagement can increase the reporting of extremism, especially when working close to families (Munro, 2019).
Counter-messaging has also been employed to prevent the risk of people falling into extremism, especially those that already show signs. The Research, Information and Communications Unit employs counter-narratives via communication, thereby reducing its threat and attractiveness. "It works to address potential risks associated with exposure to violent extremist belief systems by confronting their underlying weaknesses, exposing their proposed solutions to be false, tackling the illusion that life as part of violent extremist organization is glorious, and promoting a positive alternative to violent extremism" (Lynch et al, 2015; p. 14).

**Tertiary prevention:** Tertiary prevention for extremism is often explored with traditional counter-terrorism policies focused on disengagement and reintegration. For UK prisons, disengagement is tailored to individuals and, for Islamist extremists, is facilitated by trained Imans (Brader, 2020). UK deradicalisation programmes include the *Healthy Identity Intervention and the Desistance and Disengagement Programme*. The former programme aims to limit an individual's engagement with extremist ideology, whilst the latter involves "mentoring, psychological support, theological and ideological advice" (ibid).

The *Prevent* strategy also responds to those who are already engaged in terrorism by offering disengagement and rehabilitation. This is reiterated in the graph below which shows how *Prevent* operates at all levels of prevention.

9. *The graph illustrates the procedures of prevention from narrative campaigns and community engagement to rehabilitating those already engaged in terrorism (CONTEST, 2018; p. 32).*

2. "Focus": ‘Type’ of Extremism and ‘Scope’ of Policies
Many P/CVE policies in the UK have focused on the threat of Islamist extremism. The early
intervention scheme Channel, for example, has been accused of excessively referring British
Muslims (Versi, 2015). In the 2019 Counter-Extremism Strategy, the most pressing threat is
identified as Islamist extremism (Counter-Extremism Strategy, 2019; pp. 9-10). The strategy does
mention the extreme right-wing and neo-Nazi groups and stresses that the strategy "will tackle all
forms of extremism: violent and non-violent, Islamist and neo-Nazi (ibid; p. 10). The scope of the
strategy covers hate crime and focuses on signs of extremism in institutions such as schools and
prisons (ibid; pp 13-16).

The UK's central P/CVE policy Prevent, moreover, similarly focuses on Islamist extremism
with groups such as Al-Muhajiroun and Hizb-ut Tahrir, although this policy is dated back to 2011
(Prevent, 2011; p. 5). Prevent (ibid; pp. 20) stated that types of extremism are "significantly greater
amongst young people", especially in the online environment. In addition to Islamist terrorism,
Northern Ireland-related terrorism is also highlighted as one of the threats in the strategy. This
includes groups such as the Real Irish Republican Army, Continuity Irish Republican Army, and
other Irish Republican and Loyalist groups (ibid; p. 14). However, Northern Ireland related groups
are not seen as "extremist". Overall, Prevent sought to address:

- Extreme right-wing terrorism
- Northern Ireland-related terrorism, including separatist (although not defined as this)
- Religious and international terrorism (Al Qa'ida).

No reference was made towards left-wing, secessionist or other types of extremism within the
country and, therefore, Prevent was limited solely to Islamist extremism and far-right, albeit only
to a limited degree. The Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015 broadened this scope to include "all
forms of extremism" (Counter-Extremism Strategy, 2015; p. 10). The forms identified were:

- Violent extremism
- Non-violent extremism
- Islamist extremism
- Neo-Nazi and right-wing extremism.

The scope of P/CVE policies extends to the online space. In the Counter-Extremism Strategy
2015, the online space was identified as a key recruitment driver for extremist groups, whereby
action has been taken in partnership with the police to remove content online (Counter-Extremism
Strategy, 2015; p. 24). The strategy identified various types of extremist groups with a presence
online including Islamist groups such as ISIL, neo-Nazi groups such as National Socialist, and right-
wing groups (ibid).
The updated CONTEST strategy briefly (only one page is provided) highlights other forms of extremism other than far-right and Islamist extremism. Among the types of extremism mentioned are those focused on animal rights and environmental issues, in addition to the extreme left-wing, although the strategy is quick to stress that "None of these groups are currently assessed as posing a national security threat" (Contest, 2018; p. 21). However, it is interesting to note that counter-terrorism police "accidentally" listed groups such as Extinction Rebellion and Greenpeace - groups targeting environmental issues - as extremist and, therefore, requiring authorities to report this under the Prevent duty (Dodd and Grierson, 2020).

In 2019, the Commission for Countering Extremism identified hateful extremism as a form of extremism that "consists of a framework of behaviours, beliefs and harms", and one that "stands in stark contrast to pluralism and Britain's human rights, equality laws and norms (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019; p. 6). In 2021, the Commission published the Operating with Impunity document, which amongst other important highlights, illustrated the need for a policy targeting hateful extremists. The lack of such a policy, it argued, has allowed extremists to "operate lawfully" (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2021; pp. 12-13). Moreover, the Commission (2018; pp. 5-6), via their public consultation, highlighted other forms of extremism not reflected in UK P/CVE policy including:

- Far-left extremism
- Animal rights extremism.

Despite central P/CVE policy focusing almost entirely on Islamist and far-right extremism, members of the public and practitioners report several other forms of extremism. In a call for evidence report by the Commission for Countering Extremism (2019; p. 10), at least 8 other forms of extremism were witnessed by over 800 participants.
As mentioned previously, the scope of these P/CVE policies are quite broad and differ in terms of intervention. For example, a review led by Ian Acheson (2016; p. 5) on Islamist extremism in prisons found that despite disengagement and deradicalisation programmes, extremism "is a growing problem within prisons, and a central, comprehensive and coordinated strategy is required to monitor and counter it". A variety of EXIT strategies have responded to this threat in prisons and have focused on delivering counter-narratives for tackling extremism. It is worth acknowledging when talking about policies for extremism in prisons that some are relatively new. For example, the idea to separate extremists in prisons was only introduced in 2017 (Rushchenko, 2019; p. 300). Furthermore, in a review of the separation policy, one of the key summaries was that "The lack of engagement by the men, especially in rehabilitation and disengagement interventions, was identified as a significant challenge in the running of the centres" (Powis et al. 2019; p. 2). This has wider implications for disengagement and rehabilitation policies in the UK for extremists. The government claims, "the policy intention was, where appropriate, to enable people returning to the UK to be reintegrated into mainstream society, as they can be very important elements in the prevention strategy aimed at those who might follow in their footsteps” (Dawson, 2019; p. 10).

The UK's stance on the return of foreign fighters is quite mixed. In the infamous case of Shamima Begum, the government revoked the individual's citizenship and refused access to deradicalisation schemes. On the other hand, under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, the government introduced "temporary exclusion orders" to better integrate returning foreign fighters.
Other policies such as Prevent and the Counter-Extremism Strategy focus on improving social structures to facilitate cohesion and inclusivity at a local level, here focused on primary and secondary prevention. This can be seen in the government's Integrated Communities Action Plan 2019.

3. "Toolbox"/Instruments

The Prevent policy provides support, guidance and training through a variety of toolkits and engagement to deliver counter-narrative campaigns, among others, to reduce the threat of extremism. Local Prevent teams are organised throughout the country that supports organisations, of whom develop local Prevent action plans to carry out the Prevent duties. A variety of government actors such as the Office of Security and Counter-Terrorism and Prevent Peers meet with local officials to review policies and procedures related to Prevent (Prevent Duty Toolkit, N/A; p. 33).

As mentioned, the Prevent policy places a duty on public bodies and schools to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism. The range of sectors and organisations include (Prevent Duty guidance, 2019):

- Local governments such as councils
- Criminal justice such as prisons, probation services etc
- Education such as schools and higher education
- Health and social care
- Law enforcement.

For the educational sector, the government has provided a guidance document for schools - The Prevent duty: Departmental advice for schools and childcare providers, which albeit outdated, provides information regarding extremism and lists sources for training and other statutory guidance. Some of the documents refer to the Working together to safeguard children guidance document, which is intended for inter-agency working towards child safety. However, 'extremism' as a risk is only mentioned briefly. The same applies to the Keeping children safe in education document, which offers 3 pages for extremism referencing the Prevent policy and Channel programme, in addition to providing various e-learning support online. Various schools have created their counter-extremism policies with reference to this guidance document. For further guidance on educational policies, the Education & Training Foundations offers a Prevent for Further Education and Training programme for actors such as practitioners, support staff, governors and leaders. Moreover, for individual schools, training is offered to staff in the form of WRAP - Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent. Although, WRAP has come under criticism for being too short and not critical enough (Davies, 2018; p. 7).
When carrying out these types of instruments, the UK’s counter-terrorism response is primarily carried out by the police. Due to the national threat of terrorism, this is justified and responses to terrorism are handled by the 11 regional terrorism units across the country (Hall, 2020; p. 6). However, the UK’s major toolkit for counter-terrorism is CONTEST, which places an emphasis on Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare. As such, within some of these pillars, other actors are directed to carry out instruments to counter-terrorism. A notable example here is schools that have a duty under PREVENT to respond to signs of extremism within the school system.

Policies and practices that are targeted towards extremism are not coordinated through PREVENT, the UK’s principal counter-extremism strategy, but rather through the Department for Communities and Local Government (PREVENT, 2011; p. 6). This represents a local approach to extremism and an attempt to root out extremism in "ungoverned spaces in which extremism is allowed to flourish" (ibid; p. 10). In doing so, the PREVENT strategy stresses that it is not "a police programme" and instead relies on the local delivery of the strategy (ibid). The Prevent Duty Toolkit for Local Authorities and Partner Agencies provides examples of best practice for councils and
other local actors. The toolkit requires councils to set up Prevent boards to overview the strategy and to build partnerships within the community (LGA, N/A; pp. 8-9).

The local deliveries of P/CVE seek to address the socio-economic issues on the ground to create a cohesive atmosphere to counter extremist ideology. To assist communities in their Prevent duty, police are expected to support local action plans and aid the charity sector to prevent money from being directed to extremist organizations (Prevent duty guidance, 2019). On this note, however, it has been argued whether the tools and instruments used to counter Islamist extremism in the UK can be applied to right-wing extremism, which is seen as a type of extremism that is growing and evolving but not showing the same threat as Islamist extremism (Hall, 2020; p. 22).

Most funding for P/CVE projects comes from the government and is distributed to a local level with councils further allocating funds. Depending on the type of focus, for example on prisoners or returning fighters, different actors may be responsible for delivering P/CVE intervention and training. Training such as WRAP, which is free and accessible throughout the country, is undertaken by the government. The same applies to the ACT training, which is supplied by the Counter-Terrorism Police. The graph below represents a brief overview of the types of actors involved in P/CVE interventions.

![Organisations Involved in Delivering CVE Interventions](image)

12. A table illustrating the diversity of actors involved in P/CVE (Marsden et al. 2017; p. 5).

In 2016, the government launched the Building a Stronger Britain Together (BSBT) programme with the goal of assisting organisations and programmes across the UK in countering violent extremism. It is the main programme designed to implement the proposals in the Counter Extremism Strategy 2015 and offers funding and support to CSOs to carry out P/CVE activities (BSBT, 2019; p. 5). The BSBT scheme has funded organisations such as Reset Communities and Refugees which aims to support and integrate refugee families (Bellis and Hardcastle, 2019; p. 14).
The graphic above illustrates how BSBT has engaged with organisations and campaigns to counter violent extremism (BSBT, 2019; p. 12).

In 2013, the Government's Task Force on Tackling Radicalisation and Extremism pledged to build the capacity of local communities and CSOs to prevent extremism, particularly online (Cabinet Office, 2013; p. 3). Furthermore, the former *Preventing Violent Extremism Pathfinder Fund* sought to support local communities and build strong partnerships across society.

Efforts have also been made to train civil society groups in the online space. In the Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015, in order to counter extremist ideology online, efforts were proposed to empower people to challenge extremist views online, make young people more resilient, and build awareness of civil society groups (Counter-Extremism Strategy, 2015; p. 25).

To monitor extremism in prisons, the Joint Extremist Unit was established in 2017. The unit advises prisons on the situation of extremism and also trains prison and probation staff.

4. 'How are the policies developed'

When it comes to developing policies, strategies and action plans, most of the P/CVE work starts with public and private consultations. This is done to understand the current environment surrounding extremism and how the public perceives this. The government claims that consultations are consistently made between public and private parties on issues relating to extremism and counter-terrorism. For example, in the early stages of *Prevent* in 2010, the strategy underwent a 3-month consultation before publishing the policy (Home Office, 2015). This is reflected more widely in sector-specific policies, whereby all P/CVE policies in the UK are supposedly governed by evidence-based approaches. For counter-extremism policy in schools, calls for evidence occurred in 2015 by the Department for Education which sought to engage with mosques, schools, teachers and city councils (Long, 2018; pp. 11-14). Reports from Ofsted - the Office for Standards in
Education, Children's Services and Skills - were also used to gain insight on the dangers of extremism in schools (ibid; pp. 15-16). Furthermore, the UK's first dedicated policy on extremism - the *Counter-Extremism Strategy* 2015, prioritised an approach to extremism focused on building understanding (Counter-Extremism Strategy, 2015; p. 18). In the strategy, it is stated that "To further strengthen the evidence base, we will work closely with academics and universities, commissioning and part-funding research" (ibid).

Public consultations are also implemented especially when the individuals will be subject to a certain duty within the policy. This was the case with the *Prevent* duty guidance document, which would eventually place a duty on public authorities to "have due regard, in the exercise of its functions, to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism". The consultation for the *Prevent Duty Guidance* invited views from a variety of actors (Prevent Duty Guidance, 2014; p. 7):

- Local authorities
- Schools
- Further and higher education institutions
- NHS
- Law enforcement
- Prison and probation services
- Others working in the field "who feel that they should also be subject to the duty".

Public consultation on the *Prevent* duty guidance was particularly important due to the localised approach that the *Prevent* duty implied. As such, the guidance document welcomed "views on the practicality of the guidance, what other measures could proportionately be taken to comply with the duty, any examples of existing good practice, and any opportunities and barriers to implementation" (ibid).

In the early stages of the *Contest* strategy, the Home Office planned events across the country to engage with organizations and groups that would be involved in the remit of the strategy. However, whilst evidence was used on public threats to create this policy, members of the public were not consulted directly. In the 2018 Contest strategy, this was justified by stating, "While it is not always possible to be open about the specific threats we face or our response to them, we want to increase the amount of information that is available to the public on these issues" (Contest, 2018; p. 14). However, with the assistance of the Office for Security and Counter-Terrorism, various actors have contributed to the creation of the strategy (ibid):

- Law enforcement
- Academics
• Community leaders
• Government departments.

It is worth noting that whilst the Contest and Prevent policies were designed early on, these are constantly evaluated and reviewed. These reviews often consider public opinions, especially from marginalised communities - the Prevent policy and its partnership with British Muslims is an example (Griffith-Dickson et al. 2015; pp. 27-28). In fact, the Prevent policy is currently being reviewed at the writing of this paper. However, despite this engagement, Prevent specifically has suffered criticism for its lack of exposure to Muslim communities (ibid; p. 28).

For strategies such as the Integrated Communities Strategy (2018), consultations were done online for everyone to access in addition to face-to-face conversations with communities from across the country (Integrated Communities Strategy, 2018; p. 6). For other city-based P/CVE policies such as The London Countering Violent Extremism Programme Report 2018-2019 (2019; p. 5), the strategy engaged with communities including stakeholders, experts, women, youth, minority and marginalised people. This helped shape the focus of the strategy on community engagement, building resilience, and preventing the spread of extremism (ibid). This is a common occurrence in local P/CVE policies and the London policy is an example of the ability to engage a diverse number of actors together in decision making.

The relatively new Commission for Countering Extremism also engages with the public when drafting its reports and policy recommendations. For example, in their report Challenging Hateful Extremism, engagement is stressed as a priority to understand public perceptions of extremism. Here, the Commission engages with people from different backgrounds, local councils, community groups, schools, churches and mosques, in addition to arranging roundtables to engage with experts (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019; p. 18). In response to the Commission for Countering Extremism's call for evidence, local councils and community actors, on behalf of the Local Government Association (LGA, 2019) and the Special Interest Group on Countering Extremism, have provided insight on extremism on the local level.
To measure the impact of the Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015, the government established an inquiry which held evidence from stakeholders including representatives of the Muslim Council of Britain, Muslim Youth Association, academics, think tanks, IT companies and others (House of Commons, 2016; p. 5; Dawson and Godec, 2017; p. 29).

In the period between 2013-15, the government created an independent Extremism Task Force to "identify any areas where our current approach was lacking and to agree on practical steps to fight against all forms of extremism" (Cabinet Office, 2013; p. 1). In their report Tackling extremism in the UK, policy developments were agreed to support organisations and the capabilities of communities and expand on the Channel requirements in local authorities. This task force was therefore designed to "demonstrate the government's continued commitment to tackling extremism" (ibid; p. 7). Similarly, in 2015, the Extremism Analysis Unit was established to inform counter-extremism strategy and to "make clear that the Government should engage with people directly and through their elected representatives, rather than through self-appointed and unrepresentative community leaders" (Dawson and Godec, 2017; p. 17).

5. Social Cohesion & Social Inclusion

In 2004, a report was republished by the government looking into social cohesion throughout the country. It found that race issues were at the forefront of communities across the country to the point where cultural representation in schools was low. In regards to this, it argued that "Parental choice is a key factor and is influenced by ignorance and fear of other cultures" (House of Commons, 2004; p. 3). Since this report, local authorities and the central government have embarked on multiple policies to promote social cohesion and to reduce this culture of fear. Whilst not directly linking to extremism, it is clear that the importance of eliminating this culture of fear and building
more inclusive societies can help reduce alienation, radicalisation and subsequently extremist ideology.

Policy areas necessary for building and facilitating social cohesion vary but can range from (LGA, 2004; p. 13):

- Youth
- Education
- Housing
- Employment
- Hate crime
- Race and faith discrimination.

One of the most central reviews undertaken into the areas of social inclusion and cohesion was the *Casey Review* (2016), which collected evidence from around 1,000 individuals from community groups, academics, faith leaders and other local actors. The *Casey Review* (2016; p. 137) demonstrated key concerns regarding extremism and hate speech which "increases fear and prejudice and further alienates Muslim and non-Muslim communities". It also found that extremism disrupted social tensions and undermined British values, and that, "the less integrated we are, the more vulnerable communities and individuals become to the divisive narratives and agendas of extremists" (ibid; p. 145). In addition to its specific focus on extremism, the report also highlighted other aspects related to inclusion such as religion, the media, and leadership.

Following the *Casey Review*, the government reframed its policy on promoting inclusion. The *Integrated Communities Strategy* (2018) proposed support for migrants and young people by providing economic opportunities, accommodation and language skills (Integrated Communities Strategy, 2019; 5). The *Integrated Communities Action Plan* was published in 2019 to measure ongoing progress against the proposed measures. In addition to this, the All Party Parliamentary Group on Social Integration produces policy solutions to improve inclusion. In 2017, it published its *Integration not Demonisation* report which reviewed the UK's immigration policy to improve the integration of migrants.

Building cohesive is a major part of the Counter-Extremism Strategy 2015, whilst the 2018 *Contest* strategy emphasized the importance of integration in countering extremism:

"A successful integration strategy is important in its own right. It is also important to counter-terrorism, and to Prevent in particular, because there is an association between support for terrorist violence and a rejection of a strong and integrated society" (Contest, 2018; p. 79).
In this sense, government P/CVE policy on integration and cohesion can be separated into several major parts. The first is countering terrorism, which largely consists of the Contest and Prevent strategies. Under Prevent, the importance of building cohesion and inclusiveness is mentioned:

"There is evidence to indicate that support for terrorism is associated with rejection of a cohesive, integrated, multi-faith society and of parliamentary democracy. Work to deal with radicalisation will depend on developing a sense of belonging to this country and support for our core values" (Prevent, 2011; p. 13).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Activity type</th>
<th>Examples</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>54%</td>
<td>Debates, discussions and forums</td>
<td>‘Safe space’ debates to discuss current affairs or grievances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33%</td>
<td>General educational activities</td>
<td>Presentations to schools about Islamic beliefs and culture. Addressing under-achievement of Pakistani boys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27%</td>
<td>Leadership and management activities</td>
<td>Establishment of mosque management committees. Provision of professional media training to key contacts to help them manage media interest around terrorism issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26%</td>
<td>Non-accredited training</td>
<td>Active citizenship training for local Muslim women’s forum. Training of imams in English language, ICT and British society by qualified tutors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19%</td>
<td>Arts and cultural activities</td>
<td>Local theatre production which raised issues of extremism in communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13%</td>
<td>Sports and recreation</td>
<td>Boxing clubs, football clubs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The focus of Prevent was on social cohesion, particularly within the Muslim communities through schemes such as Being British, Being Muslim. This idea of social cohesion also expands to schools under the Prevent Duty within the Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015. Under the Prevent duty, teachers and educational institutions have a duty to monitor and prevent individuals from being drawn into extremism. Developing school curriculum in a way to highlight British values is said to support "quality teaching and learning, whilst making a positive contribution to the development of a fair, just and civil society (Harker, 2019; p. 5). Rooted in Prevent, this is intended to support social cohesion and inclusion and builds on the importance of respect. Lord Nash (2014) highlights this by stating, "a key part of our plan for education is to ensure children become valuable and fully rounded members of society who treat others with respect and tolerance, regardless of background". Positive goals here revolve around the importance of democracy, government and
citizenship, and sources are made available to teach critical thinking skills (The Prevent Duty, 2015; p. 6).

Another area of government policy is with countering extremism, which was set out in the Counter Extremism Strategy 2015. The strategy identified social cohesion as a key priority in countering extremism. In the strategy, it was argued that understanding and addressing the reasons why people do not identify with British values was key to preventing extremism, and directed a "Cohesive Communities Programme" to prevent isolation (Counter-Extremism Strategy, 2015; p. 17). Chapter 6 - Build Cohesive Communities, highlights a number of measures to build a more inclusive society and to prevent division from being exploited by extremist groups. The strategy highlights the negative impacts of integration, correlating this with unemployment for women and youth, and also offers positive goals such as English language training and more opportunities for youth (ibid; pp.37-38).

This emphasis on cohesive societies was also mentioned during the National Security Strategy 2015 as a key part in reducing the threat of extremism. In addition to countering extremist narratives, the strategy stressed to "build more cohesive communities" and to "defend and promote the values which unite us: we are proud of these values, and they are the basis for our diverse, multi-racial, multi-faith society" (National Security Strategy, 2015; p. 37).

6. How do they use / engage with 'evidence'?

The Commission for Countering Extremism is a central tool for measuring P/CVE in the country. The Commission actively reviews extremism and advises on existing and new policies to respond to extremism. An example of this is its report on hateful extremism, which identified that hateful extremism has evolved in the country due to "an ambiguous and incoherent counter extremism policy and approach" (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2021; p. 1). Further to this, the Commission identified a "failure of our laws to keep pace with evolving and modern-day hateful extremism threat", and that, "extensive polling demonstrates that the public believe more needs to be done to counter extremism (ibid). As such, the Commission for Countering Extremism analyses policies against specific evidence, usually collected on the ground by a diversity of stakeholders and practitioners.

As mentioned previously, the Commission for Countering Extremism was established to engage with the public and local authorities to understand the threat of extremism and to put forward recommendations.
The infographic above is an example of the Commission for Countering Extremism’s research and evaluation process (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2018; p. 4).

The Commission is centred on an evidence-based approach and bases its research on surveys from the public (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019; p. 19). One of the most important responses that the Commission received was that of the public's view on the government's definition of extremism. As such, most members of the public and practitioners of organisations found the definition "very unhelpful" (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2019; p. 8). This is interesting to note since, although the government claims that all P/CVE policies are backed by evidence, the central definition of "extremism" was not created in coordination with members of the public and practitioners. The same call for evidence also analysed other questions ranging from:

- Public understanding of extremism
- Scale of extremism
- Objectives and tactics of extremists
- Harms of extremism
• Response to extremism.

Calls for evidence like this are a central way to analyse the effectiveness of current policies, especially for extremism. Since the latest extremist policy was developed in 2015, it is clear that the government will seek to develop its extremist strategy with calls for evidence such as the work currently conducted by the Commission for Countering Extremism.

Other campaigns such as the *Educate Against Hate*, which supports the education sectors in providing a better understanding of the risks of extremism, are also based on evidence regarding forms of extremism. Similarly, in the updated version of CONTEST in 2018, the success of *Prevent* was measured on its impacts and reach in society, as seen by the graph below.

17. The graph highlights some of the major highlights of Prevent within the Contest strategy (*Contest, 2018; p. 31*).

*Prevent*, moreover, is said to be driven by "continuous research and evaluation" within communities across the country (ibid; p. 32). Monitoring and evaluation are made constant to inform decision-making, whilst there is engagement with academics and leading experts to ensure that policies are "based on the best available evidence" in both the online and offline environments (ibid; p. 33). Following the 2005 London attacks, several community-led working groups were created to explore extremism and to develop practical solutions. These working groups ranged from engagement with youth and women, education, security and religious actors (*Maer, 2008; p. 2*). Over 20 recommendations were provided to the government, whilst over 40 were given to local authorities to deliver, whereupon funds such as the Preventing Violent Extremism *Pathfinder and Community Leadership* Funds were launched to provide support (ibid; p. 7). These working groups,
including their recommendations, formed the basis of the Prevent strategy. Within the Prevent strategy, to ensure that schools and teachers are applying the Prevent duty, OFSTED routinely conducts inspections to measure performance on tolerance of faith and other aspects related to supporting British values. This reflects a wider mode of monitoring and evaluation on a local level by authorities, councils and other stakeholders.

For the creation of the updated Contest (2018; p. 13) strategy, the National Security Strategy (2015; p. 37-38) was consulted following its evidence regarding extremism as a significant threat that "divides communities and weakens the social fabric of our country". The Contest strategy is also stressed to be reflective of lessons learned from extremist attacks and overall constitutes a "tried and tested strategic framework" (Contest, 2018; p. 13). This is based on "An in-depth review of our counter-terrorism approach found that this structure remains effective and continues to guide the planning and the work of many agencies and departments in the UK" (ibid). The government, following a gap from 2016-2017, continually reviews the Contest strategy annually to review its progress against set objectives (Home Office, 2013). Moreover, independent consultations are often arranged to review UK P/CVE policy and counter-terrorism powers; Prevent, as an example, is currently being reviewed in 2021.

For sector-specific policies on extremism such as education, consultations were similarly made to include stakeholders in the process of developing policies. The Keeping Children Safe in Education strategy, a strategy of which forms the basis of many local educational policies, received consultation responses from actors ranging from teachers, local authorities, school leaders, parents and charities (Department for Education, 2016; p. 4).

7. Education ‘Special Focus’

Education plays a key part in the UK's P/CVE policy. Under the Counter Terrorism & Security Act 2015, all local authorities, including schools, have a statutory Prevent duty. However, particularly in education, there has been a difficulty in maintaining freedom of speech whilst also acting in "due regard to the need to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism" (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, (5)(26)). Many reports and guidance documents have been created with a focus on countering extremism in schools, and most of the policies are directed back to Prevent. For example, the Department for Education commissioned a report on the methods that can be used in schools to build resilience to extremism (Bonnell et al. 2011; p. 6). Moreover, for higher education, institutions have a duty to "have policies and procedures in place for the management of events on campus", here referring to speakers and external staff (HEI Prevent Guidance, 2019). P/CVE, therefore, is addressed in school policies in a number of ways that can
range from developing curriculum to engage students in "British values", referring vulnerable individuals to Channel, managing speakers, and training staff. Other information regarding educational policies can be found throughout this document in more detail.

Section 4: “Vectors of Analysis of Policies”

The Commission for Countering Extremism provides policy recommendations on P/CVE by combining evidence for a variety of vectors. In their 2021 (p. 7) Operating with Impunity policy report, the Commission analyses current legislation and offers policy recommendations by synthesising evidence from meetings with law enforcement agencies, academics and lawyers, amongst others. One of the policy recommendations here argued that countering extremism, particularly hateful extremism, should not be solely looked at "through the lens of counter terrorism", and yet, despite this, "this was the approach taken by successive governments for many years" (ibid; p. 17). Furthermore, targeting law enforcement, another recommendation argued that countering hateful extremism should not be focused solely on legal measures (ibid; p. 18). Here, it is argued, policies should undertake a different approach that connects and utilises a variety of actors that uses interventions that "engage and support individuals, such as young people" (ibid).

18. Above is an example of policy recommendations collected from interviews with law enforcement agencies, lawyers and others in the Commission for Countering Extremism’s Operating with Impunity policy report (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2021; p. 20).

Recommendations from the Commission for Countering Extremism's 2021 report on hateful extremism have also focused on building the capacities for law enforcement agencies to respond to the currently 'lawful' aspects of hateful extremism (Commission for Countering Extremism, 2021). In addition to this, a recommendation was made to make hateful extremism a priority alongside terrorism and child exploitation in the online environment.

Other documents such as the London Countering Violent Extremism Programme Report 2018-2019 emphasised "listening and learning" which engaged with experts, authorities, women's groups, youth and thousands of community members, including marginalised people (Greater London Authority, 2019; p. 5). The programme sets out "several recommendations which should be immediately implemented" aimed at local authorities, police and stakeholders. (ibid; p. 7). The report, moreover, claims to be "the most comprehensive and in-depth city-wide engagement ever in
this policy area and has been shaped by listening to community members, stakeholders and experts” (ibid; p. 8). Some of its recommendations focused on the socio-economic environment and stressed the need for activities to bring people from different backgrounds together and to create platforms for engagement with a focus on empowering women and youth (ibid; p. 139). Other policy recommendations focused on education and stressed the need for better citizenship content and also targeted tech companies to ensure platforms do not provide spaces for extremists to exploit online (ibid; p. 143). A large emphasis was placed on law enforcement in terms of increasing awareness of internet referral units, preventing exploitation of police staff and increasing the standards of training. It was also recommended that a complete review of Prevent was necessary. Overall, the report identified various policy recommendations for a variety of vectors and specifically targeted government, councils, law enforcement and tech companies.

The online environment has formed a key component of Contest, Prevent, and the Counter Extremism Strategy. Under Contest, partnerships are made between CSOs to build counter-narratives online (Contest, 2018; p. 34). Support is provided to CSOs via the government’s Research, Information and Communications Unit, which connects CSOs with industry partners to help with capacity building and training. Law enforcement is also involved in this process via the Police Counter-Terrorism Internet Referral Unit. In a report by the Home Office on Hate crime: abuse, hate and extremism online, one of the recommendations were aimed at social media companies and their duty to remove extremist content online (Home Office, 2017; p. 1). Specifically, the report stated:

"If social media companies are capable of using technology immediately to remove material that breaches copyright, they should be capable of using similar content to stop extremists re-posting or sharing illegal material under a different name" (ibid).

Other policy recommendations have proposed initiatives such as the Terrorism, Radicalisation and Extremism Disclosure Scheme as a measure to supplement Prevent and to counteract declining levels of public reporting on extremism (Dryden, 2019).
Homegrown violent extremism has become a widespread phenomenon in France and one of the major security and social concerns for the national government in recent years. According to the Global Terrorism Index, in 2016 and 2017 France reported the highest level of violent extremist incidents in Europe (GTI, 2016; GTI, 2017). Between 2014 and 2019 France recorded the most Islamic State (IS)-related terrorism assassinations in the West and, in 2019, French courts pronounced the greatest number of convictions and acquittals concerning jihadist terrorism in Europe (EUROPOL, 2020). Moreover, the increasing social and political polarisation, exemplified by the far-right extremist attack in October 2020 (LeMonde, a, 2019) as well as the escalation of violence during 2018-2019 Yellow Vests’ manifestations, raised concerns regarding overall violent extremism in France. As asserted by the French Minister of Interior Damanin on August 31st, 2020, terrorism remains the principal security threat the country faces (Damanin, 2020). For this reason, an in-depth analysis of the existing types of violent extremism in the country is deemed necessary.

The landscape of violent extremism in France comprises a variety of groups that can be divided into 4 categories: 1) far-left extremist groups, 2) far-right extremist groups, 3) regional separatist groups and 4) Islamist extremist violent groups.

The first form of violent extremism to be analysed is far-left extremism in the French context. France has been facing far-left and anarchist terrorism since decades, although with varying intensity. During the 1980s, several members of the extreme-left group Action Directe (AD) were arrested on charges of criminal conspiracy and bomb or gunfire terrorist attacks (Encyclopaedia Britannica). AD’s members also engaged in a number of anti-Jewish raids, including a machine-gun and grenade attack against a Jewish restaurant in 1982 (New York Times, 1982). Today, left-wing extremists engage in violent acts against institutions, mainly security forces. Their principle aim is to fuel social unrest and subvert the rule of law. For instance, several extreme-left affiliated individuals or sympathisers infiltrated the demonstrations of the Yellow Vest movement in late-2018 and, in some cases, contributed to escalations of violence during demonstrations (Daguerre, 2019). However, far-left violent extremism in France is a limited phenomenon compared to the intensity it reached in other European countries: in 2019, for instance, any far-left terrorist attack (foiled, failed or completed) nor extreme-left-related arrest was recorded (EUROPOL, 2020).
The second type of violent extremism is the far-right one\(^3\). France has faced this form of ideological violent extremism since the 1960s, when the Secret Army Organisation (Organisation Armée Secrète – OAS), a right-wing nationalist paramilitary group, carried out several terrorist attacks both in metropolitan France and in French Algerian territories (Encyclopédie Universalis). With the electoral rise of the National Front (Front National – FN) in the early 1980s, right-wing extremism in France further consolidated its leverage and anti-Muslim and anti-immigration sentiments have spread. Moreover, the rise of Islamist violent extremism, both at international and national level, contributed to create a new breeding ground for xenophobic and populist movements to grow (Paton, 2020). Specifically, in reaction both to the growing number of Islamist Foreign Fighters (FF) leaving from France to join the Islamic State (IS) since 2014 and to the new cycles of jihadist terrorist attacks in the following years, several new far-right organisations have emerged to advocate the struggle against “the Islamist threat” (EUROPOL, 2020). In 2017, for instance, a group of right-wing extremists constituted the Operational Forces Action (Action des Forces Operationnelles – AFD) to carry out terrorist attacks against Muslim civilians (TRAC). Despite the right-wing extremist movement in France remaining disorganized, such as in the case of the network of “the children of November 13\(^{th}\), 2015” (Boucart, 2020) that was formed after the November 2015’s Paris attacks perpetrated by IS, the phenomenon should not be underestimated. In October 2019, a man tried to set fire to the Mosque of Bayonne, in the South-West of France, injuring two men (LeMonde, a, 2019). Moreover, the diffusion in France of conspiracy theories that integrate supremacist and nationalist worldviews raises some concerns about a future development of right-wing violent extremism. In the latest years, for instance, the theory of the so-called “Great Replacement” (Grand Remplacement) invented by the far-right French activist Christian Renaud Camus is gaining momentum (Soullier, 2019). The theory is grounded in the belief that the white and Christian European background is being replaced by Muslim and non-European culture in the attempt to achieve the dismantlement of European civilization. For instance, investigations after 2019 Christchurch attack revealed that the attacker was inspired by such a theory (Polakow-Suranksy and Wildman, 2019). In light of the subversive nature of this theory, which has already justified violent attacks by right-wing extremists (EUROPOL, 2020), a new wave of far-right violent extremism is feared also in France.

\(^3\) According to the Global Terrorism Index, far-right violent extremism in the West (intended here as Europe, North America and Oceania) comprises the following ideological groupings: anti-feminist extremism, anti-immigrant extremism, anti-Islam extremism, anti-LGBT extremism, anti-liberal extremism, anti-Muslim extremism, anti-Semitic extremism, far-right extremism, incel extremism, neo-fascism, neo-Nazism, white nationalism, supremacism (GTI 2020, p. 61)
The third category of violent extremism in France is focused on separatism. In recent decades, France has suffered several separatist and ethno-nationalist terrorist attacks perpetrated by Corsican and Basque extremist groups, especially during the 1990s (Minority at Risk Project, a, 2004; Minority at Risk Project, b, 2004). The terrorist threat in Corsica decreased significantly after the declaration of the demilitarization of the Corsican National Liberation Front (Front de Libération Nationale Corse – FLNC). However, the emergence of offshoot violent groups raises concerns regarding a potential reappearance of the threat (EUROPOL, 2020). In December 2019, for instance, the nationalist movement FLNC so-called of 22 October (FLNC dit du 22 octobre) claimed responsibility for the partial destruction of a villa owned by a French businessperson in South Corse (LePoin, 2019). This was the first violent act claimed by the group since 2014. The same process of fragmentation has occurred within Basque separatist terrorist groups, that claimed the lives of nearly 800 people during the last half-century in France and Spain (Britannica). After the declaration of the self-dissolution in 2018 of the Basque Fatherland and Liberty movement (Euskadi ta Askatasuna – ETA), members of the most extremist factions have continued to challenge the political authority also in France (EUROPOL, 2020).

The fourth category of violent extremism in France is Islamist violent extremism, that still represents the major security threat at national level. In 2019, nearly 46% of jihadi-affiliated arrests in Europe occurred in France (EUROPOL 2020, p.34) and, within the country, they represented 90% of overall terrorist arrests in the same year (Ibid.)

Islamist violent extremism in France is not a newborn phenomenon. First evidences of Islamist violent activism can be traced back in the 1990s, when the Algerian Islamic Group (Group Islamique Armée – GIA) orchestrated a number of terrorist attacks in France in the attempt to change the position of French government on the Algerian civil war (DW, 2020). However, a new phase of widespread Islamist violent radicalisation and jihadi terrorism started in 2014. The magnitude of Islamist violent extremism in France could be understood as the combination of two situations on the ground. On the one hand, France has the largest Muslim community in Europe. By simple proportion, such a demographic reality creates a breeding ground for violent extremism to grow and spread more quickly than in other European countries. On the other hand, the interplay of various international dynamics contributed to fuel transnational jihadi terrorism. Firstly, the long-term French involvement in conflicts in Muslim countries and its past of colonisation create a sort of resentment against France (Marret, 2020). Secondly, the emergence of a well-structured jihadi organisation in 2014 such as the Islamic State reactivated several jihadi cells in France and across Europe. In 2014 only, nearly 930 French residents left for Syria and Iraq to join IS (RFI; 2014) and
in December 2015 nearly 1700 French jihadists were active in the region (Statista, 2015). However, far from being a phenomenon strictly related to international terrorism, Islamist violent extremism should be considered first and foremost as a homegrown French social phenomenon. As asserted by President Macron at the end of 2020, the tendency of certain segments of Islamist extremist community to break with the rest of society and live solely according to strict interpretation of Islam should be considered as a weakening of French social cohesion (Elysée, 2020).

Overview of types of existing P/CVE policies in France

While several European countries developed new domestic tools of prevention of radicalisation in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 events, France demonstrated early reluctance to create a new policy framework both for diplomatic and political reasons (Marret, 2020). However, the emergence of new forms of well-organised jihadi organisations such as IS and the high percentage of French foreign fighters leaving to join international jihadi groups since 2014 forced French authorities to profoundly change their approach to counter-terrorism and violent radicalisation. Therefore, while before France adopted highly security-oriented and judicial measures to fight first and foremost terrorist attacks, this structural transformation forced it to elaborate and develop a new set of policies to tackle violent extremist radicalisation from its roots.

This section will provide an in-depth analysis of how French P/CVE policies have evolved over time in reaction to various external and internal pressures. Specifically, it highlights two main trends in the French approach to P/CVE measures. Firstly, it underlines that the emergency and security-oriented measures developed between 2014 and 2018 were integrated in the 2018 National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation, with the new aim of creating a more integrated and decentralized plan of action. Secondly, it emerges that this plan seeks to tackle violent radicalisation in all its forms, but the first and important target is Islamist radicalisation.

The early measures adopted by France were highly security-oriented and conceived to fight the terrorist threat both at judicial and security level. The first national plan, adopted in 2014, defined a global strategy to respond to the increasing number of French nationals leaving for Syrian and Iraqi conflict zones (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017). This plan revolved around two axes. On the one hand, it aimed at strengthening the legislative framework by including individual enterprise in joining terrorist activities in the section of the penal code regarding criminal conspiracy linked to terrorist groups. On the other, it established a dedicated mechanism at administrative level to facilitate the detection of individuals showing signs of radicalisation or already radicalized (Loi Antiterroriste du 13 November 2014, CIPDR). Specifically, the Interior Ministry created a dedicated hotline, the National Centre for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalization (Centre national
d’assistance et de prevention de la radicalisation – CNAPR). This institutional body acted under the umbrella of the Counter-Terrorism Coordination Unit (Unité de coordination de la lute anti-terroriste – UCLAT), a centralized unit that collects notices on people showing signs of radicalisation and offered counselling capacity and psychological support to families or peers (Marret, 2020). Concurrently, a governmental website, “Stop Jihadism” (StopDjihadisme), was created and acted as a pedagogic tool to inform citizens on online jihadist propaganda in the attempt to trace online jihadist networks.

The top-down and centralized approach developed by the French government required the involvement of regional and local bodies. For this reason, at the end of April 2014, the Ministry of the Interior invited the prefectures to create two new structures, the Security Headquarters (Etats-majors de sécurité - EMS) and the Family Counseling and Support Units (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017). The aim of the first structure was to evaluate signaled individuals’ dangerousness and eventually monitor them. The second body, that mainly referred to pre-existing public social policies, contributed to support families of radicalised or radicalising individuals. This whole system operating both at national and local level was under the responsibility of a national office, the General Secretariat of the Inter-ministerial Committee for Crime Prevention (Comité interministériel de prevention de la délinquance) – recently renamed Inter-ministerial Committee for Crime Prevention and Radicalisation (SG-CIPDR).

After the Charlie Hebdo attacks in January 2015, French institutions realized how policies required to adapt and improve to face the evolving Islamist violent extremist threat. On 21st January, 2015, a new Anti-Terrorism Plan (Plan de lutte contre le terrorisme – PLAT) was created, although with a certain degree of improvisation (Marret, 2020). This new plan provided new means and financial support to operational services, such as judiciary services, and developed penitentiary intelligence and prevention dedicated units in jail to prevent Islamist extremist ideas to spread in prisons (Ibid.). However, such an approach, focused primarily on security and repression, proved its own limits later.

After November 13th 2015 attacks, the deadliest terrorist incident in recent French history, a new plan focusing on tools to fight terrorism was adopted in May 2016 – the Action Plan against Radicalisation and Terrorism (Plan d’action contre la radicalisation et le terrorisme – PART). This new plan replaced the PLAT and was based on 80 new measures (whereof 50 new initiatives) revolving around 7 axes (Second Plan d’Action Contre la Radicalisation et le Terrorisme, CIPDR). The PART also envisaged the reinforcement of resources allocated to radicalisation prevention schemes, with an addition of 40 million euros over two years. However, this new plan still focused
primarily on the reinforcement of the security apparatus to fight terrorism and included few mechanisms to prevent radicalisation – namely, the development of applied research regarding counter-extremism discourse, the mobilisation of Islamic structure and community in France and the creation of centres for reintegration and citizenship to support the treatment of radicalised or radicalising individuals in situation off unease for the family, social and professional environment and in need of specific support (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017).

On March 16, 2016 the Senate Committee decided to set up a new information mission named “Disindoctrination, disengagement and reintegration of jihadists in France and Europe”. The aim of this mission was to evaluate the arrangements for preventing or reversing the radicalisation process (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017). On July 12, 2017, the report of the committee was published and stressed the need for a substantial change in the policy of fighting terrorism and radicalisation. In particular, the report highlighted the failure of the first center for reintegration and citizenship in Pontourny, that was later closed. Against these evidences, it was clear that a de-radicalisation plan could not tackle a more rooted phenomenon, hence forcing the institution to find new solutions.

The first plan entirely devoted to the prevention of violent radicalisation in France was presented in February 2018. As asserted by the then-Prime Minister Edouard Philippe, the emergence of the new terrorist threat had required until then quick new security tools to fight the menace (Philippe, 2018). However, throughout the time the violent extremist threat has become a homegrown phenomenon and the internal barriers that have undermined social cohesion and have fuelled radicalisation needed to be dismantled. Therefore, the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation (Plan National de Prévention de la Radicalisation – PNPR) was elaborated by the CIPDR in coordination with 20 ministerial departments. The new PNPR aimed at preventing radicalisation upstream and downstream by closely collaborating with different territorial actors, such as state territorial entities, local authorities and civil society. In this perspective, 60 measures structured around 5 axes were elaborated to develop new mechanisms from resilience and capacity building to prevent radicalisation to disengagement and reinsertion of radicalised individuals (Le Plan National de Prévention de la Radicalisation, CIPDR). Moreover, this new plan included new public priorities to improve the system of prevention of radicalization (Marret, 2020), such as the monitoring of the diffusion of conspiracy theories of any kind, especially in the school system, and the new possibility to expel from the civil service (military included) civil servants that might contradict laicity or religious neutrality.

The evolution of French P/CVE policies shows how the primary focus of French institutions is Islamism-inspired violent radicalisation. Therefore, in order to fight Islamist violent hate speeches
and the process of Islamist radicalisation that undermines social cohesion, a new (and controversial) bill against “Islamist separatism” was elaborated throughout 2020 and eventually adopted by the French National Assembly on February 16, 2021 (Le Monde, 2021). This new law has been officially named “reinforcing republican principles” (Projet de Loi confortant le respect des principes de la République, CIPDR), and it aims at tackling extremist ideologies (violent Islamism first and foremost) in social environments of any kind to reinforce social cohesion. In this perspective, for instance, the new bill extends the requirement of strict religious neutrality to private contractors of a public service, reinforces the judicial control over the neutrality and laicity of local authorities and creates a new crime of “separatism”, intended as any action threatening or intimidating an elected official or a public-sector employee.

As this section aimed at showing, the P/CVE policies in France have evolved in reaction to increasing terrorist threat and violent radicalisation in the country. While at the beginning these policies mainly focused on repression and prosecution of radicalised individuals, after the new wave of attacks on its territory in 2015, the French government declared the state of emergence and intensified the military engagement against IS in Syria and Iraq and reinforced the security apparatus in France. However, this approach that focused primarily on law enforcement, criminal proceedings and ex-post de-radicalisation did not undermine the root of the phenomenon. In this perspective, the 2018 PNPR elaborated managed to elaborate a new holistic and multi-level approach. By including institutional and non-institutional actors in the organisation of the prevention of violent radicalisation in the country at national, regional and local level, France managed to develop more integrated and all-encompassing P/CVE policies.

**Multi-level analysis of P/CVE policies in France**

The French government has elaborated a new preventing plan, the PNPR – also named “Preventing to Protect” – to strengthen the capacity of State and society to prevent violent radicalisation in all social environments. Therefore, the PNPR envisages 60 different measures of primary, secondary and tertiary intervention, from early prevention of radicalisation to management of radicalising or radicalised individuals and their reintegration in society. The PNPR also relies on pre-existing public and social policies. The analysis of these measures will follow the threefold framework based on primary, secondary and tertiary intervention.

**Primary intervention**

Primary intervention focuses on early prevention of radicalisation, awareness-raising and resilience-building (RAN, 2018). With the introduction of the new PNPR, the French government
decided to strengthen primary mechanisms to raise awareness about and reinforce the knowledge of violent radicalisation. In order to reach this goal, a wide range of social actors has been addressed, consisting of 1) public officials, 2) actors involved in education, 3) internet stakeholders, 4) civil society organizations, 5) enterprises, 6) citizens.

The first category of primary intervention are public officials. Raising the awareness regarding violent radicalisation within the public sector is a priority to build capacity of detection and treatment of radicalised or radicalising individuals at local level. For this reason, training sessions that analyses various essential topics for the understanding of violent extremism (e.g. multi-level drivers of violent radicalisation, different types of violent extremism in France etc.) are occasionally organized (Former et Sensibiliser, CIPDR). These training sessions are jointly offered by the SG-CIPDR in collaboration with experts from the institutional and academic sectors and are addressed to different actors of public services – such as prefectures, national police, gendarmerie, education, justice – as well as NGOs and associations operating at local level4. Since 2014, more than 30,000 public officials have received appropriate training on the issue of radicalization (Former et Sensibiliser, CIPDR). Moreover, consistently with the aim of spreading awareness as much as possible across society, the SG-CIPDR has started organizing specific training sessions also for local elected representatives since 2019 in collaboration with the National Centre for Territorial Public Services.

The second category addressed by primary intervention mechanisms are the actors involved in education of children and young people. The first aim of this set of policies, which is developed by the SG-CPDR in coordination with the French Ministry of Education, is to raise awareness among educators in order to build resilience among children and youngsters. These measures of primary prevention are developed according to a top-down approach and concerns all the actors involved in education. Since 2017, for instance, the institutional network CANOPÉ has developed new resources for teachers to better understand the main drivers of radicalisation among the youngsters and to detect first signs of radicalization (Prévenir la Radicalisation, Reseau Canopé). At the same time, a set of new educational programs to increase the resilience of students against radicalisation and conspiracy theories has been implemented since the academic year 2018-2019, such as moral and civil education, media literacy, critical thinking to fight extremist propaganda and history of ideas and religions (Politique de Prévention de la radicalisation violente en milieu scolaire, EDUSCOL). The PNPR envisages awareness-raising campaigns also for universities and research

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4 For instance, in March 2021 a two-days training session investigating key concepts of Islam, the geopolitics of transnational jihadism and the drivers of Islamist violent radicalisation took place (cipdr.gouv.fr)
institutes. However, primary intervention at educational level involves also other types of measures. For instance, the French government provided guides and tools for preventing violent radicalisation also to sport federations, private owners of sport facilities and sport directors at municipal level (PNPR). Moreover, a new set of mechanisms has been elaborated to foster social cohesion and integration, which are fundamental to prevent violent radicalisation from spreading across society. For instance, in 2017, the project of Cités Educatives was launched to support the collaboration at local level of various actors contributing to the education of children and young people (Les Cités Educatives). Hence, families, sport trainers, teachers, associations, local enterprises or simple residents are given a new space to take part in social bonding activities, collaborate to the education of the youth and, consequently, prevent the potential emergence of social vulnerabilities that might lead to violent radicalisation.

The third category addressed by primary intervention mechanisms are internet stakeholders. As asserted in the PNPR (p.10), the French government contributes to prevent the dissemination of terrorist propaganda on the internet through different means. Firstly, the fight to online violent extremist propaganda is advanced with the mission of the French Digital Ambassador, responsible for the dialogue with major internet platforms to develop automatic instruments to remove terrorist contents from the internet. For this purpose, new financial contributions have been allocated for the development of applied research. Secondly, in the framework of the European Intern Forum, France is cooperating with internet firms and civil society organisations involved in online counter-extremism discourse. The collective Katiba des Narvalos, for instance, is reputed to have contributed to delete more than 100,000 pro-IS Twitter accounts in the French speaking world (Merret, 2020) and other types of NGOs are increasingly involved in this type of activities.

The fourth addressed category are civil society organisations. The ratio behind the PNPR is not only to raise awareness regarding violent radicalisation, but also strengthen social cohesion and integration. For this purpose, the SG-CIPDR closely cooperates with the network of associations and NGOS spread across the country. Different types of organisations are involved (Les Partenaires de Terrain du CIPDR, CIPDR). 105 Houses for Adolescents (Maisons des Adolescents – MDA) welcome young people from 11 to 25 years old and their families to provide psychological, social, educational and judicial support in troubled family situations. The Schools for Parents and Educators (écoles des parents et des éducateurs – FNEPE) support parents throughout the educational path of their children and provide different activities to raise awareness regarding radicalisation. Specialised helpline such as the Centre for the Support of Young People (Points d’Accueil écoute
Jeunes) and the National Union of Family Associations (Union Nationale des Associations Familiales – UNAF) are mobilised to support families and young people with various difficulties.

The fifth category that primary intervention addresses are enterprises (PNPR, p.14). The involvement of the entrepreneurial sector in PNPR is based on the observation that first signs of radicalisation may stem from professional problems or dire working situations. For this reason, the new plan to prevent radicalisation aims at increasing the awareness of companies, professional federations, trade unions and enterprises through the creation of a specific training system.

Finally, the last category addressed by primary intervention mechanisms is the entire French community. In order to promote and disseminate values such as tolerance, non-discrimination, laicity and dialogue, the SG-CIPDR has developed online and offline tools and activities to increase the resilience of French citizens against violent radicalization (Former et Sensibiliser, CIPDR).

**Secondary intervention**

Secondary prevention to violent radicalisation consists of interventions for people showing first signs of radicalisation. These vulnerable individuals are still in the pre-criminal space – namely, they did not engage in violence yet (RAN, 2018). Therefore, in CIPDR’s plan of action, tools and means of secondary intervention represent the intermediate mechanism to avoid radicalisation to escalate into violence. For the process of detection and early management to be effective, various actors and entities, both institutional and non-institutional at national, regional and local level, are involved. However, it should be stressed that the management of individuals demonstrating first signs of radicalisation is a socially sensitive and delicate phase. Indeed, should the intervention be mishandled, the result could be further radicalisation. For this reason, secondary prevention is highly controversial.

The triggering mechanism for secondary intervention to come into action is the reporting by any individual concerned of first signs of radicalisation of a closed person – a family member, a neighbor, a friend, a teacher, a colleague, a doctor, a civil society educator, a sport trainer exc (Signaler et Détecter, CIPDR). Any reporting can be done by contacting the National Centre for Assistance and Prevention of Radicalization (Centre national d’assistance e de prevention de la radicalisation – CNAPR), either filling an online form or calling the emergency phone number, or by calling the police station. If first signs of radicalisation are confirmed at the end of the first interview, the CNAPR transmits the gathered data to the concerned department where the radicalising or radicalised individual lives.

At department level, there are three operational and coordinated units that take over the responsibility of the radicalised individual to “deactivate” the process of radicalisation. The first
entity at local level is Security Headquarters (EMS), which comprises an ad-hoc evaluation cell to assess cases of radicalisation based on their seriousness. The second structure is the Department Cell for the Support of Prevention of Radicalisation and the Assistance of Families (cellule départementale de suivi pour la prévention de la radicalisation et l’accompagnement des familles – CPRAF), charged of supporting both the radicalised person and his/her family in order to facilitate the process of disengagement. The third structure (more focused on Islamist violent radicalisation) is the Department Cell for the fight against Islamism and Communitarian Attitude5 (cellule départementale de “lutte contre l’islamisme et le repli Communaute – CLIR) that is charged of the diagnosis of the process of Islamist radicalisation of reported individuals (Les partenaires du terrain du CIPDR, CIPDR). All these structures charged with the evaluation of radicalising or radicalised individuals were established in April 2014 and since then, 72000 reporting calls have been collected. Among these, less than 6000 were declared as violent radicalised individuals (Signaler et détecter, CIPDR). Therefore, if reported individuals are defined as radicalising or radicalised individuals, early management mechanisms are activated.

Programs of early management of radicalised individuals seek to disengage radicalising individuals and to reintegrate them in society (Prendre en charge et accompagner, CIPDR). This process focuses first and foremost on the driving causes that lead to radicalisation and, for this reason, various institutional and non-institutional actors are involved. Indeed, for disengagement and reintegration to be effective, social, educational, medical and psychological support is provided, and, should it be necessary, religious referents, social assistance to children, youth judicial protection and services of probation might be involved. These wide range of services are implemented by the CPRAF at department level in order to assure a quick and more embedded intervention. The CPRAF involves public services and associations – such as the MDA, the FNEPE and the UNAF – and the SG-CIPDR has created a national cell for the coordination and the support of territorial activities of prefects, territorial authorities and other actors involved. Moreover, the Department Evaluation Groups (Groupes d’Évaluation Territoriale – GED) monitor that the process of detection and early management is carried out in compliance with these steps (Dispositif Territorial de prevention de la radicalisation violente). Since the establishment of this early management mechanism in 2014, the CPRAF have supported 6300 individuals (5000 of whom were under 25) and 2300 families (Prendre en charge et accompagner, CIPDR).

5 “Communitarian” refers to a neologism that has emerged in French politics in recent years. Specifically, “communautarisme” is described as the inclination to neatly break with French society and Republican values in the name of religion (Faye, 2019, October 16).
Tertiary intervention

Tertiary intervention aims at de-radicalize and disengage those who have engaged in illegal, criminal acts related to violent extremism and terrorism to prevent reoffending (RAN, 2018). Disengagement corresponds to renouncing to violence, while deradicalization implies a transformation of beliefs (CIPDR). For this reason, tertiary intervention comprises corrective measures to help radicalised individuals to disengage and abandon violence. This set of policies are first and foremost addressed to two categories: the foreign fighters returning from Syria and Iraq and radicalized detainees (Désengager et réintégrer, CIPDR). The management of radicalisation has become one of the main objectives of penal and penitentiary policies conducted by the French government. The treatment of radicalised individuals follows two stages. Firstly, an in-depth evaluation of detainees charged of terrorist activities is carried out in the Radicalisation Evaluation Block (Quartiers d’évaluation de la radicalisation – QER), where detainees spend 4 months (Désengager et réintégrer, CIPDR). Secondly, detainees are sent to specific structures according to the result of their evaluation. There are three types of second-stage facilities. The first type of structures are facilities of ordinary detention where programs for preventing violent radicalisation (Programmes de prevention de la radicalisation violente – PPRV) are implemented. The second type of facilities are Blocks for the Management of Radicalisation (Quartiers de Prise en charge de la Radicalisation – QPR) where extremist proselytised detainees are monitored in high-security jails. The third type of structure are Solitary Confinement Blocks (Quartiers d’isolement – QI), which correspond to high-security jails in a closed environment where violent extremists and terrorists are detained. Despite differences regarding the level of control and monitoring, ad-hoc medical and psychological support is provided in all these facilities (Désengager et réintégrer, CIPDR).

In the latest National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation, the French government addressed a sensitive problem that is affecting (and will probably affect in next years) French society – namely, the return from Syria and Iraq of minors. In these cases, the management of radicalised individuals must be adapted to this specific category. Therefore, the management system is largely based on common law when implementing these provisions, such as: the application of child protection measures; the systematic implementation of medical and psychological assistance; the long-term monitoring of minors carried out by regional resources selected by regional medical agencies; a specific training offer for services involved in the support and management of minors; the reunification of siblings in the same place (Désengager et réintégrer, CIPDR).

Perspectives
According to the in-depth analysis of the P/CVE policies implemented in France, some considerations can be made.

Firstly, P/CVE policies were elaborated to address, first and foremost, Islamist violent radicalisation and jihadist terrorism, that represents the major violent extremist threat for France today. On the CIPDR’s online platform, for instance, there is a specific section devoted to Islamism and Islamist separatism. However, further attention should be drawn also to other forms of violent extremism that are emerging in France to develop new mechanisms, first and foremost of primary prevention, to prevent their diffusion.

Secondly, French authorities demonstrated to be able to change their policies according to evidence on the ground. Indeed, throughout the years French government has drifted away from the highly security-oriented approach it implemented in early years to develop a new all-encompassing and holistic approach to preventing radicalisation. New measures to tackle the socioeconomic, cultural and psychological drivers of radicalisation have been adopted and a wide variety of institutional and non-institutional partners at national, regional and local level have been involved. Moreover, France is largely investing in the training and capacity-building of all social actors that deal, directly or indirectly, with radicalisation and the CIPDR has integrated policies for social cohesion and integration.

Finally, it should be stressed that French authorities have developed educational policies that involve all the actors that participate in the education of children and youngsters as well as minors.
Italy

Characterization of the phenomenon of violent extremism in Italy

Italy has been confronting violent extremism of various forms for decades. The first evidences of the phenomenon after World War II trace back to the end of the 1960s, that marked the beginning of a period, known as “Years of Lead”, that Italian historians traditionally make last until 1981 and was characterised by high level of internal political violence and terrorism (Stortoni, 1992). Moreover, along with this prolonged phase of terrorism perpetrated both by far left and far right paramilitary groups, Italian authorities had to cope with the socioeconomic, financial and security threat posed by organized crime (Mafia, Camorra, Ndrangheta), that still represents a profound and deeply rooted challenge to Italian security (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017).

Today, the landscape of violent extremism in Italy is multifaceted and comprises a wider variety of groups and orientations. In the past two decades, Italy seemed to have been spared by the new wave of Islamist extremist violence that has disrupted other European countries. However, there are limits to this “Italian exceptionalism” (Groppi, 2017) and new violent episodes proved that Italy is not immune to this phenomenon. As a signal, from August 2016 to July 2020, the number of monitored jihadi foreign fighters increased from 125 to 146, hence shedding light on an unexpected Islamist violent extremist activism in Italy (Statista, 2020). Moreover, in 2018, a new acceleration in anti-immigrant and anti-Muslims attacks has been recorded (Tondo and Giuffrida, 2018 Guardian) and, in 2019, Italy accounted for the highest number of far left-affiliated arrests in Europe (EUROPOL, 2020). Therefore, further attention should be drawn to the different forms of violent extremism in Italy.

The landscape of violent extremism in Italy comprises a variety of groups that can be divided into 3 categories: 1) far-left extremism, 2) far-right extremism and 3) Islamist extremism.

Far left extremism spread through Italy in the late 1960s and consisted of a wide variety of groups. The militancy of these extremist movements was grounded on Marxist-Leninist ideology. The most prominent and longest lasting far left organisation was the Red Brigades (Brigate Rosse – BR), that managed to build a national, centralised and well-organised movement (CISAC, a, 2012). Throughout the 1970s, the BR targeted mostly politicians, law enforcement, factory managers and business leaders and, in 1978, the group kidnapped and ultimately murdered former PM and President of Christian Democracy Party Aldo Moro (Stortoni, 1992).
Even if today far left extremist groups are not strong as in the past, this kind of violent extremism still represents a threat to Italian security. In 2019, Italian authorities reported the highest number of far left-affiliated arrests (98) and of left wing failed, foiled and completed attacks in Europe (EUROPOL, 2020). Moreover, in the last 15 years, the far-left extremist landscape has gone through a process of fragmentation that makes their monitoring more difficult. For instance, a high number of anarchist cells affiliated to the Informal Anarchist Federation (Federazione Anarchica Informale – FAI) is active today in several Italian cities (Mantici, 2017) and managed, in some cases, to carry out disruptive attacks (Repubblica, 2017).

The second form of violent extremism that requires attention is far right extremism. Right wing extremism in Italy is grounded in the survival of various fascist cells after the end of World War II. These cells sought to overthrow Italian democracy and restore the fascist regime (CISAC, b, 2012). The most prominent extreme right group in the 1960s was the New Order (Ordine Nuovo – ON), along with National Vanguard (Avanguardia Nazionale – AN) and, eventually, the Armed Revolutionary Cores (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari – NAR), that was considered their direct offshoot (Stortoni, 1992). Indeed, the escalation of political violence and the dismantlement of several far-right groups during the 1970s fuelled the emergence of the NAR, that has been the most violent far right group in Italy and charged with the Bologna massacre in 1980 (CISAC, c, 2012).

In recent years, far right extremist groups have integrated new narratives and frameworks due to internal and international political dynamics. On the one hand, the economic crisis started in 2008 fuelled social grievances and resentment against the State (CEP, 2020). On the other, the refugee crisis and the new wave of jihadist terrorism in Europe since 2015 fuelled anti-immigrant and anti-Muslims sentiment (Ibid.). The far-right extremist group that engaged the most in anti-refugee and anti-Muslim mobilisation in Italy is New Force (Forza Nuova – FN), that embraces ultra-nationalism and Christian ultra-conservatism and whose ideology is articulated primarily in opposition to immigration, globalization and Islam (Castelli Gattinara, 2019). Since 2015, FN has conducted several low-intensity violent activities, such as assaults against leftist, human rights and pro-immigration civil society organizations and has conducted several anti-immigration and anti-Islam campaigns using hate speech and contributing to further polarize Italian public opinion. In 2015, 19 FN members were accused of a variety of offenses, including dangerous explosions and aggravated internal violence (ANSA, 2015) and in July 2019 a police raid in homes of several neofascists found a significant arsenal of arms, including an air-to-air missile (Gallagher, 2019).

The third type of violent extremism to be analysed is Islamist violent extremism. The first evidences of Islamist extremist groups in Italy were reported in the 1980s, when the first clusters of
militants from North Africa established themselves in Italy, especially in Lombardy (Vidino, 2013). During the 1990s, jihadists networks started using the Islamic Cultural Institute (ICI) of Milan as a transit point and recruiting centre for jihadi fighters willing to join various terrorist organisations in the Balkans and in North Africa – e.g. the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combatant (GSPC), Jama'at Islamiyya, Ansar al-Sharia and, eventually, al-Qaeda (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017). Islamist violent groups refrained to attack Italy until the Italian participation in the US-led invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003). Hence, during the 2000s, Italy experienced a new wave of lone-wolf terrorist plots and several security investigations led to the dismantling of dozens of jihadi cells (Vidino, 2013).

More recently, with the rise of the Islamic State (IS) and the start of the Syrian civil war, Italy has shifted from being the transit point of foreigner combatant to being the incubator of homegrown jihadists (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017). Indeed, despite Italy did not reported a number of foreign fighters as high as other European countries’ – nearly 1/13 of France’s contingent (Cook and Vale, 2019), various evidences raise concerns regarding a potential growth of Islamist violent extremism in Italy. For instance, according to a survey conducted between 2015 and 2016, out of 440 subjects interviewed, 24% stated that violence in defence of Islam is justifiable, 10% endorsed al-Qaida, 13% supported the Islamic State and almost 30% agreed with the duty to punish whomever insults Islam and its sacred tenets (Groppi and Chin, 2018). Moreover, since online platforms has always been the priority channels for jihadist preachers and recruiters to radicalise Italian individuals (Vidino, 2014), the over-exposition of vulnerable people, such as the youngsters, to online propaganda during the pandemic raises concerns regarding a potential new wave of Islamist violent radicalisation. For all these reasons and for the background of Islamist violent groups in Italy, Islamist violent extremism still represents a major security threat to Italy.

**Overview of existing P/CVE policies in Italy**

Given its longstanding history of political violent extremism and organized crime, Italy has developed throughout time several mechanisms to prevent extremist violence and fight terrorism. Moreover, in the past 20 years, the Italian authorities have integrated new measures and mechanisms to counter violent extremism in accordance with various European directives issued after 9/11 events. The emergence of global jihadism in the 2000s and the rise in the mid-2010s of new international terrorist organisations such as the Islamic State, followed by a new wave of jihadist attacks in Europe, have encouraged a reconfiguration of Italian P/CVE policies, that were mainly focused on left wing and right-wing extremism (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017). However, Italy still lacks a more holistic and multi-stakeholders national plan to prevent homegrown violent
radicalisation, a systemic weakness that might undermine the capacity of Italian authorities to detect and defuse the driving forces leading to violent extremism.

This section takes into consideration two trends in Italian P/CVE policies highlighting the weaknesses and the strengths of the Italian system. Firstly, the analysis focuses on the most relevant law adopted in the past 20 years that were conceived to provide judicial and law enforcement mechanisms for preventing and sanctioning violent extremism. Secondly, the draft bill “Dambruoso-Manciulli” – named after the Italian prosecutor and the MP that proposed the law – that was presented in 2017 to provide a new plan of prevention of radicalisation will be considered in order to underline the weakness of Italian P/CVE policies.

The Italian legal framework regarding the prevention, prosecution and repression of violent radicalisation is largely based on the Criminal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedures (Valiente-Ivanez et al., 2019). Specifically, 5 laws that have included new mechanisms for countering violent extremism in Italy are worth mentioning.

1) Law 438/2001 equated international terrorism – such as al-Qaeda’s transnational political violence – to the criminal category of associations with the purpose of terrorism and introduced the sanction of the financing of international terrorist organizations (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2001).

2) Law 155/2005 – issued after the 2005’s London bombings and 2004’s Madrid attacks – created the crime of recruitment and training with the purpose of international and national terrorism. The law also reinforced the powers of State Police, the National Gendarmerie (Arma dei Carabinieri), the judicial police and the Financial Guard to conduct investigations regarding terrorism (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2005). Moreover, the law allows to conduct investigative hearings with detainees and inmates in order to gain useful information for the prevention and repression of terrorism.

3) Law 124/2007 significantly strengthened institutional cooperation among State agencies, public officers and institutional and non-institutional actors that have to deal with violent radicalisation. The aim of this law was improving the monitoring, detecting and management of radicalised or radicalising individuals (sicurezzanazionale.gov.it, 2007).

4) Law 43/2015 – issued after 2015’s Charlie Hebdo attacks and the brand-new massive IS mobilisation of European foreign fighters – aimed at harmonizing the legislation developed until then by introducing a “two-track” strategy of preventive and sanctioning measures against violent extremism and radicalisation (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017)
Firstly, it introduced new and harsher measures to prosecute new figures of terrorists, such as foreign fighters and transnational terrorist recruiters or preachers. Foreign fighters are sentenced to 5 to 8 years of imprisonments, while the prison term for terrorist recruiters is 7 to 15 years. Secondly, the law strengthened the capacity of Postal and Communication Police to monitor online propaganda, which is considered a flourishing “market” for extremist recruitment and self-radicalisation. Thirdly, in order to fight the increasing phenomenon of lone-wolves terrorism, the Law 43/2015 provides also new mechanisms to prosecute either trainees or the radicalised individuals that have self-radicalised, self-trained and are willing to conduct a terrorist attack. Finally, from a procedural point of view, the law has integrated new measures to allow the Judicial Authority to remove sites used for terrorist activities and propaganda whenever is necessary (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017).

5) Law 153/2016 incorporated into the Criminal Code new mechanisms to prolong the prison term for terrorism-affiliated individuals and included new indictable categories – namely, anyone gathering, offering or lending goods or money to be used in terrorist activities (Gazzetta Ufficiale, 2016).

As can be deduced from the considerations above, Italy has prioritized a law enforcement approach to the phenomenon of violent extremism through the implementation of a largely security-oriented and centralized system. Italian P/CVE policies has focused first and foremost on Islamist violent extremism in the past 20 years. Moreover, the social environments that are believed to be conducive for violent radicalisation are prisons and online platforms, which P/CVE policies focus on (Piacente, 2019). As a result, the activities of the Italian authorities to counter violent extremism can be summarized in 7 categories:

1) intelligence and police investigations and surveillance;
2) monitoring webpages and social media;
3) countering the financing of terrorism;
4) administrative expulsions;
5) personal preventing measures;
6) judicial measures and
7) monitoring and counter-radicalisation programs within prisons (Bisoffi and van der Net, 2020, p.94).

This set of measures, combined with the longstanding capacity of Italian authorities in detecting and deterring terrorist activities, helped Italian law enforcement and judicial authorities to conduct
lengthy surveillance operations and pre-emptive raids. Moreover, the synergy between different intelligence agencies and between them and police forces, including penitentiary forces, has raised the effectiveness of Italian capabilities to counter terrorism recruitment and networking (Maniscalco and Rosato, 2017).

Nonetheless, the Italian P/CVE system is still flawed, as it presents various weaknesses that may affect its effectiveness in the future. Firstly, Italian authorities resorted to a set of measures that were conceived to deal with far right and far left extremism when countering Islamist violent extremism. For the different ideological background Islamism-inspired violence refers to, the strategy to fight Islamist violent radicalisation should integrate different approaches and perspectives. Therefore, it emerges that Italian authorities has not made clear distinctions between different forms of violent extremism until today – even if, de iure they have been focusing on Islamist violent extremism since 2001. Secondly, the strategy adopted by Italy still lacks non-coercive measures for preventing violent radicalisation. Up until now, the legal and judicial tools developed focused more on ex-post intervention, not on the creation of a sustainable environment that avoid the emergence of radicalising drivers leading to violent extremism – such as socioeconomic grievances, discrimination, teenage identity crisis (Bisoffi and van der Net, 2020). Furthermore, Italy does not have a specific strategy for deradicalization or exit programs including multi-level and transdisciplinary actions.

The 2017 so-called “Dambruoso-Manciulli” law, introducing “Measures for the Prevention of Jihadist Radicalisation and Extremism” (act 3558), aimed exactly at filling the gaps in the Italian legal system regarding P/CVE policies. Indeed, the proposed law – that has already been approved by the Chamber of Deputies in 2017 (Cargasacchi, 2018) – revolves around two goals. On the one hand, it aimed at developing a new strategy for the prevention of violent radicalisation by tackling all social environments. On the other hand, new programs of education and information for civil society as well as all institutional and non-institutional actors dealing with violent extremism, such as teachers, social educators and public officers, were conceived. This twofold strategy would operate at different levels through the creation of ad hoc institutions and centres for the coordination of the preventing plan. In this perspective, the Dambruoso-Manciulli law envisages to build a National Centre for Radicalisation (Centro Nazionale sulla Radicalizzazione – CRAD) within the Department of civil liberties an immigration of the Ministry of Interior Affairs. This centre would be charged with drafting annually a National Strategic Plan underlining the evolution of violent extremism and defining the initiatives and projects to be realized (act 3558, art.2). Moreover, the new strategy includes also the institution of Centres for the Regional Coordination on Radicalisation.
The Dambruoso-Manciulli law has introduced some meaningful tools and mechanisms based on a more holistic approach to improve the P/CVE system in Italy. However, this law still focuses almost exclusively on Islamist violent radicalisation. Such a perspective underlines the general tendency at institutional level to disregard other forms of violent extremism and the driving forces behind them.

The case study of Lombardy Region: Municipality of Milan

Introduction

Some public narratives along with relevant aspects of the national political and media debate have often insisted on the marginality of Italy compared to the global context characterized by structured and widespread radicalization processes of different kinds. The absence of terrorist attacks in Italy and, on the other hand, several such attacks on European territory have reinforced this view. In reality, the country has not been marginal or peripheral compared to this dangerous process that unites ideologies of discrimination and terrorist violence. Italy, on the contrary, has been directly hit by the threat of radicalization, in the various forms that it can take, and has also developed some responses, both institutional and repressive, both formative and preventive, particularly original and advanced. Regarding the danger of radicalisation, there have been interventions and operations by the police and some prosecutors who have thwarted events that could become dramatic due to the devastating effects in terms of human lives lost. In this respect, as Vidino states (2014), a «widespread and punctiform threat, extremely heterogeneous in all its facets and in constant evolution» has been evident. We can therefore begin to recognize a specific “Italianness of radicalizations” that deserves analytic attention properly elaborated and, at the same time, an Italian approach to the phenomenon that has allowed, along with investigative and repressive interventions, and, although not spread throughout the country, the development of methodologies, projects and programmes based on the pedagogy of the meeting, on the recognition
of otherness and ethnic and cultural differences as specific conditions to contemporary democracies and inter-ethnic coexistence. The absence of attacks or public initiatives aimed at radicalising terrorist ideology must not, therefore, be considered marginal in the world of global terrorism but to consider the forms of institutional intelligence planned and implemented together with some training programs and estimates, such as in schools in the Country. Synergy has been built between intelligence and counter activities with those preventive and formative which may perhaps represent important originality in the action to combat violent radicalization in the Country. For this reason, repressive instruments must be accompanied by interventions focused on prevention, analysis, training, implementation of the principles underlying democracy. It was not by chance that the United Nations and the European Union have repeatedly called on the Member States to create specific Preventing Countering Violent Extremism programmes (P/CVE). These programmes must necessarily be long-term and constantly integrated into training policies and projects, especially in areas where radicalisation variables are most evident. Indeed, it is essential to prevent radicalisation by means of measures, policies and projects relating to the previous stage before it is launched and, at the same time, even after it begins. Equally important are the actions aimed at deradicalization or disillusionment. From this point of view, the training programmes focused on education that will analyse the differences of cultures are fundamental. They, in fact, rather than aim at the criminalization of thought and belonging, as Cuciniello (2020) also states, academics and experts selected for training, are an opportunity to share and reinterpretation of some stereotyped models over time. These are programs aimed at recovering the teenagers who, although close to radicalization, have not yet developed criminal behaviour or tendencies. In short, these are complementary and, at the same time, fundamental tools for the elaboration of inclusive and non-exclusive knowledge. In Italy, the national guidelines for the curriculum stipulate that minors must develop an original awareness of both formal and informal rights and duties, which regulate the national community, with reference also to cultural diversity, to the relationship with otherness, religion and justice. It should also be added that training is essential for active and conscious citizenship and that basic social and cultural knowledge should be promoted through intercultural education. These goals, moreover, are at the same time educational and pedagogical reform processes for the same school institution which implements approaches, experiences and sensitivities that allow it to adapt to the social evolution of the country. The development of programs and services devoted to the construction of evolved forms of active citizenship are themselves based on development and cultural investment in critical thinking, which is of fundamental importance to avoid the doctrinal acquisition of terrorist ideology based on
stereotypical statements, not justifiable on a logical level, simplistic and surrounded by an aura of
the infallibility of almost divine. It is not by chance that the 2016-2019 Italian teacher training plan
promoted the development of critical thinking in the educational field to provide teachers with the
tools to develop a colourful criticism and a linear dialectic, being the best antidote to radicalisation
rhetoric.

The Methodology

From a methodological point of view, a desk review and semi-structured interviews were
carried out to realise this case study. Specifically, the desk research was focused on the main national
and international publications related to P/CVE policies. In addition to the desk research, seven
semi-structured interviews were also carried out involving trainers, school leaders, third sector
selected according to their role in educational institutions, universities and third sector. Telephone
interviews were conducted between March 2021 and April 2021. Telephone interviews conducted
have provided direct conversation with the subjects involved, but only through verbal exchange,
which is based on linguistic and vocal stimuli and according to the experiences gained by them.
This conversation was anticipated and stimulated by a brief presentation of the project and its
purpose. Moreover, all the interviews have been set in a dialogical way to deepen, in the course of
the dialogue, innovative aspects that would otherwise risk being left behind. In this regard, it was
decided to maintain anonymity to ensure privacy and facilitate the connection and narration of the
interviewed with the experiences gained. The reflection that inspired the elaboration with respect to
the concept of radicalization has included innovative phenomena in the debate such as bullying and
cyberbullying. From a theoretical point of view, the elaboration was based on network analysis with
reference to both the sociology of groups and the pedagogy of learning. The regional focus has been
identified because of a number of variables. First of all, the significant statistical presence of several
migrant communities’ resident in the territory of the Lombardy region resident for over 30 years.
This condition indicates an equally important presence of students of migrant origin in primary and
secondary schools (I and II degree) with particular reference to the Hinterland. Another reason for
the selection of the Lombardy Region consists in the validity of the regional law 107/2015 Article
1 paragraph 7 of 2015, which introduces, in addition to the investigative and repressive aspects,
provided by national legislation, preventive and formative actions within Italian schools with
reference to education to cultural differences. Another aspect concerned the presence in the regional
territory of developed migrant associations, already existing relations among these and local
institutions and the spread of places of a cult of different religious faiths whose role also consists in
being places of encounter, exchange and social and political elaboration. Finally, the acknowledged
presence of phenomena of social deviance also detected through numerous judicial investigations with reference to ethnic criminal groups and discriminatory narratives tending to radicalism.

**From national to regional level: some statistics**

An in-depth analysis of the Italian counter-terrorism strategy context on the totalitarian approach to the phenomenon of radicalization was well expressed in the measures at the macro level, identified by the report at the national level. From this point of view, it was important to look from the national to the regional level. Starting from the traumatic events that occurred in Europe during the last ten years, in Italy, various municipalities supported by the local regions have decided to intervene locally on events that are often globally planned. This was because it has been realized that polarization is capable of intensifying tensions and this process could also be the potential cause of amplification of the various psychological and social factors that make people vulnerable to radicalization. For this reason, the European Commission pushes to elaborate a local strategy aimed at raise awareness at a national level, especially at the municipal level, about the risks but also the opportunities in developing both paths focused on prevention and good practices. The focus on the Lombardy Region was a consequence of the multifactor aspects starting from institutional, juridical and social reasons. If we focus our eyes on the statistical point of view, it is important to remember that regarding the presence of the foreign communities, we have a clear picture. Muslims in Italy are just over 1.5 million, a big percentage are concentrated above all in Lombardy. In the record region, resident foreigners of Islamic faith are 360 thousand, equal to over a quarter of the total of those present in Italy. In second place Emilia Romagna with 178 thousand, in third Veneto where Muslims are 134 thousand, in fourth Lazio with 120 thousand presences just ahead of Piemonte (117 thousand). With respect to single nationality of origin, the estimates as of 1 July 2019 confirm a country with over 200 thousand presents at the top of the ranking: Romania, with a record of 204 thousand, an annual growth of 1.4%, in second place with over 100 thousand: Morocco (110 thousand) in third place for Albania (108 thousand) and for the first time also Egypt (103 thousand).

If for Moroccans and Albanians the increases in presences in Lombardy during the last year are comparable to that of Romanians, respectively with + 1.0% and + 1.3%, the numerical growth of Egyptians was much stronger, compared to 1 July 2019: + 4.0%, almost double the average for all

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6 A deepened knowledge, at a national level in Italy, are included in the first phase of the task 3.1
8 In Italy for example, municipalities like Turin, Milan and Reggio Emilia have begun to raise awareness, thanks to the help of the recent anti-terrorism law, about the need to work on these issues, starting with schools, officials, and religious communities.
nationalities (+ 2.3%). Another aspect that pushes us to focus our research on Lombardy Region regards some events that happened in those last ten years. Thanks to careful monitoring of social networks, the police were able to prevent different acts of violence that were brewing in Brescia and its surroundings. Like the case of Anas el Abboubi⁹, the rapper of Moroccan origin who arrived in Italy at the age of 7 was accused of condoning terrorism, then released from prison for a lack of serious evidence of guilt but once released from prison he left for Syria. Anas confessed that his hatred of the West was born in his adolescence, especially after 11 September 2001, since that moment he was often addressed with contempt as “terrorist” and “Taliban”. He was the founder of the Sharia4Italy, which started to be monitored¹⁰. Later in 2014, the police started to follow a group named: “With or without you the caliphate returned”, which was present in the town of Fiesse near Bergamo. One year later in 2015, under the operation names of Van Danne, the police dismantled the group which had a direct connection with jihadist active in the Balkans. Central was the figure of Imishiti Samet, the mind of the cell and affiliated with Daesh, who was arrested in the village of Hani i Helezit, in eastern Kosovo¹¹. In June 2016, Naim Saghari, a Tunisian, was expelled by decree of the Ministry of the Interior because he was considered dangerous. Digos had not escaped the sentences posted on the web praising Jihad, so the wife Sara Pilè, 27 years old from Brescia and living in Monticelli Brusati, converted to Islam after her marriage with Saghari was under special surveillance¹². In Samuel (2020) chapter’s 'At the crossroads: Rethinking the role of education in preventing and countering violent extremism', he argues that:

"The best defence against extremism ideologies taking over institutions of learning is to develop an education system that will prepare and equip the students to debate and defeat extremist thoughts». Finally, Samuel says that: «the government and authorities are beginning to recognize this vulnerability in education institutes and are attempting to push the holes and prevent such institutions from becoming the breeding grounds of violent extremism" (2020, p. 174).

P/CVE in the educational field

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¹⁰ https://milano.repubblica.it/cronaca/2013/06/12/news/brescia_arrestato_21enne_marocchino ha_fondato_una_cellula_jihadista_online-60906825/
¹¹ https://www.repubblica.it/cronaca/2015/12/01/news/terrorismo_arresti_e_perquisizioni_in_italia_e_in_kosovo-128530461/
¹² https://brescia.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/18_ottobre_18/bresciana-sara-pile-convertita-all-islam-resta-sorvegliata-speciale-potrebbe-partecipare-ad-attentati-1f81fd4e-d2ba-11e8-aa91-90c7da029bcf.shtml
The Law 107/2015, Article 1 paragraph 7, states that one of the tasks and objectives of the school is the:

"Developing skills in the field of active and democratic citizenship through the enhancement of intercultural education for peace, respect for differences, dialogue between cultures, support for the assumption of responsibility and solidarity (...)".

In accordance with this law, school projects involving the institution, citizenship and the third sector have been promoted with the aim of training and reforming pedagogies and training processes on the subject of the right ideology, violence and participation. This means that continuing and compulsory training is essential for teachers in their educational and teaching methodologies. Each school, however, by virtue of the autonomy that characterizes them, defines its own continuing training activities together with the construction of networks with other schools in the region to socialize practices, problems and solutions. Within this legal framework are some of the projects funding in 2015. Among these projects, there is the one called “Paths of education to differences in the perspective of contrast to all forms of violent extremism”, advanced by the USR Lombardy, focused on the training of students with the objective to fight violent extremism, especially of a religious nature, and based on the idea of encounter and dialogue as tools to avoid pedagogies aimed at minimising migrant identities and the histories of their cultures. The goal of the project was to offer advanced interpretative tools, advanced management knowledge and policy, to organize mechanisms of general prevention placing itself as an advanced reference to the phenomena of deviance, building social paths able to bring diversity together and not only to analyse and describe them in a formal way. It also aimed to build a strong territorial network between schools and local institutions, committed to strengthening the culture of difference and the prevention of terrorism. Through this approach, developed in parallel with the spread of the alarm, for example, terrorism of various origins, it has identified the need to identify school managers and teachers with knowledge on the topic. They must be able to develop educational programs within those provided by the relevant Ministry and to be open to the concepts of respect, intercultural education, equal opportunities and against all forms of bullying and cyberbullying. In this respect, Pasta (2018) interestingly talks about hate speech and forms of discrimination and even racist violence carried on and disseminated through the Network or Web 2.0. It is essential, he stresses, to get the message, especially across young people that the web is real and, almost always, public and deriving from the continuous and definitive inter-connection of many human beings. We remember the effective expression of Floridi, also valid for hate-speech, according to which the online is
“onlife”\textsuperscript{13}. Pasta’s second consideration is on the assumption that the extreme paths of radicalization, also through the web, must be interpreted according to a scale of behaviours and thresholds indicating a process to grow of the same according to a sort of “pyramid of hatred”. For this purpose, Pasta considers it fundamental to affirm new canons of authoritativeness and selection of sources, of the images and messages and of the trivialization of contents, together with other fundamental variables. For this reason, the MIUR has integrated the 2018 Digital Civic Education Curriculum with the National Digital School Plan and in this way, it can help prevent violent extremism.

Results of school training

In 2015, the relationship between the USR Lombardy, local institutions and schools, has allowed the start of a technical-scientific table composed of university experts (in particular Islamologists, pedagogists, sociologists experts in immigration and child protection), employed together with USR staff from Lombardy Region, some parents and qualified entities and consistent with the Lombardy Region project, with the task of developing an advanced and methodologically refined monitoring of the radicalisation processes in progress and a path aimed at supporting the intercultural programs of the schools concerned. Monitoring began in 2016 and covered the Lombardy provinces of Bergamo, Brescia, Como, Cremona and Milan. Its aim was to understand and analyse needs and to develop operational initiatives capable of concretely affecting radicalisation-oriented personalities. The monitoring was developed on a statistical sample of 444

\textbf{1st grade schools and 171 2nd grade schools} comprising a student population of approximately 198,400 1st grade students and 177,200 2nd grade students. In support of the work of the \textit{Scientific and Technical Committee}, studies have been carried out on the subjects involved in the initiatives already launched or to be launched. In order to build active and participatory school environments in this respect, it is important to note that \textbf{99\% of Grade I and 97\% of Grade II schools} have stated that they have already undertaken initiatives consistent with the current programme. Typology of these actions for both school levels has provided a prevalence of projects/initiatives that \textbf{exceeded 50\%} followed by the organization of curricular modules to close with extra-curricular courses. Compared to the distribution of those involved for both orders of education, both have mostly involved students. In the latter case, \textbf{23\% for the first grade and 14\% for the second grade}. Regarding the involvement of teachers from outside the schools, the presence of stakeholders such as associations, institutions and professionals in the sector, the percentage was

\begin{verbatim}
\end{verbatim}
93% in schools in grade I and 91% of schools in grade II. According to the responsibility for the prevention and management of behaviours in violation of cultural differences these were attributed primarily to the school manager (6%) and following the faculty, parents, external experts, ATA personnel and finally with only 5% to law enforcement. In the light of these data, some reflections are possible regarding the elaboration of the favourable conditions for intercultural relations within schools which are attributed primarily to the elaboration of active citizenship and education to Legality. As far as the form of interventions is concerned, in Grade II, extra-curricular education prevails, while in the first grade we have a 41% of schools that claims to have inserted previously curricular activities related to the issues of law and prevention of radicalization. Particularly important is the involvement of external experts in a percentage that is more than 90% thus including professionalism, skills and educational experiences advanced and innovative even on the educational level. The distinction and analysis, moreover, between the initiatives that have allowed the achievement of a positive result and those that failed with the objectives of the project have allowed the elaboration of more advanced and coherent planning. In this respect, among the initiatives that have been most appreciated, the Psychological Counters and the education to critical thinking in paths that, in the first case, are typically individualized and in the second instead collective. Finally, as the last consideration, the schools recognize to the relative school leaders and teachers the strategic and primary task in the identification of the cases to be attention and the elaboration of the relative planning answers. The next step was the design of a course for “system figures” for the school year 2016-2017 that involved 30 teachers and 10 leaders of the secondary school of I and II grade of the 5 provinces concerned whose task was to develop courses and operational teaching activities. They focused the course on strategic thematic areas starting from the preventive management of radicalizations, identifying, and managing adolescent conflicts, the construction of educational paths to differences, hate crime, the role of online communication. Specifically, two training courses have been organised. The first one took place between April 2018 and May 2018 and involved 33 school managers and teachers from Lombardy belonging to the provinces not yet involved. The second course, organized between April 2018 and June 2018, involved 20 teachers and managers already qualified with the aim of strengthening their design and organizational skills with reference to prevention and direct intervention in the educational courses related to the students participating. The Scientific and Technical Committee has allowed the elaboration of an analytical document in the perspective of the contrast to every form of violent extremism that has finally inspired the successive lines of elaboration of the USR Lombardia. From the beginning, therefore, it was evident the connection of the project between the various
stakeholders (institutions, schools, student bodies, law enforcement etc) as one of its main characteristics and a methodological approach based on advanced didactic reception, collective and participatory elaboration, listening and qualified training. The Region of Lombardy, in the framework of its Law No. 24 of 6th November 2017 N°24 “regional aid and assistance victims of terrorism”\(^{14}\) has also stupefied and promoted two Conventions with the aim of supporting the USR’s project of education to differences with a view to combating all forms of violent extremism in order to disseminate its contents and consolidate its governance. In 2017, the first agreement identified 5 schools in the provinces of Bergamo, Brescia, Lecco, Milan and Sondrio with the aim of training teachers and managers in the territories of reference. The aim was to consolidate regional governance based on educational experimentation, pedagogies of listening and virtuous paradigms identified in training courses already developed.\(^{15}\)

The case of Milan

Educating to differences with a view to contrasting all forms of violent extremism project

The training project entitled: “Educating to differences with a view to contrasting all forms of violent extremism” was aimed at school managers and teachers serving in lower secondary schools in Milan and the neighbouring provinces. The course - carried out in the school complex IIS “Oriani-Mazzini”\(^{16}\) – covered the following topics: 1. The school as a context of education to dialogue and prevention of extremism; 2. The (cyber) bullying and extremism on the web; 3. The youth gangs and education for differences and the prevention of gender-based violence 4. Education for religious differences and the prevention of extremism; 5. The resources of the territory available to schools. As Fassino, lead manager in this period of the school “Oriani – Mazzini” says in many interviews: "With this project, we have tried to erase - even physically - the other, which in these differences is the bearer of the two forms of extremism, the jihadist and the political one allowed to work on two paths of action the first intervention is when the subjects have already been involved, with the early identification of the danger and relative reporting and the second is the activation of recovery and deradicalization paths”.\(^{17}\)

\(^{14}\)https://www.regione.lombardia.it/wps/portal/istituzionale/HP/istituzione/Giunta/SeduteGiunta/DettaglioSeduta/SeduteGiunta/20180521-seduta-009

\(^{15}\) First results of this commitment were made public - in November 2018 - through a regional seminar, which was able to amplify the related reflections and awareness within some school centers and in collaboration with the University of Milan, involving students, teachers, and trainers from the third sector.

\(^{16}\) The course was organized from October 2018 consisting of 5 meetings - of 3 hours to Wednesday 11 November more details: https://www.orianimazzini.edu.it/index.php/educarealledifferenze.

The interinstitutional elaboration and the socialization of the analysed and matured experiences have allowed the signing in 2019 of a second Convention. This derives from a regional tender that has allowed the birth of a polo school also in the provinces of Como, Cremona, Lodi, Mantua, Monza and Brianza, Pavia and Varese. The selection was made through the development of educational projects relating to a training course for teachers and managers concerning the prevalent categories of violent extremism, the factors that favour extremist radicalization in young people, preventive interventions, methodologies, management of conflicts and analysis of internet communication. The selection of the institutes took place in July 2019 and allowed in November of the same year the comparison of the related works and documents and, at the same time, the adoption of specific intervention plans deriving from the Guidelines elaborated by the technical-scientific table of the USR Lombardia of 2018. The listening, processing, educational and social intervention activities in the eleven polo schools continued in 2020, involving students and institutions not included until then, through online seminar activities. 2021 was committed, albeit, with the consequences produced by a pandemic that had a great impact on the entire social and institutional body of the Region, in the dissemination in the Lombard territory through seminars, online conferences of the results achieved up to them through the work carried out in the last years. It is useful to highlight that the development of an inclusive school environment derives, first and foremost, as also stated by the current school director of the IIS “Oriani – Mazzini” Institute in Milan, from the satisfaction of some fundamental needs for the teaching staff.

These fundamental needs for teaching staff are: 1. The need for information and training experts relating to the needs of students; 2. The need for external bodies and associations that are able to stimulate the curiosity of students with respect to the educational and pedagogical prerogatives of the Institute; 3. The development of continuous relational exchange between the various teachers able to socialize virtuous methodologies, experiences, approaches and a common interpretation of the main issues that have emerged; 4. The need to suspend the use of the internet for teaching time due to its excessive use as this lowers the attention thresholds in students and slows down the formation of their critical thinking. The latter seeks to develop or encourage it by encouraging the participation of students in favour of research and theatre projects, the sharing of ideas and opinions, active listening, the elaboration of text and language analysis and finally the identification and processing of hate speech.

BULLOUT project

18 https://www.oranimazzini.edu.it/index.php/educarealledifferenze
In line with the previous plan, the Lombardy Region, in implementation of the regional law 1/2017 "Discipline of regional interventions in the field of prevention and contrast to the phenomenon of bullying and cyberbullying", promoted the line of intervention called: "BULLOUT" with the general purpose of supporting projects for the prevention and contrast of bullying and cyberbullying. This gives the opportunity to the Lombardy Region and the Regional School Office to sign an agreement on 25/09/2018 based on the scheme approved with DGR 539 of 17/09/2018. The relationship between bullying, cyberbullying and radicalization are by no means irrelevant, as one might think without an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon. The various forms of persecution carried out through, for example, on the Internet and by social media, among which undoubtedly bullying and cyberbullying can be expressions of a personal path that is suited to radicalization and that can be expressed in some of its phases through persecutory behaviours. Some factors like the action, the language, the behaviours adopted for example by a subject that tends or is moving towards radicalization are clearly manifested against those who most clearly represents the ideological object of his ideological elaboration. For this reason, any manifestation, especially within the school, of behaviours, languages or attitudes of this nature, must be understood and developed as an advanced critical elaboration pedagogical intervention.

The specific purpose of the BULLOUT project is to promote the implementation of projects aimed at some specific objectives, including the realization of awareness, information and training programs, including information technology, for minors and their families. Similarly, the aim is to create support programs for minors who have been victims of bullying and cyberbullying, including through the intervention of competent external professionals, including some local associations and institutions. Another objective is to promote recovery programs aimed at perpetrators of bullying and cyberbullying, also in this case through the interventions of professional figures, also with the aim of avoiding the criminalization and possible social discrimination of the minor guilty of bullying or cyberbullying.

19 Starting from the autumn of 2015, an organizational model was strengthened with the aim of encouraging the training of teachers in Lombardy, of awareness-raising initiatives aimed at the school community, in particular parents, and the consolidation of competent intervention procedures. For this reason, a referent teacher at regional level has been identified in coordination with a referent teacher for each UU.SS.TT as well as with the Postal and Communications Police, the Lombardy Co.re.com, the Universities and associations competent in the matter. All this with the aim of guaranteeing capillary actions throughout the region and the identification of particularly effective training models.

20 https://www.cyberbullismolombardia.it/pag/bullout/28/

The expert involved, a sociologist from the Catholic University of Milan, who has long been committed to the prevention of radicalization, with respect to the BULLOUT project, whose methodological aspects she took care of, states:

"Made it possible to produce a participatory model of group work that made it possible to create, for example, a radio and a comic with the aim of telling the theme of bullying and cyberbullying. The project had a methodological line through a questionnaire disseminated in schools in order to verify if there had been bullying. Following the results, we moved on to working with experts on some issues such as the peer group, the inclusion and recognition of those who have bullying attitudes, intervening in cases of established bullying, working on self-awareness and finally reflecting on co-construction with reality and with others". On the other hand, with respect to the strengths of the project, the expert again notes that: "in the participation of multiple stakeholders, not at all obvious", while the impact that the pandemic has determined on it was important. In this regard, the expert again declares that: "it has influenced the dynamics of training in schools and what saddens is the ever-clearer awareness of the isolation of the peripheries".

Listening Centres project as an antenna that welcomes

Another interesting project, also organized in the Municipality of Milan, in the areas at risk of radicalization, provided for the opening of some listening centres thanks to the direct involvement of the Ministry of the Interior and the Lombardy Region. The aim was to make direct contact with the personalities and social realities most at risk. From a methodological point of view, the Centres aim to welcome and listen to interested interlocutors and, at the same time, develop advanced empowerment paths. They will also have to carry out preventive activities such as the elaboration of studies starting from the data collected and the realization of awareness campaigns. These "antennas" positioned on the territory of the municipality of Milan also carry out an interesting connection activity between the police forces, social services, migrant and religious communities and local educational institutions.

“EXTRemism EMEnadation” project

22 The telephone interview took place on April 20, 2021.
23 https://usr.istruzione.lombardia.gov.it/comunicazioni/
Work on these issues of awareness and was subsequently proposed in an Erasmus plus project, funded by the European Union entitled: “**EXTRemism EMEndation**”\(^\text{24}\). The project: “**EXTRemism EMEndation**” aims to promote the active participation of young people in the P/CVE and radicalism issue and to find ways to combat them, through youth work and non-formal education. The *Young Effect Association* of Magenta and the *Circolo Acli* of Abbiategrasso, together with seven other international project partners, believe that it is very important to bring together young active people, youth workers and activists from the different countries involved, to discuss such topics like the extremist phenomena that today threaten security and peace in Europe.

The main objective of this project is to address radicalization in young people through education on understanding the phenomenon, on the strategies and methods of prevention to be used and, at the same time, it promotes cooperation between key players such as schools and public bodies. The project involved 28 youth workers, representatives of the partner associations of the countries involved – in addition to the Young Effect Association, project leader and based in Magenta, organizations from France, Spain, Turkey, Poland, Croatia, Bulgaria and Romania will be involved – hosted from 1 to 9 December 2018.

One of the promoters of this project is a training coach that followed all the phases, in particular the public events. He declared that he was: «*positively surprised for the participation of a specific political party (Lega) of the municipality and on the other hand, negatively surprised about the absence of the other political actor, even if they were invited (as for example Partito Democratico)*»\(^\text{25}\).

Clearly, it was important to involve all the political parties and actors of public life such as the policies and other associations present in the same district. Just with the efforts of political, social and educational systems, we can work together in the respect of all the cultures and, as Dewey and Lichtner (2010) argues, it is necessary to work on a democratic habitus, in collaboration with a school that teaches the difference between fundamentalisms and democracy, that develops educational actions aimed at managing social and identity conflicts.

**Conclusions**

**Strengths**

The projects carried out by the Lombardy Region have shown some original characteristics that have allowed their development consistent with the reasons for their elaborations and also useful


\(^{25}\) The telephone interview took place on April 13, 2021
for the achievement of some of the planned objectives such as, for example, cooperation with various territorial stakeholders that has allowed to socialize, most of all, experiences and knowledge that have raised the interest and participation of students.

1. The stakeholders and their participation made it possible to represent at least a part of the interests in the field, correctly designing the overall picture of the phenomenon and the subjects involved as was mentioned by the experts of the projects BULLOUT and EXTRemism EMEndation.

2. Another aspect of fundamental importance, moreover, is the expression of a strategic collaboration of public institutes with private subjects, which is represented by the participation in the didactic paths envisaged with the relative methodologies and pedagogies of experts in the main themes.

3. The projects have also made it possible to develop an active network of inputs and outputs that is wider than the class group and to liven up the reflections and considerations taken during the periods of school training so as to generate a continuous exchange between all its participants. In this case, it is important to remember what was said by the headteacher of the Institution “Oriani- Mazzini” in Milan about the results achieved by the Communities of good practice, that these results emerged after the bottom up with students. In the future, those projects will certainly be widespread.

Points of weakness

Along with the virtuous aspects identified there are some critical issues:

1. First, the problem of economic funds that have been limited due to projects with short lifespans. A substantially limited time scale did not allow for long-term cultural investment and consequently produced high perishability of the educational objectives assumed.

2. A suggestion made by the interview with the headteacher regarding the difference between the regional level and the national level, in relation to the theme of integration values, could be the expansion of the issues present in the civic education module.

3. The difficulties manifested in the systematization of the core of the projects. The failure to develop a system has made, in fact, rendered the projects unstable on a constitutive level, preventing them from consolidating themselves in definitively structured practices and didactics.

4. Finally, good practices and the experiences gained, if they produced immediate positive effects, have not been promoted and disseminated adequately. Also, in this case, the partial
socialization of good practices and methodologies represented a limit for the territory and for the implementation of the same at the level of national institutions.
Belgium

1. Violent extremism in Belgium: a historical overview

Belgium has a relatively recent and less intense history of violent extremism and political violence compared to other countries in Europe.

It was largely spared from terrorist attacks that haunted other countries like Spain, Germany, Italy, or France during the 1960s-1980s. The latter had some of the most powerful and well-organized terrorist groups in Europe, rooted mostly in far-left and separatist ideologies such as Italy’s Red Brigades, German Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), the nationalist Basque group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, and Action Directe in France.

In Belgium, domestic terrorism was limited to a smaller group known as Cellules Communistes Combattantes (Fighting Communist Cells, CCC). It was a short-lived organization that followed Marxism-Leninism as its ideological compass and remained active just over the span of a few years between 1983 and 1986. The CCC, led by Pierre Carette, primarily engaged in attacks against property and, to a lesser extent, bombings. The preferred targets were NATO premises or meetings, American companies, and police, which the group perceived as legitimate targets inasmuch as all symbolized capitalism and authoritarianism thereof. The CCC were responsible for some 15 attacks over less than 3 years of activity.

At the same time, Belgium was not entirely detached from the European terrorist scene of those decades, that featured prominently attacks and activities by terrorist groups from outside Europe, mainly the Middle East, as well as from Northern Ireland. In 1979 several bombings claimed by the separatist, republican group Provisional IRA rocked Belgium, especially the capital city Brussels and Antwerp. In 1981 the Palestinian organization Black September was involved in the bombing of a synagogue in Antwerp that killed 3 people and injured 100. Belgium has also been a transit country for Algeria’s and Morocco’s Islamist extremist groups such as the Armed Islamic Group and the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group. This led to the creation during the 80s of a special unit in the anti-terrorism division of Belgian police to monitor extreme Islamists (Coolsaet & Struye, 2007).

An entirely new phase began at the turn of the century, when Islamic extremism grew in numbers, level of threat, and organizational capacity (Sharia4Belgium played a prominent role) following the September 11 attacks in the U.S. and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Belgium has
developed both an issue of extremist returnees from abroad (mainly the Middle East) and of homegrown terrorism.

As of 2016, about 400-600 foreign fighters of Belgian origin, or departed from the country, had left for Syria and Iraq to join jihadist groups like al-Nusra Front (the al-Qaeda Syrian branch in that period) or Daesh. It is one of the highest value per capita in Europe. By the same date, 128 were thought to have returned to the country while at least 1/3 died fighting in the Middle East (Scherrer, 2018). As of early October 2019, 69 children and 54 adults with Belgian passports remained jailed in Syria in prison camps controlled by the Kurdish faction SDF (Coolsaet & Renard, 2020). Most notably, Belgium quickly became one of the most important ‘hubs’ for Daesh in the continent, inasmuch as many attacks claimed by the group in 2014-2016 were planned from Belgium, i.e. November 2015 multiple and coordinated attacks in Paris. On March 22, 2016, a Daesh suicide commando detonated inside Brussels airport in Zaventem, totalling 35 dead (including 3 perpetrators) and hundreds of injured. It was the biggest terrorist attack in modern Belgium.

This robust exodus towards Syria and Iraq, as well as a fast-developing jihadist and radical Islamist milieu, pressured Belgian authorities to act, both in countering and in preventing radicalization and polarization. Most of today’s pieces of legislation were designed in response to, or taking into account the last 10 years events. Current policies addressing radicalization in Belgium are born in a time of renewed threat from domestic and international terrorism. Terrorism, violent extremism and radicalization are thus understood as strictly linked phenomena by Belgian authorities. As far as Belgian policies are concerned, radicalization is best described as a process that can be stopped, inverted and/or targeted with early prevention measures.

However, it must be underscored that over the same period far-right extremism has also started to proliferate. A recent report by State Security claims that in 2019 far-right extremism gained momentum, benefiting also from the global echo of far-right motivated attacks such as the shooting in a mosque in Christchurch, New Zealand by Brenton Tarrant. It states explicitly that there is a breeding ground for right-wing ideologically inspired violence in Belgium (VSSE, 2019).

2. P/CVE policies in Belgium: the state of the art

The origin and scope of Belgium's policies to combat and prevent radicalization are closely connected with the country's peculiar institutional architecture. Belgium is a federal state divided into 3 regions: Flanders, Wallonia, and Brussels. An additional layer is that of linguistic communities: French, Flemish and German speaking communities do play a role in the country governance.
The governance system is highly asymmetrical, with both the regions and the linguistic communities holding numerous exclusive competences. Overall, this type of architecture solicits coordination and cooperation between the different government entities, but at the same time makes it difficult to formulate a unitary and strongly coherent policy on radicalization. It comes with no surprise that Belgian authorities stress the need for an “integrated policy”. The coherence of policies therefore resides for the most part in the coordination capability expressed by the institutions and officials, at the most diverse levels.

This is quite evident precisely in the case of prevention policies. In general terms, the federal level of government is responsible for repression and law enforcement. The regions are responsible for the cities and municipalities. The linguistic communities, on the other hand, have delegated competences in the fields of prevention, education and social care. As far as P/CVE is concerned, the process is not top-down. A vertical chain of command does not exist, as the principle of subsidiarity applies instead (van der Vet & Coolsaet, 2018). However, all 3 of these levels of government promote prevention policies.

At the federal level, the main P/CVE policy is known as Plan R, or Plan of Action against Radicalization, which dates back to 2005. In fact, this document is a revision of an earlier version of it, which dates back to 2002 and was called Plan M or Plan Mosques. Despite the name change, the origin of the plan is rooted in a specific type of violent extremism, that of an Islamist and jihadist matrix. This is evident from the reasons that led the authorities to update Plan R over the years. For example, the transition from Plan M to Plan R occurred for the assessment of the threat posed by
cells of the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) present on the territory of Belgium in 2004. The GICM was affiliated with al-Qaeda and was held responsible for the 2003 Casablanca bombings. The 2012 revision instead moved from the increase in visibility of an organization such as Sharia4Belgium, while the update of the plan completed in 2016 took into consideration both the flows of Belgian foreign fighters towards Syria and Iraq and the Paris attacks of 2015 (Charlie Hebdo, Bataclan) (Jaminé & Fadil, 2019). Gradually, with the evolution of the threat and with the increase of public attention on the phenomenon of radicalization in the various local contexts, Plan R has increasingly integrated a preventive approach, which has thus balanced the purely countering and securitarian approach of the origins.

Plan R is structured on two main components: a vertical and a horizontal dimension. The vertical dimension is aimed at increasing, facilitating and making efficient the exchange of information between the federal and regional / local levels, as well as simplifying the procedures for monitoring certain cases. The bodies responsible for these purposes are the National Task Force (NTF) and the Local Task Forces (LTFs). The NTF gathers monthly and includes representatives of the different governments, the police, the General Direction Crisis Centre and the Service Immigration. LTFs act locally on the territory and are responsible for monitoring specific individuals or groups. These units are in contact with the local administrative authorities and with the social and prevention services in the area. The horizontal dimension is embedded in the Local Integral Security Cells (Cellule de Sécurité Intégrale Locale, CSIL). CSILs are local platforms designed to provide social workers, stakeholders, deradicalization officers and representatives from the mayor’s office with a space for exchange, coordination and dialogue. It must be noted that local authorities are not obliged to set up CSILs, and have the final say on the participants to the platform. The CSILs have first been envisaged by the Circular Letter of 21/08/2015 of the Minister of Internal Affairs with regard to Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF).

The Plan R is a national policy whose overarching objective is formal rather than substantial: coordination stands at the centre of the plan. NTF itself is presented in the plan as a “consultation body”, deprived of executive or decisional powers. This is the result of the so-called “chain oriented approach” followed by Belgian authorities in designing this plan.

In 2013, the federal government through the Ministry of Interior supplemented Plan R with the Programme on the prevention of violent radicalization. This initiative came as a reaction to increased departures of Belgian citizens for the Middle East as foreign fighters (Wittendorp, 2017). The programme stresses the need for truly preventive actions and adopts a wider, more situated approach to radicalization that takes into account also phenomena such as polarization and hate
speech, besides stopping short of focusing on Islamist extremism alone. It is based on 6 main axes, including attention to Internet and counter-narratives, socio-economic facilitating factors for radicalization (such as youth unemployment), and training of first-line practitioners. It is the first comprehensive plan on radicalization that Belgium adopted.

Besides general plans, Belgium also has a federal policy to deal with radicalization in prisons. In March 2015 the Ministry of Justice adopted the Action Plan against radicalisation in prison, whose main goals are preventing the radicalization of detainees and improve the monitoring measures for radicalized inmates. The plan also takes into account deradicalization after the release from prison and considers judicial alternative measures to detention, while underscoring that full reintegration into society is up to regional authorities that have specific competences in these policy fields. As other pieces of policies on radicalization in the Belgium case, this Action Plan is specifically directed at Islamist-driven radicalization. For example, it mentions the crucial role that is played by Islam counsellors. This plan focuses on both de-radicalization and disengagement, while acknowledging that there is a lack of expertise on disengagement in the country.

At the regional level, both Flanders and Wallonia have issued their own, specific P/CVE plans.

The Flemish government published in 2015 its Actieplan ter preventie van radicaliseringsprocessen die kunnen leiden tot extremisme en terrorisme (Actionplan for the prevention of processes of radicalization that can lead to extremism and terrorism). It is based on 3 main pillars. The first pillar echoes the Plan R and focuses on smoothing communications across all 3 levels of government, but it also includes a more horizontal focus as it outlines procedures for liaising with schools and youth organizations. The second pillar consists of subsidies for the local authorities, while the third leg of the Actionplan focuses on Islamist extremism through training of imams and developing connections with youth of Muslim faith in schools. In its essence, the Flemish plan aims at enhanced support for the local approach to prevention of radicalization, as well as on mobilizing the civil society, in line with the devolved competencies to this level of governance.

The Wallonian plan adopts a slightly different approach. While addressing radicalization within the limits of its competences, the plan has a forward-looking stand and seeks integration with other policies, thus revealing that a broader concept of radicalization is at play. On the one hand, the plan envisages sessions of training for first-line practitioners, social workers and other personnel directly in contact with the population. On the other hand, the Wallonian plan is based on integration and social cohesion, via the strengthening of social webs of resilience as far as jobs and professional training are concerned, as well as the promotion of processes and pathway of integration. This plan has been supplemented by a 10-point plan issued in early 2019 that creates a
regional centre of expertise for the prevention of violent radicalisation made up of Walloon professionals and improves training services, providing officials with additional means to decrypt information on social networks and develop critical thinking.

At the community level, all 3 linguistic communities in Belgium have their own P/CVE plans. The French community in January 2015 has adopted guidelines and priorities for prevention policies in many domains, namely education, media, culture, equal opportunities, youth care, and sports. Education has a devoted plan, the Prevention Plan against Radicalism at School. In 2015, the Flemish prepared a prevention plan. In this case, the proposal was adopted and further refined by the Flemish government, becoming the basis for the abovementioned governmental plan. The German-speaking community published a plan in 2016 that mentions both Islamist and far-right extremism and is focused on training, early detection, and deradicalisation through social support for radicalised people.

Being centered almost exclusively on community-led initiatives, Belgium prevention activities lack a robust framework that can ensure continuity over time as well as cohesion across the different initiatives. This means that it may be difficult to evaluate the actual impact of a policy or a programme, given the ‘patchwork’ of prevention activities run in the country.

The local level is the beating heart of P/CVE initiatives in Belgium. Late versions of Plan R and the 2013 federal programme both acknowledge that the local dimension is crucial in prevention as the local context plays a prominent role in the pathways of radicalization. Local points of contacts are named by municipalities and are in charge of coordinating with the federal authorities as well as with local entities. These officials’ background can be either in security matters or in social welfare and this can influence how the local initiatives are shaped (Jaminé & Fadil, 2019). As of 2018, the internal federal public service IBZ listed 76 ongoing projects at local level (IBZ, 2018).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vector</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>Under Plan R, Local Task Forces are requested to monitor / ask for support in monitoring radicalized individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Under Action plan against radicalization in prison, religious representatives are involved systematically in dealing with radicalized or at-risk individuals. Under the Programme on the prevention of violent radicalisation, religious communities and groups of origin are involved in prevention activities. The Programme advocates for the integration of multiple identities against the backdrop of a common set of values. It also addresses social polarization. The German-speaking community plan names deradicalisation through social support for radicalised people.</td>
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The Programme on the prevention of violent radicalization identifies youth unemployment as a key challenge to address in prevention activities. If a municipality has a Strategic Plan for Security and Prevention (PSSP), it is entitled to receive financial support from federal authorities. Part of it may be used for prevention activities. The Ministry of Interior provides some funding to municipalities as a support for actions on prevention of radicalization. Under the Wallonian plan, extra subsidies for prevention activities in bigger cities are provided.

The French community plan identifies education as a key area of intervention. The community also has a specific plan for education. Under Plan R, representatives and practitioners from different fields of expertise may be involved in activities of CSILs, including schools.

### 3. Analysis of P/CVE policies

#### a) Primary, Secondary, Tertiary prevention

P/CVE policies in Belgium address all 3 kinds of prevention: primary, secondary and tertiary. The peculiar institutional architecture of Belgium and the division of competencies among the State, regions, communities and municipalities, do play a role also in shaping policies.

**National level prevention policies are mainly built around tertiary - and to a lesser extent secondary – prevention.** This depends on both historical and governance reasons. As has already been addressed in the introductory paragraph, the prevention policies currently in force have their roots in a strictly security and contrasting threat, specifically that represented by Islamist-inspired terrorism. The whole policy at federal level is coordinated by the Coordination Unit for Threat Analysis (CUTA), the successor from 2006 of the Mixed Anti-Terrorism Group (AtG). CUTA primarily draws up specific or strategic evaluations of terrorist and extremist threats in and to Belgium, while also playing a coordinating role under the Plan R as far as National and Local Task Forces are concerned. The unit is under the joint authority of the Ministers of the Interior and Justice.

Over the years, and especially with the rampant phenomenon of foreign fighters since 2012, federal plans and policies have started to broaden their scope, eventually including features of secondary and even primary prevention. It must be stressed, though, that federal policies merely set the guidelines for action plans and interventions implemented at lower levels and they mostly limit themselves to setting up a framework for coordination.

One of the stated objectives of Plan R, for example, is to “accurately depict the issue and determine the right balance between a preventive approach, a disrupting approach and a repressive approach”. This is delegated to other bodies without setting predetermined priorities. Furthermore,
there is no clear indication about the fields where preventive work about radicalization should be carried out / incorporated.

The Programme on the prevention of violent radicalization published in 2013 goes a little further. It focuses on violent radicalization as well as polarization, and names a societal approach to prevention that calls for action in several fields, including the integration of multiple identities while retaining a set of common values, the reduction of frustration in society, from where radicalization and polarization may originate, and the promotion of a respect-based society. It also has a specific focus on youth and early prevention, as it calls for initiatives that reduce and avoid stigmatization and discrimination (phenomena identified as potential enabling factors of radicalization), and it stresses the need to increase resilience of vulnerable / at risk groups. Thus, it sets the stage for initiatives of primary prevention.

**Regional and linguistic community plans are generally more focused on primary prevention**, as communities are depositories of the related competencies. The Flemish Action Plan, for example, addresses both radicalization and polarization and is structured on 5 policy lines, including mobilizing civil society and supporting the local approach. As for the latter, it lists initiatives in the field of social integration and active citizenship. Furthermore, this plan is designed as an integral part of the Integration plan and of the Equal Chances plan.

The internal federal public service IBZ repository of local initiatives displays 20 projects addressing primary prevention, 42 secondary prevention, and 14 tertiary prevention.

**b) Focus: Type of Extremism and Scope of Policies**

The Plan R is structured in working groups that are both permanent, or thematic. Thematic working groups are 5: Salafism (a radical version of Islam, belonging to the wider family of Islamist ideologies), right-wing extremism, left-wing extremism, Asia Minor, North Caucasus. The WG on far-right is coordinated by CUTA, while the one on far-left by federal police. Furthermore, there are 2 ad hoc WG on Hate preachers and Asylum & Migration.

**While nominally the federal plan addresses all kinds of extremisms, Islamist extremism is clearly the top priority** as the Plan R originated as Plan M(osquées) in the early 2000s. This is also reflected in the policy on radicalization in prison drafted in 2015, where training for imams and dynamics or religious radicalization are at the centre of the plan.

**Islamist extremism is also explicitly mentioned in some of the regional / community plans.** This is the case of the Flemish plan, that moves from the departures of youth for Syria from the cities of Antwerp, Vilvoorde and Maaseik in the spring of 2013 to substantiate the ‘acute need’ for a dedicated prevention policy. Nonetheless, the plan acknowledges that the radicalization issue
is not confined to religious extremism and lists 3 other kinds of extremisms that may follow the same mechanism: “right-wing extremism, animal rights activism, left radicalism”.

c) Tools and approaches; Capacity building

Belgium as an overall bottom-up approach for primary and secondary prevention, and partly for tertiary prevention too. This translates into local authorities and stakeholders being granted a huge room to manoeuvre, as well as the burden to take action first and trigger local processes. For this reason, there are no shared and widespread (eg at national or regional level) tools for prevention, as each city or municipality tends to develop a hyper-localized approach tailored to the very specificities and needs arising from the local situation.

Some examples help in understanding the variety of tools adopted in P/CVE in the country. In Anderlecht, a primary prevention project uses Forum theatre to engage the wider audience through a show and deconstruct the concept of radicalisation. Forum theatre requires the audience to discuss what happened on stage and agree on alternative finals (or scenes) for the play. The show is then played again with modifications. The process can be reiterated.

In Andenne, a municipality with a long history of immigration from Italy and Morocco, a project is building a repository of useful materials to understand radicalization as well as providing basic training on the issue to first-line practitioners. A specific focus is on training of personnel of the local Social Cohesion Service for welcoming practices in a multicultural context.

In many municipalities in the Mons-Borinage region, prevention work is built upon the platform for cooperation PAVEE (Plateforme Agir pour un Vivre Ensemble Egalitaire). PAVEE gathers NGOs, civil society, private stakeholders, and officials from local institutions, to discuss coexistence issues and to agree on a shared action plan. Young people from 12 can participate, as well as social workers. Activities are organized in several working groups. PAVEE allows for a continued exchange with the public, is inclusive in principle and promotes active citizenship.

As far as tools for capacity building is concerned, Belgium has benefitted from 3 EU funded projects that have been instrumental in building a comprehensive framework for prevention work in the country: Mobile team, Bounce et Family Support. All 3 were participated by the Ministry of Interior via the DGSP (Direction General Sécurité et Prévention).

Bounce project aims at enhancing resilience in the youth through different formats of training. Young people, families and first-line practitioners are the main targets of these training sessions.

In detail, there are 3 training formats:

- Bounce Young is a tool for early prevention. It is a psychophysical training targeting vulnerable young people to strengthen their resilience;
• Bounce Along aims at raising awareness about radicalization issues in families and first-line practitioners;
• Bounce Up is a train-the-trainer programme designed for first-line practitioners.

The Flemish plan to prevent radicalization has a chapter dedicated to strengthening knowledge and expertise. Since the plan identifies cities and municipalities as the key actors in prevention work, and tasks relevant Ministries to follow-up and support local initiatives, it addresses also the need to share expertise and know-how developed locally.

This is done through the VVSG, the Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities. VVSG gathers different local initiatives and expertise, and shares them via peer-to-peer meetings and study days. The person in charge of this process is also the point of contact for local administrations.

The French community plan develops the RAR (Reseau anti-radicalisme, or Anti-radicalism network) with a coordinating role. RAR is tasked also to raise awareness among first-line practitioners.

Under Plan R, Local Task Forces are tasked with supporting frontline police officers, in case the latter do not possess the necessary knowledge about radicalization. However, the Plan R does not specify any detailed nor additional measures in this regard.

d) How are the policies developed

At the federal level, the peculiar Belgian approach to prevention of radicalisation (due to decentralized competencies) translates into a strong accent on communication and coordination. Most of the Plan R is devoted to setting up coordination platforms and ensuring proper communication across different levels. However, this participated approach does not generally involve civil society, or the wider public. The only case where participation from affected communities is mentioned is the involvement of religious persons from local Muslim communities.

On the contrary, at the regional level current policies are developed consulting and engaging a very wide range of relevant stakeholders. This is the case of the Flemish plan: local administrations and institutions were consulted, vulnerable communities were engaged, experts’ opinions on the issue were heard and best practices were gathered both within the country and abroad through a dialogue with Embassies of foreign States in Belgium. This is how the Plan describes the whole process in details:

Various stakeholders have been consulted in preparation of the action plan. Concrete proposals for action were made by the distinct administrations through the Platform on radicalisation. In order to make the plan dovetail with the needs felt by the local administrations, the cities of Antwerp, Vilvoorde, Kortrijk, Mechelen and Maaseik, the
VVSG (Association of Flemish Cities and Municipalities) and VGC (Flemish Community Commission) were also consulted. The Muslim Executive was called on for discussions on common actions which could be mounted within the preventive approach to radicalisation. Furthermore, there have been opportunities for exchanging experiences with the French Community, but also in a broader international context, through meetings with the embassies of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, Denmark and Norway, during which good practices were exchanged. Lastly, the Flemish Parliament has established a commission for combating violent radicalisation, in which various experts were heard about the issue. The insights received through this commission have also been brought to bear on the establishment of the action plan. This participatory process has resulted in broad support for the action plan and in specific measures which focus on actions.

e) Social Cohesion & Social Inclusion

Social cohesion is a key point in regional policies addressing radicalisation.

In the Flemish plan, all measures are framed under the overarching goal of fostering an inclusive society. In fact, the plan is issued by the Flemish Minister for local and provincial government, civic integration, housing, equal opportunities and poverty reduction. Radicalisation is not taken as a self-standing issue. Rather, it is subsumed by the wider cohesion policy. The Plan reads:

Specific measures for the prevention of radicalisation are only useful when, at the same time, the focus lies on an inclusive society, where everyone feels at home and has equal opportunities. General measures, such as a strong condemnation and approach of racism and discrimination, dealing with the unqualified outflow from the education system, working on accessible assistance, reinforced youth work, sports in the neighbourhood and so on are also important within this framework.

f) How do they use / engage with 'evidence'

The Plan R has been reviewed and updated multiple times over the years. There is no established timeframe for review, nor there are specific guidelines. Momentous events such as terrorist attacks (both outside and inside the country) have been usually triggering review processes.

4. Educational policies

At the federal level, the main policy addressing P/CVE – Plan R – does not explicitly mention the field of education, even after the latest review of 2016. This does not mean that education is
outside its scope. In fact, the Plan R sets up the Local Task Forces, local platforms for coordination and information exchange. Within this context, practitioners or other workers in the field of education may be included in the Local Task Force, if envisaged by the municipality in charge of running the platform.

On the contrary, references to education are present in the 2013 Programme on the prevention of violent radicalization. The programme stresses the need for a tailored and multi-layered approach to radicalization and polarization, noting that there is no one-fits-all solution for radicalization. It also highlights the importance of addressing these issues through a set of different measures. Among the latter, training for teachers is mentioned. Teachers are also indicated as crucial players in countering and preventing radicalization because of their role of first-line practitioners.

The importance of education for P/CVE is framed within the context of the wider social policies:

*It is only within the framework of a transversal approach setting up the religious and family and social and educational dimension that the objectives can best be achieved.*

*The link with employment, school success, family stability and the existence of a social network are key elements in particular.*

**The overarching goal served by prevention work through education is understood as keeping frustration to a minimum and, ultimately, fostering social cohesion.** Frustration is seen as a key trigger factor for polarization, stigmatization, hate speech, and radicalization. Furthermore, education is mentioned as a key element in building resilience of vulnerable individuals and groups, rooting an individual within society, and shaping his/her belief in a democratic system and its attitude towards others in society.

As always in the case of Belgium, most part of specific P/CVE programs and plans is designed at the local level. Thus, municipalities play a crucial role in the way education and P/CVE interact and integrate, as do regional governments since education falls within their specific competences.
Section 1: The Phenomena of Violent Extremism in the Netherlands

Historical background

Diverse forms of violent extremism (right-wing, left-wing, separatist, amongst others) have confronted Europe post WWII, with an intensification seen in the seventies and eighties. The Dutch experience, though, was more moderate in spite of the fact that there were groups prepared to use violence. There was left-wing extremism, for example the ‘Rode Jeugd’, with ideologies similar to those of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF) in Germany and Brigatte Rosse in Italy, though it was never at scale (Mallki, 2010, p. 35). Bakker (2009) refers to various violent actions by groups related to squatters’ movements in the eighties. There was also RaRa, responsible for violent actions in protest against the Apartheid regime (Van der Woude, 2009). With regard to right-wing extremism in the Netherlands, the NCTV (2018) refers to the TWEED Database for the period between 1950 and 2004, showing that the country had few incidents of this type of violence. In the first decades post WWII, right wing extremisms consisted mainly of collaborators looking for atonement. A shift is noticed in the seventies, with negative sentiments towards migrants being manifest in political activity as well as in violence used against migrants. It is hard to estimate figures for such violence, as these were not structurally registered before the nineties. It goes beyond the remit of this paper to give a full overview of right-wing and left-wing extremism post WW II, but it is worth mentioning that such groups also confronted each other during various occasions in the eighties (Bakker, 2009).

Another important experience to mention in the Dutch context are the ‘Moluccan actions’, when a group of South-Moluccan youth, amongst others, hijacked two trains. Their actions related to the struggle for the establishment of an independent Republic of the South Moluccas (RMS). Ronald Janse (2005, p. 59) describes in this context a ‘failed policy by the Dutch government towards the Moluccans after the transfer of [Indonesian] sovereignty in 1949’, and strong feelings about the independence of the South Moluccas among second generation Moluccan youth in the Netherlands explained by feelings of resentment with regard to their parent’s treatment, as well as their own position in Dutch society (Janse, 2005).

The Dutch government’s strategy to deal with the Moluccan actions was to maintain dialogue, and to address various underlying issues. Maintaining dialogue as long as possible was important in what was called the “Dutch Approach”, while maintaining the option of a hard response (Wittendorp et.al. 2017). Before 1973, there was no official policy on counter-terrorism. The hijacked trains and
also developments abroad – the hijacking of 9 Israeli sportsmen at the Olympic games in Munich by the terrorist organization Black September – triggered the Dutch government’s preparation of such a policy (van der Woude, 2009). These investments were focussed on the development of special assistant units and intelligence gathering, but did not include counter-terrorism laws. The reasoning was that existing laws gave sufficient options to punish offenders for their crimes. More generally, the Dutch government tended to avoid the term terrorism, and instead used the term ‘political violent activism’ (Bakker, 2009).

Van der Woude (2009: 10) describes 9/11\(^{26}\) as a watershed moment for Dutch policymaking on countering terrorism; an action plan was developed in three weeks enabling security services and police to carry out stricter border controls, laws to make telephone tapping easier and increased monitoring on financial transactions, amongst others. The attacks closer by, in London, Madrid and a political murder in the Netherlands, led to an acceleration in policymaking on counter-terrorism, and have, as Van der Woude (2009, p. 10) describes it, led to ‘an impressive toolbox of criminal procedural and criminal law measures, mainly with a preventive character’. Later on in this paper, we will refer to a broader ‘comprehensive approach’ developed in the Netherlands to deal with violent extremism in the years after 9/11. In the past two decades, Europe has experienced various large-scale attacks from groups / individuals with an extremist jihadist\(^{27}\) ideology. The Netherlands has not experienced such large-scale attacks, but its experience cannot be seen in isolation from the wider European context.

Three periods can be distinguished with regard to violent jihadism in the Netherlands. The first was between 2002 and 2005, when the Netherlands was confronted with the so-called Hofstadgroup, a home-grown jihadist group. Members of this group, both individually and collectively, planned various attacks in the Netherlands, including the murder of the Dutch film director/producer Theo van Gogh in 2004. In 2005, the group was dismantled by the intelligence service (AIVD) and the police (NCTV, n.d.). The ‘second wave’ was triggered by the conflicts in Syria and Iraq, and the formation of the Caliphate by the Islamic State (IS) in these countries. In the period between 2012 and 2017, about 300 Dutch youth travelled to Syria and Iraq, and joined varies groups including IS.

\(^{26}\) Janse (2005) discusses the Dutch government’s reasons for changes in its approach on CT since 9/11, which was seen as a ‘new phenomenon’, posing an unprecedented security threat to society, in more detail, in his article ‘Fighting terrorism in the Netherlands, a historical perspective’.

\(^{27}\) Other names could be used for the same phenomenon we refer here to as “jihadi”, which falls in the category of religious extremism. We make use of this specific term as it is the one that Dutch policymakers on P/CVE mostly use. It must be noted that within Islam, jihadism is about one’s efforts for God, and can have various meanings, including the ‘inner jihad’, which is about one’s inner struggle to live as a good Muslim, the struggle to build a good Muslim society, and the violent struggle to defend Islam. Indeed, jihadists as described in the current paper have broadened the last term to include not only defensive, but also offensive deeds, also outside of Muslim countries (AIVD, n.d.).
Meanwhile, followers of the jihadist movement in the Netherlands increased. In 2019, the NCTV spoke of a ‘third phase’ of jihadism, in which the jihadist movement in the Netherlands was characterized as less stable, both waxing and waning at times. Furthermore, it was noticed that due to the fall of IS, the jihadist movement was more focussed on the Netherlands than its predecessors (Van Teeffelen, 2019).

Both local, national and transnational factors play a role in the phenomenon of violent jihadism in the Netherlands, and the pathway of each individual is unique, with psychological, social and other factors playing a role. The interlinkage with criminality is also noted. With regards to the national context, we could say that the waves of violent jihadism have happened in the two decades that have also been characterized by an increasingly polarized public debate on migration, especially centred around Muslims, and their integration into Dutch society. As mentioned, the pathway to radicalization is a complex one. Given the context, however, (experienced) stigmatization and a related lack of acknowledgement in Dutch society can contribute to processes of radicalization (Neve et.al 2019, p. 15; Slootman, M., & Tillie, J. 2006). In recent years, discrimination and ethnic profiling of various groups, including Muslims, have been increasingly recognized. This is also reflected in new policy developments such as increased investment to counter discrimination in young people’s access to an internship, for example (Ministerie van Onderwijs, Cultuur en Wetenschap, 2019).

Current situation

The most recent Overview of Threats28 (NCTV, October 2020, p.) still mentions jihadist extremism as the most important threat for the Netherlands. It however also states that the violent threat from this movement, which consists of around 500 persons, has diminished. The movement is (socially and ideologically) fragmented, without a strong structure or leadership, and has been repressed by government measures. Current activities of this movement include spreading propaganda and collecting money for jihadists abroad. Preparations for attacks are an exception, though in 2018 and 2019 there were some arrests for this and individuals did commit attacks both in Amsterdam (August 2018) and in Utrecht (March 2019) (NCTV, October 2020, pp.6,7). Labelling an attack as ‘terrorism’ however, can sometimes be questioned, as was the case for the attack in Utrecht, in which the offender has been described as being in the grey area between a terrorist and a criminal (Boersema, W. and Vissers, P. 2019). Apart from the jihadist movement, a

28 The Dutch Counter Terrorism and Security Coordinator (NCTV) publishes an Overview of Terrorism Threats [Dreigingsbeeld Terrorisme Nederland] (DTN) three times a year, referred to as “Overview of Threats” henceforth.
In 2018, the Dutch Intelligence Service (AIVD) published a report on right-wing extremism, which speaks of a revival of this movement since 2014. Changes have been identified both in ideology as well as in its organization (AIVD, 2018). There are various impulses for this revival, including migration, ISIS, the role of social media and the influence of the Alt-Right movement in the US. Compared to extreme right-wing movements of the 20th century, recent movements/followers are focused on an anti-Islam viewpoint, often also associated with discussions around migration and Dutch traditions. A distrust of government (Dutch as well as the European Union, both of whom are blamed for migration) is important to mention as well. In the Overview of Threats (NCTV, October 2020), the right-wing extremist movement is described as scattered, mostly individual (even though groups do exist), mostly non-violent and mostly active online. While violent threats do exist online, it is pointed out that these have not been acted upon. And while the NCTV mentions that a violent attack from a right-wing extremist group is not expected, an individual using violence is still a possibility.

Other developments are also given attention in the October 2020 Overview of Threats. The NCTV notes an increase in social discontent both online and offline since the COVID-19 pandemic began. Various groups and individuals dismiss the government and its policies, based on strong feelings of injustice, discontent and a different perception of reality. Among these groups are people that have a longer history of distrust of the government. Apart from COVID-19 and the related anti-lockdown protests, other developments such as protests against racism, discussions around identity, and the socio-economic impact of COVID-19 can lead to increased processes of polarization and radicalization. Strong discontent and polarization over certain issues could already be identified pre-COVID-19, for example the discontent among farmers on the ways they have been impacted by discussions and policies on the environment, amongst others.

Section 2: Types of Policies

As described in Section 1, 9/11 proved significant for policymaking on countering terrorism in the Netherlands. Alongside the above-mentioned action plan developed in the weeks immediately after 9/11, a policy vision followed in 2003, outlining a ‘comprehensive approach’ [brede
benadering)], an approach characterized by a combination of repressive and preventive measures. This so-called comprehensive approach still underpins the current counter-terrorism (CT) strategy, which will be discussed in more detail in the next section. Since this period, various policies have been developed, dealing specifically with radicalization, a process that could lead to terrorism (Wittendorp et al., 2017). While the jihadist waves described in the previous section have been of major importance in the development of policies, other forms of extremism have been acknowledged. For example, in the 2007 Action Plan on Polarization and Radicalization, both jihadism and right-wing extremism were identified as main threats (Dijkman 2021, 145; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, 2007). In 2009, the Suyver Commission was installed to evaluate Dutch CT policies (Wittendorp et al., 2017). It concluded that the policy domain needed a more integrated approach, which resulted in the development of the National CT Strategy (2011–2015), the predecessor of the current strategy.

**P/CVE policies at national level**

The broader policy framework of Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) and CT is guided by the National Counter Terrorism Strategy 2016–2020. This is a so-called ‘state-wide strategy’ ['Rijksbrede Strategie'], meaning that it connects all government partners at national and local level in a collective approach to deal with extremism and terrorism. The document is managed by the National Coordinator on Counterterrorism and Security, a body that falls under the Minister for Justice and Security, and which coordinates CT work in the Netherlands. The Strategy underlines its comprehensive approach and collaboration with various stakeholders, as shown in the following statement; “Local, national and international governments work together with civil society organizations, companies and key-figures to take preventive, repressive and curative measures. This combination of measures is what we call a ‘comprehensive approach’” (NCTV: 2016, p. 5). The Dutch CT strategy mentions its connection with international frameworks on countering extremism and terrorism, such as those of the EU (2005) and the UN (2006).

The CT strategy’s scope is broader than P/CVE, and includes sections on: 1. information on potential threats; 2. the prevention and disruption of extremism and terrorism; 3. the protection against extremist and terrorist threats; 4. the preparation for extremist and terrorist violence and its

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29 Nota 2003 Terrorisme en de bescherming van de Samenleving
30 ‘CT Strategy’ from here on
31 The NCTV is responsible for counterterrorism, cyber security, national security, crisis management and threats to the state. It works together with its partners in the security domain. From here onwards, we will use the Dutch abbreviation NCTV [Nationale Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid].
consequences and, 5. the persecution of offenders. For certain specific policy domains more details are described in other policy instruments, or they become more concrete in policy documents at municipal level.

An important document when looking at Dutch national P/CVE policy is the “Action Programme on an Integral Approach to Jihadism” of 2014 [Actieprogramma Integrale Benadering Jihadisme], which was developed as a response to the development of the earlier-described ‘second wave’ of jihadism, when about 300 Dutch young citizens decided to travel abroad, many of them joining extremist groups like IS in Syria/Iraq and when, in parallel, the support for this movement increased in the Netherlands. The action programme is a concrete list of 38 measures, and includes both interventions to counter jihadist networks and the spread of its ideology, as well as measures to counter radicalization and to address its breeding grounds. This document was developed by the Ministry of Security and Justice, the NCTV and the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. This action programme has played an important role in the development of many instruments in Dutch P/CVE, with many of the measures outlined still in use today.

With regard to prevention, we should also mention the Ministerial Letter to Parliament on the Government’s Policy on Prevention of Radicalization of 2018, which was produced in response to a request from the Parliamentary Commission on Social Affairs to shed light on its policy on the prevention of radicalization. This letter was issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, and was signed by four ministers, indicative of the broad engagement and collaboration in the field of prevention in the Netherlands. With regard to (primary) prevention and the role of the ‘social domain’ in P/CVE, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of Health, Wellbeing and Sports and the Ministry of Primary- and Secondary Education and Media play an important role.

Local policies and guidance for local government

In The Netherlands, Municipalities are responsible for security and the care of its citizens. Whereas the national government coordinates and facilitates the approach on radicalization, extremism and terrorism, Municipalities are responsible for carrying out these policies (Dijkman, 2021, p. 149). Municipalities where this is relevant often have their own approach in dealing with radicalization and violent extremism, which is guided by the national framework. Several additional guiding documents have been developed to support municipalities, such as the Guidance Approach

32 The Minister of Social Affairs and Employment, the Minister of Justice and Security, the Minister of Health, Wellbeing and Sports and the Minister for Primary- and Secondary Education and Media.
to Radicalization and Counter Terrorism at Local Level (NCTV 2014); the Guidance on Local Networks of Key-Figures (Expert Unit Social Stability, 2018); and the Toolkit on an Evidence-Based Approach on Prevention of Radicalization (NCTV, Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2019).

Municipalities can request funding to invest in (specific activities related to) countering and preventing (violent) extremism and radicalization.

Within the national framework, Municipalities can develop their own approach. Mayors, who have a leading role when it comes to public order and security, also play a role here (Dijkman, 2021). With such a complex phenomenon, it comes as no surprise that various views exist on what an approach on P/CVE should focus on. For example, the mayor of Rotterdam, Ahmed Aboutaleb, has underlined that more is needed than just education and job opportunities, pointing towards the important role of the Muslim community in P/CVE (NOS, 2015). In Amsterdam, the previous mayor, Eberhard van der Laan was inspired by the expert David Kenning, who does not see religion as an important factor, and instead, underlines the role of psychology (Wiegman, 2016).

Section 3: Multi-Level Analysis of P/CVE Policies

Primary, secondary and tertiary prevention

As described in the previous section, the Dutch have followed a comprehensive approach to dealing with terrorism, comprising repression, prevention and curative care. Primary, secondary and tertiary prevention methods are included. An overview of approaches used by the Dutch government with regards to P/CVE is given in the table below. For this table, the current CT Strategy, the progress report on the Integrated Approach to Terrorism (2019), as well as the Parliamentary letter on Prevention (2018) are used as main sources. The Dutch approach to P/CVE is characterized by a multi-disciplinary approach, both at national level, with the involvement of various ministries, and at local level. Municipalities and their Local Integrated Approach could be seen as the cornerstone of Dutch P/CVE policy.

Central in the Local Integrated Approach are multidisciplinary case meetings, also referred to as the ‘individual approach’ [persoons-gerichte aanpak, PGA]. In this methodology, implemented at the local level, with Municipalities in the lead, various actors from the judicial, law enforcement,

33 Activities include the analysis of local phenomenon; the individual approach to radicalizing persons; building a network of persons and organizations involved in picking up signals on potential radicalization; capacity building of various professionals active in the local integral approach; prevention activities in the environment of the persons radicalizing; evaluation of activities related to countering radicalization and extremism (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2020).
social- and youth and childcare domains are involved while considering cases of radicalized individuals. Here, an assessment is made and a tailor-made plan developed to prevent further radicalization of this person. This important approach in the Dutch strategy can be referred to as secondary prevention, though it is also used in the tertiary stage.

Primary prevention is also part of the Dutch approach to P/CVE. The formulation in the CT Strategy of initiatives to build resilience is quite targeted, for example referring to building resilience ‘amongst vulnerable groups against extremist and terrorist ideologies and recruitment’. The previously described Action Programme on an Integral Approach to Jihadism (2014) and the more recent letter to Parliament (2018) on the Prevention of Radicalization provide more details on a broader approach of primary prevention. For example, the Action Programme (2014) mentions, amongst others, cooperation with the Muslim community, also to discuss issues such as discrimination, support to schools including increased support for civic education, as well as the development of an Expertise Centre on Social Tensions and Radicalization which integrates work on radicalization and social tensions. This centre, nowadays known as the Expert Unit on Social Stability (ESS), falls under the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. With its focus on Social Stability, it has an important role in addressing radicalization and polarization. Many initiatives of the Expert Unit are carried out in cooperation with NCTV.

In the Ministerial letter to Parliament on Prevention (2018, pp.2-3), the Dutch structures for prevention are summarized as “resilient Municipalities”; “resilient professionals”; “resilient networks around youth” and “resilient youth”. Whereas some of the measures (see an overview in the table below) under these categories can be described clearly as primary prevention, such as programmes and theatre productions to strengthen resilience amongst youth, some measures are harder to categorize. For example, first-line professionals have an important role in early identification of radicalization, and need to know what to do with their concerns. While the role of first-line professionals such as youth-workers, teachers and childcare is mainly in primary prevention, we could say that information provided here also contributes to secondary prevention, when individuals are already showing signs of radicalization. In this arena where the social domain and the security domain meet, some dilemmas, around information sharing for example, arise (Azough, N. 2017). Think for example of a professional in the youth domain with concerns about an individual, but also with worries about the sharing of that information and the impact that might have. These can be huge dilemmas for professionals, both in terms of work ethic and in terms of building trust. The government tries to address such dilemmas in collaboration with the sectors involved (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2018, p. 4). For examples, guidelines for
professionals on information sharing, addressing questions on whether and when to share information, and which steps to take in advance, are available (Platf

Expertise on reintegration and deradicalization can be found among specific public or semi-
public institutions. There is the (semi-public) Extremism National Support Centre (LSE), which offers support both to families of and to individuals themselves that are dealing with radicalization (or want to exit an extremist network) and are willing to receive support. Rehabilitation Netherlands (RN) is a public institution which has a specialized team dealing with offenders (suspects and convicts) of a terrorist related crime whom they support with trajectories that are enforced based on a judicial framework. With regard to reintegration, these institutes can play a role, together with municipalities that have an important responsibility, making use of the above-mentioned multi-
disciplinary case meetings, to ensure safe reintegration in society (Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, 2018, p. 5).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention/Approach</th>
<th>More information</th>
<th>Primary/Secondary/Tertiary</th>
<th>Policy domain</th>
<th>Main actors involved in implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Research on factors and processes which contribute to resilient identity development and the role of environment for youth</td>
<td>This is mentioned in the Ministerial letter to Parliament on Prevention (2018).</td>
<td>(Contributes to) Primary prevention</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Assigned by Ministry of Health, Wellbeing and Sports</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investments in civic education, theatre and other programmes to build resilience among youth and stimulate dialogue in classrooms to address social tensions</td>
<td>An example of such theatre production is ‘Count me in’ which focusses on cultural diversity. The production is offered to schools in combination with the training ‘Dialogue under pressure’, which is focussed on how teachers can invite diverse opinions, while ensuring a safe environment in the classroom (tgplayback, n.d.).</td>
<td>Primary prevention</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Schools, Foundation School &amp; Safety. Theatre producers; civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prevention of fear</td>
<td>The CT Strategy flags the way that government communicates about CT, and the need to do this in a way that is nuanced and which prevents (further) fear and contradictions within society.</td>
<td>Primary prevention</td>
<td>Government communication</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives to build resilience among vulnerable groups at local level</td>
<td>An example is “Diamant”, which offers a trajectory for (Muslim) youth with an increased risk for criminality or radicalization. The intervention is focused on increased self-confidence, responsibility, dealing with various perspectives and empathy (Mutsaers, p. &amp; Demir, S., 2020).</td>
<td>Primary prevention</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Civil society partnering with municipalities</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

34 This organization helps schools with questions around creating a safe educational environment, and translates national policies to educational practice. The organization is an important partner of varies Ministries such as the Ministry for Education, Culture and Science.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Support to parents of children who are (potentially) radicalizing</th>
<th>This can be organized by municipalities together with local partners in the social domain. A specific, bottom up, initiative is ‘Oumnia Works’, developed by a local organization in The Hague to support parents in raising children dealing with identity questions and strengthen their resilience.</th>
<th>Primary / secondary prevention</th>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Municipalities and partners in social domain/ civil society</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Municipalities setting up a key-figure network</td>
<td>This network is about involvement and cooperation between the municipality, partners and key-figures, to bolster each other in identifying tensions and radicalization, and to prevent and counter this collectively. Key figures are described as ‘socially engaged individual with access to a wide range of informal and formal networks’ (ESS 2018, 8). They have an intermediate role between municipality and local communities, and are especially important to reach groups that are hard to reach for institutions.</td>
<td>Primary / secondary prevention</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Formal and informal key-figures (such as community leaders/ role models, but also youth workers and community policers). Municipality and partners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early identification and intervention</td>
<td>Using knowledge and expertise to identify early signs of radicalization and addressing this radicalization (by various first-line professionals). Here, capacity building plays an important role.</td>
<td>Primary / secondary prevention</td>
<td>Various, incl. community policing, education, social/ youth and childcare</td>
<td>Various actors including municipalities, community police officers, schools, youth workers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Undermining extremist and terrorist propaganda; Social media awareness</td>
<td>Initiatives have been developed with regard to, on the one hand removing and undermining violent extremist propaganda online, and on the other hand, initiatives related to strengthening digital resilience especially among youth (NCTV 2019).</td>
<td>Relevant for all three forms of prevention</td>
<td>Education, Social, Law Enforcement, Judicial</td>
<td>*NCTV, intelligence services; military- and national police.</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>*International cooperation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multidisciplinary case meetings</td>
<td>Meetings initiated by municipalities, with local partners, to discuss persons who show further signs of radicalization. A tailor-made plan is developed to prevent further radicalization.</td>
<td>Secondary / tertiary prevention (the same approach is used in the tertiary phase).</td>
<td>Multi-disciplinary approach</td>
<td>Municipalities, first-line professionals from various disciplines, NCTV</td>
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<tr>
<td>Administrative measures</td>
<td>Such measures include a travel ban, contact ban as well as an area prohibition. Further options exist, including the invalidation of ID cards/passports; the freezing of assets of an organization or individual, and the deprivation of Dutch citizenship.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>Prosecutor, Rehabilitation Netherlands, Municipality</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal law</td>
<td>Various terrorism-related actions have become punishable as terrorist offenses under the Dutch penal code (Van de Rijt &amp; Weggemans, 2017). Examples include: preparing a terrorist attack; terrorism financing; recruitment; joining a terrorist organization (van der Heide and Kearney, 2020).</td>
<td></td>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>Prosecutor, national police, judiciary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>De-radicalization programmes/Exit facility (voluntary)</td>
<td>‘Forsa’ is the name of the individual support trajectories for persons with extremist ways of thinking or persons that are or have been involved in extremist networks. Such trajectories are tailor-made and include support in building one’s resilience, dealing with trauma, (re)building one’s social network and religious questions, amongst other things (Landelijk Steunpunt Extremisme, n.d.).</td>
<td>Secondary / tertiary prevention</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>National Support Centre on Extremism (semi-public organization).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trajectories for reintegration (enforced by judicial framework)</td>
<td>Rehabilitation Netherlands (RN) has had, since 2012, a team specialized in the reintegration of offenders of a terrorist related crime. The team works both with suspects and convicts of such crimes, and their role is one proscribed by a judicial framework (not on a voluntary basis). TER Team Staff members’ expertise is to stay in touch with these persons for a certain period of time, combining a ‘regular’ rehabilitation approach with specific expertise on characteristics of radicalization (Reclassering Nederland, n.d.).</td>
<td>Tertiary prevention</td>
<td>Social as well as judicial</td>
<td>Rehabilitation Netherlands (The terrorist department of detention also plays a role in preparing reintegration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early identification of potentially violent individuals and related ‘individual approach’</td>
<td>Here, an approach in which both early identifications, as well as tailor-made trajectories in which multiple disciplines work together, is applied to offer support and prevent incidents. In case of complex (multi-problem) cases, security houses(^\text{35}) play a role.</td>
<td>•</td>
<td>Social (mental health care), law enforcement</td>
<td>Municipalities, mental health care, police</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{35}\) Since 2008, so called ‘security- and care houses’ have been set up in the Netherlands in which representatives of detention and prosecution services, municipalities, rehabilitation services, and healthcare and housing services come together to collaborate to decrease recidivism amongst youth, to minimize crime, and to decrease domestic violence and nuisance.
Link with positive goals such as social inclusion and social cohesion

The Dutch approach to P/CVE does link to objectives of social inclusion and social cohesion, but the extent depends very much on the policy instrument. In this regard, the CT Strategy says something important: ‘countering polarization and social tensions are not part of the strategy’ (NCTV 2016, p. 6). There is recognition that such tensions can indirectly contribute to the growth of extremism and terrorism, and that these issues need attention. However, coordination of these domains lies with other ministries; the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The Strategy does mention the need for the linking of policy domains. In order to work on prevention, and to analyse signals of unrest in society, one needs to keep tabs on what is going on among various groups in society. In order to do so, this link between P/CVE policies and work on social inclusion and social cohesion is crucial. Keeping in mind recent developments such as the distrust of governmental institutions amongst various groups in society, or polarization over issues such as climate change, migration and refugees, or the highlighting of institutional discrimination and racism - all compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic – this only becomes more important.

There is a strong link between radicalization and polarization in documents of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and its Expert Unit on Social Stability. For example, its Letter to Parliament on Prevention of Radicalization stated (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2018, p.2): “The approach to radicalization is not isolated. Strengthening social cohesion, stimulating democratic citizenship, strengthening the participation of migrants in the labour market and addressing discrimination are important building blocks. On a daily basis, many teachers, youth workers, community police officers, caretakers, parents and volunteers work on giving youth a positive start and on making sure that vulnerable groups are able to participate in society (...).” At the local level, for example in the Municipality of Delft, approaches on radicalization and extremism are often integrated with approaches to polarization (Municipality of Delft, 2020). In practice, when working on prevention, conversations on polarization, radicalization and extremism cannot be treated in isolation from one another.

Focus: Type of Extremism

In current policy documents on P/CVE in the Netherlands, jihadism is identified as the main threat. For example, the NCTV’s progress report on the integrated CT approach (NCTV, 2019, p.3) states: “Jihadism remains the determining factor in the Threat Overview, which justifies special
attention for jihadism in the approach to extremism and radicalization.” As described earlier, this has also been an important basis for the development of P/CVE policymaking in the Netherlands.

While the Action Plan on an Integrated Approach to Jihadism (NCTV 2014) is fully focused on jihadism, other policy instruments are, in principle, generic, though still quite focused on the jihadist threat. CT strategies however do acknowledge other forms of extremism, and the NCTV’s last report on the Strategy’s progress (2019) includes an explicit paragraph on broadening the preventive approach to radicalization and extremism. It states: “While jihadist motivated terrorism is the main threat in the current Threat Overview, the integral approach to terrorism is in many cases generic and can be broadened to address various forms of extremism. This is for example the case for left- and right-wing extremism.” (NCTV, 2019, p.8).

This broadening of the scope of P/CVE policies is also happening in practice. The following are two examples:

- The governmental training institute on countering radicalization (ROR) offers both a generic training on radicalization, as well as trainings that focus on specific types of extremism, including Islamic extremism, but also right- and left-wing, and environmental extremism (Ministry Justice and Security, n.d.). It must be noted though that on the website, two in-depth training courses are offered on Islamic extremism alone, whereas only one training course is offered covering right-wing, left-wing and environmental extremism.

- The prison regime that has been set up specifically for extremist offenders was developed after the arrests related to the Hofstadgroup and the attack on Van Gogh (Van der Heide & Kearney, 2020), indeed a form of jihadist extremism. While the major case load of this prison regime still consists of offenders with a jihadist ideology, right-wing extremists have also been prosecuted for terrorist crimes and been imprisoned within this regime.

In the Dutch CT Strategy 2016–2020, the main threat was “expected” to come from the jihadist movement, and that policy and implementation are therefore mostly focused on this threat. However, other forms of extremism are being monitored, with special attention paid to right-wing extremism. The Strategy also mentions the interlinkages between diverse forms of extremism. The analysis is that terrorist attacks from jihadists can increase right-wing extremism, which in turn can trigger left-wing radicalization and Islamic radicalization. As has been discussed, the most recent Overview of Threats (NCTV, 2020) mentions the changing nature of jihadist extremism, as well as right-wing extremism and the strong feelings of distrust in government. It will be interesting to see how this is manifested in the new CT Strategy.
The risk of stigmatization is one critical point when focussing P/CVE policies narrowly on one form of extremism. Another risk is that of a blind spot for other forms of extremism (Dijkman, 2021: 145). As mentioned in the previous paragraph, a comprehensive approach in which attention is given to societal tensions among various groups in society is necessary to work on prevention. This also requires broadening of the focus of preventive measures to engage with diverse groups in society and diverse forms of (violent) extremism.

**The role of capacity building**

In the Dutch P/CVE approach, so-called ‘resilient municipalities’, as well as ‘resilient professionals’ of multiple disciplines, are of key importance, with capacity building and knowledge exchange playing a significant role. An infrastructure of support for professionals has been developed by government in cooperation with semi-public organizations. It must be noted that along with this (semi-) governmental infrastructure, there are also various independent actors active in the field of capacity building in terms of dealing with radicalization, also being used by (local) government and partners. Below are some of the main actors that are part of the (semi-) governmental infrastructure, and which are also often mentioned, and created by, policy instruments on P/CVE:

- **The governmental training institute on countering radicalization** [Rijksopleidings-instituut tegengaan Radicalisering] (ROR). This institute trains a whole range of actors within the (semi-) public sectors, including childcare, professionals focused on wellbeing (social domain), security actors, judicial actors as well as the chain of actors involved with migrants [vreemdelingen]. These trainings focus both on recognizing signals of radicalization as well as, if needed, how professionals should act in these situations.

- Even though ROR trains first-line professionals within the youth domain, **specific support exists for first line professionals in education and the social/youth domain**, which seem to have a broader focus, linking both radicalization and polarization:
  - The semi-public School & Safety Foundation offers tailor-made trainings for schools to deal with topics such as radicalization (for example how to discuss such sensitive topics within the classroom) (School en Veiligheid, 2016).
  - Youth Platform on Prevention of Extremism and Polarization. This platform, which has been created on behalf of the Ministry of Health, Wellbeing and Sport, works together with the ESS, LSE, NJI (Dutch Youth Institute) and the School and Safety Foundation. It is a central point for both professionals and volunteers within the youth and social domain to find information and guidance on (dealing with) radicalization (Platform JEP, n.d.).
Another important way of knowledge exchange and sharing is provided at the regional and local level. The regional (Care- and) Security Houses [Veiligheidshuizen] play an important role in providing expertise at regional level on multi-disciplinary problems, and, together with a ‘flex team’ specialized in the individual approach [persoons-gerichte aanpak], they work on strengthening the ‘Local Integrated Approach’ in all regions of the Netherlands. Furthermore, to strengthen the sharing of expertise and practice, municipalities with more experience with the Local Integrated Approach are linked with less experienced municipalities (Platform JEP, n.d.).

**Education**

The CT Strategy refers to the educational sector as part of the multi-disciplinary approach in the prevention of extremism and terrorism. In this approach, teachers – together with other first line professionals – are seen as having a role in picking up early signs of radicalization as well as, depending on the case, dealing with a (potentially) radicalizing person in an appropriate manner.

The School & Safety Foundation has developed an educational approach in collaboration with various Ministries. This approach consists of tailor-made training and support to primary and secondary schools as well as to vocational training institutes. Central questions in the training material for schools/teachers include how to recognize processes of radicalization, when to intervene, but also what the role of the school is and when to involve other actors. While some municipalities make use of this approach, others have their own programmes for schools (Ministry of Security and Justice, 2019). Schools also play a broader role in terms of resilience and facilitating dialogue on sensitive issues in the classroom. Various programmes have been developed for this purpose including, for example, using theatre as a means.

In 2017, Naima Azough (at the time, Special Rapporteur on PVE and social cohesion in the education and youth domain) published a report entitled “Resilient Youth, Resilient Professionals”, based on research among professionals in the Netherlands dealing with questions around radicalization, polarization and resilience among youth. With regard to the multidisciplinary approach in dealing with individuals that are potentially radicalizing, Azough argues that professionals in the youth domain should become involved in a more equivalent manner in order to enable an effective security policy. She also refers to so-called ‘lonely professionals’, pointing to the fact that many professionals in this domain will face situations in which they have concerns relating to the behaviour of young people (also outside of the scope of direct risks). How then does one start a conversation with this young person or prevent conflict? She also points to different opinions among colleagues and an organizational climate in which professionals do not always feel
they can address certain issues (Azough, 2017). The report made various recommendations, such as the need for awareness among managers and decision makers in the social/educational domain on these issues, strengthened support for professionals, and the improvement of cooperation among the domains of (child) care, wellbeing (such as youth work), education and security. Some of these recommendations were reflected in policy instruments such as the 2018 Letter on Prevention to Parliament.

**Development of policies and the role of participation**

The Dutch government coordinates the approach on radicalization, extremism and terrorism. The NCTV has a coordinating role in this regard, and works together with various Ministries and departments to do so (Dijkman, 2021). One of the principles of coordination of the CT Strategy by the NCTV is to create collective ownership among its partners by continuous conversations (CT Strategy 2016–2020, p. 23). Dialogue with both Municipalities and others involved at a more practical level, such as Rehabilitation, the LSE and the Dutch federation of Municipalities, often plays a role in the process of policymaking (Dijkman, 2021, p. 148).

The Quickscan Local Approach to Prevention of Radicalization provides a list with questions for local governments that can help them ‘check’ whether they have developed their approach in a qualitative manner. One of the questions on the ‘check list’ is: Are civil society partners (such as professionals and communities) involved in making a local threat and resilience analysis? Furthermore, a quote on the website on outcomes of this quickscan also suggests the use of this checklist in conversations with partners to further enrich the local approach (such as its vision and the analysis, and to agree follow-on steps). Further conversation is needed at local level to find out how this takes place in practice.

**Evaluations & Evidence**

The National CT Strategy is evaluated every 5 years. Outcomes of the evaluation of the previous CT Strategy (2011–2015) are mentioned explicitly in the current Strategy (2016–2020). Such evaluations are managed by the Scientific Research and Documentation Centre (WODC)

36, though evaluations can be assigned to other institutes, as was done with the 2011–2015 CT Strategy, which was evaluated by the University of Utrecht. These and other evaluations on specific P/CVE approaches can be found online.

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36 WODC is the knowledge institute of the Ministry of Justice and Security.
For municipalities, a Toolkit on an Evidence-based Approach on the Prevention of Radicalization has been developed (ESS 2019). The toolkit has been developed by independent knowledge/research institutes, commissioned by the NCTV as well as the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. The toolkit offers knowledge and lessons learned with regard to specific programmes, as well as checklists and formats to use for specific kinds of evaluations. The toolkit distinguishes between:

- ‘Plan evaluations’: To what extent does an approach/plan of action fulfil basic requirements, such as to what extent the plan offers a solution to the identified problem and in what way has this been made plausible.
- ‘Process evaluations’: These are focused on the process of carrying out a programme; what is going well, and what can be improved upon?
- ‘Effect evaluations’: What is the impact of an intervention, and to what extent can this impact be linked to the intervention (causality)?

The toolkit shares three options in terms of who should be carrying out evaluations: the Municipality; the implementing (civil society) organization or an external researcher (research institutes, universities), and shares advantages and disadvantages for each of these options.

**PCVE at Municipal level in the Netherlands: The Delft Approach**

**Introduction**

This case study sheds light on policy (-making) and practice on P/CVE in the Municipality of Delft. It provides insight into how P/CVE policies at the national level are translated into practical policies at the local level. Based on both desk and field research, this case study also adds a practitioner perspective on such policies.

**Methodology**

For the purpose of this case study, Delft Municipality policy documents, as well as secondary sources such as academic and newspaper articles have been used. The field research involved in-depth interviews with seven professionals and volunteers, as well as e-mail correspondence with one other professional working in the field of prevention of violent extremism. The case study can

be seen as the starting point of a participatory process with a variety of stakeholders in the Municipality of Delft and the surrounding region. Both research outcomes at the national and local level will be used to formulate questions for further reflection and innovation with the aim of improving P/CVE policy and practice through the establishing of social labs, the next phase of the Participation project.

The case study is more reflective with regard to policy and practice on P/CVE than the analysis at the national level. The implications of P/CVE policies are felt at the local level, including its contradictions and dilemmas. An example is how national judicial measures to counter the financing of terrorism have consequences, such as the impossibility to open a bank account, for individuals reintegrating in society – which is contradictory with this very reintegration process accompanied at the local level, by the Municipality and its partners. The research methodology for the case study includes interviews which allow for such reflections.

Contextual background

Delft is classified as a relatively small city, with 103,595 inhabitants, in the province of South-Holland, the Netherlands. It is a university town and is part of the Rotterdam-The Hague metropolitan area, an area characterized by its diversity. Delft has relatively high education levels; with a large number of students and professionals related to the University of Delft. In terms of other socio-economic indicators, Delft is comparable with the average Dutch situation: the yearly household income is €33,300 in Delft versus €36,200 in the Netherlands, and unemployment is at 6.9% as compared to the 6% national average (Gemeente Delft, 2017, p.3). Despite the relatively high levels of education overall, there are huge differences within the population, among neighbourhoods and even between areas in one neighbourhood (Allecijfers, 2021). For example,

38 The limited fieldwork period for this case study did not allow for a large group of interviewees. The natural snowball process led to various potential interviewees – who we will consider involving at a later stage to further enrich the outcomes of the project.
39 At national level, there have been various critical reflections on CT and P/CVE policies in the Netherlands, including from a human rights perspective. See, for example, the public statement of Amnesty International (2017) with regard to Dutch CT law: ‘Netherlands: Counter-terrorism bills would violate human Rights and undermine rule of law’, as well as Duke Law International Human Rights Clinic’s recent (December 2020) submission to the U.N. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, ‘Families in the crosshairs: a human rights analysis of the Netherlands’ National Security Policies’.
40 Comprising 23 municipalities in the region of Rotterdam and The Hague (Metropol Rotterdam HD)
41 High (38%); medium (37%); low education levels (25%). To compare, in the Netherlands as a whole, these percentages are 29%, 40% and 31%.
42 The Delft University of Technology has more than 25,000 students of which more than a fifth of the students and more than the half of their scientific staff come from outside of the Netherlands (TU Delft).
43 On looking up various areas within the neighbourhood of Voorhof, one notices the income differences within them: see website https://allecijfers.nl/wijk/wijk-24-voorhof-delft/
a study on the quality of life in various neighbourhoods points at two particular neighbourhoods, Voorhof and Buitenhof, with a low ‘neighbourhood score’: a 5.8 and 6 respectively, compared to a 7.6 in the city centre. This neighbourhood score is based on both objective figures as related to the socio-economic situation as well as on subjective information related to feelings of belonging and safety in the neighbourhood (Omnibus, 2017).

With 154 nationalities, Delft was in the top 10 most diverse municipalities of the Netherlands in 2015 (Gemeente Delft, 2020). In 2020, 37% of its citizens had an immigrant background (GGD Haaglanden, 2020). Diversity is higher in some neighbourhoods than in others. Social housing policies, lack of investments as well as budget cuts in the social domain have not contributed to resilience in and the social cohesion of such neighbourhoods. The policy note on diversity, ‘Iedereen Delftenaar’, recognizes that in neighbourhoods with very high diversity, people can also harbour feelings of insecurity or loss due to changes they have experienced in their surroundings, and young people can feel that they are not part of society (Gemeente Delft, 2020). The latter relates to young people experiencing stigmatization and discrimination in different areas in society: experiencing that government institutions such as the police look at you differently, or the impossibility to find an internship. This has also been pointed to in interviews for this case study.

The mayor of Delft, Marja van Bijsterveldt, often refers to the diverse experiences of citizens in her speeches. She shares her optimism about the initiatives for bridgebuilding in the city, but also her concerns about a social divide between those with high and lower levels of education. She describes how there are groups of citizens, such as students and social elites, for whom new developments mean opportunities. On the other hand, she states that Delft also has groups of people for whom such developments are difficult to keep up with: ‘Those who feel that they are not part of the dynamics and processes, and see their securities disappear’ (van Bijsterveld, personal communication, 2018). She speaks of the high risk that these groups distance themselves from society and become alienated.

Radicalization

In 2013, the city of Delft was confronted with – and many taken by surprise by – the departure of about twenty young citizens to Syria (Neve et al., 2019). This experience prompted the

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44 The figures speak of ‘non-Dutch’ [Niet Nederlandse]. Here, this has been translated into ‘immigrant background’.
45 See, for example, how a neighbourhood where a problematic youth group was active, and from which some have left to Syria, has been described in the study by Neve et al. (2019).
46 For example during her speech during an evening on diversity organized by the Strategic Network Radicalization and Polarization in 2018 (personal communication).
Municipality to develop their local approach on P/CVE, a policy which was not in place before. A summary of this particular experience is shared in Box 1, mainly based on the report ‘Radicalization in problematic youth groups’ (Neve et al., 2019). This group partly came from a neighbourhood with relative deprivation and a high level of diversity, as well as a relatively high score of criminality. With this particular episode, Delft became one of the Dutch municipalities with a relatively high number of so-called ‘foreign fighters’ (NOS, 2019).

The threat from the Dutch jihadist movement is still, after a decade, considered the most important threat in national threat overviews, even though it is noted that the movement has weakened (NCTV, 2021). Also at municipal level in Delft, violent Jihadism remains considered as main threat. The municipality underlines the dynamic nature of the phenomenon, and has shifted its attention to new concerns related to this movement such as, for example, the raising of families by those radicalized or policies with regards to returnees.

In its policy document, Polarization, Radicalization and Extremism, the Delft Municipality (2020) refers to the Overview of Threats of December 2019 (NCTV) which also points to the threat of right-wing extremism. When discussing the issue of polarization, and referring to the presence of racism in a specific neighbourhood, one interviewee says ‘If there is right-wing radicalization in Delft, it would be there. I’m not saying that it is the case, but if it would be, then it would be there.’ The way it is formulated shows the sensitivity of this topic. Another interviewee says this about the current situation:

“If you ask me, compared to five years ago; the topic of jihadist radicalization has diminished. At the same time, right-wing extremism is becoming popular. It happens mostly online, behind the scenes. Discrimination and racism are not being accepted, so what do people do? They throw everything on the internet. That is a danger, if you can see it, you can start a conversation, but if you can’t see it, it’s behind the scenes. Online, people are being pushed in opposing positions and to participate in this, that is dangerous.”

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47 In the Netherlands, the security service AIVD pays particular attention to 20 municipalities with a relatively high number of foreign fighters. Those in the same region as Delft include Zoetermeer, Den Haag and Schiedam, as well as the city of Rotterdam (NOS, 2019).

48 Figures on returnees are not shared publicly by the Municipality. Generally, at national level, of the 305 Dutch citizens who left for Syria/ Iraq, the AIVD (April 2021) reports that 105 of those have died in the conflict, 121 of them are still in Syria, 20 are in Turkey, and about 215 children related to the citizens who left (with one or two Dutch parents) are in Syria and Turkey. About 65 foreign fighters have returned to the Netherlands. Most of the returnees came back in the Netherlands in 2013 and 2014. At the moment, the Netherlands is of the opinion that foreign fighters should be convicted in the region itself and not in the Netherlands.
This image is confirmed by the latest Overview of Threats (NCTV, 2021), pointing to ‘a growing international right-wing extremist internet world that on a small scale appears in the Netherlands in secret digital groups’. It notes that troubled youth in the Netherlands can feel attracted to these online groups, and that lone wolves committing an attack are considered a potential threat. The Municipality has integrated trainings on right-wing and left-wing extremism in its P/CVE programme, providing attention to forms of extremism not considered new. It commissioned a quick scan on right-wing extremism to gain a better understanding of it. This quick scan is not (yet) public.

While some have pointed to right-wing radicalization, we haven’t found a lot of information on this phenomenon at local level. Indeed, currently research is being done and trainings are being provided to create more insight into the phenomenon and its breeding grounds. A relevant question for reflection is whether a historical focus on Jihadism in policymaking on PCVE, also at the national level, has had an influence on how we look at this phenomenon. Could it be that policymakers, practitioners and citizens are less attentive to signs of right-wing extremism?49

Along with specific forms of radicalization, what is being noticed in recent Threat Overviews (NCTV 2019) is the polarization between groups, as well as the gap between these groups and the wider society and the government. The Municipality of Delft (2020) recognizes that citizens in the wider district can be vulnerable to extremist thinking and that groups of people can become more polarized in their opinions. In one interview, we discussed polarization and racism at neighbourhood level in Delft. It was analysed that this was rooted in ignorance and the lack of communication among diverse citizens of one neighbourhood; “If you want to address this, more communication is needed (...). That they [citizens of one neighbourhood] greet each other, have a conversation, show commitment towards the neighbourhood. Then everyone will start to appreciate and respect each other. When you only think from the perspective of prejudices, you will grow farther away from each other”.

In discussions we had for this case study, a wide range of experiences or concerns related to radicalization, polarization and the resilience of youth more generally, were pointed to. Alongside the phenomena of jihadist and right-wing extremism, other (sometimes related) issues came up. These included issues related to conspiracy theories, and the challenge of addressing this in

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49 Challenges of a specific focus in PCVE policy, and specific associations of policies as well as communities linking VE only with Jihadism, and not, for example, with right-wing extremism, are also shared by researchers in the seminar organized by RUSI (2021): ‘Gender in Conflict and Security Webinar Series – Countering Violent Extremism: Making Gender Matter’, which can be accessed here: https://rusi.org/event/gender-conflict-and-security-webinar-series-%E2%80%93-countering-violent-extremism-making-gender
classrooms. Various respondents noted the presence of discrimination and racism, for example, in a specific neighbourhood. Experience with racist expressions among professionals were also mentioned. And yet another interviewee pointed to his concern that youth are no longer attracted by religion, but that “It is about what is going to pay my paycheck”, referring to (recruitment for) drug criminality. While the number of respondents for this case study is limited, the diversity of phenomena shared underlines the fact that different people see and experience different things.
Box 1: Experience with Jihadist form Violent Extremism

At the beginning of 2013, a group of young citizens from Delft left for Syria. Neve et al. (2019) explain that some of them were part of a ‘problematic youth group’ active in a particular neighborhood of Delft. The neighborhood is characterized by high rise buildings, a high percentage (58%) of social housing, a high number of households living on minimum wage, and a relatively high score of criminality. The neighborhood is ethnically diverse. Tensions between groups with different (ethnic) backgrounds are mentioned. Neve et al. share that respondents in their research point at experiences of youth with discrimination and a lack of opportunities in Dutch society, for example when looking for an internship or in confrontation with the police, something which was said to be a source of vulnerability for radicalization.

Due to problems with older youth in the local youth center, stricter age rules were being applied there, which led to the older youth now being more frequently out on the streets. The research describes the development of a ‘street culture’, characterized by youth looking for status and success through the path of criminality, and in some cases, radicalization. In this period, strict measures were taken to address criminality while at the same time, the general sense was that relevant professionals no longer had oversight of the youth in the neighborhood. One of them dying after a confrontation during a robbery in 2010 is described as a ‘trigger’ point (Neve et al., 2019). A heavy object was thrown and the person throwing it was not prosecuted (due to the right to self-defense; in Dutch ‘zwaar weer excess’), seen by the group as collateral acceptance by authorities of the loss of a life of a young Moroccan criminal. The interpretation of this incident must be understood from the already experienced discrimination. The traumatic experience contributed to the vulnerability of this group and peers in their surroundings, looking for answers to why this had happened to their friend and how they could repent.

Already starting in 2010, some youth in the same context were deepening their religious interests. Neve et al. (2019) explain that the incident described above for some led to religious questions and an acceleration in their identification with Islam. Those leaving for Syria were not present during the robbery, but they were friends with the person who died (Neve et al. 2019). Various factors contributed to a process of radicalization among some of the youth, such as personal contacts as well as sources on the internet. Some started to reject the Islam of their parents and got in touch with a wider regional network of (so-called) jihadists. Within their environment, this behavior was initially explained as a positive step: the young people became more serious and gave up smoking and drinking. Another important factor which must be mentioned in the background of young people’s radicalization and / or decision to travel to Syria were developments in the Middle East, including the Assad regime in Syria, which was also used as an argument to ‘go help your brothers in need’ (respondent in Neve et al. 2019, p. 45). Furthermore, there are concrete indicators that recruiters played a role (Neve et al. 2019, 51).

In the end, about 20 persons left for Syria. Some of them have returned (5 in the same year that they left) and some died (Neve et al. 2019), but a full picture of what happened with the group is not available, as the Municipality does not share figures on returnees.
Policy framework in Delft

Being confronted with violent jihadist radicalization forced the Municipality of Delft to develop P/CVE policy. From 2015–2019, this was the Implementation Programme on Violent Jihadism, the title reflecting historical events which understandably focussed on violent jihadism, as was the case at national level.

The municipality of Delft is responsible for the coordination and implementation of the local approach to radicalization and polarization (Gemeente Delft, 2020). It fulfils a leading role for the district municipalities of Midden-Delfland, Rijswijk and Westland. Its integral approach towards extremism, polarization and radicalization is referred to as the local translation of the National CT strategy of 2016 – 2020 (NCTV, 2016)50. Indeed, the Delft approach and pillars fit well into the broader P/CVE framework developed by the Netherlands at national level, with the various instruments described in the national policy paper. It should be noted that the scope of the Delft policy seems more comprehensive and integrated than the CT strategy in itself, because of its explicit inclusion of the countering of social tensions and the prevention of polarization.

The Municipality of Delft recognizes the need for a tailor-made approach which requires close cooperation and exchange between civil society actors, and the social and security domains. According to its policy document, the social domain together with civil society can focus on strengthening the resilience in communities, whereas the security domain looks at potential risks. It recognizes the role and specific expertise of each of these domains in their contribution towards the policy (Gemeente Delft, 2020). The Delft approach to P/CVE includes both preventive and repressive measures and is linked to both local and national policy instruments, including the broader ambitions for the city in terms of its social innovations and vision, its policy on integration and emancipation, as well as its security plan. Cooperation with partners in the city is a central element in the Municipality’s approach: ‘We strengthen resilience together with the city; not only by investing with means, but especially by strengthening (existing) cooperation and by stimulating activities. Here, we look for connection with positive role models accessible for vulnerable youth, and for designing and implementing initiatives that contribute to social cohesion in the municipality’ (Gemeente Delft, 2020).

50 NCTV (2014) has also developed guidance for Municipalities to formulate their approaches on prevention of radicalization and terrorism of which “Aanpak extremisme, polarisatie en radicalisering Delft, Midden-Delfland, Rijswijk en Westland” is an example.
The four pillars of the Delft approach

The Delft approach consists of four pillars, outlined below. These pillars form the basis of various interventions categorized under these pillars.

1. Diminishing social tensions and polarization

Due to incidents abroad and at home that touch upon the theme of polarization and radicalization, and undermine democratic legal order, social unrest can occur. To reduce these tensions or contradictions, the Municipality of Delft invests in strengthening relationships and connections (Gemeente Delft, 2020). One way of doing so is through the contact circle, a network of 20 key players. These are socially-committed individuals who live in Delft and have access to formal and informal networks. These key players come from religious networks, the police, welfare organizations, educators and the municipality. Whenever there is a (potential) threat of social unrest, these key players come together to discuss the need of the hour.⁵¹

2. Strengthening resilience

The Municipality’s analysis is that within a context in which socio-cultural as well as physical borders are diminishing, and questions around identity, belonging and the interaction with new cultures play a role, new opportunities arise, as well as new insecurities. It therefore invests in resilience, to ensure that its citizens are able to counterbalance negative influences, including violent extremism. Interventions include:

- **A key-figure network** to collectively work on strengthening local activities to build resilience. (More on the ‘Strategic Network on Radicalization and Polarization’ in Delft in Box 2.)

- **Quick scans**: Information products that help to be kept abreast of potential social unrest and tensions from various phenomena and related vulnerabilities, as well as resilience options that should be taken into consideration when thinking about potential interventions.

- **Resilient parenting**: Support to parents and caregivers to ensure youth dealing with difficult questions about identity, religion, participation and future perspectives can address these

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⁵¹ For instance, the contact circle came together in 2019 to discuss the Christchurch (March 2019) and Utrecht (March 2019) events, both of which were acts of terrorism. Members of the contact circle were able to provide information about how their constituencies reacted to these events and came up with ideas to de-escalate possible social unrest. A public statement, and a meeting between the police, municipality and the mosques took place to look into the need for protection. An educational letter was distributed to schools on how to discuss the recent events (Gemeente Delft, 2020).
within their families. The idea is to provide the parents/caregivers with the necessary skills needed to support the youth in their development, helping make the youth, in turn, more resilient.

- **Educational activities**: The Municipality underlines the important role of education in strengthening resilience, and works within the youth domain and along with schools, professionals and youth to identify appropriate activities. These are meant to enable youth to deal with questions around identity, living together, conflict and setbacks, as well as to strengthen democratic citizenship. Examples include the use of theatre to stimulate dialogue on sensitive topics, and dialogue and workshops with professionals to discuss how to deal with phenomena such as fake news, conspiracy theories as well as polarization online.

3. Networks: building, training and maintaining

Over the past few years several frontline professionals have been trained in detecting and reporting on signs of radicalization. This is an important part of the Municipality’s investment in expertise on radicalization, extremism and polarization among both professionals and volunteers. As in other Dutch municipalities, Delft facilitates a network of professionals that pay specific attention to signs of polarization, radicalization and extremism within their social, youth or educational domains. They function as a first point of contact within their organizations with regards to the sharing of such concerns. More about their role within educational institutes can be found in Box 3. The Municipality invests in expertise among its broader operational network through sharing information about its approach and offering trainings, as well as facilitating reflection among professionals.

4. Individual approach [Persoons Gebonden Aanpak PGA]

Individual cases of radicalization are first assessed and then addressed by the setting up of a tailor-made approach and plan. This is under the lead of the Municipality, which then involves various other partners. In some cases, the regional security and care houses Haaglanden (broader region) are used, in other cases it is addressed at local level. The tailor-made approach aims at preventing further radicalization or to enable deradicalization, and is used both as secondary as well as tertiary prevention. Depending on the case, such a tailor-made plan makes use of both repressive measures as well as ‘soft’ measures – which are regular interventions carried out by the health-care and/or social domains. In some cases, coordination with the Ministry of Justice and Security is
needed in order to apply administrative measures, making use of the Dutch temporary counterterrorism law on administrative measures.52

**Box 2: The role of frontline professionals: Youth workers**

The role of youth workers is to accompany young persons along a positive pathway from adolescence to adulthood. They are accessible, with youth work in Delft taking place in some youth centres in specific neighbourhoods as well as on the streets. Essential to their work is trust building and listening to young people. This is characteristic for the ‘presence approach’ in which being there for another is the focus, instead of solving problems (Baart, 2002). This doesn’t mean that support is not offered when and where needed, for instance when there is conflict between a young person and his/her school. In some cases, individuals are referred to other organizations for help, such as Delftsupport, an organization focusing, amongst others, on child/youth care. Within their role, youth workers contribute to the ‘universal prevention’ of behaviour involving risks (Mutsaers, 2020).

Experiences of marginalization, incidents in which youth see this marginalization confirmed, a sense of community found in certain groups and collectively strengthening a sense of opposition to others in society can all play a role in radicalization processes. In these processes, for example when an incident happens (such as the robbery described in Box 1), youth workers can play an important role in addressing experienced feelings of injustice and making young people feel heard, which can prevent strong feelings that lead young people to further distance oneself from society.

Some youth workers in Delft are part of the operational network of frontline professionals that have been trained on radicalization and violent extremism. Based on their relationship with young people, they have insight into their ways of thinking and can play a role in the **early detection** of radicalization. In the wider district, some youth workers are part of the “expertise pool”, in which professionals with expertise on VE from the social/ healthcare and security domain meet (Gemeente Delft, 2020). The expert pool plays a role in assessing cases, and following on from that, a participating professional can take on the role of supporting a specific individual.

Another way that youth workers contribute to P/CVE in Delft is through initiatives, often set up by partner organizations, to **build resilience** against violent extremism. An example is the Mentorship project which was initiated by Human Security Collective (HSC). Here, youth workers, together with HSC, trained youth from the neighbourhood to become mentors for their younger peers. Currently, the Municipality is working with partners including Youth Work to set up a new initiative making use of the Bounce methodology, a trainers’ toolkit focused on building resilience among youth and their environment, the development of which has been supported by the European Commission (Salto, 2017).

**Partners** of youth work include both formal organizations, such as policymakers from relevant departments of the Municipality, the police, and other partners in the social domain, as well as informal ones, such as the local Mosque or “buurtvaders” – fathers in the neighbourhood who volunteer to supervise youth in the neighbourhood to prevent incidents and improve local safety. The Municipality recognizes the crucial role of youth work in P/CVE. To address the issue of ‘overburdening’ youth workers with this one specific topic, the combining of policies on P/CVE with policies on social cohesion and resilience building is encouraged.

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52 This law was first announced in the Integral Action Plan Jihadism (2014). Restrictive measures part of this law aim to prevent terrorist activities and departure of Dutch citizens to (Jihadist) conflict zones. The law has a temporary character of five years (NCTV, 2017). Currently extension with another period of five years is being prepared.
Box 3: The role of frontline professionals: Schools

In terms of P/CVE, schools in the Municipality of Delft have two main roles. First, many (secondary and vocational training) schools in Delft and the wider district have one or more so-called ‘attention officers’ [aandachtsfunctionarissen], who plays a role in raising awareness among colleagues and in detecting early signs of radicalization. They are part of the operational network on P/CVE of the Municipality and receive a package of relevant trainings. They can be seen as the main contact point within the school to discuss concerns related to radicalization. Attention officers have a direct line of communication with a contact person within the Municipality, with whom concerns on individuals can be discussed anonymously. In some cases, the conclusion of the assessment might be that the behaviour picked up on is not worrisome. At other times the teacher monitors this behaviour for a period. If the concerns are serious, anonymity can be waived and a name mentioned. This dilemmas that this system poses to professionals will be discussed in the reflection of this case-study. It is possible that such an individual becomes part of the so-called ‘individual approach’ (see pillar four of the Delft policy). The individual approach trajectory is private: schools (including the attention officer) typically do not know that a student is part of such a trajectory and are not involved. In exceptional cases, an attention officer/school can be informed.

It must be noted that the position of an attention officer, as well as the time he/she has to deal with this subject, differs per institution. Attention officers can be a teacher or mentor. In larger institutions, he/she could have a function outside of direct teaching, such as an advisor on social security.

Along with its role on reporting on early signs of radicalization, schools also play a role in facilitating conversations about sensitive issues such as polarization and radicalization within the classroom. The Delft Municipality offers various programmes such as theatre productions, also mentioned in national policy documents, to support this. However, schools are free to choose whether or not to use them and can develop their own approach. In practice, initiatives are often taken when incidents occur. For example, the management of a particular school formulated a response after the murder of Samuel Pathy. Teachers often do address particular incidents in the classroom leading to, in some cases, a broader conversation and process. For example, one interviewee mentioned that in his school a process was facilitated by a private partner recognized for its expertise on polarization and radicalization, who helped facilitate conversations with teachers on discussing sensitive issues in the classroom.

Indeed, a potential role of teachers lies, as with youth workers, in ‘universal prevention’: supporting youth in their pathway to adulthood. Such a role is, of course, individual dependent. The regular system in the Netherlands provides all students with a ‘mentor’. If the need for extra support arises, teachers/mentors coordinate with a ‘care coordinator’.
Box 4: The role of networks: Strategic Network on Radicalization and Polarization (SNRP)

The Municipality of Delft works with two key-figure networks; the contact circle, which meets after an incident happens (see first pillar of Delft approach), as well as the Strategic Network on Radicalization and Polarization (SNRP). Within the SNRP, individuals and organizations meet ‘to enable connections and address polarization in the city’ (SNRP, 2019, Presentation received through personal communication). It was established in 2016, in the aftermath of Delft’s foreign fighters experience. Members include professionals in the social and youth domains, civil society representatives and community leaders from various backgrounds. The network is independent, but the Municipality plays a role in facilitating it as well as in supporting activities it initiates.

The SNRP meets approximately four times a year. During such meetings, members share their experiences, along with recent trends and developments. A broad range of issues can come up: youth polarizing during election times, tensions within certain communities, positive initiatives by role models, etc. Polarization and radicalization are addressed in an integrated manner. As an interviewee put it, ‘polarizing means radicalizing’, adding that polarization can contribute to radicalization. Along with information sharing on local developments, potential collective initiatives are discussed during such meetings. A concrete issue taken up by the SNRP is discrimination on the labour market, more specifically the challenge young people face in accessing internships. This is being addressed by the development of a ‘youth network café’ in which youth can exchange experiences and get support with accessing an internship/job. Next to meetings, SNRP also has a WhatsApp group in which information on local developments as well as preventive measures in situations of unrest are being shared.

The Municipality sees the network as independent – and that is underlined as its strength. For them, such a network is of value as these local, committed citizens and professionals have strong connections with the community. Guidelines have been developed for ‘key-figure networks’ on behalf of the national government for use by Municipalities. The approach is, however, not fixed in stone. The guidelines offer various options for Municipalities, for example with regard to their own role as well as with regard to the aims of such a network (ESS 2018).
The role of evaluations and participation in the development of policies

Participation

In its policymaking on P/CVE, the Municipality needs to take the interests of various actors into account. Here, we look into two main levels of interaction – with national policy on the one hand, and with local actors on the other.

In terms of the national framework, the Municipality interacts with the National Coordinator on Security and Countering Terrorism (NCTV) explaining the local context, and in that way, influencing national policymaking. This shows how national government takes the local level into account, something which is being appreciated. This doesn’t mean that tensions between national level policies and local implications do not exist. As one interviewee explains; ‘You have to deal with national political decisions, which you need to implement locally. Here, clashes can exist with your own approach. For example, when dealing with returnees, there is a need for them to re-socialise, but at the same time, they are pushed aside by measures such as not being able to open a bank account (…)’. The interviewee is here referring to measures on countering the financing of terrorism, which are part of the judicial toolbox on countering terrorism developed at national level. This is an example of how top-down policies can have a counterproductive impact on P/CVE at the local level.

The Municipality also needs to take into account various local actors in its approach. An important group of local actors are the direct implementing partners of the Municipality, including independent/semi-public organizations that have an important role to play in the social and care domain within the city. As one interviewee explains; ‘if the municipality says, we are going to decrease preventive measures, but the policy domain is pleading for preventive measures, how are you going to sell that?’ In this statement, the interviewee underlines the importance of having the buy in of local implementing partners for its approach.

There is appreciation from professionals as well as local volunteers for the accessibility of the Delft Municipality, and a sense of inclusion, with regard to P/CVE policies. This does not mean that there are no tensions between ambitions of the Municipality and those of local organizations. As one interviewee notes, policy is influenced by politics, and therefore, does not always reflect practice.

For P/CVE policies, another important group to involve is that of young people: the main target group. Young people’s participation in policymaking in Delft is mostly indirect. Examples of the way they are involved are through interviews as well as through conversations with policymakers visiting projects involving young people. The latter has decreased due to Covid measures. This is
concerning, as young people, especially those in more deprived neighborhoods, already have a limited influence on policymaking and groups among them feel distanced from the policymaking process. Some distrust governmental institutions. This could worsen during the pandemic.

**Evaluations**

The development of the Evidence-Based Working Toolkit at national level, for the use of Municipalities, has been an important step to stimulate and support evaluations and evidence-based working (ESS, 2019). Such evaluations are important to gain more insight into how interventions work and what can be improved upon. Doing such evaluations is also a condition for local governments to receive financial support from the national level, at least for interventions above a certain amount. The Delft Municipality underlines the importance of evaluations for all its P/CVE interventions.

**Reflection**

Having described the context of Delft, its approach on P/CVE, as well as the way that is being developed, it is time to reflect on the challenges and dilemmas faced. Three main themes are of note here. It must be noticed that the reflections often relate not only to policies of the Municipality of Delft, but also to policies at national level.

**Broadening the approach**

While in recent years steps have been taken to broaden the approach, historically, the focus of P/CVE policy in Delft has been on violent jihadism. This is understandable as it was created based on the very concrete experience of young citizens leaving for Syria. The historical focus on violent jihadism has also been noticed at the national level. It must be noticed that such a specific focus in CT and P/CVE policy has been criticized for various reasons (Dijkman, 2021), including for having a blind spot for other forms of radicalization as well as for perpetuating the different treatment of different groups in society. The latter has been pointed to in a recent report53 ‘Families in the Crosshairs’ (Duke University Human Rights Clinic, 2020, p.4), which criticizes the emphasis on risks associated with ‘jihadists’ in Dutch policy:

> ‘In practice, this focus on Muslim individuals—and youths in particular—has been identified in the approaches of community police officers, local security professionals, and youth workers. For example, on the latter, the failure of prevention efforts to

53 This report was submitted to the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism in December 2020.
distinguish explicitly “between radicalization and (violent) extremism” combined with the focus on Muslim youths “has created a one-sided view and has influenced the threshold for reporting persons (names) to the security chain,” with “far right-wing and left-wing extremists or forms of nationalism not labelled as a risk.” Such inconsistency in approaching different forms of extremism can result in “stigmatization, discrimination, and unjustified profiling,” with serious consequences not only for individuals, but more broadly for their families and neighborhoods.’

In our view, initiatives related to P/CVE have also offered opportunities in support of young people and in addressing underlying problems that can contribute to radicalization among groups of young people. However, a (historical) focus on jihadism might have resulted in looking at the phenomena of polarization, radicalization and violent extremism in a partial way. An example can be found in the collaboration with Muslim communities and the investment in key-figure networks (explicitly mentioning key-figures from the Muslim community) that have been initiated in the Action Programme on an Integral Approach to Jihadism in 2014 at a national level. In various Municipalities, including in Delft, this has resulted in strong networks with informal organizations, active citizens and professionals, often with links with the Muslim community. These networks play an important role in sharing important concerns and grievances that are experienced among communities and facilitate initiatives to address them. The question that arises then is whether there are such instruments for other groups in society, or whether such initiatives can be broadened, realizing the variety of themes that are leading to the polarization of society. These are complex questions that require reflection, including on how one can develop a more inclusive approach on polarization, radicalization and violent extremism.

Indeed, compared to its first policy document ‘Implementation Programme on Violent Jihadism, 2015-2019’, the new policy document of the Municipality of Delft, presented in February 2020, is more generic in its title: ‘Approaches on Extremism, Polarization and Radicalization’. This document also mentions the broadening of the National Threat Overviews to include not only violent jihadism, but also right-wing extremism as well as the potential threat from left-wing extremism. The Municipality’s investment in a quick scan exercise on right-wing extremism as well as its investment in trainings on right-wing and left-wing extremism for frontline professionals are signs that this broadening is taking place. The Strategic Network on Polarization and Radicalization (SNRP) mentions in a presentation (personal communication, 2019) that it has the ambition of including new members and broadening its agenda to include other forms of polarization. This is an example of how also at practical level the approach can be broadened.
The role of frontline professionals in detecting early signs of radicalization

The Dutch approach to training frontline professionals in the social domain and asking them to detect early signs of radicalization in their daily work raises various questions and dilemmas. Indeed, the Municipality of Delft works with a large network of such professionals.

Problems with this practice have been pointed to by Annemarie van de Weert and Quirine Eijkman (2021, p.405); *In the end, no one can say for sure when someone actually poses a risk until the point at which the individual engages in concrete activities. The problem with this practice is that the focus on screening of citizens could identify any deviation in behavior, expression, and appearance as a potential problem. This immediately makes the policy controversial because it could create administrative arbitrariness.* As has been pointed out before, the focus of the Dutch approach on risks related to jihadism can also lead to a bias when identifying such early signs. These are important critical reflections from a human rights perspective. Here, we would like to share some other reflections by frontline professionals themselves.

First of all, should frontline professionals be burdened with this task? As an interviewee puts it: *‘A lot of issues are being thrust into the hands of the educator. Think of obesity, the phenomenon of lover boys and radicalization.’* This relates to the broader challenge faced by teachers, who have 30 students in a classroom and along with knowledge transfer, face various other situations that their students are dealing with. However, the interviewee also notes that the surfacing of socio-emotional challenges such as traumas faced by students is a reality: *‘As a school and a mentor, you face such issues. You can say, that is not my task, but that is not how it works. (...) Yes, security is also coming up in such conversations. If a student says, ‘sir, don’t share this with others, but we are going to steal this weekend’, alarm bells also ring. The question then is: what should one do with this. (...) Thinking about how we deal with that in the Dutch education sector is interesting. I think in the city of Delft (...) we are doing our best. I’m not saying it is excellent. But we are doing our best (...).’*

Frontline professionals face dilemmas with regards to their own position in identifying radicalization: *‘Should I really be making that judgement?’* The professional needs to take into account the interest of the individual young person, and the trust relationship between them on the one hand, while also thinking about security on the other. As an interviewee puts it: *‘Is it my fault when it goes wrong for a pupil?’* The bottomline in various interviews related to the fact that this judgement should not depend on one person alone. In the organization of one interviewee, it was explained how they have a very clear structure on the sharing of responsibility internally. The extent to which frontline professionals can find a sounding-board to share this responsibility with internally differs from one organization / school to another.
The role of the Municipality as a sounding-board role is appreciated, as it means that the responsibility is shared with someone with more expertise. As one interviewee explains: ‘...it is quite tricky. You do not want to label. Before you know it, this person is being registered somewhere as having scary ideas. That role, I do not want to have. That is why it is good to exchange views with (...) on an anonymous basis. The police is not a good place to do that; they will have to act immediately. That is not what you want at that stage. I just want to be able to express my concerns. Discuss what is it that I’m hearing.’

Professionals do not necessarily perceive their role of detecting early signs of radicalization as dichotomous with their role as a professional in the social domain. Referring to the trust-relationship that a frontline professional has with a young person, and the dilemma faced when reporting him or her, an interviewee explains: ‘yes, but we always do so in the interest of the well-being of the young person. We first start a conversation with this person, to see where it is coming from. Most often, these are vulnerable youth influence easily by others, so you try to protect him/her. This you do by starting conversations (...). You try to find out whether someone is really being recruited or indoctrinated. We have a bit of knowledge, but we do not know everything. If such a person is far into this process, then you ask for the insights of third persons.’

A number of interviewees emphasized the importance of training, not only to recognize radicalization, but also to prevent mis-identifying it. One interviewee explains how the trainings have helped him understand that certain kinds of religious behaviour are ‘normal’ and not signs of radicalization.

It can be concluded that the task of identifying early signs of radicalization poses various dilemmas for professionals, but that the system also provides opportunities for support in terms of training and the sharing of concerns that professionals face. A related relevant question to ask is what happens with persons reported on. This question requires further research.

The capacity to deal with diversity

When preventing violent extremism, a much broader capacity is needed than just ‘picking up signs of radicalization’. Various interviewees mentioned the need for organizations and professionals that deal with diversity. While many frontline professionals have a huge expertise here, based also on their practice of working with diverse groups in society, this capacity cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, the opposite can be true in some cases, with some professionals themselves expressing discriminatory statements.

The capacity of professionals to work in an inclusive manner is something that deserves investment. Some have pointed to the need to provide more trainings for teachers to deal with
polarizing issues in the classroom, again a situation where such capacity to deal with diversity is needed. It is about making young people feel heard. Being there for everyone, whatever their background. Being able to have diverse views heard in the classroom, and deal with them in an openminded manner. Learning to really listen to young persons. This is crucial for a much broader group of professionals than just the ones trained to carry out early detection of radicalization. This is where real prevention starts.

This capacity has been expressed beautifully in the following statement of one of the interviewees: ‘the most important thing is to offer them inclusivity (...) if you put aside your own norms and values, and start a conversation in an open-minded manner. Listening and letting them know that you do not have all the wisdom, this is how you get further. Let’s look together for answers: this works better.’

Conditions under which frontline professionals work

The last reflection relates to the broader developments in the social domain in the last few decades in the Netherlands. Some challenges and dilemmas are identified, which may not relate specifically to P/CVE policy, but to changed conditions provided for in these fields, as well as the increased pressure on showing specific kind of results. The focus will be on sharing the specific experiences of both frontline professionals as well as the active citizens of Delft.

A first example of loss experienced is the budget cuts that led to a decrease in community centres, a development that is still ongoing. As one interviewee explained: ‘before the budget cuts every neighbourhood had a community centre. In 2013 there was a large cut in budgets, which led to many of them being closed down.’ The value of a community centre, more specifically youth centres, is explained by a professional as: ‘an accessible place to have conversations’. Closing them down impacts the relationships professionals have with young people. Furthermore, various interviewees explained how the closing of these centres led to youth going elsewhere in the city, or outside of the city, which in turn led to professionals no longer feeling in touch with youth in their neighbourhood, something also pointed to in the study ‘Radicalization in Problematic Youth Groups’ (Neve et al., 2019).

For schools, the issue relates more to the time and space that teachers have to deal with various issues. As one interviewee explains: ‘Education is being overburdened. The inspection is only there

54 Conditions have also changed in schools. As one interviewee explains, a ‘school community police officer’ as well as the ‘counselor’, both of which used to have a ‘a face within the school’ have disappeared. Even though the step from counselor to the current role of ‘care -coordinator’ in this particular school is appreciated as professionalization, a critical
to check on whether the curriculum is being transferred in an optimal way. (...) The director only wants good grades. There is too much competition. Parents are also looking at that. They want the best for their child. We live in a results-driven society. If your child does not finish a senior secondary education and, instead, changes to a secondary vocational education level, that will be measured as a ‘departing student’ for the school. The inspection looks at measurable results. Yes, time is needed for primary tasks. But Maslov\textsuperscript{55} is also important. It is very important to address this, because a lot of broader questions come up. We need to have more time and space for that.’

The conditions described as well as the pressure experienced in terms of results, impacts the way frontline professionals can do their work in support of youth. It is not strange that such challenges come up in interviews related to their role in P/CVE. Indeed, a huge tension exists between what is being asked from professionals in terms of building resilience of young people in today’s complex society, and more specifically, their contribution to prevention of violent extremism, on the one hand, and the increasingly pressured conditions under which they work on the other hand.

With regard to the role of teachers in facilitating sensitive conversations relating to identity questions, for example, also referred to in P/CVE policy documents, one interviewee explains: ‘I think there is a lot of willingness. But…. A lot of things need to happen. Do you have the time and space within the school to have these kinds of conversations? (...) Do we need to offer citizenship education, or is it a form of indoctrination? Philosophy of life? More hours for civic education? What do we find important? Mathematics and Dutch language have the most hours. I completely understand. But a changing society might also need a new approach.’

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\textsuperscript{55} Maslov is a model of human needs, hierarchically structured, often visualized in a pyramid. On the bottom come physiological needs, these are followed by safety and security, belonging, esteem, and on the top self-actualization.
Summary

Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE) at the national level in the Netherlands

While some steps were taken to develop a counterterrorism (CT) policy in the seventies, the attacks of 9/11 were significant for Dutch policymaking on countering terrorism, and resulted in a wide range of criminal law measures to deal specifically with CT. Furthermore, the ‘comprehensive approach’, combining both preventive and repressive measures, became official policy to deal with terrorism in the Netherlands.

Nowadays, the broader policy framework of P/CVE and CT is guided by the National Counterterrorism Strategy (currently, the 2016–2020 iteration). Another important document is the Action Programme on an Integral Approach to Jihadism (2014), which was developed as a response to Dutch young citizens leaving for Syria and Iraq. With regard to prevention, we should also mention the Ministerial Letter to Parliament on the Government’s Policy on Prevention of Radicalization (2018), issued by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment.

The Dutch approach to P/CVE is characterized by a multidisciplinary approach, and includes measures within the categories of primary, secondary as well as tertiary prevention. At national level, this interdisciplinary approach can be seen in and through the involvement of various ministries in policymaking on P/CVE, a domain which is coordinated by the National Coordinator on Counterterrorism and Security. Municipalities play a key role in the Dutch approach, and central to their work on P/CVE are the multidisciplinary case meetings. Here, municipalities take the lead in bringing together various actors from the judicial, law enforcement, social- and youth and childcare domains to assess cases of radicalized individuals, and develop tailor-made plans. Another pillar of the Dutch P/CVE strategy includes early identification. For this purpose, some first-line professionals are trained to recognize signals of radicalization. Investment in primary prevention is through civic education and the collaboration of municipalities with ‘key-figure networks’, among others. With regard to tertiary prevention, specific public and semi-public institutions have developed competences and expertise on de-radicalization and reintegration.

The approach in Delft

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56 The NCTV is responsible for counterterrorism, cyber security, national security, crisis management and threats to the state. It works together with its partners in the security domain. From here on, we will use the Dutch abbreviation, NCTV [Nationale Coordinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid], for this body.
In 2013, the city of Delft was confronted with – as well as taken by surprise by – the departure of about twenty young citizens for Syria (Neve et al., 2019). This experience prompted the municipality to develop its own approach to dealing with P/CVE. The most recent articulation of this approach is in the 2020 document titled ‘Approach to Extremism, Polarization and Radicalization’, which is referred to as the local translation of the national CT Strategy (Gemeente Delft, 2020). The Delft way underlines the importance of close cooperation and dialogue between civil society actors and the social and security domains. While the approach fits well within the national approach, the scope seems more comprehensive and integrated, because of the explicit inclusion of a pillar on diminishing social tensions and preventing polarization – something which is in the CT strategy underlined as being of importance, yet outside the scope of the CT strategy itself.

Various first-line professionals such as youth workers and teachers play a role in the municipality’s approach to P/CVE. Essential in the youth workers’ approach is trust building and listening to young people: being there for them. In this role, they contribute to ‘universal prevention’ (Mutsaers, 2020). Schools and teachers also play a role, by facilitating conversations about sensitive issues such as polarization and radicalization within the classroom, among others. The municipality also trains some youth workers and teachers – along with other first-line professionals – on the early identification of radicalization, and when serious, to discuss such cases with the municipality. This system can, on the one hand, pose serious dilemmas to professionals but, on the other hand, we also learned about appreciation for the municipality’s role in being a sounding-board when concerns come up, as well as in terms of protecting vulnerable youth.

The case-study also looked into the Strategic Network on Radicalization and Polarization, in which individuals and organizations meet to enable connections and address polarization in the city.

**Reflections on local and national P/CVE policy**

The research on P/CVE raises various questions and reflections, relating to both local and national policymaking, which cannot be seen in isolation from one another. One major reflection relates to the historical focus on violent jihadism. Steps have been taken to broaden the approach, both nationally as well as in the municipality of Delft. This is important, as there are a variety of issues that are leading to polarization in society today and it is necessary to go beyond a specific focus when thinking about polarization, radicalization and violent extremism.
Another important question that arose relates to the inclusion of first-line professionals in the social domain in P/CVE efforts. Various challenges were flagged in the interviews. Several community centers – an important place for youth workers to connect with youth – had been closed down. A teacher referred to the burden of education and the pressure on obtaining ‘good grades’ and ‘measurable results’. A tension exists between what is being asked from professionals in terms of contributing to P/CVE on the one hand, and the conditions under which they work on the other. The question this raises is whether these conditions facilitate their role in ‘giving youth a positive start and on making sure that vulnerable groups are able to participate in society (...), a role referred to in the Government’s letter on the prevention of radicalization (Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid, 2018, p.2).
Section I: The phenomena of ‘violent extremism’ in Romania

Historical background

Historically, the phenomena of extremism in Romania was characterised by racist, xenophobic, chauvinistic attitudes and their political manifestations. Romania had a very strong and dangerous form of ultra-nationalism, fed by mainly an anti-Hungarian, anti-Jews and anti-Roma sentiment, and taken forward after 1990s as a re-legitimating strategy by the old communist elites and Securitate forces (Gabriel Andreeșcu, 1900-2000).

Post-communism Romania knew two growing nationalist-extremist currents drawing their ideology and discursive practices from elements of Nicolae Ceaușescu’s national-communism - and adapting them to the new post-communist political, social and economic scene. One political current was carried out by three “parties of the ‘radical continuity’” (Michael Shafir, 1999) known as the Greater Romania Party (Partidul România Mare -PRM), the Party of the National Unity of Romanians (Partidul Unității Naționale Române - PUNR) and the Socialist Labour Party (Partidul Socialist al Muncii -PSM), as well as another party claiming left-wing identity, the Social Democracy Party of Romania (PDSR) of Ion Iliescu. What all of them had in common was the aggressively portrayed nationalism doubled by a strident populist rhetoric (Florin Turcanu, 2016).

The second political current was following the interwar traditions of fascism-orientated radicalism, independent from the ‘legacy’ of Ceaușescu, trying to build a ‘New Right’ (Michael Mann, 2004, p. 370-71).

Between the two World Wars, a powerful political force was represented by the Legionnaire
Movement (Legion of Archangel Michael), also known as the Iron Guard, which was claimed to be an offspring of the Cristian-Orthodox tradition, characterised by the promotion of the cult of ‘glorious history’ of the Romanian people, obsessive and extreme anti-semitism, branding Jews, homosexuals and Roma as a threat to national value (Gabriel Andreescu, 2003, p. 15).

The Greater Romania Party, founded in 1991, was the most important Romanian nationalist party post-communism. It exacerbated pre-used tendencies such as anti-Hungarian sentiments, anti-Western, extreme hostility against former dissidents and against the Free Europe radio station. Its virulent populist discourse containing offensive use of language, grotesque images and specific slang was targeting the so called ‘enemies’ (Ruxandra Cesereanu, 2003). Taking advantage of the economic crisis, the GRP used its populism to reinforce the ultra-nationalistic rhetoric and win legitimacy among people on the political scene. Even after Romania adopted its national security law in 1991 (Law no. 51/1991) which defined as threat and criminalised the initiation, organisation or support of totalitarian, extremist, fascist, legionnaire, anti-semite or racist acts, the Party remained immune to investigations and, moreover, grew in popularity. Its collapse started, however, once Romania underwent economic and social transformations alongside internal affairs and new international relations.

Another Party worthy of note is The New Right (Noua Dreaptă), created in 1999 by Tudor Ionescu and positioning itself outside of the ‘general’ Romanian political parties, with a focus on militant formation rather than electoral goals (Florin Tucanu, 2016, p. 20).

The New Right Party is significantly associated with “marches of normality” against gay pride parades which took place in 2009 in Bucharest, nationalist radicalisation of the anti-abortion movement as well as anti-American manifestations (ibid). The mobilisation of NR has remained limited throughout the country, with atomic manifestations but constant incitement of hateful discourses.

Current situation

Extreme nationalism, revisionism and intolerance vis-à-vis minority groups such as Roma, sexual minorities and ethnic Hungarians are still manifest outside electoral politics in institutionalised and non-institutionalised forms. A common occurrence in the country is the so-
called ‘casual intolerance’ in both public and private speech which is widespread\(^5\) and it perpetuates harmful narratives in the society which then fuel defensive and protectionist attitudes (Radu Cinopel, 2012, p. 3).

Looking at the cosmology of radical and extremist attitudes revolving around the country, political parties are not the only participants to intolerant and extremist attitudes and movements. The Romanian Orthodox Church has constantly tried to impose its “orthodox” conception on institutions and people, with the promotion of exclusivist doctrine, contestation of rule of law principles, use of aggressive means and mobilisation of resources to gain people’s confidence against usually universal human rights issues. The way it has been able to do so is by its wealth continuously increasing through a significant transfer of public assets, a policy of partnership between the Church and the state and transforming all these relationships into means of influencing and controlling the political class and public policy opinions (Michael Minkenberg, 2015, p. 251). That together with its manipulation of religious education and the educational system in general. Through publications under its patronage, such as Scara and Icoana din adânc, it drew attention to “acts that could threaten the very existence of Romanian People”. Some of them referring to granting constitutional rights to immigrants, granting rights to minorities, the pressure put on Romanian culture by France and America, atheist liberalism and the “chaos of rights and freedoms” (Gabriel Andreescu, 2003, p. 36). The Orthodox Synod launched in 2000 an appeal against the de-incrimination of homosexuality. Similarly, although initiated by the Romanian association called the Coalition for Family, the Orthodox Church supported in 2015 an initiative for a constitutional amendment for changing the existent gender-neutral language defining marriage as between “spouses” with an explicit reference to marriage as a union between a man and a woman. This would have made same-sex marriage unconstitutional. The referendum failed but same sex marriage is still prohibited by Romanian statute law.

On the same line, the Orthodox Church supported the elimination of sexual education in schools adopted by law in 2020.

If the former ultra-nationalist parties and organisations lost their influence among people and with it, parliamentary power, the year of 2020 brought a surprising change on the Romanian

\(^5\) Borrowed from Michael Billig’s (1995) notion of ‘banal nationalism’, referring to day-to-day discursive practices displaying embedded intolerance which often goes unnoticed, while having the negative effect of reinforcing stereotypes. A Romanian example could be the idiom >> îneacă ca țiganul la Mal<< (drowning like a gypsy by the shore) which is illusive in this respect.
political scene. The newest political party in power with a clear far-right extremist agenda is Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR) who won the elections in 2020 during the historically low voter turnout of 32%. The ultra-nationalist party pledging for “family, nation, faith and freedom” used an anti-medicine, anti-vaccination and anti-Covid restrictions rhetoric to win votes, manipulating grievances and uneducated sectors of the population exasperated by the harsh Covid impact. Being part of the previously mentioned Coalition for Family, they are almost threatening with the “defence” of the traditional family structure. Additionally, AUR has strong connections to the Orthodox Church, which it has supported in holding religious ceremonies during the pandemic.

There are currently two draft laws initiated by the AUR senator Sorin Lavric for the revival of payed allowances of former legionnaires, outrightly denying and disrespecting Holocaust victims and venerating the “martyrs and heroes who’s only blame is that they fought against communism” \(\text{\cite{HotNews, 2021}}\)

**Section II: Types of policies addressing P/CVE**

Compared to its European counterparts, Romania’s approach to preventing and countering violent extremism is not robustly constructed throughout the country. There is no clear definition on radicalisation in Romania, the term being mostly translated ad litteram from EU documents. Romanian scholars distinguish between cognitive and behavioural radicalisation. Distinction is made according to whether radical ideas are expressed by beliefs or action, as well as different causes of radicalisation including domestic (socio-economic factors, marginalisation and alienation), global factors (geopolitical developments and terrorist groups) and ideological determinants which account for violent acts \(\text{\cite{Hannaoui-Saulais, 2015}}\) point out that it takes place at the intersection between individual vulnerabilities, intrinsic motivations, grievances or predispositions on the one hand (push factors), and a favourable environment (exposure to ideologies, recruiters – or pull factors), on the other.

Coming from a background of politically and socially attacking minorities, ‘enemies’ and ‘westernised change’, Romania focused incipiently on tackling the prominent xenophobia, hate speech and popularising of radicalised movements against Jews, Roma and LGBTQ+ communities. One of those steps was the creation of the National Council for Countering Discrimination in 2000 which fought against all forms of discrimination, including the pervasive anti-semitic and racist public speeches. Additionally, in 2000 the country adopted Law no. 48/2002
which addressed racist propaganda and criminalised all forms of discrimination. However, the process of legal sanctioning of discriminatory agendas or actions was far from effective due to the precarity of people’s solidarity culture against discrimination and xenophobic propaganda - especially if the victims were belonging to historically marginalised communities such as Jews, Roma or homosexuals (Romanian European Institute, 2015, p. 62).

In recent years, the phenomenon of attracting Romanian citizens to radical messages and ideologies has been observed, as they are mainly influenced by propaganda to terrorist organisations with online hate, vandalism against Jewish cemeteries (ECRI, Romania, 2019, p. 21), nazi, anti-semitic, racist and Neo-legionary gratifies plus sporadic physical attacks targeting immigrants (INSHR-EW Report, 2020).

The Romanian state authorities have already taken a series of measures aimed at counteracting the risks in this regard. These measures refer to the adoption of a legislative framework to combat anti-Semitism, negative and distortion of the Holocaust (Law no. 217/2015), using memorial to teach the history of the Holocaust in Romania, the introduction of school programs designed to stimulate tolerance and present Romanian students the history of the Holocaust, the adoption of national strategies for the Roma community (HG. nr. 18/2015 for the years 2015-2020)\(^58\), the use of administrative and legal mechanisms to combat discrimination in Romania, as well as involvement in international initiatives to combat anti-Semitism, Holocaust denial and distortion, prevention and combat terrorism.

\(^{58}\) There is another National Strategy for the inclusion of Roma citizens for the years 2021-2027 currently being debated.
Law no. 217/2015 prohibits mental as well as physical violence on the basis of race, religion, ethnicity and it also criminalises nationalist extremism.

**National Strategy to Combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech 2021-2023**

Following the December 2018 Declaration of the Council of Europe on combating anti-semitism and adopting a work framework for protecting Jewish institutions and Jewish values across Europe, while addressing the increasing radicalisation and extremist attitudes, Romania has developed a national strategy for 2021-2023. On this basis, in 2020 the Romanian Inter-ministerial Committee\(^{59}\) was born and charged with drawing up a National Strategy to Combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech. The instrument was borne out of the collective understanding of the growing threat radicalisation can pose to Romanian citizens, especially touching youth and persons deprived of their liberty (Romanian National Strategy to Combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech, 2020).

However, there are signs of concern from the civil society about the syncope implementation, in some cases, of the relevant legislation, as well as about the need to update educational programs, law enforcement policies and societal measures which determines the need to evaluate current instruments and establish ways to modernise the set of tools available to Romanian society to prevent and combat these phenomena.\(^{60}\)

The description of the strategy reveals its main and central scope, which is countering radicalisation and extremist beliefs with scarce references to the prevention process.

**Radicalisation in prisons**

As seen above, radicalisation and violent acts that lead to extremism seem to be harboured more effectively against certain types of groups. It has been established that the penitentiary system, through its specific particularities, occupies an important place in the understanding of this phenomenon and represents a breeding ground for the development of the (self)radicalisation processes (National Penitentiary Administration, Social Reintegration Directorate). Romanian

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59 Decizie Prim-Ministru nr. 138/2019

penitentiary system places persons convicted of violent extremist acts or terrorism acts under the category of “vulnerable inmates” (HG no.157/2016/ Law no. 254/2013). However, the legal framework governing the activity of the penitentiary administration system, as well as penitentiary practice does not contain and does not differentiate between inmates convicted of crimes of non-terrorism or extremism, resulting in a total lack of preventive actions for de-radicalisation and completely blurring the lines between terrorism and violent extremism. That culminates in the fact that the Romanian legislation regarding the administration of inmates inside prisons does not include a regime for the execution of sentence dedicated to violent extremism/terrorism (Journal of Penitentiary Practice, 2020, p. 104).

Romania has, however, partnered with European institutions from 2017 onwards for the implementation of training sessions for penitentiary units and staff throughout the country on the phenomenon of radicalisation (RAN, EUROPRIS, 2019, Romania).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of the training practice</th>
<th>Training sessions on the phenomenon of radicalization, under the angle of the Strategy for the prevention of radicalization in the penitentiary environment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Geographical scope</strong></td>
<td>The training course is aimed at penitentiary units from every corner of the country, mentioning that 8 penitentiary units have been selected punctually, in order to pilot and establish the degree of sustainability of the form of delivery of the course to the penitentiary staff. It is expected that from 2020, the training course will be delivered to all prison units in Romania.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- **Key features of the training practice**
  - The training sessions aim transmitting, for learning, the theoretical and methodological concepts regarding the phenomenon of radicalization in the penitentiary environment and the use of specific tools within the Strategy for preventing radicalization in order to identify the people who present risk on the target phenomenon;
  - Workers from the department in charge of preventing crime and terrorism from penitentiary units deliver the training course;
  - The training sessions were organized during 2 months in 2019, the information being transmitted in the form of PowerPoint presentations and a physical material course support for the front line staff. Starting with 2020, courses with annual frequency will be delivered to all penitentiary units in Romania;
  - The resources used: human, IT equipment, A4 sheets with brief information;

- **Methodology used**
  - The key-concepts on which the training sessions are based are synthesized from social sciences and best practices learned from participating in various events. The course is based on elements specific to radicalization which led to elaborating the Strategy for preventing radicalization in the penitentiary environment:
    - Identification of radicalization indicators;
    - Working together with civil society for reinsertation;
    - Multi-disciplinary activities for efficient recuperative interventions;
    - Specialty support from national qualified structures from in regard of radicalization and terrorism;

- **Relation to initiatives/theory**
  - The training course is put together with information and data collected from active participation into EPRIS project.

- **Target audience/beneficiaries**
  - Penitentiary administration staff which carry out specific activities with inmates as well as staff who occupy management positions in penitentiary units.

Also, since 2015, numerous studies and analysis were made by the National Administration
of Penitentiaries on the phenomenon of radicalisation in prisons touching on prevention necessities, recognition and intervention and countering radicalisation narratives in prisons (Ministry of Justice, National Administration of Penitentiaries, 2015, p. 49).

National Order and Security Strategy 2015 -2020

Following international developments responding to the widespread phenomena of terrorism, Romania took a turn of focus on counter-terrorism laws and policies, in which violent extremist acts and radicalisation were integrated, more than recognised as a single standing cause for violent acts.

The National Order and Security strategy\textsuperscript{61} for the years 2015-2020 (Strategia de ordine și siguranță națională) explicitly refers to the opportunity for criminal networks to take advantage of the freedom of movement in the European Union and the cross-border nature of terrorist threats. The document is managed by MAI (Ministerul Afacerilor Interne), otherwise the Ministry of Internal Affairs and it’s mainly a CT programme, with few P/CVE provisions. However, the strategy also identifies threats associated with xenophobia, radicalisation and extremism, as well as the importance of securing borders. The document focuses on “identification and de-structuring of criminal networks, those specialised in drug trafficking, as well as those of terrorism”, and on “expanding cooperation and actions to prevent and combat forms of serious crime and terrorism” (NOSS, p.15).

Romania does not have a specific policy document describing its ‘P/CVE Strategy’, mainly giving the fact that the country did not encounter the phenomena as other European countries have. The amount of terrorist threats has kept low. Still, according to the main authority in the prevention and combating of terrorism, SRI (Serviciul Român de Informații), otherwise Romanian Intelligence Service has stated that, from the perspective of internal security risks, the (self) radicalisation of Romanian citizens and people from conflict / terrorist risk areas can be noticed. There is a slight increase in the number of radicalised Romanian citizens, converted to Islam, concerned with formulating terrorist threats against certain objectives. The most frequently used environment for carrying out criminal activities of this type is online, and the main category of risk or with regard to minors.

\textsuperscript{61} NOS strategy’ from now on
The data from the most recent DIICOT Activity Report (2020)\textsuperscript{62} shows the urgent need of prioritisation of programs dedicated to the social reintegration of people in this category (perpetrators of radical or VE acts), as well as for counselling minors in the process of radicalisation.

**Romanian Commission for European Affairs, Romanian Parliament, Opinion on the European Parliament’s letter on ‘Supporting the prevention of radicalisation leading to violent extremism’**

Asked to offer an opinion on international cooperation for preventing radicalisation and VE, Romania commended the letter and stated that “in the context of recent terrorist attacks in Europe, it has been shown that preventing radicalisation is an essential part of the fight against terrorism and Romania is ready to support the prevention process through enhanced socio-economic methods” (Opinie, 2016).

**Section III: Multi-Level Analysis of P/CVE Policies**

As seen in the previous section, Romania shifted its focus on counter terrorism post 9/11, with limited attempts on doubling the work on the prevention of terrorism with a P/CVE Agenda. The recent focus on radicalisation, anti-Semitism and xenophobia shows that Romania may, in the future, take the route of engaging in significant VE prevention. An overview of the Romanian P/CVE approach is listed in the table below. The current National Order and Security Strategy (2015-2020), the National Strategy to Combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech (2021-2023) and the RAN and EUROPRIS provisions and trainings being implemented in prisons are the main sources. Where is needed, for example relating to education, other sources will be added.

The National Strategy to combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech has a strong primary prevention approach, giving that it focuses on various policy domains engaged in the prevention of VE. For example, it focuses on evaluating the training programs of the actors involved in the process of preventing and combating anti-Semitism, xenophobia, radicalisation and hate speech (police officers, prosecutors, judges) and updating these programs if necessary; or on evaluation of current school curricula and their modernisation. It also works on

\textsuperscript{62} Direcția de Investigare a Infrațiunilor de Crimă Organizată și Terorism, otherwise Romanian Directorate for the Investigation of Organised Crime and Terrorism.
the development of pilot cultural programs meant to prevent the proliferation of these phenomena in the Romanian society. Similarly, the programmes addressing radicalisation in prisons aim at understanding and using specific tools in order to prevent radicalisation before it happens. Additionally, it presents a very strong secondary and tertiary prevention focus, looking at identifying vulnerable individuals at risk of being a target of the phenomenon and aims towards de-radicalisation through multi-disciplinary activities and working together with the civil society for reintegration.

On the other side, the NOS Strategy, mainly a national security agenda with some counter-terrorism objectives, overall assesses the need for early identification and de-structuring of terrorist networks; Efficiency of prevention systems and early warning mechanisms; and expanding cooperation and prevention for counter-terrorism (NOSS, 2015-2020, p. 15). Given the current focus switch of the country to more awareness-raising and resilience-building against VE and radicalisation, it will be interesting to see how the next ‘National Security Agenda’ will pan out.

Romania took part in 2019 in various trainings organised internationally by the Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (YEIP) on violent youth radicalisation. The programmes consisted in youth-led field research carried out by 71 young people in Romania and Poland, including 16 people coming from migrant background with the aim to collect their views on violent radicalisation and to inform the development of prevention tools based on the meaningful contribution of restorative justice, positive psychology and the Good Lives Model (YEIP, 2019, p. 69). They analysed and worked with concepts of radicalisation, identity and belonging; on values, self-concept and self-esteem; on unfair treatment, stigma and marginalisation; and on community and environment. Romania adopted two youth strategies which are going to be analysed below.

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63 Supported in Romania by the National Council for Combating Discrimination, the Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sports and the Institute of Educational Sciences.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention/ Approach</th>
<th>More information</th>
<th>Primary/ Secondary/ Tertiary</th>
<th>Policy domain</th>
<th>Main actors involved in implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field research on understanding trigger factors in youth and challenging extremist messages</td>
<td>This was part of the 2019 programme led by the Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project. In total, 71 young people were involved, 62 from Romania (46 native Romanians and 16 migrants) and 9 from Poland.</td>
<td>Primary prevention</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Supported by the National Council for Combating Discrimination, the Ministry of Education, Research, Youth and Sports and the Institute of Educational Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of school curricula and investment on modernisation to include preventive tools for addressing radicalisation, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and hate speech</td>
<td>This is mentioned in the National Strategy to combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech (2021-2023)</td>
<td>Primary prevention</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>The Interministerial Committee made of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Culture, General Secretariat of the Government, and the National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania – Elie Wiesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intervention/ Approach</td>
<td>More information</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accent on social inclusion, enhanced employment, mutual understanding and tolerance as a key to prevent radicalisation.</td>
<td>As part of the National Strategy for Youth Policy 2015-2020</td>
<td>Can contribute to primary prevention</td>
<td>Education</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced educational and work opportunities and investment in international cooperation on good practices for youth professional inclusion in the EU</td>
<td>As part of the Romanian Strategy of Vocational Education and Training in Romania 2016-2020</td>
<td>Can contribute to primary prevention</td>
<td>Education and Economy</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training for identification of radicalization indicators; Multi-disciplinary activities for efficient recuperative interventions; Working with civil society for reintegration</td>
<td>This is mentioned in the RAN, EUROPRIS training sessions on the phenomenon of radicalisation, under the aegis of the Strategy for the prevention of radicalisation in the penitentiary environment (2017-2020)</td>
<td>Primary, Secondary and tertiary prevention</td>
<td>Law enforcement</td>
<td>Department for Preventing and Combating Terrorism; Romanian Intelligence Service; Penitentiary staff; Civil society</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Law</td>
<td>Emergency Ordinance no. 31/2002 punishes the establishment of fascist, racist or xenophobic organisations and symbols and promoting the cult of persons guilty of committing crimes against peace and humanity with imprisonment from 3 months to 15 years depending on the offence.</td>
<td>Secondary and Tertiary</td>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>Judiciary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intervention/ Approach</th>
<th>More information</th>
<th>Primary/ Secondary/ Tertiary</th>
<th>Policy domain</th>
<th>Main actors involved in implementation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Criminal Law</td>
<td>Law no. 535/2004 is the main act for the prevention and combating terrorism in Romania.</td>
<td>Secondary and Tertiary prevention</td>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>Judiciary, National Intelligence Service, DIICOT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identification and de-structuring of terrorist networks; working against terrorist financing; preventing human trafficking, radicalisation and extremism that lead to terrorism</td>
<td>National Order and Security Strategy 2015-2020</td>
<td>Mainly tertiary prevention</td>
<td>Judicial</td>
<td>Ministry of Internal Affairs, DIICOT, National Intelligence Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed multi-disciplinary and multi-actor cooperation approach for prevention of radicalisation, anti-Semitism, xenophobia and hate speech</td>
<td>Organised under the National Strategy to Combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech 2021-2023</td>
<td>Relevant for all three forms of prevention</td>
<td>Various, including education, law enforcement, judiciary, social and economic</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Culture, General Secretariat of the Government, and the National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania - Elie Wiesel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusion</td>
<td>HG. no. 18/2015 setting up the National Strategy on the Roma community for the years 2015-2020</td>
<td>Can contribute to primary prevention</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Focus: Type of Extremism

Romania’s policy documents and ‘P/CVE plans’ adopt a generic description of radicalisation and violent extremism, usually referring to them in the context of countering terrorism and anti-terrorism strategies. The National Order and Security Strategy (2015-2020) focuses on “identification and de-structuring of criminal networks, those specialised in drug trafficking, as well as those of terrorism”, and on “expanding cooperation and actions to prevent and combat forms of serious crime, radicalisation and extremism leading to terrorism” (NOSS, p.15). Similarly, although focused on addressing the specific issue of radicalisation and extremism, the National Strategy to combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech (2021-2023) only refers to the generic meaning of the words and recognises the possibility, in the future, that more Romanians could be attracted by extremist ideologies, “as diverse as they are” (National Strategy, 2021-2023, p. 3).

The legislation put in place to protect the population against terrorism, to identify, prevent terrorism and lastly to counter it only puts forward what the terrorist act could consist of without putting the emphasis on a certain type of extremism:

“Terrorism is the set of actions and / or threats that pose a public danger and affect national security, having the following characteristics: a) are committed premeditatedly by terrorist entities, motivated by extremist conceptions and attitudes, hostile to other entities, against which they act in violent and / or destructive ways; b) aim to achieve specific objectives of a political nature; c) concerns human and / or material factors in public authorities and institutions, the civilian population or any other segment belonging to them; d) produces conditions with a strong psychological impact on the population, meant to draw attention to the goals pursued (Law no. 535/2004, art. 1).

The DIICOT Activity Reports recognise the threat Islamic terrorism could pose to Romanian citizens being increasingly attracted to violent online content and islamist objectives (DIICOT Activity Report 2020).

Following the growing attention to the process of radicalisation and violent extremism with raising anti-semitic events and pervasive xenophobic discourses, Romania may, in the near future, work on defining the extremist threat in the country.
**Scope of policies: Romanian focus on upstream prevention**

As seen in the table above, some of Romania’s ‘P/CVE policies’ integrate a multi-dimensional and multi-sectorial, broad approach which include upstream prevention, reintegration and de-radicalisation. They are most present in the National Strategy to combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech (2021-2023) which works toward enhanced opportunities, economic investments and cultural debates for understanding the radicalisation process, and ease the process of reintegration. This is not directly implied in the main text but it can be read from the explanations the document offers on the expected results.

The Strategy for the prevention of radicalisation in the penitentiary environment (2017-2020) mentions reintegration and de-radicalisation as a focus. The key elements it contains are:

- Working together with civil society for reintegration;
- Multi-disciplinary activities for efficient recuperative interventions;
- Learning the theoretical and methodological concepts regarding the phenomenon of radicalisation in the penitentiary environment and the use of specific tools of prevention and de-radicalisation.

Along with these, the two National Strategy for Youth Policy 2015-2020 and the Romanian Strategy of Vocational Education and Training in Romania 2016-2020 have a strong upstream prevention focus with a multi-sectoral, enhanced opportunities approach.

The National Order and Security Strategy (2015-2020) does not contain any reference to upstream prevention or de radicalisation. It only speaks of the need for advanced national and international cooperation for the identification and prevention of terrorism. Although it mentions prevention, the document does not go forward with analysing it further.

**Instruments**

Looking at the documents with the most prominent P/CVE objectives, their approach is very much multi-disciplinary with different NGOs and civil society organisations and institutions involved in the integration, reintegration, de radicalisation, dialogues and prevention. This is true at the national level for the Strategy on the prevention of radicalisation in prisons which is implemented by the Department for Preventing and Combating Terrorism; Romanian Intelligence Service; Penitentiary staff and Civil society organisations. The same is true for the National Strategy for Combating Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech. The latter
refers to multi-actor and multi-sectorial cooperation and it’s implemented by a multitude of actors, ranging from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Education and Research, Ministry of Culture, General Secretariat of the Government to the National Institute for the Study of the Holocaust in Romania - Elie Wiesel, Federation of Jewish Communities in Romania, Centre for Monitoring and Combating Anti-Semitism, People's Advocate, National Council for Combating Discrimination, National Agency for Roma and Public Ministry - Prosecutor's Office attached to the High Court of Cassation and Justice.

**Capacity Building in Romania**

The infrastructure of support for professionals on the subject of radicalisation and violent extremism is provided by the government in collaboration with international organisations. That is true for the Training under the Strategy for preventing radicalisation in prisons which is, in fact, a multi-sectorial training developed and implemented by international actors, the Department for Preventing and Combating Terrorism, the Romanian Intelligence Service, Penitentiary staff from major national centres and participants from civil society organisations.

Because the National Strategy to combat Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech is newly developed, it does not yet include tools, trainings or approaches for implementation in its description.

**The role of social cohesion and social inclusion**

Although the majority of the legislation on state security and order refers to the ‘negative’ they are preventing, giving the counter-terrorism focus, there are positive approaches as well. For example, the Romanian Strategy of Vocational Education and Training in Romania (2016-2020) mentions enhanced educational and work opportunities and investment in international cooperation on good practices for youth professional inclusion in the EU. It is not a P/CVE document per se, but it could contribute to primary prevention. The other youth policy, the National Strategy for Youth Policy 2015-2020 prioritises education and social inclusion as a way of preventing radicalisation. The strategy on preventing radicalisation in the penitentiary environment also mentions early identification and social and cultural approaches for early disengagement from extremist ideas.

There are no other provisions, nationally, regionally or locally at the moment that deal with social cohesion or social inclusion in the domain of P/CVE.
Education

Individuals identified as being most at risk of radicalisation in Romania include vulnerable young people from poor families and/or dysfunctional families, sensitive to pressure and manipulation who feel misunderstood by society and deprived of rights, and members of the Muslim community (Pănăîtescu, 2016. p. 5).

Legislation and policies to prevent risk factors that lead to youth marginalisation are relatively recent having been adopted as a response to the European Agenda on Security, the EU Youth Strategy, and the Education and training 2020. Despite existent legal framework on control and punishment of violent forms of radicalisation, there is still little action on preventing radicalisation as defined above. The National Strategy for Youth Policy 2015-2020 was adopted in 2015 and the Strategy of Vocational Education and Training in Romania 2016-2020 was adopted in 2016. The underlying assumption of the first is that education, youth participation, inter-religious and intercultural dialogue as well as employment and social inclusion have a key role to play in preventing radicalisation by promoting common European values including social inclusion, mutual understanding and tolerance.

In addition, a number of recent legislative acts on preventing and combating school segregation and social exclusion as potential leading factor to marginalisation are reviewed along with the specific role of public authorities at the local and national levels (YEIP, 2018).

However, action plans for implementing the recent legal framework, have not been fully completed. One of the main problems is the lack of funding sources as well as reluctance of other ministries to allocate funds to support measures that fall within their responsibility. Also, the lack of synergy between institutions targeting young people (NGOs, county youth foundations, etc.) is another issue for correlating clear actions with public policies.

Several research studies have recognised the meaningful contribution of positive psychology and the Good Life Models (GLM) for rehabilitation of offenders. They explain that is not possible to better oneself without the involvement of the other and setting the connection between rehabilitation and restorative justice. The involvement of the victim and the community in the restoration of harm gives offenders “new optimism and relief of being reconnected with their communities” (YEIP, 2018).

64 See the above mentions of the National Strategy for the inclusion of the Roma community
Good Life Models interventions and practices in Romania have been very feebly developed in the justice system. The implementation of modern restorative practices in Romania started in 2002 in the justice system, with the establishment of two experimental centres of restorative justice for young people aged 14 to 21 in Bucharest and Craiova. It was set up as a result of a two-year project partnership between the Ministry of Justice and the UK government (Szabo, 2010; Rađulescu, Banciu și Dâmboeanu, 2006). The measures included mediation and a set of victims’ protection measures.

Two NGOs were identified for their work on prevention of radicalisation and marginalisation, respectively. The first is Be You Association carrying out dedicated workshops to prevent youth marginalisation in high schools from several counties in the country. The workshops are part of a project funded by the Erasmus + program focused on preventing the attitudes and radical behaviours of young people. Additionally, The Lider Just Association is carrying out a national legal education programme for high school youth in an attempt to educate them on preventing and combating discriminatory attitudes, marginalisation of vulnerable groups in their communities, and promoting social inclusion and youth participation.

Evaluation & Evidence

The National Strategy for Combating Anti-Semitism, Xenophobia, Radicalisation and Hate Speech mentions transparency and the principle of legality as two of its objectives. It goes to say that “The draft normative act was published on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Section "Decision Transparency", together with the motivation tool, respecting the legal provisions in force on decision transparency in public administration and access to information of public interest”.

The NOS Strategy is evaluated annually or whenever the situation requires it and is based on the information collected in the monitoring process, with the aim of developing a comprehensive general analysis - Evaluation report on the results achieved through the National Strategy, as well as issuing recommendations for further action. The role of integrator of the monitoring and evaluation of the National Strategy for Public Order and Security 2015-2020, including by presenting stage and evaluation reports, belongs to the General Directorate for Operational Management within the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
Greece

Summary

Greece has a history of far left and far right violence and terrorism since 1970s’. The country has dismantled a number of groups in its recent history however it still appears to be lacking momentum in developing a national PCVE Action Plan. Nonetheless, there are a number of directives and laws\(^{65}\) directed to the punishment of violent acts such as terrorism, organised crime, hate speech, violent extremism and hooliganism and could be considered as measures that could potentially have a deradicalization effects for members of violent extremist organisations. At the same time, NGO’s have tried to fill the gap and a number of projects\(^{66}\) have contributed in addressing the issue of PCVE in Greece.

Alongside the projects implemented on PCVE, there are some initiatives at a local level (by NGOs, schools and/or municipalities) which aim to tackle hate speech, discrimination, and racism and to promote positive behaviours at schools, alternative means of conflict resolution (e.g., through constructive dialogue), critical thinking and to empower the youth. In the context of the interviews carried out by the Social Action and Innovation Centre (KMOP) in Greece, the majority of the people interviewed expressed the opinion that even if the country is lagging behind in developing its own PCVE programme/policies, it would be important to focus on preventive measures as soon as possible. Whilst all considered that the PCVE measures can be better addressed at a local/regional level.

The phenomenon of violent extremism in Greece

In Greece, violent radicalisation has been present from the 1970s and has a rich history of far left and far right violence and terrorism (Kassimeris, 2013; Skleparis & Anagnostou, 2015; Skleparis & Augestad, 2020). Nonetheless, international forms of terrorism made their appearance in the country, which were more apparent than any form of religiously motivated violence (Kaminaris, 1999; Skleparis & Augestad, 2020).


\(^{66}\) For e.g. Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (YEIP), Preventing Radicalism through Critical Thinking Competences (PRACTICE), COMMunIcation campaign against exTremism and radicalisation (COMMIT), Dialogue about radicalisation and Equality (DARE), Partnership Against Violent Radicalisation in cities (PRACTICIES).
In regards to right wing extremism, the latest organisation formed was Golden Dawn, which has been described as Neo-Nazi and fascist (Dalakoglou, 2012). Its narrative and discourse could be characterised as anti-European, as it argued that the EU was to blame for the economic situation in the country. Another narrative which gained support was the “anti-immigration” narrative. Of course, all of these beliefs went alongside a number of violent acts against opponents, migrants and minority groups (Anagnostou & Skeparis, 2015; BBC News, 2013; Dalakoglou, 2012). Since 2013, its party’s leaders and members were on trial facing charges of the murder of anti-Fascist artist Pavlos Fyssas and of running a criminal organisation. Nonetheless, the party came in third place for the parliamentary elections of Greece in 2015, whilst in the July 2019 election, the party lost all of its seats in the Greek Parliament. The Court in its ruling of 8 October 2020 found the general secretary and other leading members of the party, guilty of leading a criminal organisation (iefimerida, 2020; The Guardian, 2020). It would be premature to consider that far right extremism no longer exists in Greece, as only in the year 2020, the Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) recorded 107 attacks on the basis of ethnic or national origin, colour of skin, religion, sexual orientation or sexual identity (RVRN,2021).

Greece has dismantled violent extremist leftist groups in its recent history, such as the 17N and the ELA, however, it has not signalled the end of far-left extremism. According to the European’s Union Terrorism and Situation Trend Report (TE-SAT, 2020), Greece has experienced a number of attacks carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist in the most recent years. A number of other groups have been formed (such as the Conspiracy of the Fire Nuclei, Epanastatikoi Pyrines, Sehta Epanastaton, Epanastatikos Agonas etc.). During the year 2019 two attacks were carried out against the building that housed the consular office of the Russian embassy in Athens and the second one at the offices of the Golden dawn (AMW, 2019; Counterextremism project, 2019). During the same year, according to the TE-SAT (2020) report, the greatest number (45) of convictions and acquittals for left wing terrorist offences were handed down in Greece.

The phenomenon of violent radicalisation might differ from country to country and within each country, from region to region and from city to city (Vidino, 2011:28-29). However, even if jihadist terrorist attacks can be considered to be representing a minor challenge for Greece, one should not forget its transit role for foreign terrorist fighters, due to its geographic position (Counterextremism project, 2019). In fact, while there is no sufficient evidence to suggest that terrorists have been exploiting refugee flows, there have been a few occasions in which terrorist entered Greece (and hence, the European Union) as refugees (TE-SAT, 2016; Funk and Parkes,
2016; Lampas, 2018; Counterextremism project, 2019).

Last, hooliganism is another form of radicalisation that is manifested in Greece. It firstly came up in the Greek football from “hooligans who were not on the surface motivated by political beliefs but who often espoused or were motivated by extremist ideas” (Anagnostou & Skleparis, 2015; 2017; Practice, 2018). However, it seems that from the majority of organised fan clubs, only 7-15% of young hooligans are “the most violent, and have already been convicted in the past for aggressive behaviour” (Anagnostou & Skleparis, 2015; 2017).

**Overview of P/CVE policies in Greece**

Greece appears to be lacking momentum in terms of developing a national PCVE Action Plan. In January 2020 the Prime Minister (PM) of Greece announced that in the coming months Greece would develop its National Strategy Against Terrorism and Violent Extremism (EUCPN, 2019). The PM Mitsotakis, had also announced that the Ministry of Citizen Protection will launch a Department of Prevention of Violence and a public campaign to deconstruct violent ideologies. To date Greece does not have a national strategy in place for the prevention and countering of violent extremism.

In the Greek Penal Code there are relevant directives and laws for the punishment of violent acts such as terrorism, organized crime, hate crimes, hate speech, violent extremism and hooliganism, which capture a broad range of radical acts. Laws 2928/2001, 3251/2004, 3691/2008 and 3875/2010, and Articles 187 and 187A of the Greek Penal Code regulate the issues of terrorism and organised crime in Greece and Law 4049/2012 regulates the issue of hooliganism. In 2017, the Greek government amended paragraph 6 of Article 187A of the Greek Criminal Code in conformity with an EU directive on the freezing and confiscation of instrumentalities and proceeds of crime. Article 187B of the Greek Penal Code states that lenience measures are provided for those participating in such organisations if they make it possible to prevent the perpetration of any planned crimes or to disband the organisation or gang. According to Anagnostou and Skleparis (2015), these measures can potentially have a deradicalisation effect for members of such organisations, although this is not explicitly acknowledged by the legislator.

It could be considered that Greece has focused more on the security measures to prevent

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attacks than the prevention of violent radicalisation. For example, during the 2004 Olympic Games, “unprecedented security” measures had to be employed in order to prevent attacks and to obtain information. Greece created the most extensive and expensive security infrastructure in the history of the Olympic Games and the Greek government signed 38 security agreements with 23 countries (Tsoukala, 2006). Hence, the tightening up of the relevant legislation was accompanied by an increase in security spending. In fact, large sums of money were invested in police training, infrastructure (including against nuclear, chemical and biological attacks), surveillance, and the development of intelligence networks (Kollias et al 2009: 791). However, according to Borgeas (2013), with the end of the Olympic Games, we saw Greece reducing its counter-terrorism infrastructure.

With regards to hate crime, the criminal law provisions to counter racism and racial discrimination are included in Law 927/1979 on ‘Combating Race Discrimination’, as it is in effect after its amendments of Law 4285/2014, which was enacted in September 2014. The Bill of law 4356/2015 established the National Council against Racism and Bigotry at the Ministry of Justice. The Council acts as a consultant to the Greek government, conducts reports, collects data on racism and bigotry, conducts the National Action Plan Against Racism, designs and suggests policies against racism and bigotry, etc. The Council targets mainly the rise of right-wing extremism, racism and islamophobia, but other forms of racism as well (e.g., homophobia). In 2011 the Racist Violence Recording Network (RVRN) was established at the initiative of the National Commission for Human Rights and the U.N High Commission for Refugees in Greece (UNHCR). This network, in which NGOs and bodies also participated, amongst other actions, monitors and records racially motivated acts of violence against refugees and migrants in Greece (RVRN, 2011).

As regards radicalisation in schools, there is no specific strategy for the prevention of radicalisation in schools provided for by law. However, there are national policies, such as the prevention of delinquent behaviour of minors (Article 11 v.3860/2010) for preventing youth delinquency, which follows the European Union (EU) guidelines for preventing youth radicalisation (European Commission, 2016; Practice, 2018). Relevant guidelines are described in the report of the European Commission, such as the provision of support from the civil society, updated legislations, the promotion of inclusive education and EU common values, the support of educators and educational institutions, the strengthening of partners countries’ security capacities, etc. (European Commission, 2016; Thessaloniki Youth Protection Society, 2016). In addition, it seems that there are no official critical thinking teaching methods integrated into the Greek
educational curriculum (Practice, 2018).

In addition to the measures taken to confront threats from left and right-wing terrorist acts, in December 2015, the Hellenic parliament enacted emergency legislation that established screening centres for incoming refugees on the outlying Greek islands. In August 2016, the European Union expanded its presence in Greece, deploying approximately 200 counterterrorist and other investigators to reception hotspots in Greece and other countries to strengthen the security checks on the inward flows of migrants in order to identify suspected terrorists and criminals. (Europol, 2016; The Guardian, 2015; Counterextremism project, 2019).

As regards measures to counter hooliganism, prior to the 2004 Athens Olympics, Law 2725/1999 introduced the installation of CCTV systems in football stadiums. Additionally, Law 3057/2002 and Ministerial Decision 62038/2005 established an ‘e-tickets’ system, which enabled the allocation of registered tickets among supporters and their electronic distribution (Anagnostou & Skleparis, 2017:22). Apart from the deployment of anti-riot police before, during and after sports matches, other counter-hooliganism preventive measures, include the case-by-case ban of organised supporters from attending their team’s away games, the police escort of sports teams to and from the match venue, and the employment of private security companies in sports venues.

In the meantime, the Centre for Security Studies (KEMEA), in 2012 established a research team dedicated to the study of radicalisation, terrorism and organized crime and in 2015 started cooperating closely with the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN). KEMEA and the Directorate of State Security of the Ministry of Public Order organized training seminars and workshops with the aim to raise awareness on radicalisation risk assessment tools and to create a pool of trainers. A training tool and manuals were developed for frontline practitioners to prevent the risk of violent extremism and terrorism (Skleparis & Augestad, 2020).

At the same time, NGOs have also tried to fill the gap. A number of projects have contributed to addressing the issue of Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism (PCVE). To name a few:

The Youth Empowerment and Innovation Project (YEIP) was a 3-years Erasmus+ funded

68 KEMEA is a private-law legal entity, established in 2005 and although administratively independent it is supervised by the Minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection. It is a scientific, consulting, and research institution and the official ‘think tank’ of the Ministry on security and anti-crime policy issues. http://www.kemea.gr/en.
project (2017-2020) that aimed to design a youth-led, positive policy prevention framework for tackling and preventing the marginalisation and violent radicalisation among young people in Europe. The findings indicated an increase of marginalisation and violent, mostly political, radicalisation of young people in Greece, after the outbreak of the economic (2008) and refugee (2015) crisis. The findings also mentioned that the existing legislation and policies at the time were limited, as were the programmes based on the Good Lives Model (GLM), positive psychology and restorative justice. Data from the focus groups revealed that restorative justice models like the GLM could enable individuals to work towards the development of an identity, the need and search for which is considered the core factor leading to radicalisation (https://yeip.org/about-the-project/). https://www.kmop.gr/projects-vf/yeip/

**Preventing Radicalism through Critical Thinking Competences** (PRACTICE) is an ongoing Erasmus+ funded project (09/2018-08/2021) which aims at preventing radicalisation in schools by empowering the teachers through continuing professional development by using participatory methods. ([https://www.kmop.gr/projects-vf/practice/](https://www.kmop.gr/projects-vf/practice/)).

The COMMIT project, funded by ISFP, is another initiative aiming at preventing and dissuading vulnerable young people from extremism, violent radicalisation and terrorism, by providing them with the necessary skills to co-develop alternative narratives that promote democratic values, tolerance and cooperation. At the same time, the project aims to equip the youth in order to identify and address fake news, hate speech, propaganda, and terrorist content online. COMMunIcation campaign against exTremism and radicalisation was launched in January 2020 and will end in December 2021. ([https://www.kmop.gr/projects-vf/commit/](https://www.kmop.gr/projects-vf/commit/))

**DARE-Dialogue about radicalisation and Equality**, is a Horizon 2020-funded research project that focuses on people aged 12 to 30 and approaches them as social actors rather than victims or perpetrators. DARE’s goal is to advance the understanding of the causes and dynamics of the radicalisation process, demonstrate that it is not located in any one religion or community and explore the effects of radicalization on society. The project runs from May 2017 till April 2021 and is executed by 15 partners in 13 countries: Belgium, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, the Russian Federation, Tunisia, Turkey and the UK. (http://www.dare-h2020.org/)

PRACTICIES (Partnership Against Violent Radicalisation in Cities) is a network that engages with scientists’ practitioners, local and national policy makers and other stakeholders, and which conceptualises radicalisation and violent extremism as an urban security issue. Part of the programme is to evaluate current practices in order to identify best practices. The PRACTICIES project, which ran from May 2017 until April 2020, was executed by a consortium of 25 partners from the following countries: Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia (EUCPN, 2019). Under this project, a conference was organised in Athens on the Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism – Local Strategies and Initiatives on 28-29 March 2019 in Athens, Greece with the cooperation of KEMEA. The Conference ended up with The Declaration of Athens which aspires to establish a general core principle of a strategy for local prevention policies against radicalization and violent extremism. It is the first political document and strategic initiative framing the role of local authorities in the prevention of Radicalization and Extremism in Greece.

Fieldwork

Alongside the projects implemented on PCVE, there are some initiatives at a local level (by NGOs, schools and/or municipalities) which aim to tackle hate speech, discrimination, and racism and to promote positive behaviours at schools, alternative means of conflict resolution (e.g., through constructive dialogue), critical thinking and to empower the youth.

In this respect, KMOP carried out a series of interviews and round table discussions with key stakeholders, experts and practitioners to discuss the current policies at the subregional, regional and/or municipal level and to collect their views on the challenges (the questionnaire is available in Annex). In total, the fieldwork consisted of three round table discussions (eight people in total, including three municipality members, one teacher and three social workers) and four interviews (one social worker, one professor from a Greek University, one practitioner at a local level and one lawyer on human rights) all from the Central Macedonia region. The interviews were meant to i) explore whether there are any PCVE policies or programs at a municipal level and at schools, ii) gather more information on what is being done and iii) what are the challenges encountered.

Of the 12 people interviewed, none was aware of a programme and/or policy directly aimed at CPVE, in fact, the general knowledge about the phenomenon of violent extremism and radicalization is also limited. At the same time, some interviewees expressed the opinion that even though this phenomenon might not entirely concern Greece at the moment, one cannot exclude
the possibility that it might seriously affect the country in the coming years. Some did mention the rise in far-right extremism since 2010 as an example and the violent attacks carried out by members of Golden Dawn, targeting in particular, vulnerable groups and amongst others the Romani population. Thus, it was stressed by the majority that even if Greece is lagging behind in developing its own PCVE programme/policies etc, it would be important to focus on preventive measures as soon as possible.

Some of the interviewees who are working with children (under the age of 15), stressed that there are some behaviours in the school environment that are considered to be “problematic”. E.g., there have been instances in which some children at the age of 6-8 years old were considered to be dismissive towards social workers or were expressing racist comments towards their classmates. As explained, these behaviours ought to be attributed to the parents themselves and to - a perhaps - unstable family situation. Even though the children did not act violently, one participant considered that these behaviours could be named as “early signs of radicalisation”. The parents’ influence was highlighted by a number of participants, as it was often considered that it was the parents themselves who had instilled those beliefs to their children. For e.g., some reported that there were occasions in which parents did not allow their children to attend school because of the presence of migrants, others because the children were obliged to wear masks. On the other hand, the interviewees also highlighted the benefits and positive change one could see at one’s behaviour when there was a good cooperation between the school and family – which was not the case in the extreme situations.

Some interviewees highlighted the challenges faced at a local level with the recent influx of migrants and the creation of refugee camps. As reported, some tensions were created with the local population with a number of people objecting to the creation of camps. In order to address this issue, the local communities invited the population in informative sessions, included them in discussions around the topic and offered tours in the camps. The interviewees reported that as a result, the far-right supporters were eventually left on the side whilst people who were previously objecting and considered to be conservative, no longer created problems.

A lot of ideas came up on how to better prevent and counter violent extremism, including the necessity for journalists and people working in the media to be better trained, for them to identify more easily hate speech material but also to explore ways to counter these messages. Continuing on hate speech, one participant called for better coordination – at a national level – on actions aimed to tackle this phenomenon. Education is key. Some consider it important to introduce
curricula in schools in order to educate teachers, parents, and children on what this phenomenon is, as it appears that it is practically – almost – an unknown field in Greece’s population. Similarly, in particular due to the recent arrival of migrants, it would be helpful to introduce more programmes, policies, and projects that aim at enhancing the people’s acceptance of different cultures, views, political beliefs and to be more open towards diversity. The importance of introducing curricula on i) critical thinking, ii) ways to promote positive behaviour, iii) human rights and iv) sexual education was also highlighted. Nonetheless, some interviewees stressed that there is a need for a coherent approach amongst projects in order to avoid a “fatigue” caused by the introduction of too many projects and last, for the projects to target areas which are the most affected.

Most importantly, the majority of the people interviewed expressed the opinion that the prevention and countering of violent extremism can be better addressed at a local rather than at a national level. In fact, it was highlighted that “in our societies we will always have to deal with far right or far left extremists, however, when the people are strong enough, the extremes do not find any space to expand and are inevitably left aside.”
1. Violent Extremism in Portugal: An Historical Overview

Two events have led the Portuguese authorities to step up efforts in order to cope with the terrorist threat: 9/11 and, especially, the March 2004 attacks in Madrid. Terrorism and extremism is not a new phenomenon to Portugal. Following the institution of the democratic regime, in the wake of the April 1974 Revolution, the far-left wing armed organisation Popular Forces of the 25th of April (Forças Populares do 25 Abril–FP25), carried out several attacks between 1980 and 1986, killing at least 13 people.

Since 2001, Portuguese authorities have detected numerous connections between individuals residing in Portugal and radical Islamic operatives within the ideological network of al-Qaeda, as well as logistical and support activities for terrorism, namely of a criminal nature. Nonetheless, Portugal has not become a priority target for international Islamic terrorism. Jihadist terrorism has not manifested itself in Portugal, although there is evidence of foiled plots and assessments that its territory is a ‘grey area’ where jihadist networks do organise activities.

The present Muslim community in Portugal is small when compared to other European countries and has a recent origin. Although it is not possible to know the exact number of Muslims in Portugal – as it is not mandatory to declare one's religious affiliation –, some sources suggest a figure between 45 and 50 thousand people. That figure accounts for around 0.35% of the total Portuguese population. Muslims now represent the largest religious minority in the country. Between 50% and 70% of Muslims living in Portugal are Portuguese citizens (Costa, 2006).

The contemporary Muslim presence in Portugal is essentially a post-colonial phenomenon and a consequence of immigration. Before the 1974 revolution, there was only a small community of a few dozen people who came from Mozambique and were of Indian origin. They belonged to a cultured middle class and came to the metropolis in order to continue their studies at university. They were mainly well-educated people, working in the services sector, or business. When they arrived in Portugal, many of them were successful in re-establishing themselves in the same professions.

Since they came from a Portuguese-speaking country, they were familiar with Portuguese culture and, consequently, they did not experience the constraints or tensions that would later
afflict other European Muslim minorities. After the Revolution of 1974 and during the
decolonisation process, many inhabitants from the former colonies came to Portugal. During the
1980s and 1990s, the flow of Muslim immigrants from Guinea-Bissau continued to grow.
Presently, they represent the largest national group within the Muslim community. These more
recent waves are economically and socially different from the previous ones, consisting mainly of
young men looking for a job in the lowest sectors of the economy.

After joining the European Community and signing the Schengen Treaty, Portugal started to
raise some interest among a new group of individuals coming mainly from Arab countries and the
Indian subcontinent. The main group arrived from Morocco, followed by Tunisians and Algerians.
Pakistanis and Bangladeshis comprised the main group from the Indian subcontinent. A smaller
group came from sub-Saharan Africa and consisted mainly of people from Senegal. At that time,
the Portuguese government had carried out a legalisation campaign and it became easier to obtain
a visa: between 1992 and 1997, an influx of new Muslim immigrants, permitted by the
extraordinary legalisation of illegal immigrants, contributed to a significant increase in the number
of Muslims in Portugal. Consequently, many individuals from Muslim countries who were in an
illegal situation in other European countries came to Portugal in order to apply for a visa and obtain
legal status in Europe. Moreover, the proximity to North Africa redirected many migratory flows
to Portugal. This combination of events contributed to the growth and diversification of the Islamic
community in Portugal.

The Muslim immigrants that have arrived in Portugal since the 1980s have to cope with
greater obstacles to their social and professional integration and even to obtaining legal status
because they do not speak Portuguese and do not have any kind of ties with the host country. Their
arrival can be understood in the framework of new migratory patterns in a globalized world and
of Portugal’s belonging to the European Union. Some of them live in poverty, and they work
mainly as traders, street sellers and in the construction sector. These migratory flows consist
generally of young men, who often live in male groups and share a rented house.

The arrival of these new groups is creating the current diversification of the Islamic presence
in Portugal in terms of nationality, ethnicity, socioeconomic conditions and culture. This presence
has thus acquired a multinational and multicultural character at the crossroads of several currents
and religious tendencies. This is reflected in the variety of religious practices within the Muslim
community and in the emergence of new mosques and prayer halls all over the country. Although
Muslims used to be mainly concentrated in Lisbon and its outskirts, in the past 15 years the Muslim
Barriers arising from cultural and linguistic factors may create major difficulties for the integration of immigrants. The trajectory of the Portuguese Islamic community does not find parallels in other European countries, hence the difficulty in drawing comparisons. Portugal certainly has a percentage of Muslims similar to a few countries in northern and eastern Europe, which do not reach 1%. Most EU countries display higher percentages.

That is also the case for Portugal, where there is still a small but growing Muslim population, mainly guest workers attracted by Portugal’s prosperity in the 1980s. It is true that the current diversification and growth of this religious group enables many individuals, recently arrived in Portugal, to remain outside the scope of the mainstream community structures.\textsuperscript{71}

The risk factors mostly associated with the new immigrants (like the spread of radical Islamism, diaspora networks for logistic operations, language barriers and assimilation problems) could be linked to the changes to the country’s Muslim community brought about by the migrant influxes of the last couple of decades. These changes may undercut the leverage of Portugal’s traditional Muslim community and decisively change the predominant character of its religious identity. This well-established and integrated community, with Lusophone roots and closely intertwined with Portuguese elites, could, in time, lose its leadership role. Contrary to the original Muslim nucleus, with a solid Portuguese cultural identity, the newly-arrived Muslims, raise socio-political concerns on their integration, since many are socially disenfranchised. This new Muslim diaspora could outweigh, or at least bypass, the traditional Portuguese Muslim community by creating autonomous cultural-religious clusters. In fact, episodes of possible Jihadist activities in Portugal seem to confirm the need, security-wise, to focus more attentively on this new Muslim presence.

In the mid-2000s, the Ministry of Home Affairs, acknowledged the presence in Portugal of individuals linked to the jihadist galaxy who are engaged in indoctrinating and recruiting Portuguese Muslims, a situation which creates risks of exclusion and radicalisation of Muslim citizens, especially for the newly arrived immigrants. The terrorist activities or, more precisely, logistical and other support activities which take place in Portugal, are not a source of direct threat insofar as they are not related to terrorist attacks, but are rather linked to support activities. In point

\textsuperscript{71}The country’s mosques are supposed to be under the supervision of the Lisbon Muslim Community (CIL), a Sunni umbrella organization and original Portuguese Muslim community.
of fact, networks of logistical support and funding have been detected and disrupted, but so far no conditions have been found, as in other countries, that facilitate the formation of radical groups. Nor has there been any sustained evidence of terrorists planning activities on Portuguese soil. However, there are indications that point to the passing of extremists through the country and to the fact that it has been used by Islamic extremists for logistic purposes, namely falsification of documents, fundraising, as a place of rest and hiding and, possibly, indoctrination. A detailed analysis of the activities of suspected jihadists reveals that their main activities are the support of illegal immigration, trafficking in narcotics, extortion and theft of documents, credit cards and mobile phones.

Following the outbreak of the war in Syria, a group of around 20 Portuguese citizens and Portuguese-descendants, went to fight alongside the Islamic State/Daesh organisation and other extremist groups in Syria and Iraq. There are a few features that tie together the Portuguese who enlisted in the jihadist ranks. The most remarkable feature of the Portuguese case study is that almost all individuals were recent converts to Islam. They came from European metropolitan and suburban areas, and had no previous record of involvement with extremism, and no significant records of criminal or other markedly anti-social behaviour. Most of them had family roots in former Portuguese African colonies, including Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and Angola. The so-called Leyton or London group, was composed of five men who emigrated to east London on different dates, starting from the early 2000s. They are descendants of families of immigrants that settled in the region of Greater Lisbon. They moved to London where they converted to Islam (Pinto 2015 and Franco and Moleiro, 2015). The second group lived in other European countries (France, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands), for longer than they lived in Portugal, and many also held dual nationalities.

At least since 2014, the authorities have been on the lookout for right-wing extremist groups, given the experience they have observed in other European countries, with the migration phenomenon and the refugee crisis serving as a pretext for the radicalisation of the discourse. It was only in 2017 that a greater boost of these organisations in Portugal was noticed. There was a fusion of the old extreme right’s ultra-nationalism with the neo-Nazi racism of the skinhead subculture. The short-lived nationalist organisation Movimento de Acção Nacional/National Action Movement, uniting nationalist militants and skinheads, was dismantled, but it was replaced by the Portugal Hammer Skins (PHS). Blood & Honour, and the newly created neo-Nazi movement, New Social Order, are also active both nationally and internationally (RASI 2019 and
There was a reinforcement of online propaganda and a multiplication of initiatives with some visibility. The Portuguese extreme right has given priority to the fight against what it calls cultural Marxism, in an attempt to sensitis civil society to its extremist discourse and ideology, but continues to get closer to the main European trends, in the fight for the reconquest of Europe by Europeans. In addition to intensifying international contacts, these extremists have developed an effort of convergence of their different sectors (identitarian, national socialist and skinheads). Violence is a defining feature of far-right militancy, with some incidents recorded, including assaults on anti-fascist militants. In addition, they note, within the neo-Nazi skinhead movement, some militants continued to engage in extra-militant criminal activities (RASI 2019).

2. P/CVE policies in Portugal: the state of the art

The Legal and Institutional Framework

In the aftermath of 9/11, Portugal adopted a twofold complementary strategy, on one hand, strengthening preventive measures and combating crime; on the other hand, reorganising and reforming the internal security structures and the intelligence services. Portugal developed common strategies in line with those approved by the European Union (EU), namely the transposition of decisions and other EU legal instruments into Portuguese domestic law, bolstered the investigative material and human resources and the creation of coordination structures to respond to terrorist threats.

Law 52/2003 (Law on Combating Terrorism) transposed into the Portuguese legal system EC Framework Decision 2002/475/JHA and revoked the previous legislation on terrorism. In effect, the offences of terrorism, terrorism financing and terrorism organisation are criminalized in Portugal since 1982. This law – that revoked article 300 (about terrorist organisations) and article 301 (about terrorism) of the Penal Code – provides for the punishment of terrorist acts, terrorist groups and terrorist organisations, and defines the offences of a terrorist organisation (article 2), terrorism (article 4) and international terrorism, terrorist group or organisation (article 5). On 19 February 2015, the Council of Ministers approved the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy (ENCT – Estratégia Nacional de Combate ao Terrorismo), with a view to the ‘mobilisation, coordination and cooperation of all national structures with direct and indirect responsibility in the field of combating the terrorist threat and a realisation, at national level, of the imperatives of the internal, European and international nature of the fight against terrorism’.
The National Strategy to Combat Terrorism was approved 10 years behind the EU Strategy. It was adopted by Portugal following the Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks and the disclosing of information related to the involvement of Portuguese jihadists in Daesh. The Strategy added a fifth pillar - Detect - to the four pillars outlined in the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The five pillars are: Detect, Prevent, Persecute and Reply.

In order to bring the applicable legislation into line with the Strategy, between 22 and 24 June 2015, the Council of Ministers also approved eight bills:

- Organic Law No. 8/2015, of June 22, amended its Nationality Act. Under the amended law, the Public Prosecutor may oppose to a nationality acquisition by marriage or other family relations, if the person who wants to acquire Portuguese nationality represents a threat to the national security or is involved in terrorist activities. The same applies to acquisition of citizenship via naturalisation where, until now, one could not acquire Portuguese citizenship if the person was convicted for having especially serious criminal offence;
- Law 55/2015 of 23 June makes the fifth amendment to Law 5/2002 of 11 January, establishing measures to cover all criminal offenses related to terrorism. It establishes measures to combat organized crime and economic and financial crime, establishing a special legal regime for ‘collection of evidence, breach of professional secrecy and confiscation of property for the benefit of the State’. Article 1, no. 1, paragraph b), read as follows: ‘Terrorism, terrorist organisations, international terrorism and financing of terrorism.’
- Law 56/2015 of 23 June (second amendment to Law 23/2007 of 4 July), approves the legal framework on foreign citizens entering, remaining in and leaving Portugal as well as their removal from Portuguese territory;
- Law 57/2015 of 23 June approves The Law of Organisation of Criminal Investigation, establishes criminal investigation powers to the Criminal Investigation Police (Polícia Judiciária). It envisages, among other crimes, the crimes of terrorism and related ones;
- Law 58/2015 of 23 June is an amendment to the Code of Criminal Procedure, updating the definition of terrorism. This amendment defines ‘terrorism’ as being, according to art. 1, al. f) ‘the conducts that integrate the crimes of terrorist organisations, terrorism, international terrorism and financing of terrorism’;
- Law 59/2015 of 24 June amends Law 53/2008 of 29 August, which approved the Internal Security Law. The Act alters the composition of the High Council of Internal Security and defines and regulates in greater detail that the functioning of the Anti-Terrorist Coordination
Unit (Unidade de Coordenação Antiterrorismo - UCA), created in 2003;

• The amendments to Law 60/2015 reflect an effort to adapt the new law to the current world situation. In light of this, the Terrorism Law is broadened to cover actions carried out through electronic communication. The law also creates a new crime of travelling to commit acts of terrorism.

• Law 61/2015 of 24 June, which makes the second amendment to Law 101/2001 of 25 August, which establishes the legal framework for covert actions to prevent and investigate crime. Article 2, al. f) was thus amended and now provides for undercover actions in the scope of prevention and repression of ‘terrorist organisations, terrorism, international terrorism and financing of terrorism’.

• Law 62/2015 broadens the scope of application of the Law to combat laundering of the proceeds of unlawful acts and financing of terrorism.

The intelligence organization

The 9/11 terrorist attacks produced an unprecedented reflection about the legal framework, the organisation of security and intelligence services and the relationship between law enforcement and intelligence agencies. That movement generated a reformist wave which, in turn, engendered new ideas about how to upgrade executive and coordination structures. In Portugal, the creation of the UCA and the reforms introduced in the internal security structures were also the result of a wake-up call in relation to the new security problems.

This re-evaluation included reshaping the intelligence system, including the role of intelligence agencies, police and security forces and the criminal investigation system.

The Integrated Internal Security System (SISI), created in 2005 is the core. It is coordinated by a secretary-general and composed of the institutions that represent the essential security activity in situations of normal democratic life, ensuring prevention, public order and criminal investigation: the National Republican Guard (GNR), the Public Security Police (PSP), the Criminal Investigation Police/PJ and the Aliens and Border Service (Serviço de Estrangeiros e Fronteiras - SEF). The implementation of the SISI brought closer and ‘integrated’ the two national security systems - the Internal Security System and the Portuguese Republic Intelligence System. To be more explicit, SISI is formed by two subsystems: SSI (Sistema de Segurança Internal System of Internal Security) and SIRP (Sistema de Informações da República Portuguesa/ Portuguese Republic Intelligence System). The System of Internal Security coordinates the
security forces and services: SEF, PJ, PSP, and GNR, with the exception of the intelligence agencies. It is led by a Secretary-General, with Secretary of State status, who is responsible for the strategic and operational coordination of the services and its operations, and comes under the direct tutelage of the prime minister.

The second branch, covering the intelligence apparatus, the SIRP, has jurisdiction over the two intelligence agencies: the Security Intelligence Service (SIS) and the Strategic Defence Intelligence Service (SIED). Portugal has no intelligence service dedicated solely to terrorism and organized crime. SIS (internal threat) and SIED (external threat). These intelligence services have a general responsibility for analysis and production of information on various criminality, including terrorism and organized crime, including terrorism.

It also brought together, under the UCA umbrella, the SIS and SIED. Under this strategy, the anti-terrorism coordination unit, will have increased powers and is responsible for the coordination and the actions arising from the continued plans. Law 59/2015 clarifies that UCA operates in the context of the ‘internal security system and that it is responsible for coordinating plans to execute the actions provided for in the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (NSCT). UCA is also responsible for communication and coordination between the contact points for the various areas of intervention in matters of terrorism.

In Portugal there is no radicalisation prevention program. Under the Prevent rubric, the NSCT recommended the elaboration and adoption of the Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation and Violent Extremism and Recruitment to Terrorism (APPRVERT). The matter of violent extremism was not included in the NSCT, having been included only when the plan was approved in 2017, but it is classified. The Plan should be aimed at monitoring of conditions conducive to individuals joining to engaging in terrorist activities. It should conceive ‘exit strategies’ materialized to support individuals who wish to leave violent extremism, through an interdisciplinary approach, underpinned by cross-sectoral collaboration between all relevant authorities. It should also devise ‘inclusion strategies’ by stimulating a sense of belonging, which reduce and/or prevent radical ideals, the emergence of the so-called ‘lone wolves’, involving civil society civil society in the fight against radicalisation.

The judicial organization

From a criminal law perspective, Portugal gives prevalence to the judicial institutions in the combat against terrorism. According to the existing judicial organisation and given the role of the
Ministério Público (Public Prosecuting Office), terrorism investigations are centralized in the Central Department of Criminal Investigation and Penal Action. This centralisation and specialisation logic is also applied by the police. The Judiciary Police and its Central Department for the Banditry Combat (DCCB), have the exclusive competence to investigate terrorism crimes and connected crimes – Decree Law 275 A/2000 – Judiciary Police’s Organisation Law – Law 21/2000.

As can be elicited from this section, the Portuguese prevention policies currently in force have their roots in a strictly security and countering threat approach, specifically that represented by Islamist-inspired terrorism. Portugal deals with terrorism primarily from a criminal perspective and mainly through its judicial institutions.

3. Case Study: Lisbon

Description of the method, sample and data collection tools

This research aimed to investigate the P/CVE policies on that are being developed at the local level in the city of Lisbon and how they are integrated in a broader framework. We also wanted to investigate what types of policies and which ones are being implemented in schools and among youth. From the state of the art research we found out that there is not much information available about P/CVE. The chosen method was the case study, which emerged as the most appropriate method to obtain empirical data on perceptions and practices regarding P/CVE policies from a range of key public and private actors.

The information was collected through the application of questionnaires, complemented with semi-structured interviews. The information has thus a cognitive and affective nature, insofar as the interviewees draw on their knowledge and perceptions to answer the questions. The data collected as part of the research was subsequently compared with the theoretical component. However, this approach aimed to take a snapshot of the reality of P/CVE through the eyes and perceptions of the interviewees.

For the purpose of this case study, the city of Lisbon was selected for being the capital and the most populous of the country, where the largest number of foreign citizens also reside. Within its administrative boundaries, Lisbon has close to one hundred thousand foreign inhabitants, with
the most representative third-country nationalities being from Brazil, China, Nepal, Bangladesh, India, Angola and Cape Verde. The communities from Portuguese-speaking countries, particularly Brazil, Angola and Cape Verde, are, as a whole, the most expressive. Among the residents with European nationality, the French, Italian, Spanish, German, British and Dutch communities stand out. Regarding the nationalities of the Muslim communities living in Lisbon, the official numbers reinforce what was mentioned above. The communities from the former Portuguese colonies, Guinea-Bissau and Mozambique, have a number of residents lower than other Muslim communities that arrived more recently, of which the Bangladeshi community is an example. It should be noted that this official data only accounts for foreign residents in a regular situation, so it is estimated that the number of foreign population and nationalities indicated may actually be different.

The selection of the interviewees in this case study took into account the administrative organization of Local Government in Portugal. This level of State power is composed of local authorities, which are subdivided into municipalities (whose bodies are the Municipal Council and the Municipal Assembly) and parishes (whose bodies are the Parish Council and the Parish Assembly). The municipalities and the parishes have sources of funding from the state budget, municipal taxes and municipal charges. They can also develop programmes and actions with other sources of financing, such as EU funds and funds from private partnerships. Lisbon presently has 24 parishes, with their own competencies and financial resources. Thus, in the scope of this research, a representative of the Parish Council of Santa Maria Maior, a historical neighbourhood of the city of Lisbon (which includes the ‘Mouraria’) was selected. They were also selected from the representatives of the Lisbon City Council (Social Rights Division and Division for Cohesion and Youth).

The remaining interviewees were selected, according to previously identified categories, privileging experience, as well as possible knowledge of P/CVE policies and their field work with vulnerable groups, in particular migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. According to the literature, these groups are particularly vulnerable to radicalization. Nevertheless, given the growth in Portugal of social polarization and hate speech against minorities, the dimensions of intercultural and inter-religious dialogue were also employed for the selection of interviewees.

**Sample and data collection tools**

The research sample used consists of twenty-one (21) semi-structured interviews, conducted
based on a script applied through digital platforms, except for one interview, with the High Commission for Migrations (ACM), whose responses came in writing, via email. This interview has inputs from two ACM services, the Office of Support to Local Policies for the Integration of Migrants (GALPIM) and the Commission for Equality and Racial Discrimination (CICDR). With regard to gender, there were 12 female respondents (57%) and 8 male respondents (38.1%). The respondents from the ACM (GALPIM and CICDR) did not indicate their gender.

The data of this research was collected during the period between March and April 2021, in the city of Lisbon, having as starting point an online questionnaire complemented by semi-structured interview carried out based on a script prepared within the scope of the Participation Project. The questionnaire and script followed the same structure, being composed of two sections, namely Section I, concerning P/CEV policies at the local level, and Section II, concerning P/CEV in schools and among youth. The questions were grouped in eight sections covering the dimensions ‘what, who and how’, including education and youth, as mentioned above. (See Appendix 1).

In order to adjust the questionnaire to the Portuguese context and reality, some parts of it were modified. Thus, besides the five sample categories initially suggested for the municipal case study, namely: 1) social workers, 2) professionals, 3) community leaders, 4) NGO representatives and 5) institutional representatives; two additional categories were added: 6) schools and 7) members of security forces and the criminal police.

The option to introduce security forces is based on studies on P/CEV that argue the relevancy of the role of Security Forces in guiding community and proximity policing for the prevention of radicalization, of which the ‘Safe School’ programme is an example, as well as in gathering and processing information, coordinating multidisciplinary efforts at local level, training, and detecting early signs of radicalization (Silva, 2018). The inclusion of schools in a new category is justified by the fact that one of the objectives defined in this study aims to understand and signal P/CEV policies and practices in schools and among youth. The involvement of interviewees working in schools in the city of Lisbon was deemed of particular interest.

In addition, the dimension of interculturality and inter-religious dialogue proved to be important in the national context, in which particular relevance has been given to these issues within the framework of migration.

The twenty-one interviews carried out correspond to the seven categories mentioned above, covering the following entities: four institutional representatives (Lisbon City Council, Santa
Maria Maior Parish Council and ACM); two social workers (socio-cultural mediator of the telephone line of the Aliens and Borders Service and social service technician of a refugee reception project of a CML NGO partner); three community leaders (Associação Girassol Solidário, Associação, A Casa Árabe Portuguesa Association and Lisbon´s Central Mosque); two NGO representatives (Crescer and the Portuguese Council for Refugees - CPR); five professionals (a technician from the Counter@Act project of the Portuguese Association for Victim Support - APAV, a technician from the Residências Refúgio project, a technician from the City of Lisbon Foundation, the coordinator and technician from the Rethink and the CEAR projects of the Lusófona University), two schools (Director of the Patrício Prazeres School Grouping and the Student Reception Support Office of the Fernando Pessoa School) and three members of the security forces and criminal police bodies (Coordinator of the Safe School Programme, Commissioner of the Public Security Police and Inspector of the Judiciary Police).

The interviewees include a religious leader (the Imam of the Central Mosque), who was included in the community leaders category and two academics who work in ECLP projects in close contact with religious communities in the city of Lisbon, particularly with the Islamic community (Project Rethink and CEAR), who were included in the professionals category.

It should be highlighted that the majority of interviewees (62%) work directly with vulnerable groups, migrants, refugees, children or young people, many of whom come from disadvantaged backgrounds.

With regard to the sector of activity, ten of the interviewees identified themselves as working in the public sector (47.6%), ten in the private sector (48%), and one in another sector, the Central Mosque of Lisbon (5%). Amongst the private sector institutions, one has the status of a Foundation and all of the remaining are non-profit NGOs.

Some of the interviewees opted not to reveal their name within the scope of this text, whereby mention shall be made of the entity/organization of the interviewees or the category of the sample.

The data from this research was collected during the period between March and April 2021 in the city of Lisbon and the main results may be summarized in the following points.

Absence of a specific P/CVE policy

This study clearly showed that there is no specific policy in the city of Lisbon specifically
designed for P/CVE. The overwhelming majority of interviewees (90%) stated that they were unaware of the existence of a municipal policy in this area. The four institutional representatives, namely the High Commission for Migrations, through CICDR and GALPIM, the Lisbon City Council, and the Parish Council of Santa Maria Maior, confirmed the lack of a P/CVE policy.

The ACM, a public institute under the authority of the Secretary of State for Integration and Migrations, which intervenes in the implementation of public policies on migration, stated that the CVMP 'is not an area in which the ACM intervenes directly, so we do not promote actions in this field'. The two ACM offices that provided contributions to this study, namely the CICDR and the GALPIM, replied in the same vein.

The Commission for Equality and Racial Discrimination (CICDR) emphasized that 'violent extremism' has a clear criminal and internal security bias. It recalled the existing legislation on this matter: the ENCT, noting that it 'does not have the involvement of the ACM, nor is it directed, at least directly, to the Municipality of Lisbon.' The officer reinforced the criminal and internal security nature adding that, 'in 2017 an Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalisation, Violent Extremism and Recruitment to Terrorism (PAPREVRT) was also approved, which now includes 'violent extremism', which was not in the ENCT. This plan is the competence of the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCAT), chaired by the Secretary General of the Internal Security System (SSI) and composed of the GNR (National Republican Guard), PJ (Judiciary Police), Maritime Police, Public Security Police (PSP), Foreigners and Borders Service (SEF), SIS and Defence Strategic Intelligence Service (SIED)'. It should be noted, however, that this Action Plan is classified and not public knowledge, as mentioned above.

On the other hand, the Support Office for Local Policies for the Integration of Migrants (GALPIM), stressed: 'There are no specific programmes to prevent and combat violent extremism at the municipal level; however, within the scope of the Municipal Plans for the Integration of Migrants there are measures to combat and prevent racism and promote interculturality, which could contribute to preventing violent extremism, even if they do not mention it'.

Since 2014, Municipal Plans for the Integration of Migrants have been elaborated and implemented by several Portuguese municipalities, under the impetus of the ACM, as a fundamental strategy for a more adequate management of migration flows and contribution to local development. The ACM initiative is inspired by the Common Agenda for the Integration of Third-Country Nationals (COM (2011) 455 final), which recommends that member states promote
more integration policies at local level, improve cooperation between different levels of governance (national, regional and local) and foster the monitoring of services and policies developed at these different levels, signalling good practices. Municipal plans are thus documents that incorporate the concerted action strategies of the different entities working in the area of migration, at the local level, and which contribute to the implementation of the multivectoral process of integration of immigrants into Portuguese society. GALPIM is the Office dedicated to supporting Local Policies for the Integration of Migrants, which accompanies the Municipal Plans for the Integration of Migrants (PMIM). The Municipality of Lisbon is one of the municipalities that has its own Municipal Plan for Immigrant Integration. The third plan has been concluded and is in the approval phase.

The two representatives of the Lisbon City Council share the ACM’s view regarding the contribution of the Municipal Plans for Immigrant Integration to the P/CVE, even if they do so indirectly. A representative of CML (Gabinete dos Direitos Sociais) acknowledged that there is no specific policy on P/CVE in the municipality, but ‘a vision of integration and insertion of migrants and refugees in the city of Lisbon’. Another CML representative (Division for Cohesion and Youth) cited, besides the Municipal Plan for the Integration of Immigrants in the City of Lisbon (PMIIL), other municipal plans that also contribute, albeit indirectly, to the P/CVE, namely the LGBTI Plan, Municipal Plan for Equality and Municipal Plan to combat violence against women.

According to both CML representatives, the PMIIL is elaborated in a very participatory way and implemented in articulation with an extensive network of partners and stakeholders, (NGOs, migrant associations, civil society). However, according to the interviews with CML and JFSMM representatives, the articulation between the municipality and the parish councils is adjusted to each territory and each parish.

The representative of the Santa Maria Maior Parish Council (JFSMM) also confirmed the inexistence of a specific municipal policy on PCEV. But he highlighted the close intervention work, ‘door-to-door support’ in this area, which is a historic neighbourhood of the city, with small old houses, narrow and leaning against each other. This outreach intervention may contribute, even if indirectly, to the P/CVE, by fostering the creation of bonds of trust and friendship between the migrant communities and the technicians of the parish council and a network of partner entities.

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A shared vision of insertion and growing awareness of P/CVE policies

From the interviews it emerged a consensual view shared by the interviewees that the P/CVE is achieved mainly through policies of integration and insertion, equal opportunities and promotion of interculturality, these policies being the heart of the P/CVE. Within the scope of insertion policies (not specifically CVMP policies), we can consider that there are integrated policies at vertical level (at other levels of governance) and also at horizontal level (involvement of different stakeholders). As an institutional representative from CML mentioned 'Nothing is mutually exclusive, national and local actions should be concerted and address the main reason which is social inequality.' On the other hand, the interviews also revealed a growing awareness of the importance of this issue and the need to address it in a more strategic, collaborative and integrated way. When asked if they considered violent extremism as a relevant issue that should be addressed at a local level, three quarters of the respondents (75.2%) said yes (46.6% totally and 28.6% very much so), almost a quarter said reasonably (19%) and only one said nothing (4.8%). However, when asked whether they consider that violent extremism is a relevant issue that should be addressed at a local level in schools and among young people, the respondents are almost unanimous (95.3%) in saying it is. In fact, some interviewees recognised as worrying the signs of growth in polarisation and hate, racist and xenophobic discourse that has been increasing in Portuguese society and in the city of Lisbon, particularly in recent years. In this context, the institutional representative of CML, community leaders, several professionals, security forces and criminal police bodies highlighted this dimension. The interviewee from the Policia Judiciária (Judiciary Police) stated that 'There is a lot of discrimination associated with a populist discourse that can degenerate into violent risk' and that 'there is a lack of a government communication strategy with alternative narratives that help increase resilience and integration and decrease discrimination, aiming at mitigation and anticipation'.

Several interviewees illustrated with examples the importance of integration and insertion policies, including the importance of promoting intercultural festivals in the city of Lisbon (Mesquita Central de Lisboa), refugee reception and integration programmes (CPR, Crescer),
social policies for the most vulnerable, e.g. homeless people, people with addictions (Lisbon City Council). The institutional representative of the Junta de Freguesia highlighted that during the pandemic period, many people from the Bangladeshi community, living in 'Rua do Benformoso' (a place in the city, where there is more than one mosque) were sick, quarantined, in small and overcrowded houses. 'The community opened up and asked for help'. The door-to-door support from the parish council (with food, medicines and healthcare) was very important, not only for social, economic and health reasons, but above all for the strengthening of ties with this community. According to the interviewee from JFSMM, this was perhaps one of the only less bad aspects of the pandemic. However, there is the other side of the coin. With the pandemic, the JFSMM began to accompany four times more families from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, which also demonstrates the social vulnerability of these people in times of health crisis. She has the perception that there are many more women who already work and with children attending childcare centres of a partner NGO (Associação Renovar a Mouraria). 'The Chinese community is more closed and has not opened up, even with the Covid19 crisis'. He recognizes, however, that this door-to-door intervention is possible in the territory of Santa Maria Maior, but not in all the Lisbon parish councils (for example, in the territories with social neighbourhoods). Here other intervention strategies may be necessary.

When asked if they consider that the dimension of social cohesion/inclusion is taken into account in the municipal strategy for the Lisbon Borough Council, most of the respondents (61.9%) answered in the affirmative. But it results from the questionnaires that 52.4% believe that social cohesion is taken into account indirectly. Only 33.3% of the respondents consider that social cohesion is taken into account directly.

Diversity of programmes and approaches

One of the most emblematic results of this study was the mosaic of quite diversified activities and programmes mentioned by the interviewees. In this context, more than half (52%) of the interviewees are unaware of programmes specifically aimed at PCEV. More than a third (38%) were aware of programmes specifically aimed at preventing and countering violent extremism, namely the following: Counter@Act, Rethink, Community Engagement Against Radicalisation, Resilient and United and the 'module on radicalisation' of the Safe School programme. Two respondents (10%) were aware of other programmes that addressed radicalisation and violent extremism in schools, although not specifically targeted at the P/CVE. Asked whether they know of other municipal policies or programmes that contribute to PCEV, even if indirectly, only 62%
of respondents answered in the affirmative. However, when asked if they knew of any type of programme (not necessarily municipal) that contributed, albeit indirectly, to the CPCEP, all respondents (100%) were able to identify at least one programme within the broader context of integration and social inclusion. Therefore, the more than forty programmes identified during the twenty-one interviews carried out are very diverse in terms of objectives, fields of action, actors, levels of participation, cooperation, monitoring and evaluation. Some of the programmes are integrated into European, national and local policies, while others are one-off initiatives, not continuous in nature, organized on the occasion of commemorative days. Most of the interviewees revealed that they know the actors of the policies and/or programmes (66%), which vary according to the programmes involving different stakeholders. The majority of respondents (71%) revealed that they knew the objectives of the policies and programmes, which are mainly related to the P/CVE at a primary level. It is noteworthy that only respondents belonging to security forces and criminal police bodies and two professionals familiar with P/CVE projects (Counter@Act and Rethink projects) also worked on the secondary level. It should be noted that in the scope of the Safe School programme prevention is worked at primary and secondary level, because in addition to awareness-raising sessions in the classroom (lasting about an hour), the agents have an approach to approach the most vulnerable students outside the classroom, on an individual basis. With regard to the tertiary level, only the interviewee from the Polícia Judiciária (Judiciary Police) demonstrated to be familiar with programmes in this field, mainly of a criminal nature. He mentioned that ‘It is necessary to invest in a punishment system beyond the effective penalty, in programmes and reintegration through rehabilitation (stimulating a reinsertion); reinsertion (stimulating an inclusion), inclusion (when the subject feels integrated). Fighting stigmatization: before and after. The Action Plan within the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, provides for reintegration and has a pilot with programmes defined on a case by case basis, taking into account motivation and commitment. Many of those who become radicalized do not identify with the ideology, but are vulnerable due to mental and psychological imbalances and are therefore captured and recruited. There is still a lot of prejudice about what mental illness is. It is necessary to cover the psychological dimension (from the inside out) and the psychiatric dimension (from the outside in), both are very important and should be worked on simultaneously’. The policies, programmes and actions signalled by the interviewees were the following:

1) **European Programmes**: ‘Arrival Cities - Managing global flows at local level’ - ‘Gerir Fluxos Globais a Nível Local’ (transnational project with the aim of sharing experiences and developing local action plans in the area of immigration and refugees, with a view to
sustainable urban development that promotes inclusion and integration). This project stems from the European URBACT programme.

2) **Programas Nacionais**: ‘Escola Segura’ (aims to ensure the safety of the school environment and its surroundings, preventing risky behaviour and reducing unsafe acts in the school environment. A module on radicalisation has been available since 2020), programme ‘Eu faço como o Falco diz’ (oriented to Pre-school and 1st cycle students); Aliens and Borders Service - ‘SEF vai à escola’ (intervention for the documentary regularisation of irregular foreign minors attending school), 'SEF em Movimento' (approach to different groups of more vulnerable immigrants, such as neglected minors), 'Football games between police and residents', PSP and Municipal Police in social neighbourhoods, ACM Partnership with Facebook for the Prevention and Fight against Hate Speech on the Internet, Training and Information Actions; Awareness Campaigns (digital posters on Facebook with the hashtags #PelaIgualdade #PelaDiversidade #PeloRespeito; Campanha Contra a Discriminação Racial - Escolhas Sem Racismo'; 'Programa Escolhas' (government programme whose mission is to promote the social inclusion of children and young people from vulnerable contexts, aiming at equal opportunities and strengthening social cohesion), 'Selo Intercultural' of the Ministry of Education and the ACM (award to intercultural schools), 'TEIP School - Território Educativo de Intervenção Prioritária' (school success is made of affection, it is measured in smiles and hugs, and the administration must provide all the necessary resources to monitor extreme situations) 'Religious Freedom Commission'; 'National Plan to Combat Racism and Discrimination' (currently under public discussion).

3) **Programmes of Municipal or Parish Council initiative**: 'Municipal Plan for the Integration of Immigrants in Lisbon (PMIIL)'; 'Working Group for Inter-religious Dialogue (GT DIR)'; 'SOMOS Prgramme' (human rights education), 'SOMOS School' (human rights education in schools); school food reinforcement programme (availability of meals in take-away service for needy families in time of pandemic); 'Conselho Municipal para a Interculturalidade e Cidadania' (CML consultative); 'Municipal programme for welcoming refugees'; ATLs (Free Time Activities) in schools promoted by the Parish Council; 'Conselho Municipal para a Interculturalidade e Cidadania'; 'Municipal Plan for Equality'; 'Municipal Plan to combat violence against Women'; 'LGBTI Plan'; 'W+ Unit' (protection and health programmes, in particular psychological and psychotherapeutic support for people at risk and psychological vulnerability); 'Universo D-Direitos' (aims to raise awareness of a paradigm shift on the concept of participation, the importance of listening and the right to the opinion of children
and young people); JFSMM 'door to door’ outreach intervention; 'Municipal Human Rights Award' (recognises projects developed by schools that enable discussions on human rights, with a focus on combating school failure and equitable access to education).

4) **Civil society initiative programmes**: 'Resilient and United Programme' (aims at preventing and fighting extremism and radicalisation in Portugal, combining communication technology with a more coordinated prevention effort); 'Project Rethink' (preventing vulnerable audiences from starting a radicalisation process, as well as convincing those already involved in a radicalisation process to abandon it, providing alternative narrative), 'CEAR Project - Community Engagement Against Radicalisation' (aims to systematise a practical model of community and civil society engagement that can strengthen civil society's capacities to prevent and fight radicalisation processes, through the development of 'toolkits' and dissemination of their use in local communities. Development and support of structures offering tailor-made training and consultancy to help local communities create their own radicalisation prevention initiatives and projects); 'Conter@Act Project' (contribute to changing the behaviour of young people who are or could become the target of extremist propaganda via the internet, Sports activities with teenagers from the Central Mosque of Lisbon (weekend cycling); 'Festa da Diversidade' (SOS Racism initiative with the support of the municipality); one-off awareness-raising actions on the occasion of specific days (e.g. refugee day, migrant day); 'Clube de Filosofia Al-Mu'Tamid' - has existed for 8 years, through a protocol with Lisbon's Islamic community, 30 debates at Lisbon's Central Mosque, which have brought Lisboners to the Mosque; Transformers' (movement that contributes to integrate young people at risk of social exclusion and fight the isolation of the elderly); 'Ubuntu in schools' (training programme for young people between 12 and 18 years old, aimed at promoting personal, social and civic skills), 'Academia CV. PT' (socio-educational development and integration of migrant pupils in the municipality of Lisbon); 'Portal Lisboa acolhe' (online and multilingual portal with tools for the inclusion of migrants); 'Projeto É uma Vida' (reception and integration of refugees within the 18-month reception programme) 'No Border' (reception and integration of refugees after the 18-month programme), 'É uma casa' (housing first); 'Povos, Pontes e Culturas' (promoting intercultural education and education for global citizenship); 'Welcome Sports Clube' (promoting insertion, employability and integral development of the human being through sport).

Some of the signalled programmes take place in the Greater Lisbon area and not in the municipality of Lisbon, namely the municipal programme 'Povos, Pontes e Culturas' (Seixal
Participation and partnerships

In this context, the experience of the Municipality of Lisbon in the elaboration of its Municipal Plan for Immigrant Integration (PMIIL) is particularly interesting. This PMIIL is the third plan of the City and it is concluded, but in the process of formal approval. The Plan does not make an explicit reference to the ECIP, but addresses this issue indirectly, focusing on prevention at the primary level. According to the representative of the Lisbon Municipality (Social Rights), it has three main goals: 1) to know in more detail the circumstances of the city and the migratory paths of foreign migrants; 2) to be able to respond to the diagnosis made; 3) to bring the Lisbon Municipality closer to the field and to bring the technical team closer to the associative movement and to migrant people themselves. The Plan follows the common structure for municipal plans recommended by the High Commission for Migrations,73 bearing in mind the 'Guide for the conception of Municipal Plans for the Integration of Immigrants',74 covering the dimensions of reception, integration, health, housing and solidarity. But there are other areas Lisbon focuses on: participation, culture and religion. According to the same representative of the Lisbon City Council, 'our main concern in relation to the P/CVE is the fight against racism and xenophobia'. The Municipal Council for Interculturalism and Citizenship as a consultative body of the CML, addressing issues of racism and xenophobia, is an important support in the reflection on the municipal intervention on these issues. The new PMIIL benefits from the lessons learnt from the two previous plans and relies on a wide network of partnerships, including the Secretary of State for Integration and Migration, the ACM, NGOs, civil society entities and some parish councils, depending on the different issues of each territory. The Lisbon Municipality's vision for the preparation and implementation of the Plan was to get closer to civil society, and more shared decision-making mechanisms were foreseen. Thus, the formulation of the current Plan is based on a botten-up approach and relies on a Working Group composed of municipality technicians and two elements from civil society, both of migrant origin, elected by their peers (one element from the Sunflower Solidarity Association and one element from the Casa do Brasil Association). Besides the meetings of this working group, the process of elaboration of the plan was

73 Available at: https://www.acm.gov.pt/pt/web/10181/planos-municipais.
accompanied in meetings with a larger group of immigrant associations and partner NGOs that provided feedback on the development of the work, enabling necessary changes and corrections to be made quickly and effectively. Besides the contribution of these groups in the formulation of the plan, a more shared self-evaluation, monitoring and implementation is also planned. The promotion of spaces for listening and debate was also signalled by the CML representative as very important, highlighting the role of the FMINT - Municipal Interculturality Forum. There are very different perceptions in the communities that need to be listened to, debated and shared. The interviewees who are representatives of organisations participating in the construction of the new PMIIL (such as Crescer and Girassol Solidário) consider this methodology and the involvement of civil society and migrants themselves in this process to be positive. Nevertheless, regarding the interviewees' perceptions of participation, as expressed in the answers to the questionnaires, these differ in the case of the participation of policy actors in general or policy recipients in particular. It should be noted that these perceptions do not refer to a single policy (of which the PMIIL is an example), but to a set of various programmes and initiatives directly or indirectly related to the P/CVE, as already mentioned, so the data should be read with this caveat. Thus, when asked whether they consider that the actors of the policies or programmes of the P/CVE have a participatory role, the majority consider that they do (61.9%) but there is a considerable number who do not answer (19%) and do not know (14.3%). Only one respondent said no (4.8%). However, the percentage of positive answers decreases considerably when it comes to the participation of the recipients (38.1%), the number of respondents who do not answer (33.3%) increases, while those who do not know (14.3%) and one negative answer remain. It should also be noted that from the interviews resulted a broad consensus on the importance of participation by foreign migrants themselves. The institutional representative of the JFSMM, summarized, 'a citizen will not feel Portuguese just because he or she has a citizen's card. Participating in the community and being an active part is fundamental’.

**Transversal Training Need**

When asked if they knew of any training actions on P/CVE, respondents were divided in their answers, with almost half (47.6%) stating that they knew of training actions on P/CVE for technicians and professionals, but an equal percentage of respondents (47.6%) were unaware of the existence of such training. Only one respondent did not wish to answer the question (4.8%). Among the interviewees who responded that they were aware of internal training, the security forces and criminal police bodies stand out (both the interviewees from the PSP and the
interviewee from the PJ). These respondents mentioned that training is provided by external partner entities, with specialized knowledge on this topic. The interviewee from PJ mentioned APAV and a training manual for victim identification, which is based on the experience of this NGO, which has a network of victim support offices at a national level. The interviewee from the PSP (head) mentioned that 'In 2020 they made the first online training course for trainers (1 week and 35 hours) for detection and prevention of radicalisation; In 2021 Practical course on detection and prevention of radicalisation (3 days and 21 hours). The European directives have signalled the need to work on this topic and in the last 2 years they have felt the need to carry out more actions. In addition to this training, the command has a recycling training programme for agents lasting 1 week in a specific subject of safe school; intervention course 'Like us' (2 weeks and 70 hours) The trainings include several subjects of psychology and sociology that help the agents to better deal with the programmes they face in the day-to-day of the schools.' This information was reiterated by another interviewee from the PSP, who participates in actions in schools and in the field. Following internal training, a session specifically on radicalisation was included in the 'Safe School' programme's training offer, and a total of six sessions were held nationally, aimed at pupils and teachers. In addition to PJ and PSP, interviewees from entities such as APAV (Counter@Act project), CPR (Resilient and United project) and Lusófona University (Rethink project and Community Engagement Against Radicalisation project), which specifically promote programmes in the areas of PCEV, reported being aware of training sessions on PCEV and also promoting them. The Rethink and Community Engagement Against Radicalisation trainings are aimed at NGOs, religious communities and civil society in general, while the Counter@act and Resilient and United projects are aimed at civil society in general (including schools), although the Counter@Act project was the only one more focused on training sessions for young migrants and refugees. According to the APAV professional, the project focused on the production and dissemination of knowledge, but the implementation of the actions was hampered by the restrictions arising from the Covid19 pandemic. Despite this, the training sessions reached 135 people (migrants and refugees) in Portugal and 114 people in Spain. In addition, the Counter@act campaign is still active online.

Some key ideas emerged from the interviews: the need for training, since 'It is difficult to be aware of signs of these phenomena when there is no training' (social worker); training transversal to public and private actors and at vertical (decision-makers and hierarchies) and horizontal (frontline professionals, partner entities, civil society) levels; the need for training based on field learning and continuous training, since 'Mentalities cannot be changed by decree, but with
continuous training' (interviewee from the PSP). It was also pointed out (interviewee from PJ) that balance and common sense is needed 'it is important to have a platform that raises awareness (civil society), but that does not give such importance that people panic'.

**Monitoring and evaluation**

When asked whether monitoring and evaluation are incorporated in the P/CVE policies and programmes, almost half of the respondents answered in the affirmative (47.4%), but the remaining respondents consider that there are gaps in this area and that there is room for improvement. Many of the shortcomings pointed out are related to the lack or insufficiency of human resources and financial resources, with an impact on the external monitoring and evaluation of actions.

According to the representative of CML (Department of Social Rights), the most recent PMIIL covers the balance of the implementation of the previous Plans. These had several financial and activity achievement indicators, but no indicators to assess whether the public policy is transformative, making it difficult to assess the impact. It notes that it is important to ensure not only the efficacy, but also the effectiveness of policies. In the previous Plan there was also a lack of evaluation by an external entity, as well as a lack of information and data collection throughout the implementation. The lack of human resources also hindered monitoring. It believes that in the new PMIIL the previous failures will be corrected, allowing the improvement of data collection and diagnosis. Monitoring is done through regular meetings of the working group, consisting of CML technicians and NGO representatives. The institutional representative of the JFSMM also signalled the need for support from an external entity in the collection of disaggregated data regarding the migrant population and the diagnosis of needs. The Parish Council has a very outdated diagnosis, made in 2013 (when it was established), and since then no other study, diagnosis or assessment has been carried out by an external entity.

Other interviewees also reported difficulties related to the monitoring and evaluation of other programmes by an external entity. One of the PSP respondents mentioned that the Escola Segura (Safe School) programme was evaluated in early 1992 as a good practice. But it was not evaluated again by an external entity. In the projects for the reception and integration of refugees of the Crescer association, monitoring is done regularly in team meetings, which also includes the participation of refugees, who are also Crescer technicians. Monitoring is done in a very participative way. However, the evaluation by an external entity. The project indicators are also
very quantitative (number of people assisted, number of actions carried out), not evaluating the possible transforming impact of the intervention in people's lives (success in finding a job, in training). Satisfaction questionnaires are not applied either. They feel the need to use other types of indicators. ‘Learning from the process itself is necessary’.

The Islamic Community of Lisbon and intercultural and inter-religious dialogue

In the interviews the historical and cultural context of the ‘Islamic Community of Lisbon’ - CIL (religious leader of the Central Mosque of Lisbon and professor at the Lusófona University) was particularly stressed, as well as the current challenges. The Islamic Community of Lisbon was formed in 1968 by a group of Muslim university students who, at the time, were studying in the Portuguese capital, coming from the former Portuguese overseas provinces. Over the years, the community, mostly Sunni, has been linked essentially to Portuguese-speaking African countries (particularly Mozambique and Guinea Bissau), in which there was a feeling of great cultural proximity and belonging to the national community, a feeling of ‘portugality’. This community continues to meet in Lisbon’s Central Mosque, which remains the heart of the Muslim community in the city. In recent years, however, with the greater growth of the non-Portuguese-speaking Islamic population, namely from Asia (Pakistan and Bangladesh), Sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East (Syria and Turkey) with distinct cultural and linguistic realities, the need to strengthen intercultural and inter-religious dialogue has increased. This need was also highlighted by institutional representatives (CML and JFSMM), as well as by the religious leader (Central Mosque of Lisbon), a community leader (The Arab Portuguese House) and professionals and academics working on these issues at the Lusófona University. The religious leader emphasized that ‘anyone can open a Mosque, in Lisbon’, referring to the ease with which other spaces of worship have appeared in the city, frequented by less integrated communities, where the Portuguese language is not spoken. The older and traditionally moderate Muslim communities fear the impact of potentially extreme experiences of faith. The representative of CML (Social Rights Department) stated that more than the diversity of temples and religious traditions, it is the existence of possible ‘disaggregated communities’ that is a factor for greater attention, placing the focus on the integration of people. The Portuguese constitutional and legal framework favours the environment of religious freedom. Law 16/2001, of 26 June establishes the Commission of Religious Freedom (article 52 and 53), as an independent body of consultation with the Assembly of the Republic and the Government.

The Commission has functions of study, information, opinion and proposal in all matters
related to the application of the Religious Freedom Law, with the development, improvement and possible revision of the same law and, in general, with the law of religions in Portugal. It also has functions of scientific research of the churches, communities and religious movements in the country. It is thus intended that the communities correspond to this framework with an action of dialogue among themselves, as well as promoting joint activities and openness to the common society. In addition to the Commission, some of the interviewees highlighted two working groups, namely the Working Group for Inter-religious Dialogue (GT DIR), energized by the High Commission for Migrations, and the Municipal Council for Interculturality and Citizenship is a consultative body of the Lisbon City Council. The GT DIR seeks to give visibility to the religious phenomenon as a space for the experience of citizenship and dissemination of the service that religious communities provide, either through the solidarity networks they promote (visible in these times of pandemic), either through the manifest ability to integrate migrant citizens. The Municipal Council for Interculturality and Citizenship which meets at least 3 times a year and which constitutes a working group to think about the municipal intervention in the promotion of interculturality and the fight against racism and xenophobia.

In addition to the work of the Commission for Religious Freedom and in these groups, in which the most recent religious communities do not always feel represented, there is a need to create broader spaces for meeting and dialogue, in which all communities participate and are actively involved. One of the interviewees (a professional from the Lusophone University) mentioned initiatives that tried to reach out to all Muslim communities, an example of which is the Post-Graduate Course for Islamic Leadership at the Lusophone University, which had as a preferential target group, all the Imams of the City of Lisbon. This course did not give theological training, but provided tools for these leaders to be agents of peace and dialogue in their communities. Some of the themes covered included the situation of women in Western societies, Female Genital Mutilation, radicalization and terrorism. However, only 11 Imams completed the training, all of them from the Lusophone area. Imams from the Middle East and Asia remained outside. Currently, there are plans to create a ‘Federation of Islamic Communities’, with the support of central and local authorities. This entity would always have symbolic power. But, it is believed, by bringing all religious communities into the field of dialogue, its role would be very significant.

Parallel to this dialogue and rapprochement between different religious communities, in the interviews the need to strengthen intercultural dialogue was signalled, with the involvement of the
various stakeholders and civil society. In this context, some of the interviewees emphasized the need to promote more spaces for encounter between cultures, such as the Lisbon ‘Festival of Diversity’ (institutional representatives of CML and JFSMM, religious leader of the Central Mosque of Lisbon, community leader of ACP, professional from Lusófona). The pandemic has limited the organization of these initiatives that everyone feels are important in building a sense of diversity and inclusion in the neighbourhoods, the city and the national community. These intercultural festivals, besides promoting the encounter between different communities, promote the involvement of the whole civil society. In this context, one of the interviewees (Professor of Lusófona) highlighted other initiatives that bring the Islamic Community of Lisbon closer to civil society, such as the initiative of the ‘Al-Mu’Tamid Philosophy Club’, which has existed for eight years, through a protocol with CIL, and which has opened the doors of the Central Mosque to the people of Lisbon, promoting dozens of open debates. It was also noted that on the 50th anniversary of the Islamic Community of Lisbon, the President of the Republic decorated it with the ‘Order of Liberty’ to distinguish ‘relevant services rendered in defence of the values of civilization, in favour of the dignity of the human person and to the cause of liberty’. However, even though the Islamic community is the largest religious minority in the country, the number of Muslims in Portugal (around 50 thousand)\textsuperscript{75} is very small when compared to the number of residents in other countries.

Municipal P/CVE policies through education and with youth

When asked if they consider that violent extremism is a relevant issue that should be addressed at local level in schools and among youth, the response was almost unanimous (95.3%), with respondents saying yes. It should be noted that the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2015 has some programmatic lines in the area of education. But as there is not really a national and municipal policy of PCEV, a vision of inclusion and education for human rights prevails.

It should be noted that, within the scope of this study, two additional categories of interviewees were selected (schools and security forces), due to the relevant knowledge on P/CVE programmes developed with students and young people. The selected public schools, Agrupamento de Escolas Patrício Prazeres and Agrupamento de Escolas Fernando Pessoa, both in Lisbon, have a high percentage of foreign students and from vulnerable backgrounds. The Agrupamento de Escolas Patricio Prazeres was selected as a ‘host school’ integrating students from other schools. Around 30% of the pupils are of foreign origin.\textsuperscript{76} During the period when

\textsuperscript{76} 98 841 people according to the 2019 data of the Aliens and Borders Service.
schools were closed during the pandemic, they had 30 pupils in attendance who could not attend lessons at home, among which around 15% came from Nepal and Bangladesh. The school was thus an important promoter of inclusion. The Fernando Pessoa School Grouping is a ‘TEIP School - Educational Territory of Priority Intervention’, since 2010, which allows the placement of technicians in schools in order to work inclusion strategies for all students in partnership with teachers, students and the whole educational community. In this sense, this school includes social service technicians, social education technicians and psychologists who contribute indirectly to the prevention of violent extremism by combating school failure and dropout, equal opportunities and inclusion. The school welcomes children from different backgrounds and nationalities, including refugees who have arrived from Syria, Egypt and Iraq. Many of them do not speak Portuguese or English and are integrated in the classes corresponding to their schooling level, with the support of classes in Portuguese, a foreign language. Schools have signalled programmes that consider working with the P/CVE, even if indirectly and at primary level.

When asked whether they are aware of the existence of specific municipal policies or programmes to prevent and combat radicalization in schools or among young people, the majority of the respondents said that they were not aware of them (38.1%), but slightly less said that they were aware of them (33.3%). When questioned as to whether they are aware of ECLP programmes in schools and with Young People, at the initiative of the schools themselves and/or other entities, the answers are reversed and the percentage who answer in the affirmative rises (42.9%), with the remaining three thirds being divided between those who answer that they are not aware (19%), do not know (19%) or do not answer (19%).

It is therefore very clear that the interviewees consider that it is particularly important to work on this issue in schools and among young people, but most of the programmes that they know and work on this issue (directly and indirectly) are not municipal programmes. The Patrício Prazeres Grouping highlights the project ‘Padrinhos de Leitura’ (more unruly students become reading godfathers to younger students in school libraries, noting the change in attitude when placed next to educators), the ‘Academia CV.PT’ (training in the Portuguese language and socio-educational development and integration of migrant students from the municipality of Lisbon). The Fernando Pessoa Grouping highlights the ‘Class Assembly’, a weekly discipline lasting 50 minutes, as a space to give voice to the students. It also mentions the 9th year school subject ‘Ubuntu at school’, a training programme aimed at young people between 12 and 18 years of age, intended to promote personal, social and civic competences based on the African Ubuntu philosophy ‘I am because you are’.
Projects specifically working on the issue of radicalization and countering violent extremism were identified: PSP has one of the oldest national programmes in schools, providing a wide and varied range of sessions, including ‘radicalization’ (for two years), ‘dating violence’, ‘domestic violence’, ‘racism and discrimination’. Through the Programmes ‘Safe School’ and ‘I do as Falco says’ all age groups are covered (from pre-school to secondary school). The contribution of these interviewees, together with the perceptions of the other respondents, helped us to have a more vivid picture of what is happening on the ground in Lisbon in this area. The actions carried out specifically in this area are implemented with the support of a network of partners and civil society organizations, which promote activities and awareness-raising sessions within the scope of projects co-funded for the P/CVE. Under the Resilient and United Project (CPR), an awareness-raising session was held at Portela School in February 2020 in Lisbon for 75 teachers and students aged between 15 and 15 years old. The NGO CPR mentioned that there is a lot of offer of trainings on human rights, migration and asylum, but very few on this issue of the ECP in particular. Under the Counter@Act project (APAV) training sessions were held in Lisbon for young people born in Guinea-Bissau aged between 14 and 18. The Rethink Project and CEAR (Lusófona University) also promoted training sessions for students and teachers. The methodologies used in the training sessions include presentations of content and materials produced within these projects, based on the guidelines of the Radicalization Awareness Network (RAN). Within the scope of the project ‘Peoples, Bridges and Cultures’ of the Municipality of Seixal (Greater Lisbon region), one of the community leaders interviewed (ACAP) mentioned that the topics of ‘Islam’ and ‘terrorism’ were addressed with the students, helping to deconstruct myths, prejudices and stereotypes associated to Muslims. The aim is to bring peoples and cultures closer together and to promote intercultural dialogue with the active involvement of the students. As a result of these sessions, a play was organized by the students and its public presentation.

The interviewees also mentioned projects promoted by the Lisbon Municipality and Parish Councils: Through the support of the Lisbon Municipality, canteens in a network of public schools continued to serve meals to students (and their families) from more vulnerable backgrounds, even during the period of temporary closure of schools during the Covid19 pandemic (in take-away service), with concern for ensuring an inclusive (halal) diet. The municipality created physical spaces within the schools to support students during non-teaching hours, such as the spaces at Escola Maria Barroso, Rua Nova do Almada and Escola Básica do Castelo. Lisbon’s Parish Councils play an important role in their territories in providing free time occupation ateliers (ATLs), which operate in the schools' spaces, and in which the children stay after school hours,
but during their parents' working hours. This offer is an important help for parents and single-parent families, including migrant families, with scarce support networks. The activities carried out in the ATLs are very varied and include manual arts, games and sports activities. The Lisbon Municipality also promotes programmes to raise awareness and promote human rights in schools, SOMOS School, Universo D and the awarding of a municipal human rights prize to a school with relevant activity in this area. The programme of the Municipality of Seixal ‘Povos, Pontes e Culturas’ (Peoples, Bridges and Cultures), mentioned above, stands out. Also in this municipality, inserted in the greater Lisbon area, many residents are foreign migrants.

The educational tools used in schools and among young people are diversified, formal, non-formal, informal, recreational, sports and cultural. The municipal tools used for the P/CVE in schools also include a range of social support granted to students and families in need, subjects that work on themes promoting human rights and fighting discrimination and the involvement of the educational community (including teachers, parents, students, assistants) and the collaboration of a wide network of partners. Monitoring is carried out through regular meetings with partners and the elaboration of periodic, formal and informal reports. Evaluation has essentially a self-evaluation component. Even though some programmes include the application of student questionnaires, an example of which is the Ubuntu in Schools Programme. In the interviews, a wide network of actors was identified, including teachers, school assistants, parents and students' associations, a network of public partners (Lisbon Municipality, Parish Council, PSP, Fire Brigade) and a private network of NGOs and civil society entities. The need for vertical and horizontal training within the scope of the P/CVE was also identified.

In addition to state schools, some public schools and colleges also develop P/CVE programmes through the promotion of interculturality and religious freedom, an example of which is the College ‘Os Aprendizes’ through the subject ‘religions of the world’, which has had a continuous character for two years.

Finally, the impact of the Covid19 pandemic was mentioned throughout the interviews. Social isolation and the temporary closure of schools were signalled as major challenges. According to an interviewed community leader (ACAP) since March 2020, the date of the first confinement, there has been a large and sudden school dropout ‘unfortunately instead of a specific education programme being triggered for young people, processes are triggered at the Commission for the Protection of Children and Young People CPCJ, with some vulnerable children being taken away from their parents.’ - ACAP. It is also important to warn of the risks of the internet. The pandemic exposes young people many hours to the internet. (Mesquita Central de Lisboa).
Conclusion

Firstly, it emerged from this research study that there is a huge public ignorance of a national strategy within the scope of the P/CVE, in which policies and actions could eventually be integrated at local level. At the time of writing, Portugal chairs the Council of the European Union, with the new European counterterrorism agenda highlighting the fight against violent extremism as one of its priorities. With the spotlight on this issue, the Secretary General of the Internal Security System (SSI), who is responsible for coordinating the implementation of the National Counter-Terrorism Strategy disclosed that the Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalization, Violent Extremism and Recruitment to Terrorism was approved in 2017. This revelation was met with enormous surprise and controversy, as neither the general public, nor academia, nor parliamentarians, were aware of the approval of the said Action Plan. As a matter of fact, in 2017, Parliament unanimously approved, the Resolution of the Assembly of the Republic No. 134/2017, of 26 June, which recommended the Government to draw up the seven Action Plans provided for in the ENCT, including the PAPREVRT. But the Government did not inform Parliament of the approval of the plans foreseen in the NCT, nor was there any reference to that fact in the Annual Internal Security Reports (RASI), in which all relevant internal security activity is disclosed. Also within the scope of this case study we were not able to have access to the aforementioned PAPREVRT. The Internal Security System has insisted that this is a sensitive and classified matter, so ‘all daily dynamics that allow, in an integrated way, to apply the measures and actions associated with the implementation of the NCT, are of a reserved nature’. Nevertheless, the strategies of other European countries (of which Spain is an example) are partially auditable by public opinion. We consider that knowledge of the plan is essential to the strategic framing and integration of the many and varied initiatives and projects for the prevention of violent extremism (most of them at a primary level and indirectly) that are being implemented in Portugal and in the city of Lisbon, many of which are identified in this study. The publicity of the plan is also important for reasons of transparency and informing the community that a strategy has been thought out and is being implemented, as well as by whom and with what resources. We also believe that the narrative of secrecy surrounding the PAPREVRT has contributed to the association of this issue with an essentially security and criminal matter. This view was, in fact, emphasized in this study by the ACM. However, the prevention of radicalization is not limited to

the role of security forces and services. Thus, there seems to be no real political and social awareness that the approach to this type of phenomenon has to be done in a comprehensive manner and with various civil society partners.

Secondly, a large part of the interviewees revealed their perception of the growth of polarization and hate speech, of a xenophobic and racist nature, in the Portuguese public space and society. Examples of this escalation are unprecedented episodes such as death threats made by neo-Nazis to human rights activists and members of parliament. Recent events in Lisbon, such as the vandalizing of the exterior walls of several secondary schools, universities and a refugee reception centre, with racist and xenophobic hate messages (‘Death to the blacks, for a white college’, ‘Zucas, go back to the slums!’, ‘Portugal is white. Blacks go back to Africa!’, ‘Death to the gypsies.’ ‘Long live white Europe’), the occupation of a high school where an online session against slavery and racism was taking place by a neo-Nazi group, the demonstration of a far-right group against the so-called ‘anti-national racism’ made by hooded people armed with torches at the door of the NGO SOS Racism and the anti-racist demonstrations with vandalization of statues of historical personalities and symbols of Portuguese colonialism, are warning signs of the growth of polarization and extremism and of the need to work more strategically on the P/CVE, with the involvement of all stakeholders. As one of the interviewees (a professional from the Lusófona University) mentioned, a mythological narrative of a ‘country of mild manners’ has prevailed in Portugal, based on a mistaken self-awareness that there are no problems of racism and exclusion. This narrative may have a positive factor, it may be internalized by the collective as being true, but it may also have a negative factor which is perverse, that of promoting a certain inertia in the definition and implementation of P/CVE measures.

Attentive to the signs of the times, the current President of the Portuguese Republic, Marcelo

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Rebelo de Sousa, has played an active role, both through political rhetoric and concrete actions, in promoting interculturality, inter-religious dialogue and combating extremism and radicalization. In his inauguration speech for a new presidential term, after a campaign in which one of the candidates was from the populist far-right party (Chega!), he said that his election shows that the Portuguese do not want ‘radicalization and extremism in people, in attitudes, in social and political life’. The president was elected with a large majority (60.70 per cent) on 24 January 2021, with the populist candidate receiving the third most votes (11.90 per cent).

Thirdly, with regard to the Muslim community living in the City of Lisbon, the interviews carried out revealed its cultural and linguistic diversification in recent years, thus reinforcing the importance of promoting inter-religious dialogue and intercultural dialogue, together with a strategy of social inclusion and cohesion. The President of the Republic was also mentioned by some interviewees (religious leader of the Central Mosque of Lisbon and two interviewees from Lusófona University) as a strong ally in promoting intercultural and interreligious dialogue in both terms of office. After his election in the first mandate, the president visited the Central Mosque of Lisbon and after the recent election he visited the Islamic Cultural Centre of Porto, trying to meet all the resident communities. In this context, we see the need to build bridges between all the Portuguese Muslim communities, between the older ones and the newcomers, and between these and the national community, contributing to a feeling of inclusion and belonging.

Fourthly, most of the interviewees, regardless of the sector of activity, public or private, signalled the absence of a national and local training strategy on the topic of the P/CVE. The need for training is also felt at vertical level (decision-makers and managers) and at horizontal level (professionals, technicians, civil society in general). It emerged from the interviews that there are some specific training programmes on P/CVE, but these programmes are still very recent (mostly two-three years old) and scarce. Moreover, many have emerged thanks to the impetus of European Union directives or within the framework of projects co-financed by European funds. The interviews also highlighted the need for improved communication and the need to map the supply of training at the level of the P/CVE. Many interviewees mentioned the need for training. In turn, some entities with training projects in the areas of the P/CVE regretted the difficulty in signalling trainees, as well as the lack of human resources to invest in the continuity of training beyond the deadline of the projects.

Fifthly, as a result of the interviews carried out, there was a broad consensus on the need to address the P/CVE policies in schools and among young people. The area of education was by far the one that interviewees highlighted as the most strategic to work on the prevention and
anticipation of violent extremism phenomena, covering all levels of education (from pre-school to high school). Many interviewees referred that the school assumes various social and educational roles, specifically at community level and at intellectual level, with the aim of promoting improved quality of life, promoting autonomy to solve problems, stimulating participation in collective and social life. Nevertheless, schools are still somewhat closed in on themselves. A greater interaction with the territory and context in which they are inserted could contribute to more effective inclusion and social cohesion.

Finally, for future studies, we signal the need for a comprehensive mapping of the activities and good practices of P/CVE being carried out at national and local level, in order to contribute to the eventual integration of such programmes and practices in a more transparent strategy and with the participation of all stakeholders. In this study, despite the limitations arising from a limited sample of interviewees and short time of fieldwork, it was evident that there was a growing awareness among the interviewees of the need to work on the subject of P/CVE in a holistic, comprehensive and integrated way into a national strategy, taking into account the context and particularities of each territory, at local level.
Conclusion

Several of the countries highlighted in this comparative analysis have encountered numerous forms of extremism simultaneously. In some cases, certain types of extremism such as far-right and left-wing extremism, date back to the 1960s. This is an important note to highlight that extremism in Europe, relative to terrorism, has existed throughout history. The motives of extremists, subsequently, have shifted throughout time with an underlying consensus on fuelling social unrest, as is the case with far-left extremism in France and Italy.

In the aftermath of 9/11, the early measures adopted by some countries, such as France, the UK, and Italy were highly security-oriented and conceived to counter the terrorist and extremist threat both at the law-enforcement and judicial level. In several cases, whilst terrorism and the phenomenon of extremism are different, both have often been used interchangeably within most countries. For example, in Romania's generic P/CVE plans, extremism and radicalization are referred to under the context of countering terrorism. Therefore, it emerges that often authorities have not, until presently, made clear distinctions between different forms of violent extremism, even if, as a point of fact, they have been focusing on Islamist violent extremism since 2001. As a result of this subsequent lack of knowledge of extremism, there is an apparent divide in terms of the development of P/CVE. What has also been found in this comparative analysis is the seemingly difficult task of separating 'extremism' from 'terrorism'. In some cases, there is an overreliance on criminal law in responding to extremism. Thus, this can result in a securitized approach to radicalization and vulnerability and prevent a coherent focus on the root causes of extremism of all types.

Moreover, responses to far-right, far-left and Islamist extremism all use the same approach, therefore not accounting for the different ideological backgrounds and motivates. There are some countries, such as the UK, with an understanding of extremism at all levels in society. This is replicated through local PREVENT plans that place a duty of authorities to detect signs of radicalization. The lack of a more fine-grained understanding has serious implications in what is essentially a 'one-fits-all' approach to extremism, and prevents a cohesive strategy targeted towards each type of extremism.

Most European countries developed new domestic tools of prevention of radicalization in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 events, but with different breadths and level of sophistication. Romania and Greece are the exceptions, as they are largely untouched by the dynamics unleashed by the 9/11 attacks, with the terrorist threats keeping low. The emergence of new forms of well-
organized jihadi organizations, such as Islamic State (IS/Daesh), and the wave of European foreign fighters leaving to join international jihadi groups forced authorities to profoundly change their approach to counter-terrorism and violent radicalization. Therefore, while before countries adopted highly security-oriented and judicial measures to fight first and foremost terrorist attacks, that development forced them to elaborate and develop a new set of policies to tackle violent extremist radicalization from its roots. P/CVE policies were elaborated to address, first and foremost, Islamist violent radicalization and jihadist terrorism, that represents the major violent extremist threat for most of the countries analysed. Despite signs that other forms of extremism, notably far-right extremism, are becoming more violent and on the rise, countries such as the UK, France and Italy have proclaimed Islamist extremism as the greatest threat that they face. This is interesting to note in countries such as France and Belgium, which although does nominally highlight all kinds of extremism, is clear that Islamist extremism is a top priority. Therefore, whilst there is a common theme between the countries with a focus on policies attempting to address radicalization in prisons, for example, the fact that imams are the central of the response illustrates this focus on Islamist extremism.

There are a number of specificities that mark the approach used initially by some countries to combat the growing threat of Islamist terrorism. Islamist violent extremism in France was not a new-born phenomenon when 9/1 took place. First evidences of Islamist violent activism can be traced back in the 1990s, when the Algerian Islamic Group (Group Islamique Armée - GIA) orchestrated a number of terrorist attacks in the attempt to change the position of French government on the Algerian civil war. Most of the UK's counter-terrorism policy historically, and certainly prior to 2001, focused on dissident republican groups in Northern Ireland, such as the Irish Republican Army. Despite the longstanding capacity of Italian authorities in detecting and deterring terrorist and organized crime activities, they resorted to a set of measures that were conceived to deal with far-right and far-left extremism when countering Islamist violent extremism.

Most European countries have dealt, over the years, with different forms of extremism and terrorism. The landscape of violent extremism in Europe comprises a variety of groups that can be divided into five categories gleaned from the papers: 1. far-left extremist groups, 2. far-right extremist groups, 3. regional separatist groups, 4. Islamist extremist violent groups and 5. hooliganism (in the case of Greece).

The phenomenon of left-wing extremism is still quite acute in France, Greece, and Italy. The latter accounted for the highest number of far left-affiliated arrests in Europe. Greece has experienced a number of attacks carried out by left-wing and anarchist terrorist in the most recent
years. It has dismantled violent extremist leftist groups in its recent history, however, this has not signalled the end of far-left extremism. Jihadist terrorist attacks can be considered to be representing a minor challenge for Greece, although its territory plays a transit role for migrants, and, potentially, for foreign terrorist fighters, due to its geographic position.

However, in all cases, right-wing terrorism and extremism is one seen as growing and evolving. It is worth noting here that, although right-wing extremism now constitutes a major threat in UK society, it was not always evaluated in the same light. A strong focus on Islamist terrorism and extremism, instead, has dominated the political landscape in the country. Right-wing extremism has further consolidated its leverage as anti-Muslim and anti-immigration sentiments have spread. The rise of Islamist violent extremism, both at international and national level, contributed to create a new breeding ground for xenophobic and populist movements to grow across all countries under review. Moreover, the diffusion in some countries of conspiracy theories that integrate supremacist and nationalist worldviews, raises some concerns about a future development of right-wing violent extremism. There could be interlinkages developing between diverse forms of extremism. Terrorist attacks from jihadists can increase right-wing extremism, which in turn can trigger left-wing radicalization and Islamic radicalization.

In the case of Greece, its concerns relate mainly to the rise of right-wing extremism, racism and islamophobia, but other forms of racism as well, such as homophobia. In Romania, extremism is most felt in the form of extreme nationalism, xenophobia, hate speech and popularizing of radicalized movements against Jews, Roma and LGBTQ+ communities. In 2020, a party with a clear far-right extremist agenda, Alliance for Romanian Unity (AUR), won the elections during the historically low voter turnout of 32%.

Most countries analysed have national P/CVE plans. Starting with the EU, in 2005 it drafted the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy, by adopting a new Counter-Terrorism Agenda (CT) for the EU. Another important milestone in the EU’s policies, was achieved with the adoption of the European agenda on security 2015-2020. The European Commission indicated that a strong and determined counter-narrative was crucial to eliminate terrorism’s support base. Thus, in 2013, with the Communication on Preventing Radicalization to Terrorism and Violent Extremism, the Commission set out ten areas to structure efforts addressing the root causes of extremism. The 2016 Communication Supporting the Prevention of Radicalization Leading to Violent Extremism focuses on how a multipronged approach to work at EU level to support EU Member States in seven key areas.
In the past 20 years, national authorities have integrated new measures and mechanisms to counter violent extremism in accordance with various European directives issued after 9/11. The emergence of global jihadism in the 2000s and the rise in the mid-2010s of new international terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State, followed by a new wave of jihadist attacks in Europe, have encouraged a reconfiguration of P/CVE policies, that were mainly focused on left-wing and right-wing extremism. P/CVE policies evolved in reaction to increasing terrorist threat and violent radicalization in most countries and, since 2014, the high number of European Islamist Foreign Fighters (FF) joining the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq. Internet platforms, including social media, have also been used by violent extremists, terrorist groups, and their sympathizers, providing new opportunities for mobilization, recruitment and communication. In addition, the increased online presence during the COVID-19 pandemic and lockdowns, could further create a fertile ground for, amongst others, radicalization and the spread of conspiracy theories.

While at the beginning these policies mainly focused on repression and prosecution of radicalized individuals, and reinforced the security apparatus. However, this approach that focused primarily on law enforcement, criminal proceeding and ex-post de-radicalization did not undermine the radicalization trend. National authorities demonstrated to be able to change their policies according to evidences on the ground. Indeed, throughout the years European governments have evolved away from the highly security-oriented approach implemented in early years to develop a new all-encompassing and holistic approach to preventing radicalization. In France, the first plan entirely devoted to the prevention of violent radicalization was presented in 2018: the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalization. By including institutional and non-institutional actors in the organization of the prevention of violent radicalization in the country at national, regional and local level, France managed to develop more integrated and all-encompassing P/CVE policies. In the UK, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 is of considerable interest, notably for its emphasis on extremism. The Act emphasized Prevent and Channel, which represent key elements of the UK’s counter-extremist policy. All P/CVE activities fall under CONTEST, which is the UK’s major counter-terrorism strategy focused on stopping terrorist attacks and preventing people from becoming radicalized. The PREVENT pillar deals exclusively on early stage analysis of extremism. Channel, instead, acts as a multi-agency programme that connects various local and regional actors together. This panel of actors, ranging from religious, cultural and local groups, monitor all types of extremism and are split into different fields of P/CVE, such as education and employment. Channel is very much a localized policy and reaches into different P/CVE areas, such as education, employment, housing and other socio-economic themes. In France, by including institutional and
non-institutional actors in the organization of the prevention of violent radicalization in the country at national, regional and local level, the authorities managed to develop more integrated and all-encompassing P/CVE policies.

In Belgium, the main P/CVE policy dates back to 2002. The updated version is known as ‘Plan R’, or Plan of Action against Radicalization. Despite the name change, the origin of the plan is rooted in a specific type of violent extremism, that of an Islamist and jihadist matrix. Over the years, the update of the plan was made according to the evolution of the threat and with the increase of public attention on the phenomenon of radicalization in the various local contexts. Plan R has increasingly integrated a preventive approach, which has thus balanced the purely countering and securitarian approach of the origins.

In the Netherlands, the government early on developed a comprehensive approach that also underpins the current counter-terrorism (CT) strategy. The broader P/CVE and CT policy framework is guided by the National Counter Terrorism Strategy 2016–2020. This is a so-called ‘state-wide strategy’, in that it connects all government partners at national and local level in a collective approach to deal with extremism and terrorism. When looking at Dutch national P/CVE policy, another important document is the the 2014 ‘Action Programme on an Integral Approach to Jihadism’, which was developed as a response to the development of the so-called, ‘second wave’ of jihadism, when about 300 Dutch youngsters departed to join extremist groups like IS in Syria/Iraq and when, in parallel, the support for this movement surged in the Netherlands. With regard to prevention, mention should also be made of the Ministerial Letter to Parliament on the Government’s Policy on Prevention of Radicalization of 2018, which shed light on the prevention of radicalization.

Compared to its European counterparts, Romania’s approach to preventing and countering violent extremism is not robustly constructed. Romania does not have a specific policy document describing its ‘P/CVE Strategy’, mainly given the fact that the country does not experience the phenomena as other countries included in this comparative analysis. The broader P/CVE (and CT) policy framework is guided by the National Security strategy 2015–2020, which is mainly a CT programme, with few P/CVE provisions. Thhe lack of a national policy on P/CVE prevents the growth of localized strategies. Portugal has a National Strategy to Combat Terrorism, which was approved ten years after the EU Strategy. The matter of violent extremism was not included in the Strategy, so, there still isn’t any radicalization prevention programme in place. The Prevent rubric of that Strategy recommended the elaboration and adoption of the Action Plan for the Prevention of Radicalization and Violent Extremism and Recruitment to Terrorism. The plan was approved in
2017, but it is still classified. Greece also does not have a national strategy in place for the prevention and countering of violent extremism. The lack of a national policy on extremism is a serious gap in the country's defence against extremist attitudes. The lack of any preventive measures, moreover, effectively means that the country relies on security-oriented approaches to crime. Results from fieldwork in Greece illustrate that there is a severe lack of understanding on extremism, whereby all 12 people interviewed had no knowledge of P/CVE and its subsequent policies.

Countries, such as Greece, Portugal and Romania, are greatly lagging behind in developing its own P/CVE policies. Italy lacks a multi-stakeholder national plan to prevent homegrown radicalization, and Belgium, due to its focus on the local level, lacks a framework to ensure continuity nationally.

The analysis of P/CVE policies shows how the primary, secondary and tertiary prevention methods are addressed in their design. In the UK, primary approaches to P/CVE are principally addressed via the UK's Channel strategy. As regards secondary prevention, the Channel scheme benefits from its diverse panel, which include religious actors, the police, schools and social support services. Tertiary prevention for extremism is often explored with traditional counter-terrorism policies focused on disengagement and reintegration. The French National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalization envisages 60 different measures of primary, secondary and tertiary intervention, from early prevention of radicalization to management of radicalizing or radicalized individuals and their reintegration in society. The Dutch broader policy framework for P/CVE connects all government partners at national and local level in a collective approach to deal with extremism and terrorism. Primary, secondary and tertiary prevention methods are included. In Belgium, P/CVE policies address all three kinds of prevention: primary, secondary and tertiary. The peculiar institutional architecture of Belgium and the division of competencies among the State, regions, communities and municipalities, do play a role also in shaping policies. In Greece, NGO's have tried to fill the gap and a number of projects have contributed in addressing the issue of P/CVE in Greece. In Romania and Portugal, are sparse and and lack an underlying coherent approach.

A central dimension of this study was the role played by municipalities. Under the British Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, Channel places a duty on local authorities to identify and provide support for people seen as at risk. This can include providing housing, career support and financial assistance, for example. Public sectors workers are at the frontline of P/CVE policy to identify vulnerable individuals before they are radicalized. Policies and practices that are targeted towards extremism are coordinated through the Department for Communities and Local Government. This represents a local approach to extremism. The 2019 Prevent Duty Toolkit for
Local Authorities and Partner Agencies requires councils to set up Prevent boards to overview the strategy and to build partnerships within the community. In France, despite the top-down and centralized approach, the French government required the involvement of regional and local bodies. For this reason, from 2014, the whole system operates both at national and local level, under the responsibility of a national office, the Inter-ministerial Committee for Crime Prevention and Radicalization (SG-CIPDR). Plus, the National Plan for the Prevention of Radicalization aims at preventing radicalization upstream and downstream by closely collaborating with different territorial actors, such as state territorial entities, local authorities and civil society.

The Dutch approach to P/CVE is characterized by a multi-disciplinary approach, both at national level, with the involvement of ministries, and at local level. Although underpinned by the national framework, municipalities are responsible for putting in place the adequate approaches to tackle radicalization, extremism and terrorism. Municipalities and their Local Integrated Approach can be seen as the cornerstone of Dutch P/CVE policy, anchored on the national framework. They often have their own approach in dealing with radicalization and violent extremism. Several guiding documents have been developed to support municipalities.

The 2015 British Counter Extremism Strategy 2015 identified social cohesion as a key priority in countering extremism. The strategy identified social cohesion as a key priority in countering extremism. The strategy highlights the negative impacts of integration, correlating this with unemployment for women and youth, and also offers positive goals such as English language training and more opportunities for youth. In the strategy, it was argued that understanding and addressing the reasons why people do not identify with British values was key to preventing extremism. It highlights a number of measures to build a more inclusive society and to prevent division being exploited by extremist groups. It directed a ‘Cohesive Communities Programme’, the Integrated Communities Action Plan and the Being British, Being Muslim scheme to improve inclusion and the integration of migrants.

French authorities have put in place new measures to tackle the socioeconomic, cultural and psychological drivers of radicalization have been adopted and a wide variety of institutional and non-institutional partners at national, regional and local level have been involved. Moreover, France is largely investing in the training and capacity-building of all social actors that deal, directly or indirectly, with radicalization.

A key part of P/CVE relates to how it links with positive goals, such as social inclusion and social cohesion. The Dutch approach to P/CVE includes objectives of social inclusion and social cohesion, but the extent depends very much on the policy instrument. However, coordination of
these domains lie with other ministries: the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Keeping in mind recent developments such as the distrust of governmental institutions amongst various groups in society, or polarization over issues such as climate change, migration and refugees, or the highlighting of institutional discrimination and racism - all compounded by the Covid-19 pandemic – this only becomes more important. At the local level, for example in the Municipality of Delft, approaches on radicalization and extremism are often integrated with approaches on social polarization. In practice, when working on prevention, conversations on polarization, radicalization and extremism cannot be treated in isolation from one another.

In the UK, schools have an obligation under the Education Act 2002 to promote cultural and British values. Efforts made in early prevention focus on the social issues drawing people towards extremism In line with the government's guidance on online threats and digital safety are also considered within these school policies. Other policies in schools, often named Preventing Extremism and Radicalization policies, follow this similar structure. In the Netherlands, the CT Strategy refers to the educational sector as part of the multi-disciplinary approach in the prevention of extremism and terrorism. In this approach, teachers – together with other first line professionals – are seen as having a role in picking up early signs of radicalization, as well as, depending on the case, dealing with a (potentially) radicalizing person in an appropriate manner. The School & Safety Foundation has developed an educational approach in collaboration with various Ministries. This approach consists of tailor-made training and support to primary and secondary schools as well as to vocational training institutes. While some municipalities make use of this approach, others have their own programmes for schools. Schools also play a broader role in terms of resilience and facilitating dialogue on sensitive issues in the classroom. Various programmes have been developed for this purpose including, for example, using theatre as a means. French authorities have also developed educational policies that involve all the actors that participate in the education of children and youngsters, as well as minors.

In Italy, the Regional School Office for Lombardy, has focused on the training of students with the objective of fighting violent extremism, especially of a religious nature. The objective of those projects is addressing radicalization in young people through education on cultural diversity, intercultural education, equal opportunities and to counter against all forms of bullying and cyberbullying. In Greece, there are no educational strategies by law, but there are national policies for preventing youth.
What can be gathered from the comparative analysis is that there are some similarities between countries and some, quite drastic differences. Some of the recommendations established from the various case studies focus on the need for a multi-action plan to cooperate with the cross-sectoral department, whilst others stress the need for a single clear policy on P/CVE.

Relatedly to the securitised approach to P/CVE, an interesting observation is how policies are evaluated. In countries such as Romania, policy is evaluated annually, but there is no specific information on how policies are evaluated and whether the public are involved. On the other hand, policy in the UK often involves consultations with academics, stakeholders and other organizations. In some local municipal policies, the public are also involved, where marginalized and minority communities are encouraged to participate. In Belgium, evaluation is often carried out in response to terrorist attacks, and although there is information exchange between actors, this is restricted to each city. Here, local policies are developed and tailored to the difficult priorities of stakeholders locally and not regionally and nationally. Whilst this localized nature does help to facilitate coordination on a municipal, it also makes it difficult to evaluate the overall impact of the policy as it is very focused on community-led intervention. The comparative study has shown this commonality frequently between the different countries, and seemingly there is either the lack of a national policy on P/CVE or one that cannot be applied equally throughout the country. In countries such as the Netherlands, evaluation is divided between different actors such as civil society and research institutes. This at least assists in evaluating localized policies in these sectors, but there is no sign of sharing between these sectors and departments. Similarly, although the UK has developed quite comprehensive national and local P/CVE policies, there is no platform where members of the community can share insights from education, law enforcement and academic, with the exception of the Channel scheme, though this does not necessarily share best practices and evaluation.

Despite these differences, there are also similarities between the countries analysed. As mentioned, the first similarity amongst the countries is that Islamist extremism has remained a priority for a number of countries. The second is the focus on the social environment. All countries have displayed at least some understanding of the need to focus on the drivers of radicalization at a societal level. This includes educational initiatives and the training of civil society to act on a local level. In Belgium, the UK, and The Netherlands, for example, programmes focused on tackling youth unemployment and social polarization. Even in Italy where there is a large prioritization of law enforcement approach, there is a focus on civil society and education in preventing terrorism. Central questions in the training material for schools/teachers include how to recognize processes
of radicalization, including right-wing, when to intervene, but also what the role of the school is and when to involve other actors.

A key part of P/CVE is the information exchange and communication between stakeholders and the public. Several policies have focused on this dimension and have created initiatives to engage the public in decision making. However, as seen with the case of Belgium, even where plans are established to enable this communication, such as within Plan R, participation does not include members of the public - with the notable exception of Muslim communities. Here, we can see that the dominant narrative of Islamist extremism impacts several aspects of the deliver for P/CVE policy. This has an important consequence for other types of extremism, such as the far-right, of whom develop anti-Muslim narratives. A number of localized initiatives have attempted to consolidate this approach to communication and information exchange. Belgium's localized approaches in its three linguistic communities are a good example here of information sharing, whilst Romania's Peace Institute provides training for different sectors, including law enforcement, on detecting signs of extremism. Providing training to local authorities and civil society allows for a greater awareness not only of extremism and its drivers, but also the different roles that each sector has in preventing and countering the phenomenon.

Fieldwork in the respective countries provided an opportunity to understand how experts, practitioners, law enforcement, academics and human rights workers understood and perceived P/CVE on a municipal and institutional level. In Romania, interviewees expressed concern that, although localized initiatives that promote cohesion existed, these are hampered by the lack of a national policy to promote and connect localized strategies. One of the major concerns highlighted in most of the case studies is the lack of monitoring and evaluation. In Romania, interviewees illustrate that evaluation at a municipal and national level has not been a priority of projects and is seen as a formal requirement rather than an opportunity to share and learn. Insight from the fieldwork also illustrate a range of localized tools and training to counter extremism. In Romania, educational awareness programmes are prevalent in society, whilst there are also programmes aimed at thematic areas such as migration and GBV. Local NGOs are typically at the forefront of delivering training in these countries, especially in those that lack a national policy on P/CVE.

Some of the challenges identified throughout the case studies focus on thematic issues such as migration, radicalization in prisons, and lack of participation from civil society. Insight from fieldwork in Greece, specifically focused on the lack of P/CVE and awareness of extremism. In this sense, a major challenge for eventual policy was the need to design a coherent approach to P/CVE and to avoid fatigue caused by introducing too many initiatives on different levels. This can be seen
with the case of Belgium, where despite the fact that all three linguistic communities have individual P/CVE plans tailored to the concerns and priorities in each community, there is a lack of a coherent country-wide policy allowing for information sharing and best practices. Relatedly, in Greece, despite signs of radicalization in school behaviour, there are no measures in place to combat this. The attitude of waiting until an attack occurs can have a negative impact on addressing radicalization at its roots. The challenge of implementing educational initiatives to address radicalization also applies to the other Eastern European country within this comparative analysis. In Romania, the Orthodox Church carries significant weight, and has actively supported the elimination of sexual education in schools. Addressing this issue can be quite difficult, especially when considering the support the church receives from the population.
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Annexes

Annex 1 - Sample of the questionnaire (Greece)

MUNICIPAL/EDUCATIONAL POLICIES TO PREVENT AND COUNTER VIOLENT EXTREMISM

1. Is there/are you aware of a policy to prevent and counter violent extremism at the municipal level/in schools?

   If yes
   a. Do you consider it to be an integrated policy?
   b. Do you have/know of any programmes to prevent and counter violent extremism?
   c. What stakeholders are involved? How?
   d. How does cooperation amongst various stakeholders work?
   e. What field/topics/issues are covered by those programmes/projects aim?
   f. Who implements those policies/programmes?
   g. What tools are used?
   h. Is monitoring and evaluation integrated into those policies/programmes?
   i. Would you consider that violent extremism and radicalization is a problem that should be addressed? how, in what ways?
   j. In your opinion, is it an important issue? What could be done/improved at the level of prevention of violent extremism policies in education/municipalities?

   If no,
   a. In your experience, would you consider that violent extremism and radicalization is a problem that should be addressed? how, in what ways?
   b. Would you have any examples to share?
   c. In your opinion, is it an important issue? What could be done/improved at the level of prevention of violent extremism policies/programmes in education/municipalities?
Annex 2